Soviet soldiers in Japan. Soviet-Japanese War: fighting in the Far East
Soviet-Japanese War. August 9 – September 2, 1945
flickr.com/41311545@N05
(To the 65th anniversary of the victory over militaristic Japan)
If the neutrality pact between the USSR and Japan remains in force in 1941-1945. allowed the Soviet Union to transfer troops and military equipment from the Soviet Far East and Eastern Siberia to the Soviet-German front before the victory over Nazi Germany and its European allies, the defeat of Japan's European allies put the issue of accelerated redeployment on the agenda Soviet armed forces from Europe in the opposite direction, so that the USSR could fulfill its obligation to its allies on time to enter on their side in the war with Japan, which had waged an aggressive war against them since 1941, no later than three months after defeat of Nazi Germany, given by him at the Yalta Conference on February 12, 1945.
On June 28, the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief approved plan for war with Japan, according to which all preparatory measures were to be completed by August 1, 1945, and the combat operations themselves were ordered to begin by special order. At first, these actions were planned to begin on August 20-25 and finish in one and a half to two months, and if successful, in a shorter period of time. The troops were tasked with attacks from the MPR, Amur region and Primorye to dismember the troops of the Kwantung Army, isolate them in Central and Southern Manchuria and completely eliminate disparate enemy groups.
In response to a memo from the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral N.N. Kuznetsov on July 2, Stalin gave him a number of instructions, in accordance with which the Soviet naval commander set before the USSR Pacific Fleet next tasks:
- prevent a Japanese landing in Primorye and the penetration of the Japanese Navy into the Tatar Strait;
- disrupt Japanese Navy communications in the Sea of Japan;
- carry out air strikes on Japanese ports when a concentration of enemy military and transport ships is detected there;
- support ground forces operations to occupy naval bases in North Korea, South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, and also be prepared for landings in Northern Hokkaido.
Although the implementation of this plan was originally scheduled for August 20-25, 1945, it was later moved by the Red Army General Staff to midnight from August 8 to 9.
The Japanese Ambassador in Moscow Sato was warned that from August 9 the Soviet Union would be at war with his state. On August 8, less than one hour before this date, he was summoned by Molotov to the Kremlin at 17.00 Moscow time (23.00 Japanese time), and a declaration of war was immediately read and handed to him by the USSR government. He received permission to send it by telegraph. (True, this information never reached Tokyo, and Tokyo first learned about the USSR’s declaration of war on Japan from a Moscow Radio report at 4.00 on August 9.)
In this regard, it is noteworthy that the directive on the entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan on August 9) was signed by Stalin at 16:30 on August 7, 1945, i.e. after receiving news of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, which marked the beginning of “nuclear diplomacy” against our country.
In our opinion, if Stalin, before the Yalta Conference, had agreed with the opinion of Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Lozovsky that, while continuing negotiations on the renewal of the neutrality pact with Japan, not allowing the allies to “drag the USSR into the Pacific War” against it, expressed in his reports notes to Molotov dated January 10 and 15, 1945, then the United States and its allies, having quickly achieved the defeat of Japan as a result of the use of nuclear weapons, would immediately occupy a dominant position in East Asia and sharply undermine the geostrategic positions of the USSR in this region.
On August 9, 1945, the advanced and reconnaissance detachments of the Transbaikal, 1st and 2nd Far Eastern Fronts under the command of Marshals of the Soviet Union R.Ya., respectively. Malinovsky and K.A. Meretskov and Army General M.A. Purkaev under the overall command of Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky crossed the state border between the USSR and Manchukuo and entered enemy territory. With the onset of dawn, they were joined by the main forces of three fronts, border guards and sailors of the Red Banner Amur River Flotilla. On the same day, Soviet aviation began to operate.
Well-mobilized and trained Soviet troops, who had behind them the experience of war with the Nazi armies, armed with first-class weapons for that time, and many times outnumbered the enemy in the directions of the main attacks, relatively easily crushed the scattered units of the Kwantung Army, which offered stubborn resistance only in isolated areas. points. The almost complete absence of Japanese tanks and aircraft allowed individual Soviet units to penetrate deep into Manchuria almost unhindered.”
Meanwhile, in Tokyo after the outbreak of the Soviet-Japanese War, discussions continued on the issue on the adoption of the Potsdam Declaration.
On August 10, the Japanese government, in accordance with the opinion of the Emperor, unanimously approved the decision to adopt the Potsdam Declaration, subject to the preservation of the Emperor's prerogatives. “Now, after the atomic bombing and the entry of the Russians into the war against Japan,” wrote Japanese Foreign Minister S. Togo, “no one, in principle, objected to the adoption of the Declaration.”
On August 10, the corresponding note was sent to USA. China was also informed about its contents. And on August 13, an official response from Washington was received, which indicated that the final form of government would be established on the basis of the free will of the Japanese people. To discuss the response of the US government and make a final decision, on August 14, a meeting of the government and the high command of the army and navy was convened in the emperor’s bomb shelter, at which, despite military opposition, the emperor proposed a draft of his rescript on the unconditional surrender of the Japanese armed forces on the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, and after its approval By the majority of cabinet members, this document was sent to the United States on August 15.
On August 18, the commander of the Kwantung Army, General Yamada, announced an order at a meeting with the Soviet command in Shenyang (Mukden) on the cessation of hostilities and disarmament of the Kwantung Army. And on August 19, in Changchun, he signed an act of surrender.
Having received a radiogram on August 17 with Yamada’s statement of readiness to immediately cease hostilities and disarm, Vasilevsky sent him a response by radio, in which he ordered the Kwantung Army to cease hostilities not immediately, but at 12.00 on August 20, referring to the fact that “Japanese troops moved to counter-offensive on a number of sectors of the front.”
During this time, Soviet troops managed to significantly expand the territories included in the zone where they were supposed to accept the surrender of the Japanese armed forces, in accordance with Order No. 1 of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Allied Powers in the Pacific, General D. MacArthur, dated August 14. (The next day after this, he issued a directive on the cessation of hostilities against Japan and, as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the Allied Powers, handed it over to the Chief of Staff of the Red Army, General A.I. Antonov, for execution, but received the answer that he could take the proposed actions only if will receive an order to this effect from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the USSR.)
In order to maximize the expansion of the zone, which would be under the control of Soviet troops by the time the Japanese armed forces surrendered, on August 18-19 they landed airborne assault forces in Harbin, Girin and Shenyang (with the capture of the Manchukuo Emperor Pu-yi), Changchun and in a number of other cities of Manchuria, and also made significant progress in other areas, in particular, on August 19 they occupied the city of Chengde and reached the Liaodong Peninsula, and on August 22-23 they occupied Port Arthur and Dalny, contrary to the initial intentions of the Americans to send their troops here, ahead of the Russians, under with the pretext that the Kwantung Peninsula is supposedly not included in Manchuria as a Soviet zone for accepting the surrender of the Japanese armed forces.
IN North Korea, the troops in which, as in South Korea, were subordinate to the command of the Kwantung Army, joint actions of the troops of the 1st Far Eastern Front and the Red Navy of the Pacific Fleet landed troops, in particular in Pyongyang and Kanko (Hamhin), where they accepted the surrender of Japanese troops.
By August 19, Soviet troops had killed 8,674 Japanese troops and captured 41,199 Japanese soldiers and officers.
In accordance with Order No. 106 of the commander of the Kwantung Army, General Yamada, dated August 16, the troops subordinate to him in Manchuria and Korea, as well as the troops of Manchukuo, were ordered to immediately stop hostilities, concentrate in the places of their deployment at the moment, and in large cities - on the outskirts and, when Soviet troops appear, through Soviet envoys, surrender positions, weapons collected in advance to stop resistance, avoiding damage to military property and weapons, food and fodder concentrated in other places, control the surrender of Manchukuo troops.
In order to prevent a sharp drop in the morale of Japanese military personnel, who were grieving defeat in a war in which they were ready to die for their emperor, but not surrender, a unit of the Japanese army was lowered on August 18 special order. This document stated that military personnel and civilians who find themselves under enemy control on the basis of the Emperor's rescript on the cessation of hostilities under the terms of the Potsdam Declaration are considered by the Japanese authorities not as prisoners of war (hore), but only as internees (yokuryusha). At the same time, surrendering weapons and submitting to the enemy is not, from their point of view, capitulation.
However, this definition of these actions by the Japanese side, although worthy of a positive assessment, since it reduced bloodshed, did not receive international legal recognition.
It is also important to note the fact that as a result of negotiations on August 18 in the village of Dukhovnoye about the actual surrender from August 20 of the Japanese troops mentioned above, the chief of staff of the Kwantung Army, General X. Hata obtained consent from the Red Army command to ensure the safety of the Japanese civilian population. However, the obligation was later violated, and these individuals were deported to labor camps along with the Japanese military.
During these days, in relation to the Japanese in the areas occupied by the Red Army, it was proposed to act in accordance with the telegram of Beria, Bulganin and Antonov No. 72929 to Vasilevsky dated August 16, which, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, indicated the axis:
Prisoners of war of the Japanese-Manchurian army will not be transported to the territory of the USSR. Prisoner of war camps should be organized, if possible, in places where Japanese troops were disarmed... Food for prisoners of war should be carried out according to the standards existing in the Japanese army located in Manchuria at the expense of local resources.”
Although the Japanese often, albeit half-heartedly, largely obeyed the orders of their superiors to surrender, battles with small groups of Japanese who ignored these orders were fought in various areas of Manchuria, especially in the hills. In their discovery and destruction or capture, the local Chinese population, who hated their enslavers, actively helped the Soviet troops.
The surrender of Japanese troops on all fronts was generally completed by September 10. In total, during combat operations, Soviet troops captured 41,199 Japanese military personnel and accepted the surrender of 600 thousand Japanese soldiers and commanders.
“Yes, this issue has been resolved,” Stalin said at this historic meeting... “They managed quite a lot in the Soviet Far East during the Civil War. Now their militaristic aspirations have come to an end. It's time to pay off debts. So they will give them away.” And by signing the State Defense Committee resolution No. 9898ss on the reception, deployment and labor service of Japanese military personnel. He verbally ordered Comrade Vorobyov from the People's Commissariat of Defense through the secretary of the State Defense Committee, “that he must certainly and in a short time transfer 800 tons of barbed wire to the NKVD,” and ordered Beria, who was present at the meeting, to take control of the implementation of this decision.
This step, illegal from the point of view of the Potsdam Declaration, can, however, be explained by the Japanese attack on Russia in 1904, and the Japanese intervention in Russia in 1918-1925, and Japan’s active position in the armed border conflicts of the 30s. as well as the difficult internal economic situation.
On the morning of August 9, Soviet artillery began shelling the Japanese border post Handenzawa (Handasa), located at 50 degrees north latitude. The Japanese resisted desperately for three days, taking refuge in permanent structures, until they were surrounded and destroyed by two battalions of Soviet troops attacking them.
On August 11, Soviet troops launched an offensive in Southern Sakhalin against the fortified area of Koton (Pobedino) near the Soviet-Japanese border. Japanese troops put up stubborn resistance. The fighting continued until August 19, when the Japanese side officially stopped resistance completely and the surrender of 3,300 Japanese troops was accepted.
In the battles for Maoka (Kholmsk), occupied on August 20, the Japanese lost 300 people killed and wounded, 600 prisoners were taken, and Soviet soldiers - 77 killed and wounded. Otomari was taken relatively easily with the capture of 3,400 Japanese troops. Japanese literature contains a statement that in response to the Japanese side’s proposal to cease military operations in South Sakhalin, made on August 17 after receiving an order from Tokyo on the emperor’s rescript on unconditional surrender under the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, Soviet troops in this area, fulfilling the initial order to accept surrender of the Japanese troops from 12.00 on August 20, they refused their offer under the pretext that it was allegedly accompanied by certain conditions, i.e. was not unconditional.
In addition, the Soviet side knew that in the previous days the Japanese, in order to regroup their forces for the purpose of more successful resistance, tried three times to achieve a cessation of the fighting, using fake envoys for this.
This, according to the Japanese side, led to the death of some of the “genuine” envoys during the shootout.
By August 25, after the occupation of the cities of Maoka (Kholmsk), Khonto (Nevelsk) and Otomari (Korsakov), the occupation of Southern Sakhalin by Soviet troops in cooperation with the Soviet Pacific Fleet was completed.
On August 12, the US Navy began combat operations in its combat zone south of the Fourth Kuril Strait, subjecting not only the Matua Islands to heavy artillery fire, but also the Paramushir Island, in violation of the agreement reached with the USSR at the Potsdam Conference.
On the same day, US Secretary of State Byrnes ordered their Navy to prepare to occupy the combat zone. "at the appropriate time". On August 14, the initial version of the general order to the allied forces No. 1 without mentioning the Kuril Islands was sent to Stalin.
On August 14, in accordance with the agreement reached between the military representatives of the USSR and the USA at the Potsdam Conference, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a memorandum to the State Coordination Committee for Naval Warfare on preparations for accepting the surrender of Japanese troops in the Kuril Islands zone south of the Fourth Kuril (Onekotan) Strait, which is why the Kuril Islands were not mentioned in the original version of General Order No. 1 of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Allied Powers, General MacArthur.
However, the lack of mention of the Kuril Islands in this order received by Stalin alarmed him, and he suggested that by doing so the American side was trying to evade its obligation to transfer all the Kuril Islands to the USSR, in accordance with the agreement reached in Crimea. That is why, early in the morning of August 15 (Vladivostok time), Stalin ordered Vasilevsky, together with the Pacific Fleet, to prepare for a landing on the Kuril Islands.
On August 16, upon receipt of Truman’s telegram of August 15, Stalin raised before him the question of including all of the Kuril Islands, and not just the Northern ones, in the zone where Soviet troops would accept the surrender of Japanese troops. On August 17, a positive response to this proposal was received, and Vasilevsky immediately gave the order to land troops on the Northern Kuril Islands.
In his answer, Stalin emphasized that the Liaodong Peninsula is part of Manchuria, i.e. the Soviet Kwantung Army surrender zone, and proposed that Korea be divided at 38 degrees north latitude. to the Soviet and American occupation zones.
In addition, Stalin proposed that the northern part of Hokkaido from the city of Rumoi to the city of Kushiro be included in the Soviet zone of occupation. The corresponding order No. 10 on preparations for the occupation of this area from August 19 to September 1 by troops of the 1st Far Eastern Front and Pacific Fleet dated August 18 was sent to the Soviet command. According to the Japanese historian H. Wada, Truman’s consent to the Soviet occupation of all the Kuril Islands was explained by the fact that Stalin decided not to lay claim to the occupation of South Korea.
Question about occupation of Hokkaido was discussed at a meeting of members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR with the participation of Soviet military leaders on June 26-27, 1945 during the consideration of preparations for war with Japan. Marshal Meretskov's proposal to occupy this island was supported by Khrushchev, and Voznesensky, Molotov and Zhukov opposed it.
The first of them substantiated his opinion by the statement that it was impossible to “expose” our army to the blows of the powerful Japanese defense, the second stated that the landing on this island was a gross violation of the Yalta Agreement, and the third considered the proposal simply a gamble.
When asked by Stalin how many troops would be needed for this operation, Zhukov replied that there were four full armies with artillery, tanks and other equipment. Having limited himself to a general statement of the fact of the USSR’s readiness for war with Japan, Stalin returned to this issue after the success of the Soviet troops in the battles on the fields of Manchuria. The corresponding order - No. 10 on preparations for the occupation of Hokkaido from September 19 to 1 by the troops of the 1st Far Eastern Front and the USSR Pacific Fleet dated August 18 was sent to Vasilevsky.
Having agreed to the Soviet occupation of all Kuril Islands, subject to the division of Korea with the United States into occupation zones at 38 degrees north latitude, Truman categorically rejected Stalin’s proposal for the Soviet occupation of Northern Hokkaido. As a result, the mentioned order No. 1.0 after Stalin’s reply of August 22 to Truman to his telegram of August 18 to Vasilevsky was canceled.
The US refusal to allow Soviet troops to occupy the northern part of the island of Hokkaido, where Stalin, in order not to formally violate the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration on the return of Japanese prisoners of war to their homeland, was going to move them for forced labor in special camps, led to the fact that he gave a new order. Vasilevsky’s order of August 18, 1945 (as a change to the original above-mentioned order of Beria and others of August 16 about their sending to the metropolis) had another tragic consequence, which had a detrimental effect on post-war Soviet-Japanese relations - Japanese military personnel and internees laid down their arms civilians from areas occupied by Soviet troops, on the basis of the USSR State Defense Committee order No. 9898ss of August 23 (initially 0.5 million people), were sent to special camps in Siberia and the Far East. There they were engaged in forced labor in a harsh climate unusual for the Japanese.
On August 16, Soviet landing ships with troops of the 2nd Far Eastern Army and the people's militia left Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and on the morning of August 18 began landing on the heavily fortified islands of Shumshu (Northern Kuriles) and Paramushir. The enemy met them with hurricane fire, and he believed that he was repelling an attack not by Soviet, but by American troops, since the Japanese garrisons did not know about the USSR's entry into the war with Japan, and thick fog made it difficult to identify the enemy.
In the battles for Shumsha, 8,800 Soviet soldiers fought, of whom 1,567 people died. against 23 thousand Japanese, of whom 1018 people died. Until August 24, fighting continued for the island of Paramushir.
Battle for the Northern Kuril Islands began after Japan adopted the Potsdam Declaration and sent an order to Japanese troops to cease hostilities, with the exception of the continuation of active hostilities by the enemy, and the unconditional surrender of Japanese troops on the terms of the said declaration.
Large losses on both sides, in our opinion, could have been avoided if a few days later the Soviet side had entered into negotiations with the Japanese garrisons of the Kuril Islands, which by that time, in addition to the emperor’s rescript of surrender, had received the same order from their command. As a result, on the morning of August 23, the surrender of all Japanese began, the total number of whom on the island. The noise reached, judging only by the personnel of the 73rd and 91st infantry divisions, 13,673 people. This point of view is supported by the bloodless occupation of the island of OneKotan by Soviet troops on August 25, the islands of Matua, Urup and Iturup on August 28 and their landing on the islands of Kunashir and Shikotan on September 1 with the capture without fighting of 63,840 Japanese troops.
Simultaneously with the cancellation of the order to land on Hokkaido, Vasilevsky sent a telegram to the commander of the USSR Navy, Admiral Kuznetsov, and the commander of the STF Yumashev, in which, referring to the emperor’s rescript on surrender, he suggested that the latter consider the possibility of transporting the main forces of the 87th Rifle Corps of Sakhalin to Southern Kuriles (Kunashir and Iturup islands), bypassing the island of Hokkaido, with a report on their opinion no later than the morning of August 23.
From this telegram it is clear that in connection with the cancellation of the Soviet landing on Hokkaido, the Soviet command, reacting flexibly to the change in the situation, decided to try to use this landing to occupy the Southern Kuril Islands, after Kuznetsov and Yumashev reacted positively to Vasilevsky’s request, starting the landing of troops here before official signing of the Instrument of Surrender.
As a result of this, on August 26, the separate combat operation without the participation of troops, ships and aircraft intended to occupy the Northern and Middle Kuriles up to the island of Urup inclusive.
Captain V. Leonov, having received order No. 12146 in Korsakov on that day to occupy the islands of Kunashir and Iturup by September 3, due to lack of fuel on August 28 at 21.50, he initially limited himself to sending only two trawlers to Iturup. On August 28, an advanced detachment of Soviet troops landed on this island. The Japanese garrison of the island expressed its readiness to surrender.
On September 1, fearing the small number of Soviet troops, Captain G.I. Brunstein first landed an advance detachment from the first trawler on Kunashir Island, and then a second detachment to reinforce it. And although these detachments did not encounter Japanese resistance, the occupation of Kunashir was completed only by September 4. The island of Shikotan from the Lesser Kuril Ridge was also occupied by Soviet troops on September 1 without a fight.
The operation is occupation of the Habomai Islands (Flat)- they received these names later, and then they were called Suisho - began on September 2, when Captain Leonov received an order from his command to prepare an operational plan for the occupation of these islands and instructed Captain First Rank Chicherin to lead the corresponding group of troops in the event of their occupation. Due to poor communication in difficult weather conditions, Leonov was unable, according to him, to accurately explain to Chicherin that only the landing plan was required, and not its implementation, which began on September 3.
Arriving on Kunashir at 6.00 the same day, Chicherin organized two groups for landing on the Habomai islands: the first to occupy the islands of Shibotsu (Green Island), Suisho (Tanfilyeva Island), Yuri (Yuri Island) and Akiyuri (Anuchina Island) , and the second - to occupy the islands of Taraku (Polonsky Island) and Harukarumoshir (Demina Island).
On September 3, these groups went without the sanction of the higher Soviet command to the indicated islands and, without meeting any resistance from the Japanese, completed their occupation on September 5; after the Japanese side signed the official Instrument of Surrender. At the same time, the headquarters of the Far Eastern District called them “original Russian territories” (but only with Japanese names), although these islands could be torn away from Japan only as a measure of punishment for aggression, and not as “original Russian territories,” which they were not .
Having a political and administrative map of Japan, the Soviet command could know that these islands are not administratively part of the Kuril Islands (Chishima), but belong to Hanasaki County, Hokkaido Prefecture. But from the point of view of ordinary geographical use, in a number of official publications, including explanatory dictionaries and lectures, the Habomai Islands were included in Japan as part of the Kuril Islands. But if the Americans, emphasizing the political and administrative division of Japan, had occupied them as part of their zone of occupation - Hokkaido Prefecture, then the Soviet side, obviously, would not have insisted on a different, usual and, therefore, legally valid interpretation of the limits of the Kuril Islands, so as not to conflict with the United States. And since the Soviet troops were one way or another ahead of the American ones here, the latter, knowing that the Kuril Islands (Tishima) in common usage included the Habomai Islands, given their small strategic importance, did not, in turn, begin to conflict with the USSR and insist that When distributing zones for accepting the surrender of Japanese troops, the United States took the political and administrative division of the country as a basis, postponing this issue until negotiations on a peace settlement with Japan.
In connection with the above considerations, it is curious that upon arrival at Habomai, the fighters of Chicherin’s detachment first of all inquired whether American troops had landed here, and only calmed down when they received Negative answer.
From a legal point of view, in our opinion, the reproach against our country that the occupation of the Habomai Islands by the Soviet side did not matter after the signing of the Instrument of Surrender, which legally implemented the final version of MacArthur’s General Order No. 1 on the distribution of surrender zones for Japanese troops, since these documents do not define the deadline for the implementation of the said order.
On September 2, 1945, the official ceremony of signing the Instrument of Surrender took place on board the American battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay.
On the Japanese side, this document was signed on behalf of the Emperor and the Japanese government by the Minister of Foreign Affairs M. Shigemitsu and the representative of the Imperial Main Headquarters of the Japanese Armed Forces, the Chief of the General Staff E. Umezu, on behalf of the Allied Powers - General D. MacArthur, on behalf of the USA - Admiral Ch. Nimitz, from the Republic of China - Su Yunchang, from Great Britain - B. Fraser, from the USSR - Major General K.N. Derevianko, then representatives of Australia, Canada, France, the Netherlands and New Zealand.
This document declared Japan's acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration of the Allied Powers— USA, China and Great Britain, joined by the Soviet Union, agreement to the unconditional surrender of all armed forces of Japan and the armed forces under its control and the immediate cessation of hostilities, as well as the obligation to carry out all orders of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Allied Powers necessary for the implementation this surrender and the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, or any other representative appointed by the Allied Powers.
This document also ordered the Japanese government and general staff to immediately release all Allied prisoners of war and interned civilians, and ordered the emperor and government to submit to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Allied Powers.
An important feature of the Far Eastern campaign of the Soviet armed forces in 1945 was concentration of troops and equipment in the directions of the main attacks. For example, the military leadership of the Trans-Baikal Front concentrated 70% of rifle troops and up to 90% of tanks and artillery on the direction of the main attack. This made it possible to increase superiority over the enemy: in infantry - 1.7 times, in guns - 4.5 times, mortars - 9.6 times, tanks and self-propelled guns - 5.1 times and aircraft - 2.6 times. In the 29-kilometer section of the breakthrough of the 1st Far Eastern Front, the ratio of forces and means was as follows: in manpower - 1.5: 1, in guns - 4: 1, tanks and self-propelled guns - 8: 1, in favor of the Soviet troops. A similar situation arose in the breakthrough areas in the direction of the main attack of the 2nd Far Eastern Front.
As a result of the selfless actions of the Soviet troops, the enemy suffered significant damage in manpower and equipment, more than half a million Japanese troops were captured and large trophies were taken.
In addition, the Japanese lost about 84,000 people killed.
During the Soviet-Japanese War, the courage and heroism of Soviet soldiers. Over 550 formations, units, ships and institutions of the Soviet armed forces were awarded guards ranks and honorary titles or awarded military orders of the USSR. 308 thousand Far Eastern soldiers were awarded military orders and medals for their personal exploits.
87 soldiers and officers received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and six, in addition, were awarded the second Gold Star medal.
On September 30, 1945, to commemorate the brilliant victory of the Soviet armed forces in the final campaign of the Great Patriotic War, the medal “For Victory over Japan” was established, which was awarded to more than 1.8 million people.
Since the invasion of Manchuria by Japanese troops in 1931, under the influence of the Japanese military, the Japanese government began to pursue an anti-Soviet policy, which led to a series of border incidents and armed conflicts in the second half of the 30s. and created in 1941 the threat of war between Japan and the USSR in alliance with Germany and Italy (“Special Maneuvers of the Kwantung Army”), despite the conclusion in the same year of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact. Under these conditions, guided by the principles of modern International law, which allows non-compliance with treaties with aggressors, reflected in the UN Charter of 1945, the Soviet Union, reciprocating the cooperation of the allied powers, primarily the USA, Great Britain and China, contrary to the neutrality pact, decided to enter into the war against Japan, which launched an aggressive war against these states.
What were they results of the Soviet-Japanese war of 1945? What was its historical significance and, most importantly for the topic of this work, the role of the Soviet Union in the victory over Japan and thereby ending the Second World War? The main result of the USSR's war against Japan was its defeat in this war as an integral part of the war in the Pacific Ocean and the Far East, as a consequence of the adventurism in the expansionist foreign policy of Japanese militarism. An important role in its failure was played by the underestimation of the growth of the Soviet military-industrial potential and positive changes in the military doctrine of our country in the 30s and 40s compared to the period of the Russo-Japanese War.
The Japanese military doctrine did not take into account the qualitatively increased combat power of the armed forces of our country compared to the period of the Russian-Japanese War, as well as the close coordination and interaction of all branches of the military. By the end of the 30s. certain changes occurred in this assessment, which kept Tokyo from entering the war with the USSR in 1941.
While the stamina and fighting spirit of Japanese and Soviet troops were equal, the latter gained in strength due to the extraordinary power of simultaneous coordinated fire support from artillery, armored forces and aviation.
Some historians reproach the USSR for the fact that the occupation of the southernmost islands of Habomai (Flat) - the southern part of the Lesser Kuril ridge - occurred after the signing of the Act of Surrender from September 3 to 5, 1945. But this did not represent the only exception, because battles with the occupation of territory, occupied by Japanese troops, took place another 40 days after the decision to surrender on the Asian continent, i.e. after the signing of the aforementioned document on ending the war with Japan both in certain regions of Manchuria and Northern China, as well as in the southern seas, and Chiang Kai-shek, without disarming some Japanese units, threw them into battle as anti-communist mercenaries in all provinces of Northern China right up to until 1946
As for the opinion of foreign scientists from among the critically thinking modern opponents of Soviet policy towards Japan, let us consider the point of view of the professor as characteristic Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, a Japanese national who moved to the United States a long time ago, is interesting, especially as a reflection of the Japanese attitude to this war and its consequences for Soviet-Japanese relations. “It would be too unrealistic to expect that the consciousness of Japan's guilt for starting the war would also extend to relations with the Soviet Union. However, until the Japanese begin to self-critically evaluate their past, establishing a difficult balance between their commitment to militarism, expansion and war and their justified demand to correct the negative aspects of Stalin's foreign policy “, this historian writes, not without reason, “genuine reconciliation between the two countries is impossible.”
Hasegawa concludes that “the most important reason for this tragedy” is Tokyo’s rejection of the Potsdam Declaration immediately after its presentation, which would, in principle, exclude both the possibility of war with the USSR and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki! And one cannot but agree with this conclusion.
The Soviet Union, with its armed forces, made an important contribution to the Allied victory over militaristic Japan in the war in the Far East during the Soviet-Japanese War of 1945 - an integral part of its allies' war in the Pacific of 1941-1945, and in a broader sense and World War II 1939-1945.
The USSR's accession to the Potsdam Declaration and its entry into the war against Japan was a decisive factor in Tokyo's decision to unconditionally surrender its armed forces on the terms of the Potsdam Declaration of the Allies after the US used atomic weapons against the Japanese civilian population in the sense that this event was contrary to calculations for mediation The Soviet Union's efforts to end the war in the Pacific dispelled the imperial government's last hope of ending it without a crushing defeat in the hope of causing a split in the ranks of the Allied coalition.
The victory of the USSR in this war played a huge role in the successful completion of World War II
My friends, before presenting you with a selection of photographs, I would like to introduce you to a wonderful publication that reveals little-known facts about that war and the main reasons for the surrender of Japan on September 2, 1945.
________________________________________ _____________________________________
Alexey Polubota
Unconditional samurai surrender
Japan was forced to surrender its weapons not by American nuclear strikes, but by Soviet troops
September 2 is the day of the end of World War II. It was on this day in 1945 that Japan, Germany's last ally, was forced to sign unconditional surrender. In Russia, this date remained for a long time in the shadow of the Great Patriotic War. Only in 2010, September 2 was declared the Day of Military Glory of Russia. Meanwhile, the defeat by Soviet troops of more than a million Kwantung Army in Manchuria is one of the brilliant successes of Russian weapons. As a result of the operation, the main part of which lasted only 10 days - from August 9 to 19, 1945, 84 thousand Japanese soldiers and officers were killed. Almost 600 thousand were taken prisoner. The losses of the Soviet Army amounted to 12 thousand people. Quite a convincing statistic for those who like to repeat that Soviet marshals and generals won only because they overwhelmed their enemies with corpses.
Today, a very common version is that the Japanese were forced to lay down their arms by the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and that thanks to this the lives of hundreds of thousands of American soldiers were saved. However, a number of historians believe that it was the lightning defeat of the Kwantung Army that showed the Japanese emperor the futility of further resistance. Back in 1965 historian Gar Alperovitz stated that the atomic strikes on Japan had little military significance. English explorer Ward Wilson The recently published book Five Myths About Nuclear Weapons also concludes that it was not American bombs that influenced the Japanese resolve to fight.
It was the entry of the USSR into the war with Japan and the rapid defeat of the Kwantung Army by Soviet troops that served as the main factors in the accelerated end of the war and the unconditional surrender of Japan, agrees Head of the Center for Japanese Studies at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences Valery Kistanov.- The fact is that the Japanese were not going to give up quickly. They were preparing for a fierce struggle with the United States for their main islands. This is evidenced by the fierce fighting in Okinawa, where American troops landed. These battles showed the US leadership that bloody battles were ahead, which, according to military experts, could last until 1946.
An interesting fact was recently published: in the mountains near Kyoto, the Americans discovered a special device designed to launch military projectiles that would be controlled by suicide bombers. A kind of projectile aircraft. The Japanese simply did not have time to use them. That is, in addition to the kamikaze pilots, there were other soldiers who were ready to become suicide bombers.
The total strength of the Kwantung Army in China and Korea with allied units was more than a million people. The Japanese had a layered defense and all the necessary resources to wage a protracted, fierce war. Their soldiers were determined to fight to the end. But by that time the Soviet Army had enormous experience in warfare. The troops that survived fire and water very quickly defeated the Kwantung Army. In my opinion, this is what finally broke the will of the Japanese command to fight.
“SP”: - Why is it still believed that it was the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that forced Japan to quickly capitulate?
To belittle the role of the USSR in World War II, emphasizing the importance of the United States is a general tendency. Look what's happening in Europe. The propaganda there is so successful that if you ask ordinary people, many will answer that the greatest contribution to the victory over the Hitler coalition was made by the United States and its Western allies.
Americans tend to exaggerate their own merits. Moreover, by claiming that it was the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that persuaded Japan to surrender, they seem to justify this barbaric act. Like, we saved the lives of American soldiers.
Meanwhile, the use of atomic bombs did not really frighten the Japanese. They didn't even fully understand what it was. Yes, it became clear that powerful weapons were used. But no one knew about radiation then. In addition, the Americans dropped bombs not on the armed forces, but on peaceful cities. Military factories and naval bases were damaged, but mostly civilians died, and the combat effectiveness of the Japanese army was not greatly affected.
“SP”: - Japan has been considered an ally of the United States for several decades. Does the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki leave an imprint on the attitude of the Japanese towards the United States, or is this a long-turned page of history for them?
Such things, of course, are not forgotten. The attitude of many ordinary Japanese towards the United States is by no means the most welcoming. There is no justification for that barbaric bombing. I was in Nagasaki and Hiroshima and saw museums dedicated to this tragedy. Terrible experience. In Hiroshima, near the memorial, there is a special storage facility where plaques with the names of the victims of this bombing are placed. So, this list continues to grow to this day - people are dying from the effects of radiation.
The paradox of history is that yesterday's worst enemies are today's allies. This affects how Japanese officials and official media cover those events. It is very rare to find a mention in Japanese press publications of who dropped the atomic bombs. People usually talk about this in a very abstract way. So, they say, a tragedy happened, bombs fell. Not a word about the USA. You might think that atomic bombs fell from the moon. Moreover, I admit that as a result of such silence, some young Japanese are sure that this was done by the USSR, in relation to which the media broadcast a lot of negativity.
But, I repeat, for the most part, ordinary Japanese have not forgotten or forgiven that bombing. Particularly negative sentiments towards Americans are widespread in Okinawa, which until 1972 remained under direct US occupation. This small island still houses 75% of American military bases in Japan. These bases cause a lot of trouble for the local population, from the noise of airplanes to the antics of some American soldiers. From time to time, excesses occur. The Japanese are still reeling from the rape of a Japanese schoolgirl by several Marines 18 years ago.
All this leads to regular protests demanding the withdrawal of the main American base. The latest protests by Okinawa residents were associated with the transfer of new American aircraft to the island.
The Korean Peninsula and China were a very important logistical and resource base for Japan, says Konstantin Asmolov, orientalist, candidate of historical sciences, employee of the Center for Korean Studies at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. - There was even a plan for the evacuation of the Japanese imperial court to Korea in case fierce fighting broke out on the islands themselves in Japan. By the time the nuclear strike was used, many Japanese cities had been destroyed by conventional bombing. For example, when American aircraft burned Tokyo, about 100 thousand people died. From the way the Japanese initially reacted to the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it was clear that they were not very scared. For them, in general, it didn’t make much difference whether the city was destroyed by one bomb or a thousand. The defeat of the Kwantung Army by Soviet troops and the loss of the most important strategic platform on the mainland became a much more serious blow for them. That is why we can say that the USSR, at the cost of 12 thousand dead soldiers, significantly accelerated the end of World War II.
The role of the USSR in the defeat of Japan can be judged by this fact, says Andrei Fursov, historian, director of the Center for Russian Studies at the Institute of Fundamental and Applied Research at Moscow University for the Humanities.
- At the very end of the war, Churchill gave the order to develop Operation Unthinkable, which involved a strike by American and British troops with the participation of German divisions controlled by the Western allies on July 1, 1945. Anglo-American military experts put forward two counterarguments against this operation. First - the Soviet Army is too strong. Secondly, the USSR is very necessary in order to defeat Japan. Despite the fact that already in 1943 there was a turning point in the war in the Pacific, and the Americans successfully pushed back the enemy, they understood perfectly well that without the Soviet Union it would be very difficult to “press” Japan. The Kwantung Army held vast territories in China and Korea. And the Americans had no experience of a serious land war. Therefore, it was decided not to carry out Operation Unthinkable.
The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not play a military role. On the one hand, it was an unjustifiably cruel revenge from Japan for Pearl Harbor, and on the other hand, it was an act of intimidation of the USSR, which needed to show the full power of the United States.
Today, the USA and Great Britain really want to present everything in such a way that the role of the USSR in the victory over Japan was minimal. It must be admitted that they achieved great success in their propaganda. Young people in these countries know little about Russia's involvement in World War II. Some are even sure that the USSR fought on the side of Nazi Germany. Everything is being done to push Russia out of the ranks of winners.
________________________________________ __________________________________
Victory over Japan. Photo album.
1. The movement of Soviet infantry across the steppes of Manchuria. Transbaikal front. 1945
48. An American B-29 bomber took off from the island of Tinian in the early morning of August 6 with "Baby" on board. At 8:15 the bomb was dropped from an altitude of 9400 meters, and after 45 seconds of falling it exploded at an altitude of 600 m above the city center. In the photo: a column of smoke and dust over Hiroshima reached a height of 7000 meters. The size of the dust cloud on the ground reached 3 km.
50. The Fat Man atomic bomb was dropped from a B-29 aircraft and exploded at 11:02 am at an altitude of 500 m above Nagasaki. The power of the explosion was about 21 kilotons.
54. Battleship of the Pacific Fleet of the US Navy, battleship Missouri, on which the Instrument of Surrender of Japan was signed. Tokyo Bay. 1945
56. Participants in the signing of the act of surrender of Japan: Hsu Yun-chan (China), B. Fraser (Great Britain), K.N. Derevianko (USSR), T. Blamey (Australia), L.M. Cosgrave (Canada), F .Leclerc (France). 02 September 1945
61. The moment of signing the act of surrender of Japan by General Y. Umezu. Tokyo Bay. 02 September 1945
67. The moment of signing the act of surrender of Japan on board the American battleship Missouri. From the USSR, the act is signed by Lieutenant General K.N. Derevianko. MacArthur is at the microphone. 02 September 1945
69. The act of surrender of Japan.Signatories to the act: Japan, USSR, USA, China, Great Britain, France, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands.
70. Exhibition of Japanese captured military equipment. Park of Culture and Leisure named after. M. Gorky. Moscow. 1946
Photo by: Temin V.A. GARF, F.10140. Op.2. D. 125. L.2
All photos are clickable
The Soviet-Japanese War of 1945 was the main component of the last period of World War II and a special campaign of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union of 1941-45.
Even at the Tehran Conference in 1943, the heads of government of the USSR, USA and
In Great Britain, the Soviet delegation, meeting the proposals of the allies and striving to strengthen the anti-Hitler coalition, agreed in principle to enter the war against militaristic Japan after the defeat of Nazi Germany.
At the Crimean Conference of 1945, US President F. Roosevelt and W. Churchill, not hoping for a quick victory over Japan, again turned to the Soviet government with a request to enter the war in the Far East. True to its allied duty, the Soviet government promised to oppose Japan after the end of the war with Nazi Germany.
On February 11, 1945, Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill signed a secret agreement, which provided for the USSR's entry into the war in the Far East 2-3 months after the surrender of Germany.
On April 5, 1945, the Soviet government denounced the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, signed on April 13, 1941. The statement on the reasons for the denunciation said that the pact was signed "... before the German attack on the USSR and before the outbreak of war between Japan, on the one hand, and England and the United States of America, on the other. Since then, the situation has changed radically. Germany attacked the USSR, and Japan, an ally of Germany, helps the latter in its war against the USSR. In addition, Japan is at war with the USA and England, which are allies of the Soviet Union. In this situation, the Neutrality Pact between Japan and the USSR has lost its meaning.
Difficult relations between the USSR and Japan had a long history. They began after Japan's participation in the intervention in the Soviet Far East in 1918 and its capture until 1922, when Japan was expelled from its territory. But the danger of war with Japan existed for many years, especially since the second half of the 1930s. In 1938, famous clashes took place on Lake Khasan, and in 1939, the Soviet-Japanese battle on the Khalkhin Gol River on the border of Mongolia and Manchukuo. In 1940, the Soviet Far Eastern Front was created, which indicated a real risk of war.
The Japanese invasion of Manchuria and later Northern China turned the Soviet Far East into a zone of constant tension. Continuous conflicts kept the entire population and especially the troops in anticipation of war. Every day they expected real battles - in the evening no one knew what would happen in the morning.
They hated the Japanese: every Far Easterner, young and old, knew, as they wrote in books and newspapers then, that it was they who threw the partisan Lazo and his comrades alive into the furnace of a steam locomotive. Although at that time the world did not yet know what the secret Japanese “731st detachment” was doing with the Russians in Harbin before the war.
As you know, in the initial period of the war with Germany, the Soviet Union had to maintain a significant contingent of its troops in the Far East, part of which was sent to the defense of Moscow at the end of 1941. The transferred divisions played an important role in the defense of the capital and the defeat of German troops. The redeployment of troops was facilitated by the US entry into the war with Japan after its attack on the US naval base at Pearl Harbor.
It is very important to note that Japan is stuck in a war with China, in which, by the way, it lost 35 million people. This figure, which our media began to print quite recently, speaks of the unusually cruel nature of the war for China, which, in general, is characteristic of the Asian mentality.
It is this circumstance that explains Japan’s non-entry into the war against the USSR, and not the reports of our intelligence officer Richard Sorge (who, most likely, was a double agent, which does not detract from his merits). I believe that this is why Sorge, of course a great intelligence officer, did not carry out the order Moscow about returning to the Union, where he would have been shot much earlier before his execution in a Japanese dungeon.
It must be said that the Soviet Union, long before 1945, began to prepare for a battle with Japan, which was explained by the increased power of the army and the skill of its headquarters. Already from the end of 1943, part of the replenishment of the Soviet army arrived in the Far East to replace those who had served here previously and had good military training. Throughout 1944, the newly formed troops, through continuous exercises, prepared for future battles.
The troops of the Soviet Union, who were in the Far East throughout the war with Germany, rightly believed that their time had come to stand up for their Motherland, and they must not lose their honor. The hour of reckoning with Japan has come for the unsuccessful Russian-Japanese War at the beginning of the century, for the loss of its territories, Port Arthur and the Russian ships of the Pacific Fleet.
From the beginning of 1945, troops released on the Western Front began to arrive in the Far East. The first trains from the Soviet-German front in 1945 began to arrive in March, then month after month the intensity of traffic increased and by July it reached its maximum. From the moment it became clear that our troops would advance to punish, as they then called, “militaristic” Japan, the army lived in anticipation of retribution for years of Japanese threats, provocations and attacks.
The troops transferred from the West to the eastern theater of operations had good equipment, honed by years of fierce battles, but, most importantly, the Soviet army went through the school of the great war, the school of battles near Moscow and Kursk, the school of street fighting in Stalingrad, Budapest and Berlin, storming the fortifications of Koenigsberg, crossing large and small rivers. The troops gained invaluable experience, or rather, experience paid for by the millions of lives of our soldiers and commanders. Air battles of Soviet aviation over Kuban and in other military operations showed the increased experience of the Soviet army.
At the end of the war with Germany, this was the experience of the victors, capable of solving any problems, regardless of any of their losses. The whole world knew this, and the Japanese military leadership understood this.
In March-April 1945, the Soviet Union sent an additional 400 thousand people to the troops of its Far Eastern group, bringing the number of the group to 1.5 million people, 670 T-34 tanks (and a total of 2119 tanks and self-propelled guns), 7137 guns and mortars and many other military equipment . Together with the troops stationed in the Far East, the regrouped formations and units formed three fronts.
At the same time, in the units and formations of the Japanese Kwantung Army opposing Soviet troops in Manchuria, where the main combat operations took place, there were absolutely no machine guns, anti-tank rifles, rocket artillery, there was little RGK and large-caliber artillery (in infantry divisions and brigades as part of artillery regiments and divisions in most cases there were only 75 mm guns).
The concept of this operation, the largest in scope in World War II, provided for military operations over an area of about 1.5 million square kilometers, as well as in the waters of the Sea of Japan and Okhotsk.
The Soviet-Japanese War had enormous political and military significance. So on August 9, 1945, at an emergency meeting of the Supreme Council for the Management of the War, Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki said: “The entry of the Soviet Union into the war this morning puts us completely in a hopeless situation and makes it impossible to continue the war further.”
The Soviet Army defeated the strong Kwantung Army of Japan. The Soviet Union, having entered the war with the Japanese Empire and, having made a significant contribution to its defeat, accelerated the end of World War II. American leaders and historians have repeatedly stated that without the USSR's entry into the war, it would have continued for at least another year and would have cost an additional several million human lives.
The commander-in-chief of the American armed forces in the Pacific, General MacArthur, believed that “Victory over Japan can be guaranteed only if the Japanese ground forces are defeated.” US Secretary of State E. Stettinius stated the following:
“On the eve of the Crimean Conference, the American chiefs of staff convinced President Roosevelt that Japan could capitulate only in 1947 or later, and its defeat could cost America a million soldiers.”
Today, the experience of the Soviet army, which carried out this military operation, is studied in all military academies around the world.
As a result of the war, the USSR returned to its territory the territories annexed by Japan from the Russian Empire at the end of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 following the Peace of Portsmouth (southern Sakhalin and, temporarily, Kwantung with Port Arthur and Dalniy), as well as previously ceded to Japan in 1875, the main group of the Kuril Islands and the southern part of the Kuril Islands assigned to Japan by the Treaty of Shimoda in 1855.
The military operations against Japan showed an example of interaction between several countries, primarily: the USSR, the USA and China.
Today's relations between Russia, the heir and legal successor state of the USSR, and Japan are complicated by the absence of a peace treaty between our countries. Modern Japan does not want to recognize the results of World War II and demands the return of the entire southern group of the Kuril Islands, received by Russia, as an indisputable result of victory, paid for with the lives of Soviet heroic warriors.
We see a rapprochement in the positions of our countries in the joint development of disputed territories.
* * *
Separately, we should dwell on our losses in this little-remembered war. According to various sources, Soviet troops lost more than 30 thousand people, including 14 thousand killed. Against the backdrop of the victims and destruction that the country suffered in the war with the Germans, this seems to be not much.
But I would like to remind you that as a result of the Japanese attack on Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, on the central base of the Pacific Fleet of the US Navy, the Americans lost 2,403 people killed and 1,178 wounded (on that day the Japanese sunk 4 battleships, 2 destroyers of the American fleet, several ships received severe damage).
The United States celebrates this day as the National Day of Remembrance for those killed at Pearl Harbor.
Unfortunately, the Soviet-Japanese War, the grandiose battle of World War II, despite its uniqueness and scale, still remains little known and little studied by historians in Russia. The date of signing the surrender of Japan is not customary to celebrate in the country.
In our country, no one commemorates those who died in this war, because someone decided that these numbers were small compared to the incalculable losses on the Soviet-German front.
And this is wrong, we must value every citizen of our country and remember everyone who gave their lives for our beloved Motherland!
The promise had to be kept
In Russia, more and more people deny the validity of the Neutrality Pact between the USSR and Japan (1941) and justify the military actions of the Soviet Union against Japan after the end of World War II, which gave rise to the problem of the “northern territories” and the tragedy of the Siberian prisoners of war. Retired KGB Colonel Alexei Kirichenko, who revealed the truth about the problem of Soviet arrests, emphasized in an interview with our newspaper that this point of view is erroneous.
Ryosuke Endo: On April 5, 1945, the USSR informed Japan that it would not renew the Neutrality Pact. Because of this, many argue that war against Japan is not a problem.
Alexey Kirichenko: USSR Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov told Japanese Ambassador Naotake Sato that he did not intend to renew the pact. However, the experienced ambassador got Molotov to recognize that it was valid until April 25, 1946. Then Stalin “corrected” this agreement and attacked Japan, but the agreement between the foreign ministers should not have been violated.
Asahi Shimbun 08/23/2016 He went through Siberian camps
Mainichi Shimbun 08/15/2016
— Recently, one Japanese specialist cited the words of the Japanese military, voiced in 1941, as well as the theory of the movement to the north of Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka. This specialist argues that Japan did not intend to comply with the neutrality pact.
— Thoughts about war are the work of the military. There were people in the Navy and Army who opposed the war with the USSR. Matsuoka's views did not coincide with those of the government. In July of the same year it was changed. It doesn't matter who had what plans.
- Some also claim that Soviet Far Eastern forces deterred Japan from attacking.
— In fact, in the fall of 1941, Japan transferred part of the Kwantung Army to the south, quickly concentrating military power there. In September, the USSR understood that Japan would not be able to start a war with such a composition. At the end of October, Stalin held a meeting with Far Eastern military leaders and the leadership of the Communist Party, during which it was decided to transfer Far Eastern units to the west (to fight the Nazis). They were confident that Japan would not attack. On November 7, 1941, Far Eastern forces took part in a parade on Red Square and headed west to participate in the war. Thanks to this, an attack on Moscow was avoided. In the period from 1941 to 1943, the well-trained and armed 42nd Division was completely transferred from the Far East to the west.
— From Manchuria, forays into the territory of the USSR were often made. Some believe that they were a manifestation of Japanese intentions to attack the USSR.
— After the conflict on the Khalkhin Gol River (1939), Japan carefully ensured not to violate Soviet borders. The fact is that at the height of the Sino-Japanese War, Japan could not conduct military operations in two directions. At the same time, the Kwantung Army arrested Soviet deserters and intelligence officers, so it seems to me that the border violations were most likely on the part of the USSR.
— How did the USSR decide to attack Japan?
— I believe that in the first half of the war, the Neutrality Pact was extremely beneficial to both the USSR and Japan. However, after the Battle of Stalingrad (1942 - 1943), the USSR realized its own strength and began preparing for war with Japan. The Defense Committee decided to build a railway from Komsomolsk-on-Amur to Sovetskaya Gavan in preparation for an attack on Japan. Construction was completed a few days before the scheduled date of August 1, 1945.
— Also, many argue that the Second World War ended not thanks to the atomic bombing, but precisely thanks to the actions of the USSR. Thus they justify the attack on Japan.
— If you analyze the situation in Manchuria, it becomes clear that there were only 380 aircraft with a one-way fuel supply. By mid-August, most of them had returned to Japan. The Soviet side had more than five thousand aircraft, but there were practically no air battles. There were also very few tanks in Manchuria. The reality is that Japan was completely weakened.
— Why don’t you hide your point of view, which differs from the official version?
— I began to study Japan as an enemy of the USSR. Nevertheless, having become thoroughly familiar with Japanese reality, I realized that the USSR and then Russia made many mistakes. These mistakes affected the current Russian-Japanese relations. Of course, Japan — far from an angel. I believe there is value in avoiding tragedies and difficulties in the future.
Soviet attack on Japan: On August 9, 1945, Soviet troops attacked Japan, violating the Neutrality Pact. They invaded Manchuria and Sakhalin. The USSR continued to fight after Japan signed the Potsdam Agreement and the end of the war was declared on August 15. Soviet troops captured the four northern islands on September 5, although Japan signed a surrender on September 2. The USSR interned about 600 thousand unarmed Japanese soldiers. More than 60 thousand people became victims of Siberian imprisonment.
Alexey Kirichenko is a former KGB colonel. Employee of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Born in Belarus in 1936. In 1964 he graduated from the KGB Higher School and worked in the second department in the Japanese direction. In the 80s, he became an employee of the institute and began studying the issue of Japanese prisoners of war. I tried to get to the bottom of the Russian-Japanese problems. Among the works — "Unknown moments of 200 years of Japanese-Russian relations."
InoSMI materials contain assessments exclusively of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the InoSMI editorial staff.
By August 1945, the USSR had prepared the Trans-Baikal and two Far Eastern fronts, the Pacific Fleet and the Amur Flotilla for war with the Japanese Empire and its satellites. The allies of the USSR were the army of the Mongolian People's Republic and the partisans of northeast China and Korea. In total, 1 million 747 thousand Soviet troops started the war with Japan. The enemy had approximately 60% of this number under arms.
The USSR was opposed by approximately 700 thousand Japanese in the Kwantung Army, and another 300 thousand people in the armies of the Manchurian Empire (Manchukuo), Inner Mongolia and other protectorates.
The 24 main divisions of the Kwantung Army had 713,729 men. The Manchu army numbered 170 thousand people. Army of Inner Mongolia - 44 thousand people. From the air, these forces were to be supported by the 2nd Air Army (50,265 people).
The backbone of the Kwantung Army consisted of 22 divisions and 10 brigades, including: 39,63,79,107,108,112,117,119,123,122,124,125,126,127,128,134,135,136,138,148,149 divisions, 79,80,130,13 1,132,134,135,136 mixed brigades, 1st and 9th tank brigades. The strength of the Kwantung Army and the 2nd Air Army reached 780 thousand people (perhaps, however, the real number was less due to a shortage in the divisions).
After the start of the Soviet offensive, on August 10, 1945, the Kwantung Army subordinated the 17th Front defending the south of Korea: 59,96,111,120,121,137,150,160,320 divisions and 108,127,133 mixed brigades. Since August 10, 1945, the Kwantung Army had 31 divisions and 11 brigades, including 8 created from the rear and mobilized Japanese of China since July 1945 (250 thousand Japanese of Manchuria were called up). Thus, at least a million people were deployed against the USSR as part of the Kwantung Army, the 5th Front in Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, the 17th Front in Korea, as well as the troops of Manchukuo Di-Go and Prince Dewan.
Due to the considerable number of the enemy, its fortifications, the scale of the planned offensive, and possible counterattacks, the Soviet side expected quite significant losses in this war. Sanitary losses were estimated at 540 thousand people, including 381 thousand people in battle. The death toll was expected to reach 100-159 thousand people. At the same time, the military sanitary departments of the three fronts predicted 146,010 casualties in battle and 38,790 sick.
The calculation of the probable losses of the Transbaikal Front is as follows:
However, having an advantage in people by 1.2 times, in aviation - by 1.9 times (5368 versus 1800), in artillery and tanks - by 4.8 times (26,137 guns versus 6,700, 5,368 tanks versus 1,000), the Soviet The troops managed to quickly, in 25 days, and effectively defeat a huge enemy group, suffering the following losses:
Dead - 12,031 people, medical - 24,425 people, total: 36,456 people. The 1st Far Eastern Front lost the most - 6,324 dead, the 2nd Far Eastern Front lost 2,449 dead, the Trans-Baikal Front - 2,228 dead, the Pacific Fleet - 998 dead, the Amur Flotilla - 32 dead. Soviet losses were approximately equal to American losses during the capture of Okinawa. The Mongolian army lost 197 people: 72 killed and 125 wounded, out of 16 thousand people. A total of 232 guns and mortars, 78 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 62 aircraft were lost.
The Japanese estimate their losses in the Soviet-Japanese War of 1945 at 21 thousand dead, but in reality their losses were four times higher. 83,737 people died, 640,276 people were captured (including 79,276 prisoners after September 3, 1945), a total of irretrievable losses - 724,013 people. The Japanese lost irrevocably 54 times more than the USSR.
The difference between the size of enemy forces and irretrievable losses - approximately 300 thousand people - is explained by mass desertion, especially among the Japanese satellite troops, and the demobilization of the practically incapacitated "July" divisions, begun in mid-August by the Japanese command. Captured Manchus and Mongols were quickly sent home; only 4.8% of non-Japanese military personnel ended up in Soviet captivity.
There are estimates of 250 thousand people Japanese military personnel and civilians killed in Manchuria during the Soviet-Japanese War of 1945 and its immediate aftermath in labor camps. In reality, 100 thousand fewer died. In addition to those who died during the Soviet-Japanese War of 1945, there were those who died in Soviet captivity:
Apparently, these data do not include 52 thousand Japanese prisoners of war who were repatriated to Japan directly from Manchuria, Sakhalin and Korea, without being sent to camps in the USSR. Directly at the fronts, 64,888 Chinese, Koreans, sick and wounded people were released. In front-line concentration points of prisoners of war, 15,986 people died before being sent to the USSR. By February 1947, 30,728 people had died in camps in the USSR. Another 15 thousand prisoners died by the time Japanese repatriation ended in 1956. Thus, a total of 145,806 Japanese died as a result of the war with the USSR.
In total, combat losses in the Soviet-Japanese War of 1945 reached 95,840 people killed.
Sources:
The Great Patriotic War: figures and facts - Moscow, 1995
Prisoners of war in the USSR: 1939-1956. Documents and materials - Moscow, Logos, 2000
History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union of 1941-1945 - Moscow, Voenizdat, 1965
Medical support for the Soviet army in the operations of the Great Patriotic War - 1993
Smirnov E.I. War and military medicine. - Moscow, 1979, pages 493-494
Hastings Max THE BATTLE FOR JAPAN, 1944-45 - Harper Press, 2007