Homeless assistance service. Center for social adaptation for persons without a fixed place of residence and occupation named after E.P.
Kaluga State Pedagogical University
them. K.E. Tsiolkovsky
Department of History and Political Science
Zemsky Sobors in the history of Russia
Abstract of a 3rd year student
Faculty of Psychology
FP groups – 311
Latysheva Evgenia
Kaluga, 2005
1. Historiography……………………………………………………3
2. What are Zemstvo Sobors…………………………………………..6
3. The largest zemstvo cathedrals………………………………….…...10
4. Cathedral Code of 1649……………………………………..14
5. Periodization of the history of zemstvo councils………………………....17
6. Classification of Zemsky Sobors…………………………………..18
7. Conclusions…………………………………………………………….....20
8. References…………………………………………………………….22
HISTORIOGRAPHY
The question of zemstvo councils of the 16th – 17th centuries. was one of the most popular problems of noble-bourgeois historiography. Interest in this problem, in addition to its purely scientific significance, was largely due to the fact that noble-bourgeois historians often looked for a prototype of representative institutions in zemstvo cathedrals, the introduction of which, it seemed to them, should have become a condition further development political system in Russia in the 19th-20th centuries.
An appeal to the past of state institutions seemed to show the direction of the Russian autocracy along the path of transforming it into a bourgeois monarchy without revolutionary upheavals and coups. It is no coincidence that attention to zemstvo councils intensified during the periods of the first and second revolutionary situations and during the revolution of 1905-1907.
In the volumes “History of Russia from Ancient Times”, published annually since 1851, book after book, by S. M. Solovyov, the material related to the Zemsky Councils was systematized and their actual history was reproduced. The source base for studying the activities of zemstvo councils at that time was still very insufficient. Mostly these were official materials published in the “Collection of State Charters and Treaties” and in publications of the Archaeographic Commission; some data are given in the “History” of N. M. Karamzin. Soloviev also used some new archival documentation (for example, embassy files). Therefore, the history of the study of zemstvo cathedrals can begin with his work.
Further study of zemstvo councils was associated with the introduction of new sources into scientific circulation and a more complete use of those already known in the press. New materials identified by I. N. Zhdanov made it possible to more comprehensively master the activities of Stoglav in 1551 as a church-state meeting of a special type, which he called the “church-zemsky council.” S. F. Platonov extracted a number of information about zemstvo cathedrals from the “palace ranks” and “rank books.” I. I. Dityatin discovered in the archives of the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs documents about the cathedral of 1651 (conciliar act, voivodeship replies, letter of conscription for the cathedral, verdict on the election of representatives) and other materials from the 17th century.
In connection with the study of the Zemsky Sobor of 1648-1649, the thoughts of scientists turned to the Council Code as a source. One of the tasks of the source analysis of the monument was to establish the extent to which elected people took part in its development. The condition for solving this problem was the use of a versatile methodology: studying the text of the Council Code, making notes in the margins, comparing it with other sources, etc.
A new stage in the study of zemstvo cathedrals was opened by the research of V. O. Klyuchevsky. He put forward three methodological premises. Firstly, we must proceed from the fact that zemstvo councils are “a special type of popular representation, different from Western representative assemblies,” where there was a struggle between social classes and social classes with government. Secondly, it is necessary to study “the connection of ancient Russian zemstvo councils with the soil that grew them, with native institutions”, to find out “which social worlds sent these representatives to the councils, when they arose and how these worlds were structured, who and why they chose as their representatives.” Thirdly, it is necessary to grasp “the prospects in the history of conciliar representation: whether this institution had any development, historical growth, or whether it froze in the same way as it was born, remaining a political runt.”
In Soviet literature, the topic of zemstvo councils did not immediately take its rightful place. In the 20-40s, articles appeared that introduced new materials about individual councils into scientific circulation: 1613, 1616, 1639, 1683-1684. Regarding general concepts development of this political body, they basically adhered to the ideas that developed in pre-revolutionary historiography.
A number of interesting considerations regarding zemstvo councils were expressed by V.K. Nikolsky. As if summing up the results of the study of this institution in pre-revolutionary historiography, he emphasized its complexity and the variety of specific forms of manifestation.
A series of new research in this area began with an article by M. N. Tikhomirov. The author, first of all, formulated his attitude to those disagreements on the issue of Zemstvo Councils, which emerged in pre-revolutionary literature. He emphasized that he was closer to the approach to the topic of V. N. Latkin (the Russian cathedral is a representative body of the European type) than that of V. O. Klyuchevsky (the Russian cathedral is a “political runt”). Noting that “the question of zemstvo councils in the conditions of powerless autocratic Russia of the 19th century is not only a historical, but also a political issue,” Tikhomirov considered it a timely and urgent task to re-turn to the study of cathedrals as estate-representative institutions. The author reviewed the data on all known councils of the 17th century, showing the conditions and consequences of their convening.
Currently, the history of zemstvo cathedrals is still of interest to researchers. The cathedrals left many legal monuments (codes, codes of law, etc.), which are of great historical interest.
WHAT ARE ZEMSKY SOBRAS
Zemsky Sobors were the central estate-representative institution of Russia in the mid-16th and 17th centuries. The appearance of zemstvo councils is an indicator of the unification of Russian lands into a single state, the weakening of the princely-boyar aristocracy, the growth of the political importance of the nobility and, in part, the upper classes of the town. The first Zemsky Sobors were convened in the mid-16th century, during the years of intensified class struggle, especially in cities. Popular uprisings forced the feudal lords to unite to pursue policies that strengthened state power, economic and political position of the ruling class. Not all zemstvo councils were properly organized class-representative assemblies. Many of them were convened so urgently that there could be no question of choosing local representatives to participate in them. In such cases, in addition to the “consecrated cathedral” (the highest clergy), the Boyar Duma, the capital’s servicemen and commercial and industrial people, persons who happened to be in Moscow on official and other business spoke on behalf of the district servicemen. There were no legislative acts defining the procedure for selecting representatives to councils, although the idea of them arose.
The Zemsky Sobor included the Tsar, the Boyar Duma, the entire Consecrated Cathedral, representatives of the nobility, the upper classes of the townspeople (merchants, large merchants), i.e. candidates of the three classes. The Zemsky Sobor as a representative body was bicameral. The upper chamber included the Tsar, the Boyar Duma and the Consecrated Council, who were not elected, but participated in it in accordance with their position. Members of the lower house were elected. The procedure for elections to the Council was as follows. From the Discharge Order, the voivodes received instructions on elections, which were read out to city residents and peasants. After this, class elective lists were compiled, although the number of representatives was not fixed. Voters gave instructions to their elected officials. However, elections were not always held. There were cases when, during an urgent convening of a council, representatives were invited by the king or officials locally. In the Zemsky Sobor, a significant role was played by the nobles (the main service class, the basis of the royal army), and especially merchant people, since their participation in this government agency the solution of monetary problems depended on providing funds for state needs, primarily defense and military. Thus, in the Zemsky Sobors a policy of compromise between various layers of the ruling class was manifested.
The regularity and duration of meetings of Zemsky Sobors were not regulated in advance and depended on the circumstances and the importance and content of the issues discussed. In some cases, Zemsky Sobors functioned continuously. They resolved the main issues of foreign and domestic policy, legislation, finance, state building. Issues were discussed by estate (in chambers), each estate submitted its written opinion, and then, as a result of their generalization, a conciliar verdict was drawn up, adopted by the entire composition of the Council. Thus, government authorities had the opportunity to identify the opinions of individual classes and groups of the population. But in general, the Council acted in close connection with the tsarist government and the Duma. Councils met on Red Square, in the Patriarchal Chambers or the Assumption Cathedral of the Kremlin, and later in the Golden Chamber or the Dining Hut.
It must be said that the zemstvo councils, as feudal institutions, did not include the bulk of the population - the enslaved peasantry. Historians suggest that only a single time, at the council of 1613, was apparently attended by a small number of representatives of the Black Sowing peasants.
In addition to the name “Zemsky Sobor”, this representative institution in the Moscow state had other names: “Council of the Whole Earth”, “Cathedral”, “General Council”, “Great Zemstvo Duma”.
Zemsky Sobor 1651
Among the popular movements of the mid-17th century. especially great value has the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people under the leadership of Bogdan Khmelnitsky, which prepared the reunification of Ukraine with Russia as part of the Russian state. This major political act was previously considered at zemstvo councils. Back in January 1650, the Russian ambassadors in Warsaw G. G., S. G. Pushkin and clerk Gavrila Leontyev, in their negotiations with representatives of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, reproaching the Polish authorities for violating the terms of the peace treaty of 1634, spoke about the tsar’s intention to convene Moscow Zemsky Sobor to consider “royal untruths” 1281.
The council was convened in 1651. 1282 The royal letter from January 31, 1651 to Krapivna governor Vasily Astafiev reached us about the selection “for our royal, great, and zemstvo, and Lithuanian cause” and sending to Moscow “for a period, for the national team Sunday" (February 19) two "best nobles" and two "best" townspeople 1283. As can be seen from the text, this is not the first letter to the Krapivensky governor (“it was written from us to you in advance...”). Consequently, organizational activities began before January 31, 1651.
Letters to other cities with the same content are unknown to us, but the archives of the Discharge contain the voivodes’ responses to them, which give (albeit sparingly) an idea of how the election campaign of 1284 took place. We know 47 such replies in 44 cities: Aleksin, Arzamas, Belgorod, Belev, Volkhov, Borovsk, Vereya, Vladimir, Volok, Voronezh, Yelets, Zaraysk, Zvenigorod, Kaluga, Karachev, Kashira, Kozelsk, Kolomna, Krapivna, Kursk, Livny , Likhvin, Lukha, Moshchovsk, Mozhaisk, Murom, Mtsensk, Nizhny Novgorod, Novosili, Odoev, Orel, Pereyaslavl Zalessky, Pereyaslavl Ryazansky, Putivl, Rylsk, Ryazhsk, Sevsk, Serpeisk, Serpukhov, Suzdal, Tula, Cherni, Shatsk, Yuryev Polsky . At the same time, two replies were preserved for Vladimir, Pereyaslavl Ryazansky and Rylsk. One might think that these are not all the cities where elections were held, but only those under the jurisdiction of the Discharge, and even then, probably not all.
From the replies it is clear that the royal letters were received in different cities not at the same time. The earliest (January 27) received them were the governors of Borovsk and Vladimir 1285. In other cities, notices about the cathedral were sent to the most last days January or February, some governors received them late (“after... the indicated date”) 1286.
The norms for representation (“best people”) are not the same for different cities: two noblemen and two townspeople; one of the nobles, one of the townspeople, people; two noblemen, one townsman; 4 noblemen, one townsman. Sometimes we're talking about only about nobles or only about townspeople. Probably, the allocation of “electors” to cities depended on the size and composition of the population.
The governors report on the progress of the elections. They proceeded differently. The Arzamas governor writes that he did not fulfill the tsar’s instructions and did not send out the “elected people” by the deadline, because the letter from Moscow came to him late in 1287. In a number of cities there were no townspeople, so the election of delegates from among them did not take place: “and the townspeople, sir, people... there is not a single person... and I, your servant, have no one to choose” (Aleksin); “Of the townspeople, there is no one better to choose, sir, because... the townspeople best people taken to your, the sovereign’s, stone fence business as kissers...” (Zvenigorod); “And the townspeople, sir, people... there is not a single person” (Kozelsk); “But there are no townspeople, sir” (Mtsensk, Sevsk). A demand came to Rylsk for two townspeople. The voivode first replied: “And from the townspeople, sir, there is no one to choose from, because the townspeople... are few, but who, sir, are the townspeople, and they are in your business, sir, in the tavern and in the customs collection in tselovalniki", but a few days later one Rylsk townsman was sent to Moscow 1288. The letter from Krapivna said that there were only three townspeople there, “and they were thin, wandering around the yard”; therefore, the governor chose “instead of the best townspeople” the boyar’s son, who “lives in the settlement in Krapivna and often has ... the sovereign’s many affairs with the regimentals from the boyars and the governor as clerks,” and the Krapivna gunner 1289. The Livensky voivode reported that due to the absence of any townspeople, “except for the bobs and janitors,” he selected one of the bobs and sent one blacksmith to Moscow 1290. In fact, it was no longer a choice, but an appointment 1291. Ryazhsky townspeople elected a gunner to the cathedral in 1292. There were no refusals from the governors regarding the sending of nobles to the “royal great and zemstvo and Lithuanian cause”.
The voivodeship reports are very laconic, so there is not a lot of specific information about the elections in them. Usually they are limited to a short and unclear formula: I, voivode such and such (or we, voivode and clerk such and such) “chose” (“chose”) such and such and “sent” (“sent”) or “ordered” (“ordered”) them to appear in Moscow to the Discharge Order 1293. This formula, taken by itself, can give rise to the assumption that the governor himself chose who to send to the Zemsky Sobor. That local administrators showed autocracy is indisputable: they replaced the Krapivensky governor as an “elected” townsman with a boyar’s son. But this was arbitrariness, not the usual order. A literal understanding of the verb “chose” as “put forward at his own discretion” would mean the absence of a system of elected representation in Rus'. Obviously, the word “chose” in relation to the governor must be understood in the sense that he held the elections.
The impersonal expression “chosen” is distinguished by great uncertainty, which we find in the message of the Arzamas governor: “And by your sovereign... decree, two people were chosen from the Arzamas nobles... and from the townspeople, sir, two people were chosen... And by by choice, sir, I, your servant, sent those nobles and townspeople to you, sir...” 1294. Now the question arises: by whom were they chosen?
In a number of replies there is a direct indication that the nobles and townspeople elected their representatives themselves (separately from each other). Thus, the Voronezh voivode wrote: “... the Voronezh residents, the boyar children, chose two people from the boyar children..., and the townspeople chose the townsman...” 1295. The same was the case in Luhu 1296, Vereya 1297. In Krapivna, only nobles and boyar children held elections “among themselves” 1298. In Odoev, both servicemen and townspeople elected two people each 1299.
In some cases it is said that the voivodes received from the voters a “choice” for elected delegates (unsubscribes from Vereya 1300, Novosili 1301). The Novosilsk “choice” - the verdict of 58 nobles and boyar children dated February 15, 1651 on the election of two people to the Zemsky Sobor came in its own form. It is said about the “elected” that they are “suitable and intelligent for the sovereign, royal, and great, and zemstvo, and Lithuanian affairs...” 1302. Probably writing “choice” was mandatory.
Apparently, before the “selection” was formalized, local service people were interviewed (“fairy tales” were taken from them) about a possible candidate. The Murom voivode described this procedure as follows: “And according to... your, sovereign... decree, I, your servant, ordered both halves of the Murom noblemen to gather in Murom in a hut for both halves and choose from one half, according to the fairy tale of the nobles, the nobleman Subota Semenov son of Chaadaev, and from the other half of the nobleman Gavril Ivanov, son of Chertkov" 1303.
In some cities, the population showed indifference to the elections. Sometimes governors took their implementation into their own hands and began to act administratively. In Pereyaslavl Ryazan, almost the same thing happened as in 1648. The Voivode sent gunners and zatinshchiki to all the camps of the Ryazan district with a call to the “elected nobles” to come to the city for elections to the Zemsky Council. On February 14, “not many people arrived,” the voivode wrote, “and I, your servant, have nothing to choose from.” The arriving nobles brought to the retreat hut a list of 8 names of those who should be involved in the “sovereign’s business,” and the governor, simply pasting the list under the unsubscribe, sent it to Moscow 1304.
Something similar happened in Karachev. At the call of the governor, “not many” nobles and boyar children came to the city. They showed the governor that there were 12 Karachevites on the “selected” list. He sent a gunner and archers after them a second time. Pushkar did not find them at home. Only two of the “elected nobles” came to the city, and the governor sent them to Moscow as “elected” participants in the Zemsky Sobor of 1305.
Great unrest among the Krapiven nobility was caused by the arbitrariness of the governor, who, with his own authority, sent the son of the boyar Fedos Stepanovich Bogdanov to the cathedral, while it was necessary to send a townsman of his choice. A collective petition was filed against Bogdanov “by the whole city” (on behalf of nobles, boyar children, Cossacks, archers, gunners, zatinshchiki and “all ranks of people”), in which he was called a “thief” and “setter” and was accused of He, having “met” with the governor V. Astafiev, went to Moscow. The petitioners wrote that they did not choose such a “thief and schemer” for the “sovereign’s great cause,” and did not give him a “choice,” and he could not be involved in the “sovereign’s royal cause.” They asked to evict Bogdanov from Krapivna, delete him from the list of service people - Solovlyans, and exclude him from the membership of the Zemsky Sobor. On the petition there is a note from the Duma clerk Semyon Zaborovsky: “The Emperor granted him permission, did not order him to attend to his business, ordered him to leave him” 1306.
Bogdanov filed a counter petition, in which he accused the nobles N.I. Khripkov and R.I. Satin with their son and friends of drawing up a complaint against himself. According to Bogdanov, it was they (and not he at all) who “met” with the governor and, in order to drive him, Bogdanov, out of the city, they ordered the governor to “elect him for the townspeople as elected people.” When he arrived in Moscow, they began to “to expel and disgrace,” they wrote a false petition against him. Khripkov and Satin themselves, according to Bogdanov, “are rich people and loudmouths and every person is their fighter, they were chosen as elected people ... according to their own strength and wealth,” and “they are not fit for any sovereign’s business” 1307.
Obviously, during the elections to the Zemsky Sobor in a number of provincial cities of the Russian state, contradictions openly manifested themselves between local service people and the administrative administration, as well as between various layers and groupings of the nobility. The governors sought to appoint candidates they liked as deputies and acted in circumvention of existing norms, used their authority, proximity to certain social circles, resorted to illicit means in the election struggle, pitted people against each other. separate groups voters. Service people opposed their “elected” candidates to the voivodeship candidates; in the struggle for various noble candidates, blocs were created among the nobles, using brute force, blackmail, and slander to eliminate opponents. But it also happened that city nobles and boyar children avoided participating in the elections. This could mean political indifference, and, on the contrary, be a special form of political opposition.
The literature does not always tell exactly how the Zemsky Council took place in 1651. V.N. Latkin writes: “The Council consisted of several meetings. The first took place on February 19. Only the ecclesiastical ranks were present, that is, the consecrated council, by which the report or “sovereign letter” was read. The clergy responded to it eight days later, i.e. February 27. The second meeting took place on February 28; It was attended by the tsar, the boyar duma and all members of the council, except for the clergy. At this meeting the above-mentioned “letter” 1308 was also read.
A. I. Kozachenko paints approximately the same picture: “...At first, only the consecrated council was convened. He began his work in Moscow on February 19, 1651. The government reported to the clergy on the state of affairs in Ukraine, on Russia's relations with Poland, as well as on the threat to Russia from Crimea, Poland and Sweden. On February 27, 1651, the clergy, led by Patriarch Joseph, presented their opinion (“advice”) to the government... Having received the response from the clergy, the government convened the full secular part of the Zemsky Sobor... The meeting of the secular part of the cathedral took place in the Dining Hut, in the Kremlin February 28 and to those gathered “according to this letter it was announced” 1309.
Some clarifications should be made to the stories of Latkin and Kozachenko. The meeting of the Zemsky Sobor in 1651 was, apparently, only incomplete, without the clergy. It took place in the Dining Hut on February 28, in the presence of the Tsar, and at it the members of the cathedral were familiarized with a note (report) specially prepared on behalf of the government, dedicated to Russian-Polish relations and the Ukrainian issue. This is what it says in the postscript to this official document: “And on February 159, on the 28th day, according to the sovereign’s decree, the steward, and the solicitor, and the Moscow nobleman, and the nobleman, and the boyar children, elected from the cities, and the guest, and the living rooms, and the cloth , and black hundreds, and settlements, and city elected merchants in the Dining Hut, according to this letter, it was announced. And the sovereign is the king and Grand Duke Alexey Mikhailovich of all Russia was at that time, and with him, the sovereign, the boyars and duma people were in the Dining Hut" 1310.
Previously, the text of the sovereign’s “letter” (report) was sent for “advice” to Patriarch Joseph and the highest clergy. As can be seen from the patriarch's response to the king, this happened on February 19, 1311. Thus, February 19 is the date not of the first meeting of the Zemsky Sobor, but of the transfer of a government note to the spiritual “council” (“according to your sovereign ... Alexei Mikhailovich of All Russia decree, the boyar and butler Prince Alexei Mikhailovich Lvov brought to us, your pilgrim, a letter, what was announced to us at the council") 1312. The tsar first wanted to find out the opinion of the ecclesiastical dignitaries, and then raise the questions raised in the letter at the Zemsky Council. We do not know how the discussion of the royal “letter” took place at the council of the highest hierarchs of the church. It is possible that the government note was “announced” at the spiritual council by boyar A. M. Lvov, or perhaps the latter’s mission was limited to handing it over to the patriarch, but it was discussed without secular persons.
The response of the patriarch and other church hierarchs was received by the tsar on February 27, and the next day, February 28, the Zemsky Sobor was already listening to the tsar’s “letter” (report), which had just been discussed in spiritual circles 1313. The “letter” should be dated before February 19, 1651, when it was handed over to the patriarch. It was probably written around February 19, the supposed date of the Zemsky Sobor, which is indicated in a number of documents.
The government note (report) raises two questions:
1) about the “untruths” of the Polish kings Wladyslaw and John Casimir
and lords' rads committed in violation of the peace treaty of 1634;
2) about the readiness of Bogdan Khmelnitsky to transfer to Russian citizenship. It is indicated that it is necessary to familiarize those gathered with this text (“and at the cathedral speak all sorts of chips out loud to the people...”) and convince them of the disloyal actions of the Polish authorities (“so that all sorts of people would be aware of their lies by the rulers of the Moscow State”) 1314.
The compilers of the “letter” strive to provide more material indicating a violation of treaty norms by the Polish side. At the same time, the principle of clarity in displaying material was proclaimed, achieved by comparing the points of “eternal completion” and cases of deviation from them by Polish statesmen(“...and the grind is written out of the eternal end and from the state’s approval, and how after the eternal approval from the royal side many untruths were committed, but there were no corrections in that from the king and from the lords”) 1315. The “letter” sets out the contents of the 1634 treaty and provides facts of its violation by the Polish side, failure to fulfill the promises of the Polish embassies, and protests of the Russian government. We are talking primarily about causing moral damage to the Russian autocracy (distortion of the royal title in diplomatic correspondence, “evil disgraces and reproaches” directed through printed works to the Russian tsars, “which not only the great sovereign, the Christian anointed of God, and the common man could hear and endure impossible and scary to imagine") 1316. Along with the desire to protect the “honor of autocratic monarchs,” the “letter,” intended for announcement at the Zemstvo Council, takes under protection from “dishonors and reproaches” and “the Moscow state... all ranks of people” 1317.
On behalf of the Zemsky Sobor, the state “letter” raises the question of the trial and execution at the Sejm of persons guilty of belittling the prestige of the Russian tsars and insulting the dignity of their subjects. This aspect of the matter is emphasized repeatedly.
The government note (report) ends brief description international relations. Jan Casimir of Poland “exiles” with the Crimean Khan; both of them “are planning to fight and ruin the Moscow state,” and are trying to use Sweden for these purposes. Against such an international background, the fact reported to the Zemsky Sobor that Bogdan Khmelnitsky “with the entire Zaporozhian army” addressed the Russian government with a request for citizenship acquires considerable significance.
The last phrase in the sovereign’s “letter” contains the question: what to do if John Casimir, King of Poland, and the lords are glad “according to the agreement of correction and for the sovereign’s honor, the guilty will not be executed” and will continue to refer “to the war against the Muscovite state with the Crimean Khan. ..” 1318 Members of the Zemsky Sobor must answer this question. Its full composition, determined by the royal decree, is placed before the text of the government letter: “The Sovereign Tsar and Grand Duke Alexei Mikhailovich of All Russia indicated the Lithuanian decision to hold a council, and at the council to be: the patriarch, and the metropolitan, and the archbishop, and the bishop, and the black power , and boyars, and okolnichy, and Duma people, and steward, and attorney, and Moscow nobles, and deacons, and nobles from cities, and guests, and merchants, and people of all ranks" 1319. The clergy considered the royal “letter” separately from other class groups and sent a written response.
If the Polish king did not agree to satisfy the demands of the Russian government, the church gave permission to terminate the Russian-Polish “eternal consummation” by joining the Zaporozhye army to Russia. If the king meets the claims presented to him from the Russian side, then, the clergy declared, the Russian government will be free to resolve the Ukrainian issue as it sees fit 1320. Thus, consent was given to the annexation of Ukraine.
We do not know any other answers from class groups to the question of “how to be.” The government was satisfied with the opinion of the clergy, and at a meeting of the secular members of the council on February 28 (where the clergy were absent) it limited itself to “announcing” the “letter.” Judging from the original full list of participants at the council, this was probably a departure from the broader program of discussing all "ranks" (as had been the case in 1653). Now Russia was not yet ready for the war for Ukraine 1321.
1281 TsGADA, f. 79, op. 1, 1650, book. 78, pp. 258-259 volume: “And about those royal majesty’s untruths in the reigning city of Moscow, our sovereign, the king and the Grand Duke Alexei Mikhailovich of All Russia, the autocrat and sovereign and owner of many states, orders to hold a council, and at the council he orders the patriarch, and the metropolitan, and the archbishop to be , and the bishop, and the abbot, and the entire consecrated cathedral, and his royal majesty's boyars, and the entire synclite and all ranks of people, and those of the royal majesty and you lords are glad to see all the lies that were corrected on the royal majesty's side, at the cathedral he orders to subtract Those of the Royal Majesty and you gentlemen were glad of lies to all people.” See also: Solovyov S. M. History of Russia since ancient times, book. V (vol. 9-10). M., 1961, p. 559.
1282 The Council of 1651 is poorly covered in the literature. About him, see: Dityatin I.I. On the issue of zemstvo councils of the 17th century. - “Russian Thought”, 1883, book. XII, p. 84-100; Latkin V.N. Zemsky Sobors of Ancient Rus'. St. Petersburg, 1885, p. 231-285; Kozachenko A.I. Zemsky Sobor of 1653 - “Questions of History”, 1957, No. 5, p. 151-152.
1283 Materials for the history of zemstvo cathedrals of the 17th century by Vasily Latkin. St. Petersburg, 1884, p. 91.
1284 TsGADA, f. 210, Moscow table, no. 240, pp. 374-448. Printed by V.N. Latkin: Materials for the history of zemstvo councils of the 17th century, p. 92-128, No. 1-47. For a description of these replies, see: Dityatin I.I. Decree. cit., p. 84-100.
1285 Materials for the history of zemstvo cathedrals of the 17th century, p. 93-94, 96-98, No. 3, 7, 8.
1286 Ibid., p. 92 -93, No. 1.
1287 Ibid.
1288 Ibid., p. 93, 102, 106, 113, 121, 124, No. 2, 14, 20, 28, 37, 38, 41.
1289 Ibid., p. 102-103, No. 16.
1290 Ibid., p. 108, no. 22.
1291 Shmelev G. Attitude of the population and regional administration to elections to zemstvo councils in the 17th century. - In the book: Collection of articles dedicated to V. O. Klyuchevsky. M., 1909, p. 497.
1292 Materials for the history of zemsky councils of the 17th century, p. 122, no. 39.
1293 Ibid., No. 2-8, 11-15, 18-23, 25-28, 30, 31, 33, 34, 37, 38, 40-47.
1294 Materials for the history of zemstvo councils of the 17th century, p. 92-93, No. 1.
1295 Ibid., p. 98, no. 9.
1296 Ibid., p. 109, no. 24.
1297 Ibid., p. 99, no. 10.
1298 Ibid., p. 103, no. 16.
1299 Ibid., p. 116, no. 32.
1300 Ibid., p. 99, no. 10.
1301 Ibid., p. 113, no. 29.
1302 Ibid., p. 90.
1303 Ibid., p. 110, no. 25.
1304 Ibid., p. 117-120, No. 35-36.
1305 Ibid., p. 103-104, No. 17; Shmelev G. Decree. cit., p. 497.
1306 TsGADA, f. 210, Belgorod table, no. 32, no. 3-5, 204-207; Shmelev G. Decree. op., p. 497-499.
1307 TsGADA, f. 210, Sevsky Stol, no. 143, pp. 269-271; see ibid., ll. 272-280.
1308 Latkin V.N. Decree. cit., p. 233.
1309 Kozachenko A.I. Decree. cit., p. 151-152.
1310 Reunification of Ukraine with Russia, vol. III. Compiled by: P. I. Pavlyuk, D. I. Myshko, E. S. Kompan, A. A. Bevzo, T. P. Yakovleva. M., 1953, p. 11, no. 1; see also: Materials for the history of zemsky councils of the 17th century, p. 81-86; Acts relating to the history of zemstvo councils. Ed. Yu. V. Gauthier. M., 1909, p. 64-68, No. XIX.
1311 Reunion, vol. III, p. 11, no. 2.
1312 Ibid.
1313 Ibid., p. 12, no. 2.
1314 Ibid., p. 7, no. 1.
1315 Reunion, vol. III.
1316 Ibid., p. 9, no. 1.
1317 Ibid.
1318 Ibid., p. 10-11, no. 1.
1319 Ibid.
1320 Ibid., p. 11-12, no. 2.
1321 Kozachenko L.I. Decree. cit., p. 152.
(continuation)
Conciliar verdict on accepting citizenship. – Behavior of the highest Little Russian clergy.
In Moscow, the tsar's decision to accept Little Russia as a citizen first of all tried to consolidate it with a conciliar verdict.
At the beginning of 1651, a Zemsky Sobor was convened, for discussion of which the Little Russian question was proposed along with Polish untruths, such as: non-observance of the royal title, the publication of books containing dishonor and reproaches to the Moscow officials and the sovereign himself, the plots of the Crimean Khan to jointly fight the Moscow state, etc. n. But then the Great Zemstvo Duma spoke out in favor of accepting Little Russia and in favor of a war with the Poles conditionally: if they do not correct themselves, i.e. will not give satisfaction. Obviously, the Little Russian issue has not yet matured enough in the eyes of the Moscow government; it waited to see what further circumstances would show, continuing to maintain the peace treaty with Poland, and in its diplomatic relations with it so far limited itself to complaints about the violation of the articles of “eternal consummation”, mainly about non-observance of the full royal title, as well as about the dishonor caused by the publication of books, filled with blasphemy against the Tsar and the entire Moscow state. Our government has already demanded no more, no less than death penalty the persons responsible for this, in accordance with the Sejm constitution (resolution) of 1638. Such a demand was made in 1650 by the Moscow ambassadors, the boyar and the gunsmith Grigory Le Havre. Pushkin and his comrades, and in 1651 envoys Afanasy Pronchishchev and clerk Almaz Ivanov. The king and the lords of the Rada responded to such a demand with various excuses, calling it a “small matter” and sending embassies with empty excuses, and blaming the blame on insignificant persons who were staying unknown where. With a similar answer, for example, Polish envoys, the royal nobleman Penceslavsky and the royal secretary Unechovsky, came to Moscow in July 1652. The following year, 1653, when the last desperate struggle of the Cossacks with the Poles was taking place and when Khmelnitsky’s requests to the tsar to accept Little Russia as his citizenship were especially persistent, Moscow considered it possible to intervene in this struggle, but began with diplomatic intervention.
In April, the sovereign sent the great and plenipotentiary ambassadors of the boyar-princes Boris Alexandrovich Repnin-Obolensky and Fed. to Poland. Fed. Volkonsky with the embassy clerk Almaz Ivanov and a large retinue. This embassy made the same demands for the punishment of those guilty of “registering” the royal title or belittling the “state honor”; in addition, they complained about the robberies of Polish and Lithuanian people in border cities and the removal of peasants from boyar and noble estates and estates, about treacherous links with the Crimean Khan and the passage of his ambassador to Sweden, all with the same intent, i.e., to fight Moscow together state. But all these Polish non-corrections, the Moscow ambassadors, in the name of the sovereign, proposed to be consigned to oblivion if the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth stops the persecution of the Orthodox faith, returns the churches selected for the union, ends the internecine war with the Cossacks and establishes peace with them according to the Treaty of Zborov. The lords of the council did not give any satisfactory answer to these representations, and they directly laughed at the demand for the death penalty for those guilty of registering the title; against the Cossacks Polish troops They set out on a campaign while our embassy was with them. The latter left with nothing, although he declared that His Royal Majesty would no longer tolerate Polish non-corrections, and “he will stand for the Orthodox faith and his sovereign honor, as much help as the merciful God gives.” Only at the end of September did Prince Repnin-Obolensky and his comrades return to Moscow. Here we received timely news about bad move negotiations, and, of course, they counted on this failure in advance, and therefore they had already made the appropriate decisions and were preparing for an armed struggle. These decisions, as we said, the young tsar and the Boyar Duma considered it necessary to support with solemn popular consent. For this purpose, the usual Zemsky Sobor was convened in Moscow in advance from the clergy, boyars, nobles, merchants and all ranks of people.
The Council began its meetings in June and slowly discussed an important Little Russian issue. It ended on October 1, the Feast of the Intercession of the Blessed Virgin Mary. The Tsar and the boyars listened to mass in the church of this holiday (better known under the name of St. Basil); and then with a procession of the cross he arrived at the Palace of Facets, where spiritual and elected zemstvo people gathered together with the consecrated cathedral, headed by Patriarch Nikon. At the beginning of the meeting, a statement of the above-mentioned Polish lies and Cossack harassment before the Tsar was read (by the Duma clerk); Moreover, it was reported about the arrival of the new hetman envoy Lavrin Kaputa with notification of the renewed war with the Poles and with a request for help, albeit from a small number of military men.
Zemsky Sobor. Painting by S. Ivanov
At the council, the Little Russian question was raised on a predominantly religious basis; the salvation of the Western Russian Orthodox Church from Polish persecution and from the union introduced by the Poles came to the fore. It was pointed out that King John Casimir, upon his election, swore an oath on the freedom of “different” Christian faiths and in advance allowed his subjects from allegiance and himself from obedience if he did not keep this oath and began to oppress someone for their faith; and since he did not keep his oath, then Orthodox people have become free and can now enter into citizenship of another sovereign. The officials of the Zemsky Sobor cast their votes in the usual manner. Their answers, of course, had already been formed in advance and were now clothed only in a solemn form. The opinion of the consecrated cathedral was already known. Subsequently, the boyars in their response focused mainly on persecuted Orthodoxy, as well as on the fear that the Zaporozhye army, out of necessity, would not succumb to the Busurman sovereigns, the Turkish Sultan or the Crimean Khan; therefore, they concluded, one should “take Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the entire Zaporozhye army with cities and lands under the high sovereign hand.” After the boyars, the same was repeated by court officials, nobles and boyar children, archery heads, guests, merchants and black hundreds and taxable people of palace settlements. According to custom, service people expressed their readiness to fight the Lithuanian king for the sovereign honor, not sparing their heads, and merchants pledged to provide “assistance” (monetary) for the war and also “die their heads” for the Sovereign. Following the verdict of the council, the embassy of the boyar Vas was announced on the same day, apparently prepared in advance. You. Buturlin, steward Alferyev and Duma clerk Larion Lapukhin, who was supposed to go to Kyiv and Ukraine to swear the allegiance of the hetman, the entire Zaporozhye army, the townspeople “and all kinds of tenants” .
Although negotiations on connecting Ukraine with Great Russia were conducted primarily on a religious basis, and the Moscow government in particular brought to the fore the salvation of Orthodoxy in Little Rus', however, it is curious that the highest Little Russian clergy almost did not participate in these negotiations at all and - as we have already indicated - did not express any desire exchange Polish citizenship for Moscow. Monks and priests, on the contrary, clearly sought such a change and even went to the Moscow state in significant numbers.
The fact is that the metropolitan, bishops and abbots of the most important monasteries mostly came from the Russian gentry, who, although they still preserved Orthodoxy, had already undergone significant Polishization in their language, customs, beliefs and feelings, were very unsympathetic towards the autocratic Moscow system and looked down on the Moscow people, considering them significantly inferior to themselves in culture and almost barbarians. A clear example of this, in addition to the famous Adam Kisel, is the Orthodox Little Russian nobleman Joachim Erlich, who in his notes is hostile to the Khmelnitsky uprising and to any enemy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Kiev hierarchy at this time was of gentry origin and came out of the school of Peter Mogila, who, as is known, had family and friendly relations with the Polish aristocracy, and if he turned to Moscow, it was only for the sake of helping with schools and churches. His successor in the metropolis, Sylvester Kossov, a Belarusian nobleman by birth, just as willingly took advantage of alms from Moscow and, at her request, sent Kyiv scientists; but he valued more the duties and privileges associated with his department, was pleased with the improved position of the highest Orthodox clergy during the time of Khmelnitsky, and did not express any desire to reunite the Little Russian flock with the Great Russian one. He did not at all smile at the thought of exchanging his nominal dependence on the Patriarch of Constantinople, that is, almost complete independence, for actual subordination to the stern Moscow Patriarch. In addition, with the fall of Ukraine from Poland, the Orthodox flock was divided into two parts; for Belarus and Volyn remained with the Poles; consequently, the Kiev Metropolitan could lose both power and income in this other part of his metropolis. Therefore, he not only was not offended by the senators’ refusal to accept him into their midst, contrary to the Zboriv Treaty, but even after that he continued to act as a mediator between Khmelnytsky and the Polish government and worked for their reconciliation. Peter Mohyla’s successor at the Kiev-Pechersk Archimandry, Joseph Trizna, and partly the Kiev Brothers Archimandrite Innocent Gisel, acted in the same spirit. The Moscow government, of course, took notice. They expressed their bewilderment at their constant non-participation in the hetman’s petition for citizenship; but Khmelnitsky assured them of their secret agreement with him, and their silence was justified by the fear of revenge from the Poles if his petition was not crowned with success. When it was crowned, then the true attitude of the Little Russian hierarchs to the matter of reunification was revealed.
Regarding the Zemsky Sobor of 1651, see Latkina"Materials for the history of Zemsky Sobors of the 17th century." (His study “Zemsky Sobors of Ancient Rus'”. 231 et seq., with references to the Archive of the Ministry of Justice, St. Petersburg, 1885). Child o Zemsky Sobors ("Russian Thought". 1883. No. 12). In the Acts of Moscow. State (II. No. 459 under 1651) there is news about the election of nobles and boyar children in Krapivna to the great zemstvo and Lithuanian affairs. It is clear that we are talking about the Zemsky Sobor of 1651. The nobles chose two people. And instead of two townspeople, the governor himself appointed the son of a boyar and a gunner; for which he received a reprimand. Polish untruths are also spoken of in the order to envoys to Emperor Ferdinand III. (“Monuments of diplomatic relations” III. 95 – 97). The acts of the Zemsky Sobor of 1653 were published in S.G.G. and D. III. No. 157. II. P. 3. I. No. 104. Acts of the South. and Zap. Ross. X. No. 2. The general content of this act in the Palace Discharge. III. 369 – 372. A more complete copy of it, extracted by Mr. Latkin from Moscow. Arch. M. In. Cases, published by him in the appendices to his memorable study, 434 ff. Various opinions about this cathedral: Solovyov’s “History of Russia”. T. X. "Russian West." 1857. April. K. Aksakov "Works". I. 207. Child's mentioned work. Platonov "Notes on the history of Zemsky Sobors". J. M. H. Ave. 1883. No. 3. G. Latkin rightly proves that the meeting on October 1 was only the final, solemn one at the Council of 1653, that its meetings began on June 5, and elections for it were made in May. Confirmation is given from the Palace. Resolution (III. 372) the news that on the same day, October 1, the embassy to Ukraine was announced to boyar Buturlin and his comrades to take the oath. Consequently, it was prepared in advance in accordance with the conciliar verdict that had already taken place. Based on the hitherto incorrect idea of a one-day meeting of the council, as Latkin points out, an incorrect polemic between Solovyov and Aksakov took place about its significance in the series of zemstvo councils in general. (239–241). Tsar Alexei, on April 24, 1654, releasing the prince. Al. Nick. Trubetskoy and other governors on the campaign, said to the military people: “Last year there were cathedrals more than once, at which you elected two nobles from all cities; at these cathedrals we talked about the lies of the Polish kings.” (Soloviev. X. p. 359 of the first edition. From Polish affairs of Moscow. Arch. M. In. D.). Obviously, this refers to different sessions of the Council of 1653. Acts of Moscow. State II. Nos. 527, 530, 535, 538. (News from Putivl and Chernigov about Khmelnitsky and Vygovsky, their and the colonels’ threats to transfer to Turkish citizenship in the event of the tsar’s refusal to accept the Zaporozhye army. Art. Matveev’s embassy to Bogdan. Review of Ukrainian boyar children for preparation them for the campaign, etc.).
On January 8, 1654, the Pereyaslav Rada decided to reunite the Ukrainian people with the Russian people in one Russian state. This event was preceded, as is known, by the resolution of the Zemsky Sobor in 1653 on the acceptance of Ukraine into Russian citizenship and on the war with Poland.
Despite the great historical significance of this Council, it has not yet attracted the attention of researchers. It is therefore necessary to at least briefly highlight his activities.
Since the beginning of the liberation war of 1648, the Russian government provided extensive economic and financial assistance to the struggling Ukraine. Diplomatic support for Ukraine from Russia gradually expanded, as well as assistance in people, weapons, and ammunition. At the beginning of 1649, the Russian government recognized Hetman Khmelnytsky and from that time regularly exchanged ambassadors with him. At the same time, the government informed the hetman of its readiness to accept Ukraine into Russian citizenship, but considered it necessary to avoid war with Poland for now.
In its diplomatic speeches in Poland, the Russian government did not hide the fact that, depending on the outcome of the negotiations, the eye would bring the issue of Ukraine to the Zemsky Sobor. Thus, the Russian ambassadors G. and S. Pushkin and G. Leontyev, having arrived in Warsaw in 1650, very decisively raised the issue of “untruths” with the royal government, threatening to break off relations. At the same time, the Russian ambassadors warned the Polish government that if the lords “do not correct themselves,” then the Tsar “will order a Council to be held in Moscow” and at it “the royal untruths will be removed” and the violations of the “peaceful end” by the other side will be discussed 1 . The lords “did not reform”; in December 1650, the Sejm decided to resume the war in Ukraine.
At the end of 1650 - beginning of 1651, the hetman's embassy headed by M. Sulichich arrived in Moscow. The Russian government confronted him with the question of how to carry out the transition of Ukraine to citizenship and how to organize the future administration of Ukraine 2 . Soon after this, the Russian government for the first time considered it necessary to bring the Ukrainian question to the Zemsky Sobor. This was done by the Councils of 1651 and 1653.
At the end of January 1651, after negotiations with the embassy of M. Sulichich, the government decided to hastily convene the Zemsky Sobor. Its convocation was scheduled for February 19, 1651. In the “conscription letter” of the government dated January 31, 1651, it was ordered to choose two people from the nobles, “and from the townspeople, two people immediately,” sending the elected “by the specified date” 3 .
However, at first only the consecrated Council was convened. He started
1 S. M. Soloviev. History of Russia. Book 2. T. VI - X. St. Petersburg, b. g., p. 1596
2 "Reunification of Ukraine with Russia." Documents and materials in three volumes. T. II. M. 1953, pp. 490 - 492.
3 B. Latkin. Materials for the history of Zemsky Sobors of the 17th century in St. Petersburg. 1884, p. 91.
his work in Moscow on February 19, 1651. The government reported to the clergy on the state of affairs in Ukraine, on Russia's relations with Poland, as well as on the threat to Russia from Crimea, Poland and Sweden 4 .
On February 27, 1651, the clergy, led by Patriarch Joseph, presented their opinion (“advice”) to the government. Its meaning was this: if the Polish government “does not give justice and justice to the guilty under the agreement and eternal consummation,” then the church “can give permission” for the kissing of the cross under the agreement; in this case, “Etman from Cherkasy can be accepted with approval.” However, it was recommended that even if the Polish king was “right,” then even then the government should act according to the circumstances, as “God will tell” 5 .
Having received a response from the clergy, the government convened the full secular part of the Zemsky Sobor. Here were represented, in addition to the tsar, clergy, boyars and duma people, stewards, solicitors, Moscow nobles, nobles and boyar children, elected from cities, living rooms, cloth and black hundreds and settlements and city elected merchants. The “postscript” to the government’s report to the consecrated Council states that the meeting of the secular part of the Council took place in the “dining hut” in the Kremlin on February 28 and was announced to those gathered “according to this letter” 6 . However, in the available documents there is no information either about the decision of the secular part of the Council, or about the decision of the Council in its entirety.
Until now, historians believed that this was the result of poor preservation of the sources. Now, we think this idea should be reconsidered. The Russian government, through its ambassadors, warned Poland that it would raise the issue of the “untruths” of the Polish government at the Council. But in February 1651, only the opinion of the spiritual part of the Council was requested. The secular part of the Council was only informed of these “untruths.” However, she apparently did not make decisions on this issue, since Russia was not yet sufficiently prepared for war with Poland at that moment. The secular part of the Zemsky Sobor made this decision in its final form only in 1653. It is no coincidence that the decision of the Council of 1653, especially its first half, largely repeats the text of the materials of the Council of 1651. It can be assumed that the discussion of the issue of Ukraine at the Zemsky Sobor in 1651 was important for the Russian government in order to prepare public opinion to a war with Poland for Ukraine. This was the significance of the Council of 1651.
After this Council, the Russian government increasingly took the path of realizing the reunification of Ukraine with Russia. In this regard, the special meeting on the question of Ukraine, convened at the beginning of 1653, which was little covered in our historical literature, was very important. At one time, S. M. Solovyov mentioned this fact, but did not give it special significance. Materials about this meeting, unfortunately, were not included in the three-volume book “Reunification of Ukraine with Russia.”
The meeting began on February 22, 1653 in Moscow. The Tsar and the boyars took part in it. It ended on March 14, 1653. At this meeting, it was decided to send a great embassy to Poland, convene a Zemsky Sobor in Moscow and begin preparations for war with Poland. At the same time, it was planned to strengthen ties with Hetman Khmelnytsky and inform him of the Russian government’s consent to accept the Zaporozhian Army into its citizenship and, finally, send an embassy to the hetman “to receive” Ukraine. All these activities were carried out.
4 See “Reunification of Ukraine with Russia”. T. III. page 11.
5 Ibid., pp. 11 - 12.
6 See ibid., p. 11.
On March 19, 1653, a decree was sent “to all cities” to “be of service to people” in Moscow “by the 20th of May, with all the service, and for that period the sovereign will deign to look at Moscow, at the horse” 7.
On April 24 of the same year, it was decided to send an embassy to Poland headed by Prince B. A. Repnin-Obolensky and B. M. Khitrovo. At the same time, preparations began for the convening of the Zemsky Sobor. There is no reason to believe that the Zemsky Sobor of 1653 was convened only on October 1 and lasted only one day, as stated, for example, by S. M. Solovyov 8. As early as May 2, 1653, that is, shortly after the state meeting in February - March, the government sent out a “conscription letter” calling elected people from the nobility to Moscow. In the “Palace Discharges” for 1653, the following entry speaks about this: “On the second day of May, the sovereign’s letters were sent to Zamoskovnye and all Ukrainian cities to the governors and officials. It was ordered that in all cities two people be sent from each city of their choice nobles, good and reasonable people, and send them to Moscow for a specified period, May 20th" 9.
By the deadline, the majority of the elected officials came to Moscow 10. On the appointed day, May 20, 1653, the Zemsky Sobor began its work. This is directly indicated by the June letter we discovered from Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich to the ambassadors in Poland B. A. Repnin and B. M. Khitrovo. “Be it known,” this letter reported, “there was a Council on the seventh week in the Mayan environment on the 20th day...” The same document indicates that one question was brought to the Council - about Ukraine. The discussion dragged on; “The conversation went on for a long time,” the letter reported. “And all ranks of people were interrogated about whether to accept Cherkassy” 11.
By May 25, the unanimous opinion of the Council became clear. “And all sorts of ranks and public people unanimously spoke about this, so that Cherkassy could be accepted.” The Tsar approved this opinion, which made those present at the Council “most rejoiced” 12.
The fact that on May 25 the opinion of the Council was determined is confirmed by the surviving draft of the decision of this Council (or the report at it) 13 . Subsequently, this draft formed the basis for the final verdict of the Council, pronounced on October 1, 1653. As is known, this sentence began with a reference to the May discussion of the issue: “In the past, in the 161st year of May 25, by decree of the great sovereign... it was spoken at the council about the Lithuanian and Cherkassy affairs. And this year, in the 162nd year of October, on 1 day the great sovereign... indicated that a council should be held about the same Lithuanian and Cherkasy affairs..." 14. The expression “spoken at the Council” confirms the fact that the issue was discussed at a number of meetings of the Council, as evidenced by the above June royal letter. On October 1, the Council met with its previous composition only to formalize its final decision, prepared on May 25. This connection is indicated by the beginning of the sentence on October 1, 1653. On October 1, 1653, the Council met with the composition elected in May, since during the period from June to September 1653 there were no new elections.
The Zemsky Sobor of 1653, of course, belongs to the number of so-called “complete” Sobors. It included more than one rank or class. In the record of the "Palace ranks" the composition of the Council is defined as follows: the Tsar, the consecrated Council, the boyars, the okolnichy, the Duma people, "with the stolniks and with
7 We were talking about the general review of the Russian army, which took place on the Devichye Pole from June 13 to June 28, 1653. "Palace ranks". T. III. St. Petersburg. 1852, pp. 343, 356.
8 S. M. Soloviev. Decree. cit., p. 1631.
9 "Palace ranks". T. III, p. 350.
10 Central state archive ancient acts (TSGADA), Discharge. Belgorod Table, p. 351, pp. 346 - 351.
11 Ibid., State Archives, Rank XXVII, N 79, 1653, l. 1
14 "Reunification of Ukraine with Russia". T. III, p. 406.
solicitors, and from the Moscow nobles, and from the tenants, and from the elected townspeople..., and from the stolniks, and from the solicitors, and from the nobles, and from the tenants, and from the townspeople, there were elected people" 15.
From the very beginning, this Council included a significant part of the electors “from the cities of Zamoscovna and Ukraine” - from nobles, children of boyars and merchants 16. It also included the consecrated Council - the patriarch, two metropolitans, a bishop, abbots, as well as the Boyar Duma in full force and the tsar. It should be noted that Metropolitan Michael of Serbia also participated in the work of the Council and was especially mentioned in the verdict. In the draft decision of the Council of May 25, among the non-elected participants, also named were stewards, solicitors and noblemen of Moscow and clerks, who were present, apparently at the call of the government. The verdict of the Zemsky Sobor on October 1 speaks of a more expanded composition of its participants. In addition to those who previously participated in the work of the Council, the cathedral act also names, along with Moscow nobles, residents, then guests and living rooms and cloth hundreds and black hundreds, and palace settlements and all ranks of people, and archers. In the final part of the verdict on October 1, moreover, the heads of the Streltsy were named and it was clarified that taxable people from the Black Hundreds and palace settlements participated 17 .
Thus, the Zemsky Sobor of 1653 began its work in May in a limited composition, in which the proportion of elected representatives from the provincial nobility (2 people from the county) and merchants was relatively high. When the verdict was passed, the composition of the Council was significantly expanded to include the Moscow administrative administration, the Streltsy heads, as well as taxable merchants from the Moscow Black Hundreds, palace settlements and Streltsy. Since the statement of the opinion of these ranks in the verdict speaks only about service and trade people of “all ranks”, we can conclude that from the Black Hundreds and palace settlements only trade people were recruited, that is, in fact, townspeople, although legally they could be peasants. It was important for the government to know the opinion of merchants of all ranks, since the financing of the upcoming war was connected with this.
The Zemsky Sobor of 1653 opened on May 20, met with long interruptions and completed its work only on October 1. On May 25, when the unanimous consent of the Council members to the annexation of Ukraine was determined and a draft of its verdict had already been drawn up, the work of the Council was interrupted. This break can be established not only from the above quote from the verdict of October 1. In the list of cities we found in the archives, from which “nobles were sent to Moscow by sovereign decree and were at the cathedral” in 1653, those cities are also named from where “the nobles came after the cathedral.” Those who arrived after May 25, 18 are included in the list of absentees.
The government was going to resume the activities of the Council on June 5. This is evidenced by letters sent from the Discharge to Kursk, Putivl, Sevsk and Voronezh. Thus, in a letter received in Kursk on May 30, it was ordered that the elected officials who did not appear should be sent “to Moscow to the Discharge for the period of June by the 5th” 19 .
How can we explain the break in the meetings of the Council? This is answered directly by the royal letter sent to Poland in June to B. A. Repnin and B. M. Khitrovo. Having announced the agreement of the Zemsky Sobor to “receive Cherkassy,” the government announced the adjournment of the meetings of the Council until the ambassadors returned from Poland: “and we postponed this until you...” 20 .
15 "Palace ranks". T. III, p. 369.
16 TsGADA, Discharge, Sevsky table, pp. 145, 148. Belgorod table, pp. 351, 362, 366; Polish Affairs, 1653, NN 6 and 8.
17 "Reunification of Ukraine with Russia". T. III, pp. 407, 414.
18 TsGADA, Discharge, Belgorod table, p. 351, l. 352a.
19 Ibid., Sevsky Table, p. 148, pp. 152, 154, 179.
20 Ibid., State Archives, Rank XXVII, N 79, l. 1.
It is known that the embassy, which left for Poland on April 30, completed negotiations only on August 7 and returned to Moscow only in September 21. That is why the Council did not resume its work on June 5, since the government intended in its decision to take into account the results of the embassy of Prince B. A. Repnin and B. M. Khitrovo.
The government was well aware of the sentiments of all the ranks of the Zemsky Sobor. In this regard, the departure of the embassy of A. Matveev and I. Fomin to Ukraine in early June becomes clear. A. Matveev later stated that he was “sent to Hetman Khmelnytsky to call for citizenship” 22 .
Already on June 22, the government, with a royal letter, notified the hetman of its agreement to accept Ukraine as citizenship. This letter was also sent after the preliminary opinion of the Zemsky Sobor was revealed. Information received shortly before about the growth of aggressive aspirations on the part of Turkey accelerated this step of the government. The royal letter of June 22, 1653 notified the hetman of his readiness to accept Ukraine and that “our military people... are recruiting and building for the militia”; the government proposed to mutually exchange ambassadors 23 .
Meanwhile, there was still no news from the embassy of Prince B. A. Repnin from Poland. Then it was decided to send ambassadors R. Streshnev and M. Bredikhin to the hetman. They had to inform the hetman that the government was waiting for the return of B. A. Repnin’s embassy to make a final decision. At the same time, it was instructed to clarify with the hetman issues of future joint military operations, to scout out the forces of enemies, etc.
Streshnev and Bredikhin left Moscow on September 13, and in the middle of that month news was received that the embassy from Poland was returning. Therefore, on September 20, a royal letter was sent to M. Bredikhin and R. Streshnev, in which the government invited the ambassadors to notify the hetman that the royal decree would be sent “soon” through the hetman’s personal representative L. Kapusta, who arrived in Moscow at that time. At the same time, the ambassadors were punished to inform the hetman about accepting Ukraine as citizenship if the battle with the royal army had already taken place, and, conversely, that the hetman should wait for the decree if the battle had not yet taken place 24.
This directive of the Russian government in no way gives reason to perceive the presence of any hesitations in its policy. If the war in Ukraine resumed and the battle had already taken place, then this predetermined Russia’s entry into the war even before the final decision of the Council. If there was no battle, then a responsible decision, which should have entailed Russia’s entry into the war with Poland, should have been made with the participation of the Zemsky Sobor. The decision of the Council was necessary, since the upcoming war would inevitably require great human and material sacrifices on the part of Russia.
This was the meaning of the instructions sent by the government to Streshnev and Bredikhin. Klyuchevsky was mistaken in considering this directive a “cruel mockery.”
On September 25, 1653, the Russian ambassadors finally returned from Poland and were immediately received by the Tsar, who was at that time in the Trinity-Sergius Monastery. In September, but somewhat earlier, the hetman’s embassy arrived in Moscow, headed by Bohdan Khmelnitsky’s personal confidant, Colonel Lavrin Kapusta, Chigirinsky. L. Kapusta asked the government to immediately send to Ukraine - to Kyiv and other cities -
21 In the article list of the embassy there is a mention of the royal charter received on July 5 (TsGADA, Polish Affairs, 1653, No. 84, l. 552).
22 "The story of the innocent imprisonment... of boyar Artemon Sergeevich Matveev." St. Petersburg. 1776, p. 43.
23 "Reunification of Ukraine with Russia". T. III, p. 323.
24 See ibid., p. 406.
yes - under the governors of "military people, although with 3000 people." He reported that the horde was already near the White Church, that from Turkish Sultan Ambassadors arrived to the hetman, persistently “calling him to your citizenship,” but that the hetman “to him (the Sultan. - A.K.) He refused, but relied on the sovereign's mercy" 25.
The situation in Ukraine was indeed very serious. The response of the Polish government, delivered by B. A. Repnin and B. M. Khitrovo, spoke of Poland’s intention to resume the war in Ukraine, which had already actually begun; The hetman set out with his army on a campaign. A final decision had to be made. The Zemsky Sobor was sufficiently prepared for this during its work from May 20.
On October 1, the last, final meeting of the Zemsky Sobor took place, at which the conciliar act was approved. The meeting took place in the Kremlin, in the Faceted Chamber. It is significant that the entry for “Palace Discharges” notes that at the Council, in fact, only the question of Ukraine was discussed; relations with Poland are not even mentioned 26 . The Tsar came to the final meeting with a religious procession from St. Basil's Church. This emphasized the solemn nature of the meeting. At the Council in full, the “letter” of the government, that is, the report, was “read aloud”. Basically the first part of the report, dedicated to analysis relations between Russia and Poland after the Peace of Polyanov, repeated the report to the Council of 1651 and the draft edition of May 25, 1653. Then the results of the embassy of B. A. Repnin and B. M. Khitrovo to Poland were reported.
The embassy demanded that the Polish government stop all “untruths”, punish those responsible, and invited the king to make peace with Ukraine. The lords refused to comply with this and, in turn, demanded the complete surrender of Khmelnitsky. With the departure of the embassy, Poland resumed the war in Ukraine.
In the report to the Council, the Russian government especially emphasized that the king took an oath not to oppress Orthodox subjects, and in case of its violation, the subjects are released from the oath to the king.
The report further stated that the hetman's embassy headed by L. Kapusta had arrived in Moscow, that the war in Ukraine had resumed and was developing favorably for the Ukrainian people's army, but the lords were not giving in and in the future they intended to fight with Russia. It was also reported that the hetman requested to send at least 3 thousand military men to Ukraine.
To make a decision, all ranks participating in the Council were interrogated carefully and separately. The answer was given primarily by the boyars and duma people, that is, the secular non-elected part of the Council. They spoke out for war with Poland and for the acceptance of Ukraine. The question of freeing the population of Ukraine from the oath to the Polish king was considered very important, because it affected the principles of monarchism. According to Duma officials, in connection with the violation of the oath on the part of the Polish king, the Ukrainian people were thereby freed from their oath to the king, and, therefore, the tsarist government accepted “free people” and not rebels. “And according to this, they sentenced everything: accept Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the entire Zaporozhye Army with cities and lands” 27.
After this, the opinion of the elected people was sought. They were interviewed according to class groups. All of them spoke out in favor of declaring war on Poland, “for the honor” of the Tsar, “to stand and wage war against the Lithuanian King.” A special conciliar act reports the unanimous decision of elected representatives of the two main classes - service people and townspeople. The service people promised that they would “fight without sparing their heads.
25 Ibid. page 412.
26 "Palace ranks". T. III. pp. 369 - 372.
27 "Reunification of Ukraine with Russia". T. III, p. 414.
and for the sake of dying for their sovereign honor." Posad, trade "people of all ranks" "people are helping and for their sovereign honor their heads will die for the sake of." These assurances of servicemen and townspeople, of course, were especially important for the government. In general, the elected part The Council strongly recommended that the government accept Ukraine into Russian citizenship. “And the great sovereign would grant Hetman Bohdan Khmelnitsky... according to their petition, he ordered them to be accepted under his sovereign high hand” 28 .
As we see, in the conciliar act of October 1, 1653, there is no mention of the opinion of the clergy consecrated by the Council, and this is not accidental, since this opinion was already expressed on February 27, 1651 at the first Zemsky Council, dedicated to the issue of Ukraine.
How did the Council’s verdict on October 1 differ from the draft decision (or government report) on May 25? In general, the verdict sounds more decisive, referring to the justification for the break with Poland and the adoption of Ukraine as citizenship, while in the draft this intention was not formulated. It recalled the obligation of the parties not to lay claim to other people’s lands, “and not to fight or encroach on both sides of the land, and to put aside all sorts of old and new matters that have long been forgotten and to reconcile and move forward... do not take revenge on any unfriendships” 29 .
The verdict does not mention this. But it strengthens the indictment against the Polish government with reference to the results of the embassy of B. A. Repnin and B. M. Khitrovo. For example, it is reported about the king’s relations with the khan, about the passage of Crimean ambassadors to Sweden “for quarrels and war.” The verdict also strengthened the concept of the liberation war of the Ukrainian people, providing an explanation of the reasons for Bohdan Khmelnytsky’s alliance with the khan and the hetman’s appeals to Russia.
The verdict accuses the Polish king Jan Casimir of violating his oath of religious tolerance and thereby substantiates the right of Ukrainians to consider themselves free from the oath to the Polish king. Finally, and most importantly, the verdict contains final part with the decision to war against Poland and accept Ukraine into Russian citizenship.
Thus, by comparing these two documents related to the beginning and end of the work of the Zemsky Sobor, we can trace a certain evolution in the views of the Russian government, its readiness to finally accept on this issue firm decision by October 1, 1653.
In accordance with the position of individual ranks in the Russian feudal-absolutist state of the mid-17th century. The participation of all these ranks in the Zemsky Sobor was also of a different nature. While the boyars and Duma people “sentenced on everything” and their sentence was entirely included in the decision of the Council, the other ranks were only interrogated “separately.” The serving people could only answer whether, according to this decision, they were ready to “fight without sparing their heads” with the king. The trading people had to answer whether they would provide the war with “assistance” or whether they would fight.
By the end of the final meeting, the Council was informed of the government's intention to send an embassy to Ukraine led by V. Buturlin in order to “bring its inhabitants to faith.” "And on this date (October 1. - A.K.) Boyar Vasily Vasilyevich Buturlin and his comrades in the Faceted Palace were told" 30, - recorded in the "Palace Discharges".
On October 4, the hetman’s embassy headed by Lavrin Kapusta left for Ukraine, and on October 9, V. Buturlin’s embassy left Moscow to “receive” Ukraine.
29 TsGADA, Polish affairs, 1653, N 6, l. 3.
30 "Palace ranks". T. III, p. 372.
The decision of the Zemsky Sobor of 1653 under the conditions of a feudal-absolutist monarchy could not be binding on the tsarist government. However, the government took the opinion of the “officials” of the state into account. It is enough to recall, for example, the royal letter to the embassy of Prince B. A. Repnin and B. M. Khitrovo regarding the interruption in the work of the Council in June 1653.
However, in relations with both new subjects, tsarism never referred to the decision of the Zemsky Sobor of 1653 and did not even mention it. An example is the royal letter sent on the second day after the decision was made to ambassadors Streshnev and Bredikhin to Ukraine, as well as the article list of the embassy of V.V. Buturlin, which “received” Ukraine 31.
For all that, the decision of the Zemsky Sobor of 1653 certainly had historical significance. It expressed the opinion of certain social circles (landowners, merchants and archers close to the masses, as well as the taxing Black Hundreds and palace settlements). The opinion of these circles represented at the Council in 1653 was undoubtedly influenced by the mood of the Russian people, their sympathetic attitude towards the struggling Ukraine. Without the categorical and unanimous verdict of the Zemsky Sobor of 1653, the tsarist government would not have risked taking Ukraine into citizenship and starting a war for it with lordly Poland.
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Zemsky Sobors are now often remembered as an ancient example of “democracy in Rus'.” From time to time, proposals are made: shouldn’t we restore zemstvo cathedrals in one form or another? Perhaps the gradual evolution of modern democracy will bring it closer to the ideal preserved by ancient Russian democracy... Or is the Zemsky Sobor a phenomenon too exotic for modern times? 2016 marks the 450th anniversary of one of the largest Zemsky Sobors, held in 1566. It's time to talk about what zemstvo councils were.
When the Russian monarch doubted whether to continue hard war, he convened a Zemsky Sobor and asked the “land”: will it cope? When the government was going to introduce a new law or set of laws, a zemstvo council was again required: how would people react to the change in legislation, would riots break out, were there any special requirements that should be taken into account in the formulation of legislative norms? When the old dynasty was suppressed, and it was necessary to place a representative of the new one on the throne, people from all over the country again gathered at the Zemstvo Council to determine who would rule Russia.
Here are several major zemstvo councils that changed Russian history with their decisions:
1549– after many years of internecine quarrels among the nobility, Russia needed public reconciliation; The first Zemsky Sobor provided it and prepared the ground for a whole series of major reforms.
1566– Ivan IV asks his people if they are ready to continue to bear the hardships of the great Livonian War? In May 1566, the Lithuanian embassy visited Moscow and conveyed the terms of the peace agreement, which were very unfavorable for Russia. The Tsar understood that continuing the war could be very expensive: the fighting dragged on, requiring ever new costs. But he did not want to put up with giving up too much. In this situation, Ivan Vasilievich decided to convene representatives of the most different layers Russian society, listen to their advice, find out their mood. 380 people gathered - a great crowd for those times. The general decision was: to wage war. You cannot put up with yielding to the impudence and daring pressure of the enemy.
1598- the dynasty of the Moscow Rurikovichs was stopped, and the Zemsky Sobor elevated Boris Godunov, who was the brother-in-law of Emperor Fyodor Ivanovich, to the throne.
1613- The Zemsky Sobor brought Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich, the first of the Romanov dynasty, to the Russian throne. Over the course of several years of his reign, zemstvo councils were convened constantly. They actually merged into one large Zemsky Sobor, which worked, if we use the vocabulary of our days, as a collective " anti-crisis manager" In a half-dead country, ravaged by rebellious Cossacks, interventionists and simply multiplied criminality, he collected money, formed armies, and threw them at the enemy.
1648– The Moscow state is shaken by a whole wave of riots; in order to calm the people, the government puts legislation in order and introduces a huge code Russian law– Cathedral Code of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich; The Code is discussed at the Zemsky Sobor.
1651 And 1653 years - Hetman Bogdan Khmelnitsky, on behalf of the Cossacks of Little Russia, appeals to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich with an appeal to accept him and the Cossack army into Russian citizenship. If the sovereign agrees with his proposal, there will be a big war with Poland, which will not want to let go of the Cossack region that belongs to it without a fight. Twice representatives of the land, having gathered at the cathedral, told Alexei Mikhailovich: accept the hetman with the same Orthodox Cossacks, and with the Poles - well, they are ready to fight if necessary... The difficult war that followed lasted thirteen years, but in 1667 it led Russia to victory.
On the screensaver is a fragment of a painting by Alexei Danilovich Kivshenko (1851-1895), Mikhail Fedorovich. Deputation from the Zemsky Sobor.