Spain in World War II. Spain during World War II Spaniards during World War II
Krelenko Denis Mikhailovich,
candidate of historical sciences,
Associate Professor of the Department of Modern and Contemporary History of SSU
International relations during the Second World War, the processes of formation of opposing military blocs and the alignment of relationships within them are, of course, one of the most interesting topics in historical science. Despite the presence of a significant and diverse range of scientific literature devoted to this topic, there are a number of issues that have remained outside the close attention of historians. Some of them deserve a more detailed analysis due to the impact they had on the overall course and outcome of the world conflict. One of these topics is undoubtedly the study of the role of Spain in the events of 1939-1945.
A number of interesting research papers are devoted to or touch upon this topic. Domestic researchers who have touched upon this problem agree that Franco’s Spain was a faithful satellite of fascist Germany and the Axis countries. This point of view, at first glance, seems completely justified and justified, if we take into account that the “spiritual” closeness between the political regimes that existed in these countries and the close economic cooperation between Spain and the “Axis” were traditionally recognized. As a significant confirmation of this, they usually cite the participation in combat operations on the Eastern Front of the Spanish volunteer “Blue Division” and the “Salvador” air squadron. However, upon closer examination with the involvement of more facts, the final conclusion about Franco’s consistently pro-Hitler position seems controversial. The objective of this work is to try to clarify the scope of Spain's contribution to the course and outcome of the Second World War.
I think we should start with the fact that throughout the war, Spain officially maintained the status of a neutral state. It would seem that, having received significant support from Hitler and Mussolini during the struggle for power in the country, Franco should have energetically demonstrated his commitment to his patrons. Meanwhile, on September 4, 1939, F. Franco, being the head of the Spanish state, signed a decree on neutrality. Spain's position took two forms - direct neutrality and the status of a non-belligerent country proclaimed on June 12, 1940. Following this diplomatic maneuver, Spanish troops occupied the fortress of Tangier, which had previously been under international control, on July 14. Franco took advantage of the fact that further international control in the summer of 1940 was difficult due to the fact that the representatives of the nations exercising power in Tangier belonged to states at war. Under these conditions, the transfer of this important strategic point into the hands of neutral Spaniards seemed to be the best option for the parties concerned.
Franco’s second action, which did not correspond to ideas about the behavior of a neutral country, was sending the “Blue Division” to the Soviet-German front, which took part in hostilities in 1941-43. However, in this case, Spain legally remained outside the conflict, since the division was a volunteer. Organizationally, it was part of the 16th Wehrmacht Army as the 250th Infantry Division, so it was an instrument not of Spanish, but of German foreign policy. This is how the Spanish author evaluates it. Franco in this case used the same technique as Stalin during the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939 - military intervention without a declaration of such.
The sending of Spanish soldiers to Russia, it seems, was carried out by Franco for three reasons. First of all, based on the consistently anti-communist sentiments of the caudillo and his entourage. Secondly, this event ensured the outflow of the most restless Falangists from Spain. Among their ranks were those who formed the “right” opposition to the moderate course of the Generalissimo, those who believed that Franco’s policy in internal affairs was not tough enough, and in the international arena his intentions did not sufficiently meet the interests of the Axis states.
Thus, if the caudillo prepared executions and prisons for former opponents in the civil war to the “left,” then for convinced fascists, activists of the “Phalanx,” they were given an honorable death on the snow-covered fields of Russia. Franco did not like extremists of any stripe, both among his “blues” and “reds” and believed that Spain would only benefit if it got rid of them.
And, finally, the third reason why the Blue Division “roared with fanfare” to perform anti-Bolshevik exploits was the desire to confirm its allied loyalty to Hitler without thoroughly getting involved in military cooperation with the Reich. The Blue Division did not play any serious role in the hostilities, although it was actively used and completely replaced up to three sets of personnel. The significance of the Spanish division against the background of that titanic struggle seems insignificant. Neither one nor ten Spanish divisions could change the course of events on the Eastern Front.
At the end of 1943, Franco, partly under pressure from the allies of the USSR, partly realizing the complete futility of the war against Russia, considered it best to recall the remnants of the division home, without remembering his promise to Hitler that, if necessary, not a single one would stand in the way of the Communists in Europe division, but a million Spaniards. It is interesting that upon arrival in Spain, some of the volunteers ended up behind bars, as happened, for example, with the pilots of the “Salvador” squadron.
It is known that the state can influence certain events both through direct actions and through its own inaction. In this regard, it should be noted that by its passivity in the West, Francoist Spain brought the Anti-Hitler coalition much more benefit than the Blue Division did to it on the Eastern Front.
Franco could have provided truly serious assistance to the Axis countries by returning the fortress of Gibraltar, once captured by the British, to Spain. However, the Spaniards did not provide such a service to the Reich. The British Air Force and Navy bases functioned well throughout the war, providing the British with a certain stability in the Mediterranean theater of operations and the ability to control a huge area of the Atlantic.
To appreciate how important Gibraltar was during the war, one should recall several episodes, such as the “hunt for the Bismarck” at the end of May 1941. Then it was the aircraft from the aircraft carrier Ark Royal based in Gibraltar that managed to seriously damage the Nazi battleship, after which it lost The course of the Bismarck was overtaken and destroyed by ships of the English fleet. Another case involved the transfer of fighters from aircraft carriers leaving the Gibraltar base to Malta, which was subjected to massive air strikes by German aircraft. Finally, the presence of an airfield on the Rock of Gibraltar capable of receiving maritime patrol aircraft allowed the British Air Force and Navy to carry out relatively safe convoys with strategic cargo along the west coast of Africa.
In a word, the role of this stronghold in the struggle in the Mediterranean and ocean communications in the Atlantic can hardly be overestimated. It is safe to say that the hypothetical possibility of Britain losing control of Gibraltar, especially during the difficult period of 1940-41, threatened with incalculable consequences: loss of resistance in North Africa, loss of communication with the colonies due to the lengthening of shipping routes with a significant shortage of trade tonnage. It is possible that such a development of events could have forced the United Kingdom to seek a way out of the war. In other words, theoretically, Franco had the opportunity to remove one of the three main members of the Anti-Hitler coalition from the war. He did not take advantage of this opportunity himself and did not allow Hitler to realize it.
Events developed as follows: Franco’s initially declared neutrality caused bewilderment in Berlin. However, given the difficult situation in which the country found itself after the civil war, it was felt in Germany that Franco apparently expected to enter the war later, having recovered from a protracted internal conflict. Even the openly cool attitude expressed by the Spanish leadership towards the attack on Poland did not shake Germany’s confidence in its Iberian ally.
To be fair, it should be noted that such confidence had some basis. Caudillo demonstrated far-reaching expansionist plans in the summer of 1940. Obviously, this was due to the impression of the lightning defeat of France. During this period, Franco actively probed Berlin's opinion regarding the possibility of Spain entering the war on the side of Germany and Italy. However, much here raises doubts - whether Franco really intended to fight under the influence of the climate of military hysteria or was just fooling his German “friend”.
The fact is that the price the Spaniards asked for their possible entry into the war was simply exorbitant. Franco demanded that Hitler guarantee his claims to part of Algeria, French Morocco, the expansion of the Spanish Sahara to the 20th parallel, as well as to French Cameroon. In addition, for the operation against Gibraltar, planned first, the following materials were requested from Germany: 200 tanks, 40 Tu-88 dive bombers, 200 heavy artillery systems, in addition, 800,000 tons of grain, 100,000 tons of cotton, 25,000 tons rubber, 625,000 tons of chemical fertilizers and much more in equally impressive volumes.
It is interesting that even if Hitler fulfilled all the caudillo’s orders, the exact timing of Spain’s entry into the war was not determined. Fulfilling the listed conditions was, if not impossible, then quite difficult. Their implementation implied serious complications in Germany's relations with Vichy France and required significant withdrawals of raw materials from the economy and military materials from the meager reserves of the Wehrmacht.
It can be assumed that Franco, who was reputed to be a sober statesman, deliberately set such difficult conditions for Hitler. Any reaction gave a win-win result. If Germany supplies everything required, Spain will receive Gibraltar and huge colonies in Africa at minimal cost. If not, then the Spanish leadership, citing the objective difficulties of the destroyed country, will refuse to wage war and will not risk losing anything. Moreover, the outright hypertrophy of requests makes one think that it was the second option that Franco thought was preferable.
And so it happened. The price set in Berlin was considered exorbitant and it was decided to refuse Franco's services, relying on an air offensive against England. It seems that by making such a decision, Hitler made one of the most serious mistakes. Epiphany came to the Fuhrer very quickly, as soon as it became clear that it would not be possible to “bomb England” out of the war. In this regard, the Mediterranean theater of military operations, and with it Gibraltar, acquired particular importance.
Already in August 1940, attempts to put pressure on Spain intensified in order to force Franco to enter the war or to get Hitler’s troops to Gibraltar. However, the determination shown by England, which continued stubborn resistance, impressed Franco. The desire to take part in the war, if he had any, noticeably diminished. Fearing outright refusal of Hitler, Franco turned to a policy of delays and promises regarding his intentions to enter the fight.
The mission of Admiral Canaris, undertaken to familiarize himself with the intentions and capabilities of Spain, on the one hand, and the visit to Germany of the head of the Spanish Foreign Ministry did not produce any results. The Spanish side stubbornly refused to bind itself to any promises.
Based on Canaris's mission, the German General Staff decided to prepare its own operation against Gibraltar with as little Spanish participation as possible. This is how the first German plan for the capture of Gibraltar appeared, called “Felix”. Apparently, Franco was more open in his relations with London. In any case, the British were informed that “Spain would remain aloof from the European conflict unless attacked.”
Meanwhile, Hitler's attempts to get Franco to enter the war did not stop. The Fuhrer decided that he would be able to convince the caudillo in a personal meeting, which was scheduled for October 23, 1940. Franco's train arrived at the platform of the Endai station on the Franco-Spanish border an hour late. According to the version accepted in domestic and foreign historiography, the caudillo was late on purpose. This point of view was questioned only once by R. Serrano Suñer, known for his pro-German positions, who forty years after the incident argued that the delay was accidental.
One way or another, the first and only meeting of the two dictators took place in violation of Hitler’s calculations. During 9 hours of negotiations, the Fuhrer outlined to the caudillo the essence of the “Felix” plan, which involved the passage of 20 Wehrmacht divisions through Spanish territory, intended to storm the Gibraltar fortress. The Spanish army was assigned a supporting role. The operation was planned to be carried out on January 10, 1941, and it was on this day that Spain was supposed to declare war on the United Kingdom. Hitler's speech also contained a demand to transfer strongholds in the Canary Islands for the needs of the German fleet.
In response, the caudillo stated that the outlined project was not suitable, since it offended the national feelings of the Spaniards, that the capture of Gibraltar was the work of the Spanish army, which the German side should provide and equip accordingly. He considered it necessary to supplement his opinion with the remark that overcoming the Pyrenees passes in winter is a very difficult matter, and the entry of foreign troops onto Spanish soil could cause a national movement similar to the anti-Napoleonic Guerilla. Of the entire range of issues discussed, Franco, in fact, agreed to agree on only one - the schedule of military supplies from Germany. All other questions, despite Hitler’s efforts, remained unanswered. With this, Franco left, leaving Hitler to think over his first diplomatic defeat in the existence of the Third Reich.
Disappointment with his ally prompted Hitler to order the creation of a new plan to capture Gibraltar. This time the plan for the military operation, codenamed “Isabella,” was provided with a political addition. The Abwehr explored the possibility of eliminating Franco and replacing him with the pro-German General Muñoz Grandes. Given these nuances, calling Hitler and Franco allies is quite problematic.
Due to Franco's intractability, the headquarters developments of “Isabella - Felix” remained on paper. The same fate befell a later version of the operation on the Iberian Peninsula, known as Plan Ilona (“Gisela”).
Obviously, since 1942-43. Franco stopped viewing Spain as an Axis supporter. Moreover, already on November 13, 1942, W. Churchill, informing I. Stalin about the progress of Operation Torch, wrote the following: “The political reaction of Spain and Portugal was highly satisfactory, the danger is that the port of Gibraltar and the airfield will be rendered unusable until stopped causing trouble.”
The episode with Franco’s complete non-resistance to the Allied landings in North Africa clearly demonstrated the “special” position of Spain. Already during this period, allied relations with Germany became an obvious fiction, despite close economic cooperation and loud pro-German slogans in newspapers and at Phalanx meetings.
In September 1942, the Germanophile R. Serrano Suñera was replaced as head of the Spanish Foreign Ministry by F. Gomez Jordana, known for his sympathies towards England, which meant the actual abandonment of the pro-German priority in foreign policy. On October 10, 1942, ignoring Berlin's indignation, Franco announced Spain's transition from the status of a non-belligerent country to neutrality.
The only thing that still connected Spain with the Reich was fairly close economic cooperation. But this can hardly be regarded as a manifestation of allied relations. Moreover, Spanish strategic raw materials were supplied to both Germany and England. The United States played a significant share in Spanish trade turnover. In addition, supplies of raw materials to Germany were partly to pay off Spain's war debts, and partly in exchange for weapons and military equipment. Thus, part of the military products produced by German industry was, as it were, transferred to a neutral field. Moreover, these were, as a rule, the most scarce combat weapons: anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, fighters, dive bombers.
Interestingly, when in 1944 the US State Department launched a campaign to pressure Spain to prohibit it from exporting tungsten to Germany in exchange for military equipment, Churchill asked Roosevelt not to engage in nonsense. The cunning Englishman understood that German industry still had to process Spanish raw materials, and under the bombing of Anglo-American aviation, in conditions of energy shortages and other wartime difficulties, and ready-made military equipment was leaving for Spain, which could be used against allied air raids and landings in Normandy or in battles on the Eastern Front. Thus, the sovereign right of the Spanish state to freely exchange goods with any country, upon thoughtful consideration, also showed benefits for the Anti-Hitler coalition.
As for the spiritual closeness with the fascist regimes and Franco’s initially declared hostility to democracy and hatred of Bolshevism, one should take into account the conditions under which Francoism arose and established itself. After all, the Franco dictatorship was born as an anti-crisis system in the fight against the deadlock into which the liberal-democratic Second Republic had led the country. In this struggle, the most fierce opponents of the traditionalists on whom Franco relied were the ultra left and the communists, and the fascist Phalanx provided him with the most decisive support. Therefore, Franco could not feel love for democracy and communists, just as he could not help but feel drawn to regimes that were totalitarian in nature.
However, the caudillo was guided not by likes and dislikes, but exclusively by the national interests of Spain, the main of which was peace. Given the difficult situation of his country, he pursued a policy aimed at avoiding participation in a global military conflict. Willingly or unwittingly, he thereby rendered a service to the Anti-Hitler bloc. It is enough to compare the significance of a normally functioning Gibraltar with the participation of division No. 250 in hostilities.
The presence or absence of the possibility of the British exploiting the Gibraltar fortress at a certain moment meant how effective Great Britain's participation would be in the fight against Hitlerism. Britain's contribution to the Second World War is incommensurate with the Soviet one, but it is much more significant than one Spanish division.
Having abandoned unnecessary ambitions, Franco made no attempt to return Gibraltar to Spain; moreover, he did not allow such an attempt on the part of Germany. How realistic it was for Spain to achieve this on its own is evidenced by examples of the fall during that period of such British fortified bases as Singapore and Tobruk under the blows of an enemy no stronger than Spain.
It seems that W. Churchill most successfully expressed his attitude towards the Spanish position in World War II: “You should make a distinction between the person who knocked you down and the one who did not touch you.” In general, Franco's policy during the Second World War was balanced and cautious. His only serious mistake was the adventure with the Blue Division. Due to a certain narrowness of thinking, he did not take into account that the struggle on the Eastern Front would be different from the war with Red Spain, because he would have to fight a people defending their own independence and that the force leading this struggle in the person of the Communist Party would act as a defender of the national idea. However, the caudillo quickly reoriented himself; he had enough common sense not to firmly link Spain’s position with the fate of the countries of the aggressive bloc. Therefore, when the victorious powers decisively and harshly reshaped the post-war world, the Franco regime remained alive.
Among his achievements are the fact that he managed to avoid participation in a global armed conflict, lay the foundations of a new state and prepare the ground for Spain's post-war entry into the world community.
The leaders of fascist Spain were aware that the involvement of a bloodless and not yet completely “pacified” Spain in the war would inevitably result in a disaster for the regime. Despite all the efforts of Hitler's diplomacy, Franco was in no hurry to enter the war and September 4, 1940. signed a decree on neutrality Spain at war. In June, the status of neutrality was replaced by the status of a non-belligerent party.
A series of decrees created a system of government control that allowed the state, without being the owner of the means of production, to influence through administrative measures both the sphere of production and the sphere of distribution and consumption. Regulation and control of the economy were carried out while maintaining private property, initiative and profit. The ideological design of the policy of state control was the “concept” of economic nationalism, shared by both phalanx ideologists and traditionalists. The extreme manifestation of economic nationalism was calls for policies autarchy, with which the monopoly circles of Spain pinned their hopes on the complete elimination of competition from foreign capital. The war, which deformed all the usual economic ties, strengthened Spanish government circles in their intention to speed up the creation of a system of self-sustaining economy. This goal was pursued by a series of so-called industrial development laws. 1939-1941. Autarchy was a forced step caused by the Second World War and the economic blockade, which at times was very harshly applied by the Western powers towards Spain. But at the same time, this created favorable conditions for strengthening the position of Spanish monopoly capital. October 24, 1939 was A law was issued on the patronage and protection of national industry. Enterprises of “national interest” were primarily those that were related to the military industry, including the mining industry that supplied raw materials for it.
Among the measures that determined the boundaries of state intervention in the economy in the interests of monopoly capital, a special place was occupied by the law from September 25, 1941 about education National Institute of Industry, designed to “direct and finance the creation and re-creation of a national industry.” He was initially subordinated directly to Franco, and then headed by him until 1963 Suanchez, engineer, friend of Franco's teenage years, an ardent admirer of the economic policies of Nazism. Thus, when creating the state-monopoly sector of the economy, Franco used the ideas of the phalanx, passing them through a sieve of pragmatism and the real interests of the ruling elite.
The news of the German attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941 was greeted with enthusiasm in Spanish government circles: after all, now it was possible to somehow get even with the country that had provided great material assistance to the Popular Front and sent Soviet volunteers to fight against Franco. Now, Franco, who had won the civil war, could send Spanish volunteers to fight against the USSR. IN July 1941 was formed and sent to the Eastern Front in the Novgorod region by the Spanish " Blue Division"(The division got its name from the blue shirts - the uniform of the Phalanx), then transferred to the Leningrad Front. General Emilio Esteban Infantes, commanded the Blue Division. In the fall of 1941, a Spanish air squadron arrived in the Moscow region (Klin area). Due to various factors - changing prospects for ending the war, humiliating treatment by the German army, unpreparedness for harsh weather conditions - desertion and defection to the side of the Soviet army flourished in the division. “Blue Division” 12, severely thinned out in battles on the Soviet front October 1943 was recalled to her homeland.
A few days earlier, the press had received orders to “change their tone” and the Falangist leaders had been given instructions accordingly. At that time, even in Arrese's speeches, the usual vilification of communism faded into the background, giving way to the propaganda of the thesis that the phalanx was a completely original organization, capable of restructuring its activities in accordance with new conditions. Fearing sanctions from the powers of the anti-Hitler coalition and realizing that it was the phalanx that would primarily serve as the reason for these sanctions, Franco decided that the time had come to verbally dissociate ourselves from fascist doctrines. March 24, 1945 receiving the new American ambassador M. Armur, Franco declared that the phalanx was not a political party at all, but just an association of people interested in maintaining order, the prosperity and development of Spain.
During World War II, Spain adhered to neutrality. In fact, this meant that the state did not participate in hostilities, but supported the Axis countries with ammunition and sent volunteer troops to support the armies of Hitler or Mussolini. In addition to Spain, in 1939-45 the following had this status:
- Portugal;
- Switzerland;
- Sweden;
- Argentina;
- Türkiye.
The rise of the fascists to power in Spain
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Spain was experiencing a protracted crisis. In order to get out of it, the government had to overcome feudal remnants, introduce democratic orders and carry out reforms aimed at improving the situation of workers and peasants. Since the Spanish king and his ministers did not make concessions to the population, radical left and right groups appeared in the state. Over two decades, radicals carried out several coups d'etat, during which the monarchy fell. In 1936, a bloc of communist and socialist parties won the parliamentary elections, which caused indignation among nationalist military circles. The military decided on another coup, in which the Phalanx, a fascist organization created in 1933, played a key role. The rebellion escalated into a three-year civil war, at the end of which the fascists, led by General Francisco Franco, came to power in Spain.
All this time, Hitler provided active support to the Spanish fascists, supplying weapons and military specialists to Spain.
Spanish participation in hostilities
With the country exhausted by civil strife, Franco was in no hurry to enter World War II, despite Hitler's calls. Under various pretexts, Spain avoided starting hostilities. For example, it demanded huge territories in the Mediterranean region, which Hitler obviously could not agree to. But at the same time, Nazi slogans were published in Spanish newspapers, and society as a whole approved of the actions of the leaders of the Axis countries. Since the summer of 1940, Spain opened its ports to German warships and began supplying the necessary raw materials to the Third Reich.
At the same time, there was a fairly strong political group in the country that advocated Spain’s participation in the war. This position was shared by Franco himself, but the national army was resolutely against the outbreak of hostilities. Therefore, the Spanish government had to maneuver between its soldiers and its allies.
In 1941, Franco proposed to Hitler to transfer the Spanish volunteer “Blue Division”, consisting of 50 thousand people, to the borders of the Soviet Union. Some of them were ordinary soldiers, and some were members of the Phalangist militia and participants in the Civil War. The Blue Division took part in battles in the Leningrad and Novgorod region. The Spanish soldiers were not particularly combative. Members of both the German and Soviet command noted that the Spaniards were undisciplined and highly irresponsible. In addition, the soldiers of the Blue Division had a very difficult time withstanding the climate of the northern USSR; many soldiers suffered from frostbite and illness. If in 1941 there were many volunteers ready to fight with the Soviet Union, then at the end of 1942 there were almost no people willing to go to the front.
In order to get Spain out of the war, England and the USA put some pressure on Franco. They created obstacles to the import of fuel and food into Spain and blocked Spanish ports. They began to take more active action in 1943. By this time, Franco and his supporters had already become disillusioned with Hitler and began to think about withdrawing Spanish volunteers from the war. But, despite military failures, the Fuhrer remained a formidable opponent. Franco quite rightly feared that in the event of betrayal, German troops would immediately occupy Spain.
At the end of July 1943, the American ambassador arrived to Franco, presenting the Spanish dictator with a fact: the Blue Division must immediately stop fighting the USSR. Soon the English side made a similar demand to Franco. The Spanish soldiers were returned to their homeland, and Franco tried to continue to maneuver between Hitler and the Western allies. Until 1944, Germany continued to receive tungsten from Spain. Supplies stopped only after the corresponding request from the USA and England. At the same time, the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition received the right to use Spanish ports and air bases, and enthusiastic articles about the successes of American and British soldiers began to appear in the Spanish press. Being a staunch opponent of communism, Franco hoped to the last that after the end of the war with Germany, England and the United States would lead troops against the USSR, so in correspondence with Churchill he tried to raise the topic of the fight against Stalin. However, the answer was harsh: Churchill said that cooperation with an anti-democratic regime was not in the interests of Great Britain. Franco spent a lot of time and effort trying to convince the Western press that Spain was a free, rule-of-law state where the rights of citizens and individuals were respected. Franco himself was not convicted as a Nazi criminal and remained as leader of Spain until his death in 1975. But all this time, Spain remained branded as a totalitarian state, for this reason it was not accepted into the UN, created in 1945.
Officially, Spain did not take part in the Second World War - it maintained neutrality. However, in reality, she never remained indifferent to the greatest conflict of the 20th century.
Why did General Franco, who came to power in Spain in 1939, not openly side with Hitler, who helped him defeat the “Reds” during the civil war of 1936-1939? There is an opinion among researchers that by the beginning of World War II, Spain lay in ruins, was starving, and did not have the physical ability to help anyone.
This is partly true. However, such an explanation is not enough. Moreover, Hitler did not require any economic assistance from Spain. For the war, he could only need the Spanish army, its personnel - soldiers and officers. This army was quite large and disciplined. In addition, she was well armed, in addition to her own, with the same German, as well as Italian and Soviet weapons. By the beginning of the Second World War, in the ranks of the country's armed forces, only in the ground forces, there were at least 300 thousand people.
So the reason for Spain’s non-participation in the Second World War, it seems, is not the devastation, but rather the lack of political will of its leadership to completely and completely associate itself with Hitler. The latter nevertheless tried to involve Spain in his military adventures. Just look at his famous meeting with Franco in the French city of Hendaye on October 23, 1940. After this meeting, for which the Spanish ruler was also late, Hitler remarked to his entourage: “We have nothing to talk about with these types.” Well, Franco spoke of Hitler and his team as “insane and ill-mannered” people.
They say that in response to Hitler’s proposal to take part in the “axis,” that is, in the alliance of Germany, Italy and Japan, Franco put forward such conditions that the Germans almost went crazy. He demanded the transfer of English Gibraltar to Spain, as well as part of the national territory of France and its possessions in Africa - Oran, Morocco and Guinea. Some historians believe that such obviously unacceptable and impossible demands on Germany’s part were deliberately made in order to get rid of Hitler once and for all. There is also information that Franco was informed about the futility of an alliance with Hitler - secretly from the Fuhrer - by Admiral Canaris, head of the German military intelligence and counterintelligence service.
However, in 1940, Franco was still afraid of Hitler. Therefore, he allowed German submarines to enter the ports of Spain, and German spies to operate freely in Madrid. Spain supplied Germany with tungsten, so necessary for tank armor, and in 1941 sent the so-called volunteer “blue division” to the eastern front “to fight communism.” The division was on the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts until the fall of 1943, when it was finally recalled to its homeland, having lost up to five thousand killed, eight thousand wounded and several hundred prisoners in Russia.
By this time, Franco was “disillusioned” with Hitler. The factors that convinced him of the unnecessaryness of relations with Germany were the Allied landings in North Africa and their successes in combat operations with German troops and, of course, the defeat of Germany in the Battle of Stalingrad.
Let us note that during the war, Franco did not break off diplomatic relations with either the United States or Great Britain. While maintaining close relations with Germany and Italy, he simultaneously flirted with his allies in the anti-Hitler coalition. And even, especially for them, he invented his own concept of events taking place in the world. They say that he supports Germany only in the conflict with the USSR, but in the confrontation between Hitler and the Western powers, he has complete neutrality. In addition, Spain was even ready to support Western democracies in their conflict with Japan, which Franco always disliked.
Meanwhile, relations with Germany gradually deteriorated, and Franco increasingly feared a German attack with the aim of occupying Spanish territory. As it turned out later, a similar plan, codenamed “Ilona,” actually existed in Germany. So by 1944, almost the entire Spanish army was concentrated on the border with France. Here, to repel a possible German invasion, a defensive line was hastily built.
Well, at the end of the Second World War, Franco even decided to declare war on Japan. The immediate reason for such a step was the killing of about one thousand seven hundred Spaniards in the Philippines by Japanese occupation forces in 1944. Franco even began to prepare a new “Blue Division” to fight the Japanese and broke off diplomatic relations with Tokyo.
Meanwhile, during almost all the years of the Second World War, Spain had to fight the internal armed opposition - Republican partisan detachments operating in hard-to-reach areas, mainly in the north of the country.
In addition, on October 19, 1944, detachments of up to three thousand people entered the territory of Val d'Aran, northern Catalonia, from France, with the aim of restoring republican power in the region and organizing a springboard for further advance into Spanish territory. They consisted of veterans of the Spanish Civil War and members of the anti-fascist Resistance Movement in France. Spanish troops repelled this attack. The Republicans lost up to 600 people killed.
In the post-war period, many works were published in Spain that praised the “wisdom” of Franco, who did not allow the country to be drawn into a global carnage. Now many researchers explain Spain’s non-participation in the war not so much by the “wisdom” of its ruler, but by a coincidence of circumstances and, mainly, by the fact that Hitler was not particularly interested in Spain in those years - due to the presence of more important world problems - and he put up with her double-dealing.
To achieve this, the General Staff planned Operation Felix for 1941, during which German troops were to storm Gibraltar from land, from Spanish territory. Spain rejected Hitler's offer to seize British Gibraltar. Franco was wary of entering the war on the side of the Axis powers, realizing that his armed forces would not be able to protect the Canary Islands and Spanish Morocco from British attack. Later, Franco even stationed field armies in the Pyrenees, fearing a possible German occupation of the Iberian Peninsula.
During World War II, Spain was ruled by a military dictatorship, but despite Franco's ideological affinity and gratitude to Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler, the Caudillo government was divided between Germanophiles and Anglophiles. When the war began, the Anglophile Juan Beigbeder y Atienza was the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The rapid advance of Germany in Europe led Franco to replace him on October 18, 1940 with Ramon Serrano Suñera, the Caudillo's brother-in-law and a staunch Germanophile. After the Third Reich's 1942 defeats on the Eastern Front and North Africa, Franco again changed course, appointing a British sympathizer as minister. Another influential Anglophile was the Duke of Alba, the Spanish ambassador in London.
Although Spain did not officially participate in World War II, Spanish citizens volunteered to fight for both sides, largely reflecting the partisanship of the civil war.
Although Spanish caudillo Francisco Franco did not enter World War II on the Axis side, he allowed volunteers to join the German army on the condition that they fight against Bolshevism (Soviet communism) on the Eastern Front, and not against Western enemies of the Third Reich or the population of any country Western Europe. In this way, he was able to simultaneously maintain relations with the Western Allies, Hitler's enemies, thank Germany for its support during the Spanish Civil War, and provide an outlet for the strong anti-communist sentiments of many Spanish nationalists (Spanish) who wanted to take revenge on the USSR for helping the Republicans (Spanish). Spanish Foreign Minister Ramon Serrano Suñer proposed the creation of a volunteer corps, and at the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, Franco sent an official offer of assistance to Berlin.
Hitler approved the use of Spanish volunteers on June 24, 1941. Volunteers flocked from all regions of Spain. Cadets from the officer training school in Zaragoza showed a very high desire to fight against the USSR. Initially, the Spanish government was ready to send about 4,000 people to help Germany, but it soon became clear that there were more than enough volunteers to form an entire division of four regiments. On July 13, 1941, a division of Spanish volunteers, numbering 18,693 men (641 officers, 2,272 non-commissioned officers, 15,780 lower ranks), under the command of civil war veteran General Agustin Muñoz Grandes, left Madrid and was transferred to Germany for five weeks of military training at training ground in the city of Grafenwoehr. There (July 31, after taking the oath) it was included in the Wehrmacht as the 250th Infantry Division. To ensure that the division's staff complied with the German troop supply system, it was soon reorganized into the standard three-regiment structure for the Wehrmacht. The personnel of the “extra” regiment were distributed among the remaining regiments, called “Madrid”, “Valencian” and “Seville” (according to the place of residence of most of the volunteers in these regiments). Each infantry regiment consisted of three battalions (four companies each) and two fire support companies. The division's artillery regiment consisted of four battalions (three batteries each). From part of the released personnel, an assault battalion was formed, armed mainly with submachine guns. Subsequently, after heavy losses, this battalion was disbanded. The Blue Squadron (Spanish) was formed from volunteer pilots. Escuadrillas Azules), armed with Bf 109 and FW 190 aircraft. Thanks to the blue shirts - the uniform of the Falange, the only one in Spain and the ruling party - the division acquired its name - Blue Division(Spanish) Division Azul, German Blue Division).
After training in Germany, the Blue Division was sent to the front. In the period from June 24, 1941 to October 10, 1943, the division took part in the siege of Leningrad, including both Tikhvin operations, defensive and offensive, Operation Polar Star and Krasnoborsk operation. In total, about 45,000 Spaniards served on the Eastern Front. Soldiers and officers of the Blue Division received the following awards: 3 Knight's Crosses with Oak Leaves, 3 German Crosses in Gold, 138 Iron Crosses First Class, 2359 Iron Crosses Second Class and 2216 Crosses of Military Valor with Swords. During the battles with the Red Army, the Blue Division suffered the following losses: 4957 killed, 8766 wounded, 326 missing, 372 captured (most returned to Spain in 1954), 1600 people received frostbite, 7800 fell ill.
In October 1943, under intense diplomatic pressure, Franco decided to call the Blue Division home, leaving a token force until March 1944. Joseph Stalin's desire to strike back against Franco by achieving an Allied invasion of Spain at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945 did not find support from Harry Truman and Winston Churchill. They convinced Stalin to instead agree to a full trade embargo against Spain.
After defeat in the Spanish Civil War, many republicans and their sympathizers went into exile, mainly to France, where they were interned in refugee camps such as the Gurs camp in southern France. Many joined the French Foreign Legion at the start of World War II, forming a significant part of it. Some sixty thousand Spanish refugees joined the French Resistance, some continuing the fight against Francisco Franco. Several thousand more joined the Free French Forces and fought against the Axis powers. Some sources claimed that 2,000 Spaniards served under General Leclerc, many of them from Durruti's column. The 9th Company of Leclerc's Division, largely composed of Spanish Republicans, was the first military unit to enter Paris after its liberation in August 1944, where it encountered large numbers of Spanish Maquis guerrillas fighting alongside French Resistance fighters. In addition, approximately 1,000 Spanish Republicans served in the 13th Demi-Brigade of the French Foreign Legion.
During the Spanish Civil War, a group of Spanish communist leaders and a large number of children from Republican families were taken to the Soviet Union. When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, many, such as communist General Enrique Lister, joined the Red Army. According to Anthony Beevor, 700 Spanish Republicans served in the Red Army, and another 700 acted as partisans behind German lines. Individual Spaniards, such as double agent Juan Pujol Garcia (British agent alias Garbo, German Alaric), also worked for the Allied cause.
From the very beginning of World War II, Spain fought on the side of the Axis powers. In addition to ideological affinity, Spain owes Germany $212 million for supplies during the civil war. On March 26, 1939, the government of General Franco signed the Anti-Comintern Pact. And in June 1940, after the fall of France, the Spanish ambassador in Berlin presented a memorandum in which Franco stated that he was “ready, under certain conditions, to enter the war on the side of Germany and Italy.” Preparations for war began in Spain; thus, an anti-British and anti-French campaign was launched in the Spanish media, during which demands were made to transfer French Morocco, Cameroon and the return of Gibraltar to Spain. On June 19, 1940, Franco informed Berlin of his readiness to enter the war, but Hitler was irritated by Madrid's claims to the French colony of Cameroon, which belonged to Germany before the First World War, and which Berlin planned to regain.
At first, Hitler was not very interested in Spain's participation in the war, since he was confident of victory. In August 1940, as Berlin became more serious about Madrid's participation in the war, a problem arose: Germany needed air and naval bases in Spanish Morocco and the Canary Islands, which did not suit Franco. After his victory over France, Hitler revived Plan Z (shelved in September 1939), a program of massive rearmament and expansion of the German navy to fight the United States. At the same time, he wanted to place German bases in Morocco and the Canaries for the planned clash with America. An American historian wrote: “The fact that the Germans were willing to abandon Spain's participation in the war rather than abandon their plans to establish naval bases on the coast of Northwest Africa and beyond certainly demonstrates the centrality of this issue to Hitler as he looked ahead, planning a naval war with the United States." In September, when the Royal Air Force had demonstrated its resilience against the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain, Hitler promised to help Franco in exchange for active intervention. This became part of a strategy to prevent an Allied invasion of northwest Africa. Hitler promised that "Germany will do everything possible to help Spain" and would recognize Spanish claims to French territory in Morocco in exchange for a share of Moroccan raw materials. Franco responded warmly, but without any firm commitment. Meanwhile, Falangist media raised the topic of reunification of territories, claiming the regions of Catalonia and the Basque Country, which were part of France.
Hitler and Franco met only once, in Hendaye, France, on October 23, 1940, to fix the details of the alliance. By this time, the benefits of the alliance had become less clear to both sides. Franco, in exchange for participating in the war on the side of Germany and Italy, demanded help in strengthening the Canary Islands, as well as large quantities of grain, fuel, military equipment, military aircraft and other weapons. In response to Franco's almost impossible demands, Hitler threatened possible annexation of Spanish territory by Vichy France. In the end, no agreement was reached. A few days later in Germany, Hitler told Mussolini: “I would rather have three or four of my own teeth pulled out than talk to this man again!” Historians are still arguing about why Franco demanded such a high price from Hitler for Spain’s entry into the war, whether the caudillo outplayed himself by overestimating the importance of Spain for Germany, or, saving the country from participating in a destructive war, deliberately set an exorbitant fee, knowing that Hitler would refuse an alliance on such terms.
Spain was dependent on oil supplies from the United States. Washington, at Britain's request, limited fuel supplies to the Spaniards. Lacking a strong navy, any Spanish intervention would inevitably face oil shortages. Relying on the allies, Germany and Italy, in this matter was useless, since they themselves experienced fuel shortages. From the German point of view, Vichy's active response to British and Free French attacks, such as the destruction of the French fleet at Mers-el-Kébir or the failed Dakar landings, made bringing Spain into the war less important. Moreover, in order to keep the Vichy regime on its side, the territorial changes proposed by the Spaniards in Morocco were unacceptable. As a result, the negotiations ended after nine hours in failure.
In December 1940, Hitler again contacted Franco through the ambassador in Madrid. Germany attempted to force Spain to agree to allow German troops to pass through its territory to attack Gibraltar. Franco refused, citing the danger that the United Kingdom still posed to Spain and its colonies. In his response letter, the caudillo wrote that he wanted to wait until Britain fell. In the second letter, Hitler offered grain and military supplies to Spain. By this time, however, Italian forces had been defeated by the British in Cyrenaica and Italian East Africa, and the Royal Navy had demonstrated freedom of action in Italian waters and neutralized the Vichy French fleet at Mers el-Kebir in French Algeria. As a result, Franco refused Hitler's proposals.
According to his own autobiography, on February 12, 1941, Franco, at the request of Hitler, met privately with the Italian leader Benito Mussolini in the city of Bordighera (Italy). The Fuhrer hoped that the Duce could convince the caudillo to enter the war. However, Mussolini was not interested in supporting Franco after the recent series of defeats his forces had suffered in North Africa and the Balkans.
Despite Franco's reluctance to participate in World War II, Spain planned for the country's defense. Initially, in 1940 and 1941, most of the Spanish army was stationed in the south of the country in case of an Allied attack from Gibraltar. However, over time, as German interest in Gibraltar grew, Franco gradually redeployed some of his divisions to the mountains along the French border in case of a possible German invasion. When it became clear that the Allies were gaining the upper hand in the conflict, Franco stationed almost all of his troops on the French border, receiving personal guarantees from the leaders of the Allied countries that they would not invade Spain.
As the war continued, the Germans planned to counter the Allied advance through Spain. There were three successive plans, each less aggressive than the previous one as German capabilities weakened.
Operation Ilona, later renamed Operation Gisela, was a shortened version of Operation Isabella. Developed in the spring of 1943, it was to be implemented regardless of whether Spain remained neutral or not. It was planned that five German divisions (four of them mechanized or motorized) would, operating from German-occupied France, seize the southern exits from the Pyrenees into Spain, as well as take ports along the northern coast of Spain to stop the proposed Allied landings.
Operation Nuremberg, designed in June 1943, was intended to be a defensive operation in the Pyrenees on both sides of the Spanish-French border in the event of an Allied landing on the Iberian Peninsula, in order to repel an Allied attack on Spain and France.
On June 14, 1940, the same day that Paris was occupied by the Germans, Spanish troops occupied the Tangier International Zone. Despite calls from writer Rafael Sánchez Masas and other Spanish nationalists for the annexation of "Tánger español" (translated from Spanish - “Spanish Tangier”), the Franco regime publicly considered the occupation to be a temporary wartime measure. A diplomatic dispute between Britain and Spain over the occupation of Tangier in November 1940 resulted in Spain promising to respect British rights and not fortify the area. The city's former status was restored on October 11, 1945.
According to Graham Kelly's 2008 book, Winston Churchill authorized millions of dollars in bribes to Spanish generals in an attempt to influence the Franco regime to prevent Spain from entering the war on Germany's side. In May 2013, documents were released showing that MI6 had spent more than $200 million in today's dollars bribing senior Spanish officers, shipowners and other agents to keep Spain out of war.
Despite the lack of resources, Franco's Spain supplied some strategic materials to Germany. A series of secret agreements were concluded between the two countries. The main resource supplied by Madrid was tungsten ore from German-owned mines in Spain. Tungsten was needed by Germany for its advanced precision engineering and therefore its weapons production. Despite Allied attempts to buy up all available supplies, which had fallen in price, and diplomatic efforts to influence Spain, supplies to Germany continued until August 1944.
In addition to wolframite, Spain supplied Germany with other minerals: iron ore, zinc, and could actively work in Spain and Spanish Morocco, often in collaboration with the nationalist government. Gibraltar was a prime target for espionage, sabotage and sabotage, using anti-British Spanish workers. One such attack occurred in June 1943, when several explosions caused a fire at the shipyard. The British, in turn, recruited anti-fascist Spaniards to uncover subsequent attacks. In this way, a total of 43 sabotage attempts were prevented. In January 1944, two Spanish workers convicted of attempted sabotage were executed.
The Abwehr also established observation posts on both sides of the Strait of Gibraltar, collecting information about the movements of ships and the firing of the British fleet. A German agent in Cadiz became the target of a successful Allied deception operation that led Hitler to believe that the Allied landings in 1943 would take place not in Sicily, but in Greece instead of an invasion of Sicily. At the beginning of 1944 the situation changed. The Allies had gained a clear advantage over Germany, and one double agent provided Britain with enough information to protest against the Spanish government. As a result, the Spanish government declared its "strict neutrality." Thus, the Abwehr operation in southern Spain was stopped.
Refugee laws were largely ignored during the early years of the war. Refugees, mostly from Western Europe, fled deportation to concentration camps from occupied France, as well as Jews from Eastern Europe, especially Hungary. Trudy Alexie writes about the "absurdity" and "paradox of refugees fleeing the Nazis' Final Solution to seek refuge in a country where Jews were not allowed to live openly as Jews for more than four centuries."
Throughout World War II, Spanish diplomats extended their protection to Eastern European Jews, especially in Hungary. Jews claiming Spanish ancestry were given Spanish documents without having to prove their origins and either went to Spain or were able to survive the war in Nazi-occupied countries through their new legal status.
About the Nazi plans to exterminate the Jews; returning home, they reported them to the admiral. So, at the end of the war, Sanz Bris was forced to flee Budapest, leaving behind the Jews he had saved. Italian diplomat Giorgio Perlasca, who was himself living under Spanish protection, used forged documents to convince the Hungarian authorities that he was the new Consul General of Spain. In this way he was able to save thousands of Hungarian Jews.
Although Spain actually made more efforts to help Jews avoid deportation to concentration camps than most neutral countries, there was debate within the country about its treatment of refugees. Franco, despite his aversion to Zionism and “Judeo-Masonry,” apparently did not share the rabid anti-Semitism inherent in the Nazis. Some 25,000-35,000 refugees, mostly Jewish, were allowed to travel through Spain to Portugal and beyond.
Some historians argue that these facts demonstrate the humanitarian attitude of the Franco regime, while others point out that the regime only allowed Jewish passage through Spain. After the war, the Franco regime was very hospitable to those who were responsible for the deportation of Jews, in particular the Commissioner for Jewish Affairs (May 1942 - February 1944) of the Vichy French government.
Chief of Security Franco, issued an official order on May 13, 1941 to provincial governors to provide lists of all Jews, both local and foreign, present in their districts. After compiling a list of six thousand names, Romani was appointed Spanish ambassador to Germany, allowing him to hand the list over to Himmler personally. After Germany's defeat in 1945, the Spanish government attempted to destroy evidence of collaboration with the Nazis, but this official document survived.
At the end of the war, Japan was forced to pay significant reparations in money or goods to countries for damage caused by the Japanese military during the war. One of these countries was Spain. which received compensation for the deaths of more than a hundred Spanish citizens, including several Catholic missionaries, and the destruction of Spanish installations in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation. To this end, Japan entered into 54 bilateral agreements in 1954, including with Spain in the amount of $5.5 million, which were paid in 1957.