V2 guidance system. VAF missiles - “weapons of retaliation”
The initial impetus for the development of missile weapons, leading to the creation of the ballistic missile A-4 (V-2), was a secret order given by the Minister of the Reichswehr in 1929, given in 1929 to the head of the department: to begin experiments and study the possibility of using a rocket engine for military purposes. Already at that time, many generals saw long-range missiles as an excellent means of striking enemy strategic targets.
Since 1932, research on ballistic missiles was concentrated in an experimental laboratory under the direction of Walter Dornberger belonging to the Armament Directorate. The laboratory staff included the later famous Wernher von Braun.
The laboratory was very successful, and already in 1933 the first ballistic missile with a liquid-propellant engine was designed, called “Agregat-1”, or A-1. It had a starting weight of 150 kg, a diameter of 300 mm and a length of 1400 mm. The rocket engine, running on liquid fuel (ethyl alcohol and liquid oxygen), developed a thrust of 295 kgf. Then a more improved version of this missile appeared - “Agregat-2” (A-2).
In March 1936, the commander-in-chief of the German ground forces, General Fritsch, visited the laboratory. Having familiarized himself with the results of the experimental launches, he immediately ordered the development of a rocket project, fantastic at that time, which weighed 1 ton. could deliver a combat charge to a range of 275 km.
Since conducting test launches of these missiles in the Kummersdorf area, where the laboratory was located, was unrealistic, development and testing were transferred to the island of Usedom, on the Baltic Sea coast. Not far from the village of Peenemünde, the decision was made to create an Army Experimental Station. It was the world's very first missile research center, capable of testing and developing guided missiles of any class.
The first rocket, the A-3, created in Peenemünde, was an unsuccessful design. It was a rocket with a diameter of 762 mm and a length of 7620 mm. With a starting weight of 750 kg, the fuel weight was equal to 450 kg, the engine developed a thrust of 1500 kgf within 41 seconds.
However, tests carried out in a wind tunnel revealed a number of negative nuances and poor stability of the rocket in flight at supersonic speeds.
Then it was decided to create another A-5 rocket, using the A-3 engine and a new automatic control system using graphite rudders.
With a shorter length than the A-3 (5825 mm), the diameter of the new A-5 rocket was increased to 700 mm, and the span of the stabilizer planes increased to 1330 mm. From 1938 to 1942, several hundred of these missiles were launched.
In March 1939, Hitler himself was present at the bench tests of the A-5 rocket engine in Kummersdorf. The deafening roar of the engine made a huge impression on him, and he promised Wernher von Braun all support and instructed him to create a new long-range combat missile based on the A-5. This is the beginning of the history of the A-4 rocket, which later became better known throughout the world as the V-2.
All work on the creation of the A-4 was completed by June 1942. Like all its predecessors, its shape resembled a giant artillery shell, equipped with 4 mutually perpendicular stabilizers. Its total length was 14,300 mm, the maximum hull diameter was 1,650 mm, and the starting weight reached 12.7 tons and consisted of the weight of the fuel (8,760 kg), the combat charge (980 kg), and the structure along with the power plants (3,060 kg) . The rocket consisted of 30 thousand parts, and the length of the electrical wires of the equipment exceeded 35 km.
The missile's flight range ranged from 290 to 305 km, but some samples covered a distance of 355 km. The total flight time was approximately 5 minutes, with speeds in some areas exceeding 1500 m/s.
To launch the rocket, it was planned to use so-called field-type launch positions and protected launch positions.
Protected starting positions were erected on the outskirts of the French cities of Viserney, Watton and Sottevast. They were executed according to all the laws of science, and were a bunker with a concrete dome.
The rocket on a railway platform was delivered to the bunker from one exit, serviced and refueled, and after installation on the launch trolley and through another exit it went to the launch pad - a 4-corner concrete platform with a cone in the middle. Inside the bunker there were barracks for personnel, a first-aid post and a kitchen.
The equipment of such a position made it possible to carry out up to 54 V-2 launches per day.
Any flat area of terrain was used as a field-type position, on which the launch pad was simply installed. The table was leveled with jacks, and all the equipment of the launch complex was placed on tractors and cars. Modified armored personnel carriers were used as missile launch control vehicles.
The mobile launch complex was highly mobile and tactical. Due to the fact that the starting positions changed frequently, they were difficult to invulnerable to air raids.
If you look at it from a technical point of view, the most interesting project is the transportation of missiles by water in a submerged position in a transport and launch container with the subsequent launch of a missile from it; by the way, the container was to be towed by a submarine.
By mid-1944, all technical documentation for testing the container had already been prepared. The contract for the production of 3 containers was concluded at the end of December 1944. Construction was planned to begin in March 1945.
Serial release V-2 was put into production at the enterprises of the Mittelwerk underground industrial complex, built in gypsum mines near the city of Nordhausen. According to the program prepared by the German Ministry of Armaments, the production of 12,000 missiles was envisaged V-2. Until April 1945, when American troops entered the industrial complex, 5,940 missiles were fired (sometimes their monthly production could reach 600-690 units). Another 238 missiles were produced at Peenemünde.
Special missile units were formed specifically for conducting test combat launches. The first to appear in July 1943 was the 444th experimental training battery, almost completely staffed by employees of the center in Peenemünde.
In December 1943, a secret directive was signed on the formation of the first formation of missile forces - the 65th Army Special Forces Corps. It included the 91st Artillery Command (V-2), which included one stationary, two mobile divisions and a separate battery of SS troops, the 155th anti-aircraft regiment (V-1), and an ultra-long-range artillery unit (V-3), which remained to exist only on paper.
The corps was promptly subordinated to 2 aviation fighter regiments used to cover starting positions from the air, as well as an SS geodetic battalion, which determined, adjusted the shooting and accuracy of missile attacks, and a division of heavy guns on railway platforms to camouflage access roads and positions.
The corps had a clearly formulated task: to launch a missile strike on London, thereby persuading England to conclude a peace treaty. At the end of August 1944, to carry it out, the 65th Corps launched Operation Penguin.
Missile units V-2, numbering more than 5 thousand soldiers and officers and up to 1.5 thousand different vehicles. Having moved from their places of permanent deployment to the areas of combat launches, by the evening of September 8, Chiswick (London region) was shaken by the first strikes of the V-2.
During this seemingly short period of time, 1269 V-2 for England (43 for Norvig, 1225 for London and 1 for Ipswich) and 1739 for various purposes on the continent (28 for Luttgich and 1593 for Antwerp).
The official English data is as follows: in England, more than a thousand people achieved their goals V-2, which killed 9,277 people (6,524 seriously wounded and 2,755 killed).
Near Antwerp, 1,267 rockets exploded, which, along with the V-1, led to the deaths of 6,448 civilians and military personnel. The number of missing and wounded was terrifying.
From these brutal missile strikes, the Anglo-American allies suffered enormous material and human losses, but still this was not at all the result that Hitler had hoped for.
Even the use of massive rocket fire did not affect England’s determination to stand to the end.
Stanislav Voskresensky
History of the R-2 ballistic missile
At the beginning of the post-war era, at least two large-scale programs were successfully implemented in the Soviet Union to reproduce samples of foreign technology - the creation of a long-range stratospheric piston bomber Tu-4 based on the American B-29 and the development of production of the German V-2 rocket under the name R-1 (see “TiV” No. 3.5/2009).
However, if the Tupolev Design Bureau had experience in developing countless aircraft from the first years of Soviet aircraft construction, then the authority of S.P. Koroleva, V.P. Glushko and other chief designers on the R-1 and its elements were very modest. Before the “defeat” of NII-1 during the repressions of the late 1930s. they managed to create only a few small-sized experimental liquid rockets, and during the war years in the prison design bureau they were mainly involved in rocket boosters for aircraft. Naturally, having delved into the study of captured German technology, they immediately began designing an improved model, the creation of which was supposed to increase their authority and status. And, of course, having worked in rocket technology for more than a decade, they had their own extensive ideological baggage, which they could not wait to translate into reality.
Nevertheless, common sense dictated that the first independent development should not stray too far from the V-2, at least from the principle of continuity of production, technological and operational equipment and equipment.
It is well known that the V-2 rocket was put into mass production by the Germans and was used to fire at the enemy in a clearly unfinished form. Along with the obviously low reliability of the rocket, this decision also determined a property of the V-2 that was very useful for Soviet engineers - it had many hidden, unused reserves. The Germans can be understood: they created an unprecedented example of technology and, without prototypes, were forced to put excess reserves into development.
In particular, this concerned the engine, the thrust of which could be increased almost 1.5 times (from 27 to 37 tons) by increasing the suppression from 16.2 to 21.6 kg/cm2, which required increasing the power of the turbopump unit from 470 to 1066 hp Only through such modification could a significant reduction in gravitational losses be achieved. Even taking into account the high costs of overcoming aerodynamic drag, the final speed increased by 10-15%, and the range by almost a third. A deeper study also showed the possibility of increasing the specific impulse of the engine by 10% by increasing the alcohol concentration from a compromise of 75% to the maximum 92%.
Another direction of improvement was associated with lightweighting the design, primarily with the transition to a load-bearing structure of tanks made of aluminum.
According to preliminary estimates made back in Germany, the combined implementation of these measures provided at least a twofold increase in range with unchanged dimensions and launch weight of the rocket. As a backup, a weighted version of the rocket with a cylindrical part extended by 1.9 m was also considered. Next, a group of engineers led by Konstantin Davydovich Bushuev, who decades later became widely known as the technical director of the Soyuz-Apollo space program on the Soviet side, took on work at the design bureau in Podlipki.
The creation of the rocket, named R-2 (product 8Zh38), was planned to be carried out in two stages. The first of them was supposed to improve the engine and slightly increase the capacity of the rocket's fuel tanks, and the second was to implement the innovations in full.
When defending the preliminary design of the R-2 at the technical council of NII-88, held in April 1947 in the presence of D.F. Ustinov, doubts were expressed about the feasibility of a number of basic technical solutions. The biggest concern was the liquid oxygen carrier tank. Along with the double wall, a layer of thermal insulation - glass wool - was also excluded. Suggestions have been made about unacceptably high losses of oxidizer during refueling and pre-launch preparation. An attempt to resolve the issue by introducing pre-launch oxygen supplementation met resistance from the military. In order to reduce the degree of technical risk, it was necessary to abandon the supporting liquid oxygen tank, returning to a suspended structure similar to the V-2.
Initially, it was believed that such a compromise scheme would only find a place on the experimental rocket model, the R-2E. But it was preserved on serial products after missiles with an external tank achieved the specified range during flight tests. But at the same time it was necessary to compensate for the weight of the structure, and the developers decided to increase the fuel reserve by 70% - from 9.4 to 15.84 tons. The length of the rocket increased from 14.275 to 17.65 m, the launch weight - from 13.43 to 20.3 tons. Soon another problem emerged that threatened to cancel out all the innovations in the design scheme of the R-2 - bench testing showed insufficient strength of the new aluminum carrying fuel tank under heavy loads and intense heating at the atmospheric entry site when approaching the target. But this time the design study gave a disappointing result: if we returned to a heavy suspension design for both fuel tanks, even the extended rocket would not reach the declared range.
Then the situation was resolved in accordance with the humorous slogan of those years: “If vodka interferes with work, quit... work!” If a rocket prevents you from reaching your target, throw the rocket! Of course, after it completed its main task - it accelerated the warhead to a speed sufficient to fly to the target by inertia. Not because of a good life, but in the face of the threat of a fundamental shortfall in the required range, the designers went for a scheme with the separation of the warhead from the rocket in flight.
But nothing comes for free. Along with the missile body, a significant part of the damaging effect was also lost. After all, the V-2, even without the warhead and fuel, weighed 3.5 tons. All this mass fell on the target at a speed twice the speed of sound. And the fuel was not completely consumed and exploded along with the filling of the warhead, increasing the effect of the explosion by 1.2-2 times. All these factors created an impressive striking effect. When the rocket fell, a crater more than two tens of meters in diameter was formed in the ground. When a rocket hit city blocks, the destructive effect far exceeded the effect that Muscovites remembered of the most powerful of the ton fascist bombs dropped on the capital, which exploded in the building of the Moscow Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Therefore, during the transition from R-1 to R-2, the weight of the warhead increased from 1075 to 1500 kg, the explosive charge increased by 1.4 times, while the area of severe destruction approached 1000 m2.
In addition, it was necessary to achieve static stability of the separated warhead to maintain its organized flight with the required orientation. In relation to a warhead completely filled with explosives, this meant one thing - you need to install an empty stabilizing “skirt” behind it. On the V-2 this place was occupied - there was an instrument compartment.
At the same time, moving the instrument compartment away from the head section significantly improved the operating conditions of the rocket. When preparing the launch of the R-1, specialists fumbled in the instrument compartment of the rocket, standing at a 12-meter height on a service platform swaying in the wind. In addition to the fact that the climate in our country was noticeably different from Western Europe, such activities created the preconditions for accidents. The rocket developers and testers were greatly impressed by the death of Captain Pavel Efimovich Kiselev, who became the first victim of domestic rocket technology. When preparing the first launch of the R-1 on September 13, 1948, he jumped a couple of times, deciding to demonstrate the strength of the suspension of a small service platform attached to the head of the rocket. But the chain broke, and the crashed tester, without regaining consciousness, died the next day. Therefore, responding to the urgent demands of customers, Korolev decided to place the instrument compartment lower on the R-2, between the tank and the engine. But this caused the indignation of the “managers”: their sensitive instruments were next to the main source of vibrations - the rocket engine. Then the rocket scientists introduced a shock-absorbing suspension for the instruments and made the instrument compartment sealed, which was supposed to reduce the level of acoustic impact.
Finally, a device was required that would ensure the separation of the warhead, giving it a speed that would prevent it from being overtaken by the rocket body. After analyzing the possible options, we settled on the simplest and most reliable spring pusher.
With a detachable warhead, there was no need for huge stabilizers, the main task of which was to ensure stable uncontrolled flight of the rocket after entering the atmosphere. However, despite the significant weight gain from eliminating stabilizers, they were still retained on the R-2. Although theoretical studies confirmed the possibility of reliable control of even a statically unstable rocket, reasonable caution prevented the implementation of too many innovations on one product. In addition, before the start of flight tests, it was impossible to obtain any reliable computational and experimental confirmation of the performance of the new “stabilizer-free” scheme. In the USSR there were still no wind tunnels for conducting research at high supersonic speeds. Although the R-2 ultimately became 3.375 m longer than the prototype and flew almost 1.5 times faster, provided that the luxurious plumage of the V-2 was retained, data obtained from captured reports on the results could be extrapolated to it with sufficient reliability blowing in German pipes.
The increase in range acutely raised the problems of expanding the range and ensuring safety.
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K.D. Bushuev and SP. Korolev.
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Layout of R-1 and R-2 missiles:
1 – head part; 2 – fuel tank; 3 – tunnel pipe with fuel supply pipeline; 4 – oxidizer tank; 5 – instrument compartment; 6 – turbopump unit; 7 – engine combustion chamber; 8 – tail section; 9 – aerodynamic stabilizer; 10 – gas jet rudder.
The route was extended east, into the semi-desert Kazakh lands. But if one of the R-2s, like the second V-2 launched in 1947, went towards Saratov, almost across the given direction, it could cause a lot of serious trouble. For the first time, the R-2 rocket was equipped with means for emergency engine shutdown in flight - the so-called AED system.
Another fundamentally new system introduced on the R-2 was the lateral radio correction equipment, created at NII-885 as a development of similar German developments. The need for its use was determined by the fact that the devices of the autonomous control system, adopted back on the V-2, determined only the angular orientation and longitudinal speed of the rocket and, in principle, could not take into account the drift of the rocket in the lateral direction. Despite the launch range being twice as long, the radio correction system ensured accuracy no worse than that achieved on the R-1 - ± 8 km in range, ± 4 km in the lateral direction. But the combat use of missiles became more complicated; new units had to be introduced into the structure of the engineering brigades, servicing two radio correction points, tens of kilometers away from the launch position. The industry needed to expand the production of new equipment. In addition, with radio control, the range of permissible firing directions was reduced from 45 to 1.75°.
To test the R-2, a new telemetry system “Don” was created, which provided transmission over 12 continuous and 12 discrete channels.
The team led by V.P. Glushko OKB-456 on the RD-101 (8D52) engine, outwardly almost indistinguishable from the original prototype produced in our country under the name RD-100 (8D51) - the V-2 engine, not only increased the thrust by 9.8 tons, but also the specific impulse in ground conditions - by 4 kgf / kg, but also shortened its product by 0.35 m and lightened it by 15 kg, bringing the weight to 930 kg. It is significant that the values of thrust and specific impulse were directly specified by a government decree of 1948 - for documents of this level this was unusually detailed. To simplify operation, liquid sodium permanganate was replaced with a solid catalyst for the decomposition of hydrogen peroxide.
It should be noted that, to some extent, the R-2 was created on a competitive basis. Simultaneously with the work at NII-88 in Podlipki on R-2, a similar G-1 (R-10) missile, also with a range of 600 km, was designed by the Germans brought to the USSR, led by Helmut Gröttrup, at the NII-88 branch on Gorodomlya island in the middle of the lake Seliger. They completed their preliminary design by the end of 1948.
Both projects included a number of common innovations compared to the V-2 - a detachable warhead and load-bearing tanks. The engine had to undergo significant processing: the Germans proposed using gas taken from the main combustion chamber as a working fluid for the turbopump unit. Electro-hydraulic steering gears were to be replaced with pneumatic ones.
But the main feature of the rocket proposed by the Germans was the use of radio control instead of an autonomous control system. The complex “Verticant” and “Horizon” devices were replaced by simpler two-degree gyroscopes. The task of missile guidance was solved by instruments installed on the ground based on information about the speed and coordinates of the missile received from radio equipment, while corrective commands were transmitted to the missile. In general, this scheme was closer to anti-aircraft missile systems with radio command control such as the later domestic S-25, S-75 and S-125 systems.
As a result, Gröttrup hoped to achieve a tenfold improvement in accuracy and a significant reduction in the cost of the rocket. Unlike the actually created R-2, doubling the range compared to the V-2 was achieved on the G-1 with almost the same dimensions and launch weight of the rocket.
According to formal quality criteria, the German project was much more advanced than the R-2. However, the compared projects were based on different ideologies for the development of rocket technology. The R-2 was a slightly “polished” V-2, did not require significant changes in technological equipment, and its development was not associated with great technical risk. At that time, such an evolutionary path of development was still far from a dead end. This was confirmed by the subsequent development of the R-5 rocket, a further, even deeper modernization of the V-2, when it was possible to achieve a range of 1200 km, almost five times the reach of the original German rocket.
On the contrary, the G-1 was a tangle of technical innovations, the development of which would inevitably encounter many difficulties, and additional time would be required to overcome them. Moreover, all subsequent experience in the development of rocket technology confirmed the failure of the very idea of creating a turbopump unit operating on very hot gas taken from the combustion chamber. In reality, engine building has gone exactly in the opposite direction. Created in the 1960s. In engines of the so-called closed circuit, “warm gas” from the turbopump unit entered the chamber. The transfer of control functions to radio systems made the complex dependent on ground-based means and made it vulnerable to enemy radio countermeasures.
But the G-1, even with incomplete implementation of the innovations proposed by the Germans, would become a springboard for the further offensive of new rocket technology, for the creation of more advanced models. Political situation at the end of the 1940s. did not require an urgent replacement of the V-2. The loss of a couple of years in terms of time to create a missile with a range of 600 km could be compensated by the gain in the pace of the race to create an intercontinental missile with a nuclear charge that is really needed by the army.
At the same time, it is difficult to condemn Korolev and his associates for technical conservatism. Korolev acted extremely carefully, relying on already proven technical solutions.
Something else is more important. Despite the fact that the G-1 design had great prospects, the team of its creators could not have any future. Sooner or later the Germans were supposed to be returned to their homeland, so they tried to keep them away from any valuable secrets. In an information vacuum, without contact with TsAGI, other leading scientific organizations, and developers of rocket components, German engineers did not have the opportunity to verify the correctness of the technical decisions they made. In addition, like any country pursuing an independent policy, the USSR sought to create its own personnel for developing military equipment.
Thus, the outcome of the “competition” of R-2 and G-1 was predetermined even before the start of design work. In fact, Korolev was engaged in “shadow boxing.” But in those years this was not yet obvious to everyone. Let us recall the brilliant demonstration of the capabilities of German scientists when investigating the reasons for the unsuccessful V-2 launches in 1947. So the presence of a competing team of German specialists spurred Korolev and his designers on.
However, the results of “German competition” were not always unambiguously beneficial. So, K.P. Feoktistov, one of the first cosmonauts and leading developers of space technology, is of the opinion that Korolev’s refusal to use a liquid oxygen carrier tank was determined not by any rational arguments, but by a simple desire to demonstrate his independence from German advisers.
Innovations associated with the separation of the warhead of the R-2 rocket should have been tested under full-scale flight conditions, which was done in May 1949 with six launches of experimental R-1A missiles (the same R-1, but with a detachable warhead). It was decided to throttle the engine so that the thrust-to-weight ratio of the R-1A would correspond to the R-2, whose weight increased relative to the R-1 to a greater extent than the engine thrust.
In addition, in the interests of testing the radio correction system, antennas and equipment were installed on the tail section, necessary to study the passage of radiation through the torch of the R-1 A engine. After firing along the usual trajectory for ballistic missiles, they carried out a pair of vertical launches, equipping the missiles with salvageable ones instead of warheads on parachutes with containers with FIAN-1 measuring equipment. The task of studying the upper layers of the atmosphere in those years was no longer academic in nature. Before the start of the rocket era, with the help of aerostatic means it was possible to study environmental parameters only below 30 km. Without reliable information about the properties of the atmosphere at many times higher altitudes, it was impossible to calculate the trajectories of promising missiles, especially intercontinental range ones. Looking ahead, we note that experimental R-1s with a detachable warhead were used until the mid-1950s.
Despite the natural priority for combat missions at the height of the Cold War, it became clear that the prerequisites were already being created for manned space flight. To be it or not to be depended on whether living beings were able to endure the state of weightlessness. To quickly resolve this fundamental issue, starting on July 22, 1951, over the course of a month, five launches of rockets of the R-1 B modification were carried out, in the head parts of which rescued containers with animals were placed. In a series of four launches ending next month, only one failed. In other cases, the experimental dogs returned to the ground alive and unharmed. Until the end of August, two rockets in the R-1 B version were launched, on which, instead of the FIAN equipment, a parachute was installed to save the rocket body, but it was not possible to successfully deploy it. In June-July of the following year, three launches were carried out in the R-1D modification, in which the experimental dogs did not descend to the ground together in a common container, but were shot on ejection seats in special spacesuits with a parachute system.
Finally, in four of the six launches in the P-1E variant, it was possible to solve the problem of saving the rocket body, but this required a special system, which included a kind of “gun” for shooting the parachute system and solid propellant engines for preliminary pulling forward the separated warhead.
In the period from September 25 to October 11, 1950, five launches of non-standard, experimental R-2E missiles were carried out. Two of them ended unsuccessfully, including one due to a fire in the tail section. This episode cast doubt on the possibility of using the aluminum tail section envisaged by the project and already put into production on the combat R-2. On the R-2 rockets of the first series, they decided to temporarily return to the steel compartment, although it weighed a quarter of a ton more.
The first launch on October 21, 1950 ended in an accident. Only five days later, a relatively successful launch took place: the active phase went through normally, the warhead separated from the rocket, but collapsed at the final stage of the flight upon entry into the atmosphere. Six more launches ended with the same warhead failures. The “thermal barrier” got in the way of rocket science earlier than expected. This was the first warning that there were serious head heating problems. A few years later they began to be seen as one of the main obstacles to the creation of ICBMs.
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Experimental rocket R-1 D.
The remaining launches of the first series of 12 missiles were also clearly unsuccessful due to failures of the propulsion system and failures in the control system caused by vibrations. In one of the launches, when breaking the sound barrier, all the stabilizers flew off the rocket. It turned out that for the sake of manufacturability, the compartment skin was not attached to the tail compartment at all, and this created all the prerequisites for the occurrence of flutter. We had to urgently correct the documentation and restore order in production.
An attempt to introduce a lightweight aluminum tail section, which weighed a quarter of a ton less than steel, also ended in failure. On both rockets with this innovation, flutter again occurred due to an unacceptably high level of vibration of the tail unit. The first series of launches ended on December 20. The rocket clearly needed major improvements, first of all, strengthening the warhead. This work took 9 months.
Flight tests of the second series of already modified missiles, jointly with the GAU, took place from July 2 to July 27, 1951, while out of 13 launches, only one ended in an accident, clearly due to a manufacturing defect. Control tests of the next batch of missiles, carried out from August 8 to September 18, 1952, were also successful in 12 of 14 launches.
Along with the rocket, ground equipment units were also tested. The 8U24 installer intended for the R-2 was distinguished by an increased boom length of 3.25 m and the presence of a docking mechanism for installing the warhead on the rocket, which was transported to the launch position separately from the rocket.
In general, the complex of ground equipment was largely unified with the previous development and made it possible, along with the R-2, to launch the R-1 if necessary.
After the R-1 missile was put into service, a decision was prepared to organize its serial production at plant No. 66 in the Ural city of Zlatoust. A recent graduate of the Moscow Higher Technical School named after. Bauman K.P. Feoktistov will be one of the first cosmonauts in the future. But the production capacity of the Ural plant was considered insufficient to produce missiles on the required scale. It was necessary to find a more powerful plant.
In accordance with the GKO decree of July 21, 1944, in the first post-war years in Dnepropetrovsk, using German equipment received through reparations, a very large plant was created, where the production of national economic trucks was successfully launched. But the production of cars did not last long, since by government decree of May 9, 1951 “On the transfer of the Dnepropetrovsk Automobile Plant to the Ministry of Arms,” the enterprise was switched to rocket production. To provide technological support for serial rocket production, a department of chief designer was created at the plant, which received number 586, headed by Vasily Sergeevich Budnik, who previously worked as Korolev’s deputy.
Involving automakers in rocket production was not unusual. In the USA in the 1950s. Chrysler developed and produced the Jupiter medium-range rocket.
If we do not take into account the NII-88 pilot plant, then we can assume that throughout the 1950s. The plant in Dnepropetrovsk was the only manufacturer of large Soviet ballistic missiles - R-1, R-2 and R-5, developed at the SP Design Bureau. Queen. Since the end of the decade, it switched to the production of missiles created at OKB-586, located on its territory, under the leadership of Mikhail Kuzmich Yangel. In addition to missiles, the Dnepropetrovsk plant has been producing wheeled tractors for decades (since the mid-1950s). This, on the one hand, served as a cover for defense issues, and on the other, made it possible to more fully use the production capacity of a huge enterprise designed for the mass production of cars.
At the beginning of 1952, the assembly of the R-1 rocket from components and parts of the Podlipkinsky plant was completed, and three months later mass production of rockets of its own configuration began. In the 1950s Plant No. 586 also produced engines for ballistic missiles.
When production was transferred to Dneprpetrovsk, two sets of R-1 rocket fuel tanks made from so-called veneer panels (simply plywood) were delivered from the Urals. According to the plan of the famous aircraft designer A.Ya. Shcherbakov, who served as chief designer in Zlatoust, the use of non-scarce and cheap materials should have contributed to the mass production of rockets. Perhaps this was justified under the conditions of production and operation of the V-2, when the missiles were sent from the factory directly to combat units and were almost immediately used against the enemy. But in this case, the missiles traveled halfway across the country, lay in Dnepropetrovsk before assembly, and then in Zagorsk before firing bench tests. As a result, the tanks dried out and started leaking when the engine was turned on.
After the documentation and equipment for the production of the R-2 were sent to the banks of the Dnieper, plant No. 66 was switched to the production of more traditional military equipment - multiple launch rocket systems. In 1955, it was decided to load this enterprise with the production of operational-tactical missiles R-11, which in terms of weight and size indicators are significantly smaller compared to the R-1.
Launch of the R-2 rocket.
But Dnepropetrovsk was too vulnerable, and not only because of its proximity to the borders of our Motherland. Even with the potential enemy being completely unaware of the location of the main center of Soviet rocket production, the immediate proximity to well-known powerful metallurgy and metalworking enterprises did not leave Plant No. 586 any chance of surviving a nuclear war.
On the contrary, the Urals were located in the interior of the country. The terrain contributed to the implementation of measures to shelter production not only from prying eyes, but also from the effects of weapons.
In this regard, in 1952-1953. At the highest government level, a project was considered for the construction of a plant in the vicinity of the city of Miass, with production located both in ordinary above-ground buildings and in underground adits laid in the bowels of the Maly Ilmen mountain. Even for the so-called “ground” option, it was planned to place a warehouse of finished products with an area of 40 thousand m in protected adits, and for the “underground” one, workshops three times larger in area. Productivity was set by the annual production of 1000 R-1 and 2000 R-2 missiles. However, the cost of the project was impressive - 1.466 and 1.7 billion rubles. for the “ground” and “underground” options, respectively. Minister of Armaments D.F. Ustinov advocated for the “underground” option, but the State Planning Committee agreed only to the “ground” one.
After some suspension of activity at the end of Stalin's reign and during subsequent political reshuffles, work on the underground plant, number 139, resumed.
But with the massive introduction of nuclear weapons, the very idea of such a highly protected enterprise lost its meaning. Even if the underground workshops had remained unharmed, the colossal destruction and high level of radioactive contamination at the exits from the adits excluded the removal of finished products from the plant. And there would be no one to use it and no reason...
Ultimately, SKB-375, the leading organization for the design of submarine ballistic missiles, headed by V.P., settled on the site of plant No. 139 under construction. Makeev.
By decree of November 27, 1951, the R-2 missile was adopted and put into mass production both in Podlipki and Dnepropetrovsk. In May-June 1954, 10 missiles manufactured according to documentation for serial production were tested, eight of which flew off successfully.
In addition to the traditional launches at maximum range, tests of the R-2 missile were also carried out at intermediate ranges of 200 and 270 km. At the same time, a reduced accuracy of hits was revealed. It was considered advisable to use one or two additional warheads when launching at these ranges.
In the early 1950s, when the number of atomic bombs manufactured in the USSR amounted to only a few dozen, much attention was paid to the possibility of using radioactive substances as a means of destruction. Beginning in 1953, the development of missiles with warheads of “special filling” in liquid and projectile equipment was carried out. However, despite their simplicity and low cost, these warheads were extremely dangerous to operate and did not allow for long-term storage. As the arsenal of classical atomic weapons increased quantitatively, this combat equipment did not receive further development.
There is information that in the early 1950s. Design assessments of the use of nuclear charges on the R-2 were carried out, but practically atomic weapons found use on the next OKB SP rocket. Queen with twice the range - R-5M.
Like the R-1 rocket, the modified R-2 was used for research into the upper atmosphere, equipped with a salvageable container containing 260 kg of scientific equipment. From 1957 to 1960, 13 launches of the R-2A modification were carried out at altitudes of up to 208 km, 11 of which were successful. Containers with scientific equipment later became the first “space” exhibits at the Exhibition of Achievements of the National Economy (VDNKh) of the USSR.
Following the industry, the R-2 also began to be mastered by the army, which by that time had already created several new missile units. The first “Special Purpose Brigade” (BON), formed in Germany, after returning to the USSR, was stationed at the newly organized Kapustin Yar training ground. Since 1948, it received the designation 92nd BON, and from the end of 1950 - the 22nd BON Reserve of the Supreme High Command.
The formation of new military units was carried out as follows. At first, they were located on the territory of the Kapustin Yar test site (GCP-4), where the personnel underwent the main part of the training course and conducted practical missile launches. After this, the newly formed BON left for its permanent location.
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Project of an underground plant for the production of R-2 missiles in the vicinity of Miass.
R-2A rocket.
The special forces brigade consisted of three fire divisions, consisting of two launch batteries (i.e., a total of six launchers). The starting positions were to be deployed at a distance of 30-35 km from the line of combat contact.
It was believed that in combat conditions, a special purpose brigade should provide a fire performance of 24-36 missile launches per day. This corresponded to an interval between missile launches of 6 to 4 hours, while the standard for preparing one missile at the launch position was 4-5 hours. The greater of the given fire performance values was achieved by the mid-1950s, when, as more and more After confident mastery of the technology, rocket engineers moved from sequential to parallel execution of pre-launch preparation operations. During demonstration exercises at the Kapustin Yar training ground in the summer of 1955, it was possible to prepare the rocket for launch in 3 hours 25 minutes. However, all these records made sense during massive rocket attacks, similar to the actions of the Germans against England. By the mid-1950s. the new nuclear reality no longer left room for such operations.
Since the regimental shooting ranges were clearly not suitable for launching long-range missiles, combat crews from all over the country were sent from time to time to conduct training launches at the Kapustin Yar training ground.
In December 1950, the 23rd BON RVGK was formed, soon sent to its permanent location in the city of Kamyshin, also located in the Lower Volga region (but north of Stalingrad).
In 1952, two more special-purpose brigades were created, the 54th and 56th, the first of which remained in Kapustin Yar, and the second was later relocated to Kremenchug. The following year, missile units were re-organized, which had a different name - the 70th and 72nd “engineering brigades” of the RVGK. The previously formed 22nd, 23rd, 54th and 56th BON were also transformed into the 72nd, 73rd and 85th and 90th engineering brigades of the RVGK, respectively. Engineering brigades could include up to four engineering divisions, consisting of two starting batteries, i.e. have a total of up to eight launchers.
After this, the founder of the missile forces - BON, by that time the 72nd engineering brigade of the RVGK, left Kapustin Yar, heading literally to the “bear corner” of our Motherland - the village of Medved, Novgorod region.
In 1958, during the preparation of a government decree on the creation of strategic missile forces, the 77th (Belokorovichi), 90th and additionally formed in Lyanitsy (Bryansk region) in 1955, the 233rd engineering brigade of the RVGK were transferred to the Ground forces.
In 1956, the 72nd and 23rd engineering brigades were supposed to operate in the Western theater of operations, the 73rd and 77th in the Southwestern, the 90th and one division of the 85th brigade in the Southern, and the third division - in the Far Eastern theater of operations (the village of Manzov-ka, Ussuri Territory).
The R-2 missile was not only in service with the listed first missile units of the Soviet Army, but also supplied to units and formations formed in the late 1950s and early 1960s. already for much more advanced medium-range missiles and ICBMs. For several months, or even more, rocket scientists mastered practical skills in working with equipment on the R-2, until more advanced, in some cases already intercontinental, products arrived from the factories.
The Soviet government adopted a resolution on the transfer of design and technological documentation for the R-2 to China on August 6, 1958, and less than six months later, on the transfer of a license for its production. Several items collected in the USSR were also transferred to China. There is evidence that the first licensed rocket, Model 1059, was tested in China on November 5, 1960, two months after the launch of the R-2, supplied from the USSR.
Just as the Soviet rocket industry began with the development of the German V-2, the Chinese industry was fine-tuning the production of the R-2. At the end of the 1950s. In the People's Liberation Army of China, the formation of 20 regiments began, which were to be armed with R-2 and R-11 missiles. However, given the obvious obsolescence of the R-2, they were soon replaced with more advanced products.
To date, the R-2 has been preserved in the form of at least a couple of museum exhibits and monuments. The geophysical version of the R-2 rocket was demonstrated for a long time in the Cosmos pavilion at VDNKh, and the combat version, equipped with some non-standard elements from the R-1, is located in the hall of the Military Historical Museum of Artillery, Engineering Troops and Signal Corps in the city on the Neva. In addition, a model of the R-2 missile was installed as an obelisk on the Yaroslavskoe highway at the entrance to the city of Korolev - the former city of Kaliningrad, Moscow region.
Literature and sources
1. Novoselov V.N., Finageev A.P. The era of rockets. – Chelyabinsk, 2006.
3. Chertok B.E. Rockets and people. Sublips. KapustinYar.Tyuratam. -M, 2006.
4. SKB-385. Design Bureau of Mechanical Engineering, GRTsim. Academician V.P. Makeeva. – M., 2007.
5. Russian State Archive of Economics. F. 298, On. 1, D. 73.
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There are so many legends currently circulating about the times of the Third Reich! Airplanes with forward-swept wings, jet aircraft and “flying saucers”, top-secret Ahnenerbe research laboratories located almost kilometers underground...
Most of all this is mere fiction and outright nonsense. But there was one industry in which the Germans really advanced quite far - rocketry. Their V-2, the "Weapon of Vengeance", was truly a technological breakthrough. The British especially “appreciated” the power of these missiles, since these weapons were created and used for attacks on London.
Brief historical excursion
Each V-2 was launched from a special mobile launcher. Each rocket, which was 14 meters long, carried almost a ton of explosives. The first rocket of this type fell on London in early September 1944. It left behind a ten-meter crater, three killed and 22 wounded people.
Before it, the Germans had already used the FAU-1 projectile aircraft, but this technology was a fundamentally new type of weapon. The missile flew up to the target in just five minutes, due to which the detection means of that period were completely powerless in front of it. From a historical perspective, the V-2 represents the latest attempt by the German defense industry to turn the tide of the war in its favor. Their “superweapon” did not have any influence on the outcome of World War II, but it became an important milestone in the development of world rocketry and space exploration.
Witnesses later recalled that huge piles of fragments rose into the air, and all this was accompanied by a terrible roar. The launch of the missiles themselves took place almost silently: in most cases, this event was only reminiscent of a light pop coming from the other side of the English Channel.
About development and costs...
How many people died due to V-2 launches is still unknown, since such data was not recorded anywhere. It is believed that in Britain alone, about three thousand people died from missile attacks. But the production of the “miracle weapon” itself took the lives of at least 20 thousand people.
The missiles were built by concentration camp prisoners. Nobody counted them, their lives were worth absolutely nothing. The V-2 rocket was assembled near Buchenwald, work went on around the clock. To speed up the process, specialists (especially welders and turners) were brought from other German concentration camps. People were starving, they were kept without sunlight, in underground bunkers. For any offense, prisoners were hanged directly from the cranes of assembly lines.
The creator of these rockets, Wernher von Braun, is considered almost a genius of world rocket science. An evil genius, it must be said: von Braun was never tormented by those who collected the weapons he created, in what conditions the unfortunate prisoners worked and died. However, the recognition of this man’s merits was well founded: after capturing the technical documentation for the missiles, the Allies recognized the superiority of German developments over their projects.
Forward to the stars!
For its time, the rocket engine was extremely powerful: it was capable of lifting it to a height of about 80 kilometers with a flight range of approximately 200 kilometers. The power plant ran on a mixture of oxygen and technical ethanol. It is especially important that the Germans began to use a supply of oxidizer (oxygen), which was placed in a container on board the rocket. This made it independent of atmospheric air. In addition, it was possible to significantly increase engine power. We can say that the V-2 rocket became the first technology that could actually leave the Earth and reach outer space.
Of course, small developments in this area have existed since about the 30s of the last century. But all of them were characterized by much more modest sizes, a small fuel supply, and no one even thought about space during their development. Thus, the V-2, the “superweapon” of the Third Reich, became a real springboard that helped all of humanity explore near-Earth space.
Technological breakthrough
But even this was not what amazed the technicians of the allied states. The most important technological innovation that was massively used in the design of these missiles was full target guidance.
At that time, this was a real fantasy, which only the V-2 could make real! The “superweapon” of the Third Reich could hit its target without needing guidance from the ground at all. To achieve such impressive results, German developers used the simplest (for today's times) electronics. Before launch, the coordinates of the target were entered into the “on-board computer”, to which the rocket was “oriented”.
Other technical solutions
In addition, specially created gyroscopes were used for the first time, which stabilized the flight with considerable accuracy. The rudders located on the side stabilizers corrected the direction if the rocket deviated from the given course. It is not surprising that even before the end of the war, the USSR, USA and Britain really wanted to take possession of the technology for creating the V-2 (photos of it are available on the pages of this article).
For obvious reasons, von Braun was not too eager to fall into the hands of Soviet soldiers, preferring American “captivity.” The Soviet Union was left with almost an entire assembly line, several copies of missiles and several technical personnel. Domestic and American specialists dismantled the equipment that their countries received, literally piece by piece. However, the Yankees were so interested in the German V-2 rocket that they immediately took several of them overseas. There, new technology was used for some high-altitude experiments.
Further developments by Brown
In the USA, they were well aware that the V-2 designer was much more valuable than the assembly line for its production. Von Braun realized that the Americans would immediately provide him with everything he needed for a wonderful life and continuation of further work, and therefore he quickly surrendered to the Allies. We must give this man his due: despite his active participation in the program for creating intercontinental missiles, he made every effort to ensure that the main activities of his department were aimed at developing the space program, since this is what he dreamed of almost all his life.
Soon the creator of the V-2 rocket makes its American version, Redstone. It was an actual continuation of the line of German missiles, with minor “cosmetic” improvements and additions. A slightly later modified and significantly improved version of the Redstone was used by the Americans in 1961 to deliver their first cosmonaut, Alan Shepard, into orbit.
Von Braun's legacy
Thus, finding a connection between those rockets that were assembled at the cost of the lives of thousands of prisoners of war and the first flights into space is not so difficult. Simply put, the Americans got not only the creator of the V-2, but also all the technological developments in this area. Technologies that cost enormous resources, the main of which were human lives.
A rather complex moral and ethical question immediately arises: how realistic was it to send an artificial man into space and visit the Moon without using the technology that was developed by Nazi scientists? Of course, the USSR and the USA had their own developments, but the “help” of Nazi Germany saved a huge amount of time and money. In general, nothing unprecedented happened this time either: the war simply spurred on many scientific fields. In the 30-40s of the last century, this especially affected rocket science, which until then was practically in its infancy.
Fundamental contribution to space exploration
In general, the fundamental principles on which FAU-1 and FAU-2 were developed have not undergone significant changes over the past seven decades. The overall design remains unchanged, liquid fuel has proven to be the most optimal option, and the same gyroscopes are still used in flight stabilization systems to this day. All these solutions were once laid down thanks to the V-2. “Weapon of Vengeance” once again proved the power of human thought. Thanks to the technology still in use today, man has received a constant reminder that science must always keep humanity in mind.
Modern use
It should not be assumed that today the FAA exists only in the form of government space programs. About 15-20 years ago, some enthusiasts began to say that the creation of spacecraft would soon become the prerogative of private specialists. Today Elon Musk demonstrated the truth of these statements.
At the same time, these people could not count on the help of powerful investors; no one believed in them. And even more so, no one would transfer to them technologies on the basis of which rockets could be built. V-2 came to the rescue again. It is precisely her schemes that form the basis of those private designers who soon promise to begin intercepting large space orders from the state industry.
The surrender of Germany in 1918 and the subsequent Treaty of Versailles became the starting point for the creation of a new species. According to the treaty, Germany was limited in the production and development of weapons, and the German army was prohibited from having tanks, airplanes, submarines and even airships in service. But there was not a word in the agreement about the nascent rocket technology.
V-2 on the launch pad. Support vehicles are visible.
In the 1920s, many German engineers worked on developing rocket engines. But only in 1931 did designers Riedel and Nebel manage to create a full-fledged liquid fuel jet engine. In 1932, this engine was repeatedly tested on experimental rockets and showed encouraging results.
That same year, the star of Wernher von Braun began to rise, receiving a bachelor's degree from the Berlin Institute of Technology. A talented student attracted the attention of engineer Nebel, and the 19-year-old baron, while studying, became an apprentice at a rocket design bureau.
In 1934, Brown defended his dissertation entitled “Constructive, Theoretical and Experimental Contributions to the Liquid Rocket Problem.” Behind the vague formulation of the doctoral dissertation was hidden the theoretical basis for the advantages of rockets with liquid jet engines over bomber aircraft and artillery. After receiving his PhD, von Braun attracted the attention of the military, and the diploma was kept strictly classified.
In 1934, the West testing laboratory was created near Berlin, which was located at the Kummersdorf test site. It was the “cradle” of German missiles - jet engines were tested there, and dozens of prototype missiles were launched there. There was total secrecy at the test site - few knew what Brown's research group was doing. In 1939, in northern Germany, near the city of Peenemünde, a rocket center was founded - factory workshops and the largest wind tunnel in Europe.
In 1941, under Brown's leadership, a new 13-ton A-4 rocket with a liquid fuel engine was designed.
Consequences of using V-2. Antwerp.
In July 1942, an experimental batch of A-4 ballistic missiles was manufactured, which were immediately sent for testing.
Note: V-2 (Vergeltungswaffe-2, Weapon of Vengeance-2) is a single-stage ballistic missile. Length - 14 meters, weight 13 tons, of which 800 kg were the warhead with explosives. The liquid jet engine ran on both liquid oxygen (about 5 tons) and 75 percent ethyl alcohol (about 3.5 tons). Fuel consumption was 125 liters of mixture per second. The maximum speed is about 6000 km/h, the height of the ballistic trajectory is one hundred kilometers, and the range is up to 320 kilometers. The rocket was launched vertically from the launch pad. After the engine was turned off, the control system was turned on, the gyroscopes gave commands to the rudders, following the instructions of the software mechanism and the speed measuring device.
By October 1942, dozens of A-4 launches had been carried out, but only a third of them were able to reach their target. Constant accidents at launch and in the air convinced the Fuhrer that it was inappropriate to continue funding the Peenemünde rocket research center. After all, the budget of Werner von Braun's design bureau for the year was equal to the cost of producing armored vehicles in 1940.
The situation in Africa and on the Eastern Front was no longer in favor of the Wehrmacht, and Hitler could not afford to finance a long-term and expensive project. Air Force commander Reichsmarschall Goering took advantage of this by offering Hitler a project for the Fi-103 projectile aircraft, which was developed by designer Fieseler.
V-1 cruise missile.
Note: V-1 (Vergeltungswaffe-1, Weapon of Retribution-1) is a guided cruise missile. V-1 mass - 2200 kg, length 7.5 meters, maximum speed 600 km/h, flight range up to 370 km, flight altitude 150-200 meters. The warhead contained 700 kg of explosive. The launch was carried out using a 45-meter catapult (later experiments were carried out on launching from an airplane). After the launch, the rocket control system was turned on, which consisted of a gyroscope, magnetic compass and autopilot. When the missile was above the target, the automation switched off the engine and the missile floated towards the ground. The V-1 engine - a pulsed air-breathing jet - ran on regular gasoline.
On the night of August 18, 1943, about a thousand Allied “flying fortresses” took off from air bases in Great Britain. Their target was factories in Germany. 600 bombers raided the missile center at Peenemünde. German air defense could not cope with the armada of Anglo-American aviation - tons of high-explosive and incendiary bombs fell on the V-2 production workshops. The German research center was practically destroyed, and it took more than six months to rebuild.
In the fall of 1943, Hitler, concerned about the alarming situation on the Eastern Front, as well as a possible Allied landing in Europe, again remembered the “miracle weapon.”
Wernher von Braun was called to the command headquarters. He showed film footage of A-4 launches and photographs of the destruction caused by a ballistic missile warhead. The “Rocket Baron” also presented the Fuhrer with a plan according to which, with proper funding, hundreds of V-2s could be produced within six months.
Von Braun convinced the Fuhrer. "Thank you! Why didn’t I still believe in the success of your work? I was simply poorly informed,” Hitler said after reading the report. The reconstruction of the center in Peenemünde began at double speed. The Fuhrer’s similar attention to missile projects can be explained from a financial point of view: the V-1 cruise missile in mass production cost 50,000 Reichsmarks, and the V-2 missile cost up to 120,000 Reichsmarks (seven times cheaper than the Tiger-I tank, which cost about 800,000 Reichsmark).
On June 13, 1944, fifteen V-1 cruise missiles were launched towards London. The launches continued daily, and within two weeks the death toll from “weapons of retaliation” reached 2,400 people.
Of the 30,000 projectile aircraft manufactured, about 9,500 were launched into England, and only 2,500 of them reached the British capital. 3,800 were shot down by fighters and air defense artillery, and 2,700 V-1s fell into the English Channel. German cruise missiles destroyed about 20,000 houses, wounded about 18,000 people and killed 6,400.
On September 8, on Hitler's orders, a V-2 ballistic missile was launched at London. The first of them fell into a residential area, forming a crater ten meters deep in the middle of the street. This explosion caused a stir among the residents of the capital of England - during the flight, the V-1 produced the characteristic sound of a pulsating jet engine (the British called it a “buzz bomb”). But on this day there was neither an air raid signal nor a characteristic “buzzing” sound. It became clear that the Germans had used some new weapon.
Of the 12,000 V-2s produced by the Germans, more than a thousand were released in England and about five hundred in Antwerp, occupied by the Allied forces. The total number of deaths as a result of the use of “von Braun’s brainchild” was about 3,000 people.
The last V-2 fell on London on March 27, 1945.
The “miracle weapon,” despite its revolutionary concept and design, suffered from disadvantages: low hit accuracy forced the use of missiles at area targets, and the low reliability of engines and automation often led to accidents even at the start. The destruction of enemy infrastructure with the help of V-1 and V-2 was unrealistic, so we can confidently call these weapons “propaganda” - to intimidate the civilian population.
At the beginning of April 1945, an order was given to evacuate Wernher von Braun's design bureau from Peenemünde to southern Germany, to Bavaria - Soviet troops were very close. The engineers were based in Oberjoch, a ski resort located in the mountains. The German rocket elite expected the end of the war.
As Dr. Conrad Danenberg recalled: “We had several secret meetings with von Braun and his colleagues to discuss the question of what we would do after the end of the war. We debated whether we should surrender to the Russians. We had information that the Russians were interested in missile technology. But we have heard so many bad things about the Russians. We all understood that the V-2 rocket was a huge contribution to high technology, and we hoped that it would help us stay alive..."
During these meetings, it was decided to surrender to the Americans, since it was naive to count on a warm reception from the British after the shelling of London by German missiles.
The "Rocket Baron" realized that the unique knowledge of his team of engineers could ensure an honorable reception after the war, and on April 30, 1945, after the news of Hitler's death, von Braun surrendered to American intelligence officers.
This is interesting: American intelligence agencies closely monitored von Braun's work. In 1944, the “Paperclip” plan was developed. The name came from stainless steel paper clips used to fasten the paper files of German rocket engineers, which were kept in the filing cabinet of American intelligence. Operation Paperclip targeted people and documentation related to German missile development.
This is not a myth!
Operation Elster
On the night of November 29, 1944, the German submarine U-1230 surfaced in the Bay of Maine near Boston, from which a small inflatable boat set sail, carrying two saboteurs equipped with weapons, false documents, money and jewelry, as well as various radio equipment.
From this moment, Operation Elster (Magpie), planned by German Interior Minister Heinrich Himmler, entered its active phase. The purpose of the operation was to install a radio beacon on the tallest building in New York, the Empire State Building, which in the future was planned to be used to guide German ballistic missiles.
Back in 1941, Wernher von Braun developed a project for an intercontinental ballistic missile with a flight range of about 4,500 km. However, it was only at the beginning of 1944 that von Braun told the Fuhrer about this project. Hitler was delighted - he demanded that we immediately begin creating a prototype. After this order, German engineers at the Peenemünde center worked around the clock to design and assemble an experimental rocket. The two-stage ballistic missile A-9/A-10 "America" was ready at the end of December 1944. It was equipped with liquid-propellant jet engines, its weight reached 90 tons, and its length was thirty meters. The experimental launch of the rocket took place on January 8, 1945; after seven seconds of flight, the A-9/A-10 exploded in the air. Despite the failure, the “rocket baron” continued to work on Project America.
The Elster mission also ended in failure - the FBI detected a radio transmission from the submarine U-1230, and a raid began on the coast of the Gulf of Men. The spies split up and made their way separately to New York, where they were arrested by the FBI in early December. The German agents were tried by an American military tribunal and sentenced to death, but after the war, US President Truman overturned the sentence.
After the loss of Himmler's agents, Plan America was on the verge of failure, because it was still necessary to find a solution for the most accurate guidance of a missile weighing one hundred tons, which should hit the target after a flight of five thousand kilometers. Goering decided to take the simplest possible route - he instructed Otto Skorzeny to create a squad of suicide pilots. The last launch of the experimental A-9/A-10 took place in January 1945. It is believed that this was the first manned flight; There is no documentary evidence of this, but according to this version, Rudolf Schroeder took the place in the rocket cabin. True, the attempt ended in failure - ten seconds after takeoff, the rocket caught fire and the pilot died. According to the same version, data about the incident with a manned flight is still classified as “secret”.
Further experiments of the “rocket baron” were interrupted by evacuation to southern Germany.
America is learning from experience
In November 1945, the International Military Tribunal began in Nuremberg. The victorious countries tried war criminals and members of the SS. But neither Wernher von Braun nor his rocket team were in the dock, although they were members of the SS party.
The Americans secretly transported the “missile baron” to US territory.
And already in March 1946, at the test site in New Mexico, the Americans began testing V-2 missiles taken from Mittelwerk. Wernher von Braun supervised the launches. Only half of the launched "Revenge Missiles" managed to take off, but this did not stop the Americans - they signed hundreds of contracts with former German rocket scientists. The US administration's calculation was simple - relations with the USSR were quickly deteriorating, and a carrier for a nuclear bomb was required, and a ballistic missile was an ideal option.
In 1950, a group of “rocket men from Peenemünde” moved to a missile test site in Alabama, where work began on the Redstone rocket. The rocket almost completely copied the A-4 design, but due to the changes made, the launch weight increased to 26 tons. During testing, it was possible to achieve a flight range of 400 km.
In 1955, the SSM-A-5 Redstone liquid-propellant operational-tactical missile, equipped with a nuclear warhead, was deployed at American bases in Western Europe.
In 1956, Wernher von Braun heads the American Jupiter ballistic missile program.
On February 1, 1958, a year after the Soviet Sputnik, the American Explorer 1 was launched. It was delivered into orbit by a Jupiter-S rocket designed by von Braun.
In 1960, the “rocket baron” became a member of the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). A year later, under his leadership, the Saturn rockets, as well as the Apollo series spacecraft, were being designed.
On July 16, 1969, the Saturn 5 rocket launched and, after 76 hours of flight in space, delivered the Apollo 11 spacecraft into lunar orbit.
On July 20, 1969, astronaut Neil Armstrong set foot on the surface of the Moon.
Illustration copyright Getty
September marks the 70th anniversary of the first German attack on London using V-2 rockets. As the correspondent found out, German technologies from the Second World War are still used in rocket science.
One sunny morning in September 1944, my father, then just a teenager, was waiting for a train at Cromer station on the east coast of England. It was wonderful clear weather. From a platform high above the city, one could see the coast of German-occupied Holland on the other side of the calm North Sea.
“Suddenly I noticed three lines on the horizon, rising into the sky and disappearing into the stratosphere,” my father recalled. “I’m sure it was the V-2 rockets taking off, but I don’t know where they fell then.”
V-2 launched from mobile launchers. Each 14-meter rocket carried an explosive charge weighing 900 kilograms. The first V-2 fell on London on September 8, 1944. It left a crater 10 meters in diameter, killing three and injuring 22 people.
Unlike traditional aircraft and its predecessor, the V-1 missile, the V-2 rocket was a fundamentally new type of weapon. The flight time to the target was no more than five minutes, and the warning systems did not have time to react to it. Rockets fell on unsuspecting London, Norwich, Paris, Lille and Antwerp. Vau (the German pronunciation of the letter V) meant Vergeltungswaffen, that is, “weapon of retribution.” The V-2 rocket was Germany's last and desperate attempt to turn the tide of the war in its favor.
Some time after witnessing the launch of a V-2, my father narrowly escaped the effects of a missile attack that found him waiting for a tube train at Queen's Park Overground station in north London.
Illustration copyright Getty Image caption In 1945, after the end of the war, the V-2 killer of Londoners was put on public display in Trafalgar Square.“Suddenly there was a loud bang on the road nearby, and a huge cloud of debris rose into the air,” he said. “The V-2 was a weapon of intimidation. Rockets fell from the sky suddenly, without any warning.”
During World War II, over 1,300 V-2 units were produced in England alone. As Allied forces advanced deeper into the continent, Germany began to bombard Belgium and France with missiles.
Development at the cost of thousands of lives
There is no exact data on the total number of victims of the V-2, but it is assumed that there were several thousand. In the UK alone, 2,724 people were killed by missile attacks. However, the V-2 production program itself claimed much more lives - at least 20 thousand.
Illustration copyright Getty Image caption Scene of destruction on London's Farringdon Road after the V-2 crashed there, 1945“This fact is often unfairly forgotten,” says Doug Millard, an expert on the history of rocketry and curator of the space technology exhibition at the London Science Museum, in the main exhibition hall of which the V-2 is housed. “Rockets were built at the cost of many lives, because the Nazis used slave labor concentration camp prisoners."
The prisoners worked in a 24-hour underground factory called Mittelwerk near the Buchenwald concentration camp in central Germany. Many prisoners who possessed the necessary technical skills - for example, welders - were brought from other camps. The conditions of their existence were terrifying - people were kept without sunlight, in unsanitary conditions, they were hungry and lacked sleep. There were cases of prisoners being killed for attempting to sabotage work. According to eyewitnesses, the offenders were hanged from the cranes of assembly lines.
Despite his complicity in maintaining inhumane conditions for workers at the Mittelwerk factory, the creator of the V-2, Wernher von Braun, went down in history as a rocket science genius. The Allies recognized that the V-2 rocket was technologically superior to their own developments.
Illustration copyright Getty Image caption The V-2 was capable of covering a distance of about 190 km at a cruising altitude of over 80 kmThanks to its powerful engine, the V-2 was capable of covering a distance of about 190 km with a cruising altitude of over 80 km. The engine, running on ethanol and liquid oxygen, was a fundamentally new word in rocket technology. In fact, the V-2 became the world's first space rocket.
"Small rockets had been built since the 1930s, but the V-2 was much larger and had a longer range," says Millard. "It took rocket science to a whole new level."
Revolutionary technologies
One of the most revolutionary technological solutions used on the V-2 was an automatic guidance system that did not require constant target designation from the ground. The target coordinates were entered into the on-board analog computer before launch. Gyroscopes installed on the rocket controlled its spatial position throughout the flight. Any deviation from the given trajectory was corrected by rudders on the side stabilizers.
It is not surprising that after the end of the war, the USA, USSR and Britain rushed to take possession of the technology to create the V-2. Von Braun, who did not want to work for Stalin, surrendered to the Americans. And the Soviet Union got a missile factory and a test site.
“Both American and Soviet specialists took the V-2 apart, piece by piece, to understand the principle of its operation,” notes Millard. “As a result, the Soviet Union created an exact copy of the rocket. The Americans took several copies to the United States, where they used them for high-atmospheric experiments.”
Illustration copyright Getty Image caption German Wernher von Braun (far right) among American rocket scientistsHowever, in the USA they understood that technology is secondary in comparison with the genius who created it. The Americans got von Braun. And although Washington's military priority was the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles, the German engineer was able to simultaneously pursue his long-time dream of flying into space.
“Von Braun soon began developing the Redstone rocket, a modification of the V-2, for the US Army,” says Millard. “A version of the Redstone was used in 1961 to launch the first American astronaut, Alan Shepard,” into space.
Legacy of the V-2
Thus, it is not difficult to trace a direct connection between the V-2 rocket, created using the slave labor of prisoners of war, launched at targets from Nazi-occupied Europe, and the first American manned flight into space.
“The V-2 technology, which later allowed the Americans to go to the Moon, was developed at the cost of enormous resources, including human lives,” Millard emphasizes.
Was it possible to land a man on the moon without resorting to Hitler's weapons? Probably yes, but it would take much longer. As with many innovations, the war spurred work on rocket technology and hastened the advent of the space age.
The fundamental principles underlying rocket technology have not changed significantly in 70 years. The design of rocket engines remains the same, most of them run on liquid fuel, and gyroscopes are still used in on-board control systems. All these solutions were first implemented on the V-2.
Without knowing it, on a September day in 1944, my father witnessed the beginning of the space age. "Rocketry hasn't changed much since then," says Millard. "In that sense, we're still in the V-2 era."
Illustration copyright Google