Missile cruiser Admiral Golovko. History of the cruiser from official sources
The development of a new generation destroyer with guided jet weapons (as anti-ship cruise missiles were called at that time) began in 1956. On December 6 of the same year, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral S.G. Gorshkov, approved the tactical and technical specifications for the development of a preliminary design of a new destroyer, agreed with the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry, and a little earlier - on October 16 and 24 of the same year - the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, accordingly, approved those agreed with the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry, the Ministry of Aviation Industry , the Ministry of Defense Industry and the Ministry of General Engineering, a tactical and technical specification (TTZ) for the development of short-range anti-aircraft guided missile weapons (later M-1 Volna) and strike* rocket weapons (later P-35). Thus, the development of the project, which received the number 58 , was carried out almost synchronously with the development of the main weapons. This circumstance predetermined the relatively focused and almost “search-free” development of the project, which changed from stage to stage mainly only to the extent that was determined by the zigzags in the design of the main weapon systems.
* This term appeared much later - in the early 1970s - approx. author
The design of the ship was entrusted to TsKB-53, which by that time had finally specialized as the main design bureau for large surface combat ships of the main classes. After a long break, V.A. Nikitin was again appointed chief designer, and the observation group from the Navy was headed by engineer-captain 2nd rank P.M. Khokhlov. Sketchy project 58 was developed in September 1957. The Navy Shipbuilding Directorate issued an order for the development of a technical project, completed in March 1958.
The lead destroyer, named "Grozny", was laid down at the Leningrad Shipyard named after A.A. Zhdanov on February 23, 1960, launched on March 26, 1961, and in June 1962 the ship was presented for state tests to a commission chaired by Vice Admiral N.I. Shibaev. During construction, the final classification of the ship was made, which had previously been vaguely referred to in official documents as a “ship with jet weapons.” Apparently, the original views of the country's leadership of that time on the role of surface ships, on the one hand, affected, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the fear of “teasing the geese” by using traditional terms - cruiser, destroyer, etc. The situation became clearer by the beginning of the 60s and the new ship was already confidently ranked among class of cruisers, subclass “missile cruiser” - ship of 1st rank. The previous one was reminiscent of the remaining destroyer name of the lead ship and the previously unprecedented mixed cruising-destroyer organization and staffing. For example, in BC-5, only one division was transferred from the cruising organization instead of the required three, and instead of the second and third, groups were retained as on destroyers, i.e. ships of the second rank. As will be seen later, the “cruiser” classification did not actually reflect the traditional principles of designing ships of this class. Actually project 58 in constructive terms, he continued the development of large-displacement destroyers. However, the era of classic cruisers had already ended by that time, but traditions still remained traditions.
Initially, the formulation of the main purpose of the new cruiser was extremely brief and surprisingly modest: “the destruction of light cruisers, destroyers and large enemy transports and the conduct of successful combat with enemy ships armed with short-range rocket weapons.” Subsequently, it expanded: the tasks of destroying aircraft carrier groups were added.
Despite the fact that the designers already had some experience in creating and, to some extent, operating ships with guided missile weapons, designing a new ship presented significant difficulties associated not only with the placement of little-known and constantly changing (during the design process) their tactical and technical characteristics (TTX) of weapon systems, but also with the integration into a large complex “ship-weapons” system of a huge, hitherto unprecedented number of combat and support samples, not connected into single complexes and supplied “in bulk”. This was especially true for numerous radio engineering “products,” as they were then called.
The TC was chosen as the basis for the theoretical drawing (DT) of the body project 56, since it has undergone a thorough and comprehensive “run-in” of theory and practice. As a result, working out the drawing project 58 did not present any particular difficulties and, basically, was carried out at the preliminary design stage. However, model tests at TsAGI and TsNII-45 in regular seas required a more complete formation of the bow frames. At the same time, better results were obtained on all strokes in terms of pourability and especially splashing than on project 56. Given the composition of the armament, the best architectural form of the hull was considered to be one with a long forecastle and a slight rise to the stem. The hull was built longitudinally and divided into 17 compartments by 16 waterproof bulkheads. The ship's unsinkability was ensured when any three adjacent compartments were flooded, but there were areas where the ship could withstand the flooding of four adjacent compartments. SHL-4 steel was used as the body material. Add-ons again (after pr.57bis) were mainly made of aluminum-magnesium alloys of the AMG-5V and 6T grades, only the front wall of the bow and rear wall of the stern superstructure, two tiers of the foremast, the tower part of the main mast, as well as reinforcements for the antenna posts of the Yatagan and "Yatagan" radars Turret" was made of steel. It should be noted that despite the widespread use of AMG alloys (in addition to superstructures, the latter were also used for light bulkheads, platforms, decks, vestibules, shafts, etc.), rules for designing them and methods for calculating strength did not exist then. Concerns regarding the low fire resistance of AMG structures were expressed at the design stage, but no practical steps were taken. The technical design included consideration of anti-fragmentation protection for SAM cellars, but this too was rejected for reasons of weight savings, i.e. for the same reasons that led to the widespread use of AMH.
Basic shipbuilding elements of a cruiser project 58 are best perceived in comparison with elements of the previous rocket ship - a large rocket ship project 57 bis(table 1).
table 1 Shipbuilding elements |
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Shipbuilding elements |
Project 57bis* |
Technical project 58 |
Standard displacement, t |
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Normal displacement, t |
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Total displacement, t |
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Maximum length, m |
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Length according to vertical line (L), m |
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Width along the vertical line (B), m |
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Draft according to waterline (T), m |
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Side height at midship, m |
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Total completeness factor |
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L/B ratio |
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B/T ratio |
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Initial metacentric height at Dп, m |
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Sail area, sq.m |
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* Note: the elements of Project 57-bis, given in Table 1, are somewhat different from the technical specifications published in the magazine “Shipbuilding” No. 4, 1994. Here the construction data is given, there – the technical design. |
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table 2 |
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Load section |
Weight, t (%Dst) |
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Project 57bis |
Technical project 58 |
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Booking |
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Armament |
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Ammunition |
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Mechanisms |
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Electrical equipment |
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Liquid cargo |
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Supply |
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Displacement reserve |
Particular attention during the design, as mentioned above, was paid to strict weight savings. Enlarged weight load table ( table 2) gives a clear idea of the work of design thought in this direction and indicates the achievement of certain successes (payload).
The general layout of the ship, compared to previously built ones, was distinguished by the placement of the main command post (MCP) complex in the hull, the absence of open combat posts, passage to posts without access to the upper deck, and a relatively small number of superstructures (this was achieved due to the volume obtained due to the extended forecastle) . Architecturally, the impressive unusual pyramidal foresail and mainmasts attracted attention, which for a long time determined the appearance of many domestic warships of subsequent projects. Their use was dictated by the need for volumes for high-lying posts of high-frequency radar units, the need to rigidly reinforce a large number of antenna devices of numerous radio and radio equipment, including very bulky and heavy ones, as well as to better meet the requirements of anti-nuclear protection (PAZ) and anti-chemical protection (CCP) – resistance to shock waves and “washability” with water protection.
The main power plant of the ship was adopted mainly according to previous destroyer projects, that is 41 , 56 , 57bis. However, to achieve the specified full speed of 34.5 knots, it was necessary to boost both the main turbo-gear units and the boilers while maintaining the requirements of strict weight discipline and efficiency. In addition, special requirements were put forward for protection against weapons of mass destruction and for reducing the levels of physical fields, in particular the thermal field. As GTZA on project 58 Turbines of the TV-12 type were installed, which differed from the previous TV-8 with a higher aggregate power - 45,000 hp, a 35% lower specific gravity and a 2-4% higher efficiency with the same dimensions. This was achieved mainly by increasing the contact stresses in the gear teeth, increasing the pressure in the main condenser and increasing the flow rate of cooling water, as well as through the use of new materials and other design measures.
The main high-pressure boilers of the KVN-95/64 type had turbo-compressor air pressurization, which made it possible to double the voltage of the combustion volume, reduce the specific gravity by 30% and increase the efficiency at full speed by 10% compared to the previously used KV-76 boilers. In addition, it was possible to significantly (60%) reduce the temperature of the exhaust gases. A completely natural consequence of these measures was a deterioration in the efficiency of the installation at low and medium speeds. During the creation of the installation, it turned out that the unit can be boosted to 50,000 hp. In general, MKU project 58 had the following main characteristics (at maximum load):
– steam capacity of each boiler – 95 t/hour;
– operating steam pressure – 64 kgf/sq.cm;
– steam temperature – 470 °C;
– shaft speed at full speed – 300 rpm;
– specific fuel consumption at full speed – 329 g/hp/hour (845 kg/mile).
To provide steam for standby modes and to prepare the MCU for the trip, an auxiliary boiler with a capacity of up to 7 tons/hour was provided.
The ship's electrical power system operated on three-phase alternating current with a voltage of 380 V. The main sources of electricity were two TD-750 turbogenerators with a power of 750 kW each and two diesel generators DG-500 with a power of 500 kW each, located in two power plants, and parallel operation of the turbochargers was ensured. and diesel generators both among themselves and among power plants. Thus, no special standby electric generators were provided and the operation of the mechanisms in the mentioned modes, as a rule, was provided by one of the turbogenerators with steam extraction from the auxiliary boiler. To a large extent, the general design decisions for the ship basically repeated those of previous destroyers with adjustments due to an increase in displacement. So, for example, the area of the rudders of the anti-roll bars is pr.58 was increased to 3.2x2 m instead of 2.6x2.15 on pr.57bis, ship's watercraft (boats and a six-oar yawl), unlike previous projects, were made of AMG, while practical things were adopted completely unified.
The main weapon of the ship was the new P-35 missile system, developed on the basis of the P-5 complex, which was used to arm submarines projects 644 And 665 converted from diesel-electric boats project 613. The P-35 complex differed from the previous KSShch by a significantly larger (at least 250 km) firing range, a more advanced supersonic missile 4K-44, which had both conventional and nuclear equipment and was used against both sea and coastal targets, a fundamentally new system control and significantly more advanced and reliable performance properties. As part of the ship's missile defense complex project 58 included: two packaged quad guided launchers SM-70, 16 cruise missiles, a 4R-44 (“Binom”) control system and other service devices.
The SM-70 launchers had remote horizontal guidance and a fixed elevation angle of 25 degrees when launching missiles. They permanently housed 8 4K-44 missiles and, in addition, there were 8 more spare missiles in the cellars located in the superstructures. The control system made it possible to carry out a simultaneous two-missile salvo from each launcher, that is, the total salvo of the cruiser could be formed from four missiles. The preparation time for the first salvo was no more than 12 minutes. In the cellars, the missiles were stored fully equipped, but without fuel and pyro-candles, in launcher containers - with pyro-candles and configured on-board equipment. The “Binom” control system ensured the launch of missiles from the launcher, their telecontrol by radio commands during the mid-flight section of the trajectory, and the command acquisition of the target by the homing head. On the foremast and main mast of the cruiser, one dual antenna post of the system was placed, which ensured the simultaneous “wiring” of no more than four missiles. During the development process, the P-35 complex was tested on coastal stands and on a converted test vessel. The Volna anti-aircraft missile system underwent comprehensive ship tests on a converted destroyer project 56K"Gallant". Therefore, the designers already had at their disposal some practical results related to the “behavior” of the complex directly on the ship. Included in the M-1 air defense system project 58 included a twin (double-boom) stabilized launcher ZIF-101, a system for storing and delivering missiles V-600 (4K-90), a control system with equipment for pre-launch preparation and launch of missiles 4R-90 - “Yatagan”. In the cellar, 16 missiles were placed in two revolving drums. The combat characteristics of the complex provided 2 launches every 5 seconds, the firing range was initially up to 16 km along the horizon (when firing at surface targets) and the altitude reach was about 15 km. The Yatagan radio command system was single-channel and could fire two missiles at one target. In general, despite the fact that the M-1 “Volna” complex was developed as a naval version based on a land-based, that is, as at first it seemed, a fairly well-known complex, during the development of the project it was necessary to radically rearrange the bow of the ship twice due to serious changes weights and dimensions of the V-600 missile defense system.
The underestimation of the role of cannon artillery in the 50s in practice led to the fact that by the time the development of the project began for arming surface ships with new artillery systems, it was really possible to rely only on the 76-mm two-gun automated gun mount AK-726 (ZIF-67). When included in the ship's armament, artillery was assigned a clearly secondary and auxiliary role. Although the AK-726 was officially called a universal installation, its main purpose was considered to be air defense, which was confirmed by its high rate of fire - 90 rounds per minute. On project 58 two turrets were installed in the rear, but the common control system with a single fire control radar "Turel" MP-105 turned two two-gun turrets into one four-gun turret. In the main mode, the turrets were controlled remotely, however, there was backup local control using optical sights (“Prism”) installed on the guns themselves.
The ship's total artillery ammunition was 2,400 rounds and was stored in two magazines in open honeycomb racks without clips; the latter were stored and equipped in the transshipment rooms.
The torpedo armament was installed the same as on project 57bis: two three-tube torpedo tubes TTA-53-57-bis, which were placed side by side on the upper deck (in the area of frame 129) and were intended for firing homing anti-submarine torpedoes SET-53 and long-range torpedoes 53-57. Shooting was carried out only with gunpowder. The “Zummer” anti-submarine torpedo fire control system was interfaced with the “Burya” anti-submarine torpedo weapon control system and with the MP-105 radar station, which provided target designation for surface targets. On the ship project 58 For the first time (on serial ships) the RBU-6000 rocket launcher system (two twelve-barreled installations) with new RSL-60 rocket depth charges was installed. Ammunition was taken at the rate of four full salvoes, i.e. 96 RSL. The firing control of the RBU was carried out by the “Storm” system, which ensured the determination of the course, speed of targets, their heading angle, and so on. It should be noted that the RBU-6000 complex from the very beginning was considered, first of all, as an anti-torpedo protection complex, but subject to the receipt of the necessary data from the GAS.
Aviation weapons (helicopter) did not appear on the ship from the very beginning of design. Only in the technical design it was necessary to lengthen the aft end in order to ensure the possibility of receiving and taking off a Ka-25 type helicopter. Further studies showed that without increasing the ship's displacement, it is impossible to ensure full-fledged basing of the helicopter. Therefore on project 58 It was possible to place only a runway with lighting equipment, a launch command post (UCP) and a small supply of aviation kerosene (5 tons). Moreover, the helicopter itself was taken into overload and its basing, thus, could be considered purely symbolic.
To control a tactical group of ships in battle and to coordinate the use of strike missile weapons, as well as control of air defense and electronic warfare systems of the formation, on project 58 a simplified flagship command post (FCP) with corresponding premises and posts was equipped. Looking ahead, it should be noted that the FKP was almost never used for its intended purpose and during the operation of the ships its premises were converted for other purposes.
The radio equipment was initially represented by two two-dimensional general detection radars MR-300 "Angara", the antennas of which were located on the tops of the foremast and main mast and were combined with the antennas of the Nickel-KM interrogation stations, which corresponded to two response stations "Khrom-KM" . The tasks of detecting surface targets and navigation were initially solved by one Don radar. To detect underwater targets and provide target designation to torpedo and rocket-launching weapons, there was a GS-572 (Hercules-2M) circular and stepwise search sonar with a retractable underbody antenna. To detect and roughly find enemy radars, a radio-technical reconnaissance complex (RTR) “Bizan-4D” was installed, and to create active jamming, jamming stations “Krab-11” and “Krab-12” were installed. In addition, F-82-T fired jamming devices were envisaged, consisting of two launchers with two guides each and with a total ammunition load of 792 rounds, but they were never installed on the cruisers. Regarding issues of ship protection, it should be added that even then the forerunner of the “Stealth” concept was envisaged and practically implemented: tilting the walls of the superstructures, cooling the exhaust gases of boilers and diesel generators, installing main machines and electric machines on shock absorbers, supplying air to the edges of the propellers, blackout of the ship and so on. In addition, as on previous ships, starting with project 56M, anti-nuclear, anti-chemical and anti-bacteriological protection was implemented in full (according to the requirements of that time), which was achieved by appropriate strength of the hull and structures, sealing of premises, filter-ventilation units, collective and individual protection of the crew, a water and decontamination protection system.
The ship's communications equipment included 6 sets of HF and CB transmitters, 12 receivers, 6 transceiver radio stations, the operation of which was provided by 34 antennas.
By the time construction of the lead ship was completed, some weapons systems had not been created and, therefore, were not installed on board. The most unpleasant thing was the absence of the “Success-U” system, designed to provide target designation to the P-35 complex from external sources (Tu-95RTs aircraft and, much later, Ka-25Ts helicopters). It is quite clear that the combat capabilities of the ship were only partially realized, since it was possible to confidently fire missiles only within the radar horizon. True, there was a simplified method using voice (via radio communication channels) target designation from a helicopter, but as already indicated, the latter was not permanently based on the ship, and the method itself was unreliable. In addition to the Success-U system, it was not possible to install a system that ensures the joint use of weapons, a system for ensuring a group attack of submarines, a television surveillance system for close-in situations, and some other systems and complexes. Subsequently, some of them did appear on ships (unfortunately, not on all of them), and some remained on paper. For example, the planned replacement of the Don navigation radar with a more advanced one, Volga, did not take place; the interrogators and responders Nickel and Khrom were also not replaced with Dural-K, etc.
The staffing table stipulated that the ship's crew would consist of 27 officers, 29 midshipmen and chief petty officers and 283 foremen and conscript sailors. The habitability of personnel was, in comparison with previous projects, somewhat improved due to the allocation (for the first time on our ships) of a dining room, which provided accommodation for 2/3 of the foremen and sailors. In addition to meals, cultural events were held in the dining room - film screenings, lectures, meetings, etc. In combat conditions, an operational center was set up in the dining room. A great “achievement” in the field of habitability, as it was then believed, was the widespread use of lining, insulation, all kinds of cladding made from AMG, laminated plastics and even birch plywood. There is no need to prove that such a decision in practice showed itself from the worst side, but for this statement it took the death of the military-industrial complex "Votvazhny", the EM "Sheffield", fires and disasters on ships of our and foreign fleets.
Overall cruiser project 58 was in many ways a fundamentally new and complex ship, if only because it was the first to house two missile systems for different purposes. In this regard, tests of the lead ship, especially the P-35 complex, were of particular interest. Tests were carried out in the White Sea from July 6 to October 29, 1962. They fired throwing blanks and combat missiles (in a telemetric version) in single and salvo launches. The targets were stationary targets - the former leader "Leningrad" (SM-5) and a mothership of torpedo boats project 1784(SM-8), the firing range was about 200 km, the weather was calm, radar observability was good. The firing results varied in success rate, but ultimately both targets were hit by missiles hitting the superstructures. The tests did not go smoothly; many defects and shortcomings were revealed, but the vast majority of them were eliminated either on site or during testing of the complex. The main reasons for the defects were the hasty delivery to the ship of elements and assemblies that were not fully developed, insufficient consideration of real ship and sea conditions, and individual design errors. The equipment of the Binom control system turned out to be especially unreliable. The actual interval between missile launches from a common launcher turned out to be almost four times longer than the design one, and the diagram of the firing sectors of both bow and stern installations in practice turned out to be greatly “truncated.” Otherwise, the selection committee considered the P-35 complex to be in compliance with the Navy specifications and the contractual draft and demanded that the main comments, of which there were about a hundred, be eliminated.
The Volna anti-aircraft missile system was tested against PM-2 parachute targets and a MiG-15M target aircraft - a total of 5 actual firings were carried out. As a result of the tests, basically the same shortcomings of the M-1 air defense system were repeated, which were also revealed on the destroyer "Brave" ( project 56K). The most serious of them were the low reliability and short service life of individual units of the Yatagan control system, the inability to fire at low-flying targets, and significantly smaller affected areas than required. The last circumstance is precisely project 58 was largely due to the unsuccessful placement of the ZIF-101 launcher. The length of the nasal tip was not enough, as a result of which the ZIF-101 launcher was excessively “pressed” to the SM-70 launcher. The latter, in turn, also “suffered,” as already mentioned, from such proximity and also had an unsatisfactory shelling pattern. But in general, the Volna complex complied with the technical design and technical requirements.
The AK-726 artillery mounts had not yet been put into service at the start of testing at the Grozny missile launcher, although they were installed on ships projects 61, 35 , 159 . Five firings - three at air targets and two at sea targets - showed that the ship's artillery armament generally worked reliably. However, at ship speeds above 28 knots, strong vibration of the installations was observed: the barrels “walked” in a vertical plane (up to 9 mm). Reinforcements carried out by the plant made it possible to reduce vibration, but it was not completely eliminated. Ultimately, the installations were put into service, but the Turel fire control system, like other radar fire control systems, took quite a long time to be brought into working condition.
The tests of torpedo weapons were, in general, successful, since serial and proven systems and mechanisms were installed on the ship. The same results were reached when testing RBU-6000. However, as on ships of previous projects, great criticism was caused by the work of hydroacoustic means - first of all, the GAS GS-572, which did not provide the necessary target designation due to insufficient range and strong dependence on sea hydrology.
Tests of other radio equipment have shown that their main disadvantages are: unsatisfactory electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) during simultaneous operation, outdated material of the instrument equipment, and weakness of electronic warfare equipment. It was considered a big mistake to install two identical radars on the ship - MR-300, which naturally operated in the same frequency ranges and, of course, interfered with each other. It was emphasized that such a decision was not only technically, but also tactically unjustified. A particularly unpleasant and embarrassing circumstance was that during the operation of the general detection radar, strong interference was observed with the operation of the firing radars, especially the artillery “Turel”.
Concluding a brief review of the results of tests of weapons and weapons of the Grozny RKR, mention should also be made of tests on the aviation part. Unfortunately, these were carried out very frivolously. The helicopter did not directly participate in the tests, and the tests themselves bore a modest name - verification. However, even the inspection required numerous modifications to be made on the ship: solving the problem of runway icing, applying a non-slip coating, manufacturing a special cover for the helicopter, improving signal lighting equipment, etc.
Very interesting and requiring a separate special narrative were the tests to check the possibility of personnel staying in combat posts, premises and on the open deck during the launch of missiles (anti-ship missiles and missiles) and the operation of the radar. The need for such tests was dictated by the fact that the new rockets had large specific thrust impulses of the starting engines (stages), which, in combination with short-term operation, created large shock loads. The influence of ultra-high-frequency radiation (microwave) radar on people was noticed during the tests of the cruiser Sverdlov in 1952, but then little importance was attached to this. The tests were carried out on experimental animals - rabbits, which were placed in various places and combat posts, and the use of weapons and RTS was carried out taking into account their maximum biological impact. 3-5 hours after the launches, the animals underwent postmortem examination for further histological examination. Tests revealed dangerous locations for personnel during launches of P-35, V-600 missiles and operating radars. When firing missiles, personnel could be in all closed combat posts, and when firing anti-ship missiles, the presence of personnel in a number of rooms (even in gun mount No. 1) turned out to be unacceptable without special protection equipment. The time spent by personnel at combat posts exposed to microwave radiation after testing was limited by special instructions.
As one would expect, the ship's spent main power plant operated generally normally. However, it turned out that the specified maximum speed of 34.5 knots was achieved by boosting the power to 95,000 hp. The actual cruising range was 3,650 miles with an average operational speed of 18 knots (at least 3,500 miles were required).
table 3 Main stages of construction of RKR project 58 |
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Name ship |
Factory- sky |
Bookmark |
Descent |
Enter into operation |
"Grozny" |
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"Admiral Fokin" |
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"Admiral Golovko" |
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During tests in the North in the summer of 1962, an extraordinary event occurred in the life of “Grozny”: the ship was visited by the then leader of the country N.S. Khrushchev, accompanied by the Minister of Defense, Marshal R.Ya. Malinovsky. The first commander of the cruiser, Captain 2nd Rank V.A. Lapenkov, first took the ship out to sea and conducted demonstration firing with the P-35 complex. The management watched them from aboard the cruiser Murmansk. The firing turned out to be successful, the missiles went beyond the horizon and hit the target shield with a direct hit. After that, the distinguished guests went to the “Grozny” and examined the ship. N.S. Khrushchev was delighted with the ship and expressed a wish to visit Halifax on an official visit in the near future. Looking ahead, in this regard, I would like to mention that “Grozny” underwent particularly careful finishing and appropriate additional equipment, including a polyvinyl chloride coating on the upper deck, which subsequent cruisers did not receive.
In various versions of military shipbuilding programs, the number of cruisers expected to be laid down was indicated differently. At the maximum, it was planned to build at least 16 units. However, in fact, in Leningrad, at the shipbuilding plant. A.A. Zhdanov built 4 ships ( table 3). Life has made serious adjustments, which we were partially able to implement in project 1134, which became a further development of ships project 58, which improved them in many elements. Therefore, “Varyag”, named after the famous cruiser and immediately upon construction received a guards rank*, turned out to be the last ship of the series.
* The legendary “Varyag”, when re-enlisted in the Russian fleet, was assigned to the Guards crew - approx. author
Cruisers project 58 served in all four of our fleets. They were mastered by personnel and actively participated in combat service deployed since the late 1960s. There were no serious accidents or disasters on them, which gives reason to conclude that the ships turned out to be reliable and accessible for reliable operation. The lead cruiser “Grozny” was especially lucky: it starred as “himself” in the feature film “Neutral Waters,” securing documentary immortality for itself.
Serious modernization of ships project 58 were not exposed. In the 1970s, some of the required missing radio-technical weapons were installed on them (but not all), for example, the “Success-U” system (only on the Admiral Fokin and Grozny RKRs) two-coordinate radars MR-300 were replaced by three-coordinate MR -310 (“Admiral Fokin” and “Varyag”). All ships received a second Don-2 radar (detection of surface targets), salute guns and, finally, two batteries of small-caliber six-barreled 30-mm AK-630 assault rifles with a radar and a Vympel fire control system for each. The B-600 anti-aircraft missiles were replaced by the more advanced B-601, and the 4K-44 anti-ship missiles (on some ships) by the Progress anti-ship missiles. In addition, according to individual decisions, some cruisers were equipped with complexes and means not provided for by the project: the MR-262 active jamming station (Fence), the Password state identification system, the Gateway space navigation complex, etc. By the beginning of the 90s, these cruisers had already exceeded their age limit. In 1990, Varyag was the first to be withdrawn from the Pacific Fleet; in 1991, it was the turn of Grozny, which was part of the Baltic Fleet; in 1993, Admiral Fokin (Pacific Fleet) was decommissioned. Currently, the long-suffering Black Sea Fleet still has the Admiral Golovko in service, but regardless of the course of further events, its fate is clear - age is age.
Missile cruisers project 58 left a noticeable mark on the history of domestic shipbuilding and the fleet. It is often considered that these are “the world’s first missile cruisers that had no foreign analogues.” The point, of course, is not the name. These ships were “designated” cruisers, so to speak, by a willful decision. This is evidenced by the fact that the destroyers of the late 1970s of both our and the American fleets surpassed them in displacement by almost twice. The priority in creating such ships in our country was determined by a number of natural, that is, objective reasons, which, by and large, did not depend on the talents or voluntarism of specific leaders or teams. But what is indisputable is that domestic scientists and designers managed for the first time in practice to successfully solve the problem of creating a powerful compact ship with missile systems for various purposes, with a high saturation of new, at that time, electronic weapons and that seemed to meet the then requirements for waging war at sea . It is necessary to especially highlight the actual primacy project 58- This is the first domestic surface ship with nuclear weapons and, therefore, with previously unprecedented and incomparable combat capabilities.
For the development and creation of the cruiser project 58 The government awarded the Lenin Prize, but, as often happened, neither the chief designer nor the actual chief observer of the Navy was on the list of those awarded it. V.A. Nikikitin, after completing his main creative work, went on a “well-deserved rest”, and P.M. Khokhlov, almost simultaneously with him, was transferred to the reserve. Latest drawings for project 58 A.L. Fisher and V.G. Korolevich were signed as the chief designer, and the tireless M.A. Yanchevsky was “finalized” as the chief observer of the Navy. Anyway, missile cruiser project 58 became the “swan song” of the outstanding Russian Soviet military shipbuilder Vladimir Aleksandrovich Nikitin.
The Russian navy is currently being re-equipped. Russia was forced to re-equip its fleet by insurmountable circumstances. The warships that Russia inherited from the Soviet Union have mostly fallen into disrepair. Of these, some of the old ones have been disposed of, and the other part must be modernized. They should be replaced by modern combat units - Project 22350 frigates.
Project 22350: why frigates?
Currently, the Russian naval forces have a sufficient number of small missile ships, as well as corvettes, which are required to guard Russian maritime borders. However, to further strengthen Russia’s naval power and to more reliably protect Russia’s sea approaches, vessels that guard the far sea zone are also needed. The Russian authorities, together with the Navy command, expect that this role will be played by frigates of the new Project 22350, designed to replace outdated missile cruisers.
Why frigates and not some other type of warship? A brief historical excursion is necessary here. There were no frigates in the naval forces of the USSR: in those days, combat ships were classified differently. Those that were essentially frigates were called patrol ships in the USSR or, in common parlance, “patrol ships.” These were reliable and formidable ships, capable of guarding the near approaches to the coast, as well as performing independent military missions in open waters. Subsequently, when the Russian Navy replaced the USSR Navy, patrol vessels began to be renamed frigates. In other words, combat ships in Russia began to be classified in the same way as throughout the world.
At the beginning of the new millennium, instead of outdated patrol ships, Russia began building a new generation of warships, that is, frigates. Russia was pushed to this by inevitable necessity. Old ships, such as the cruiser Grozny and the cruiser Admiral Golovko, were completely outdated and, accordingly, could not adequately carry out combat missions dictated by the times. The construction of new ships began to be referred to by the code name “Project 22350”. The result of the project should be the replacement of the outdated cruiser Admiral Golovko by a modern frigate of Project 22350.
According to the government's plan, new Russian frigates are required to surpass the ships of previous generations in their combat qualities and, accordingly, strengthen the power of the Russian navy, regardless of what part of the world ocean such a ship will be located in. According to approximate tactical and technical characteristics, Project 22350 military vessels are designed for a cruising range in excess of 4,000 miles. In addition, they will be able to stay in the process of autonomous navigation for at least thirty days. Such characteristics will allow them to successfully protect the far sea zone. In terms of their displacement, as well as the variety of weapons, the new frigates will be to some extent inferior to the ships of the previous generation. However, the level of their security, electronic equipment, and fire control of frigates will be significantly higher.
Initially, the Russian government planned to equip all fleets, but subsequently government plans changed. It was decided to equip the Black Sea Fleet with new generation ships. For anyone who closely follows world political news, this decision of the Russian government is quite understandable.
Features of the construction of ships of project 22350
Exactly how many ships should be built to implement Project 22350 is not known exactly. However, some sources claim that at least twenty such ships should be built. The estimated time frame allowed for construction is no more than twenty years. The frigates were supposed to be built at four enterprises: the Kaliningrad Yantar Shipyard, the Baltic Shipyard, the Severnaya Verf shipyard, and the Admiralty Shipyard, which are located in St. Petersburg.
On February 1, 2006, Severnaya Verf began building the first frigate of Project 22350, called Admiral Gorshkov. As befits the first-born, “Admiral Gorshkov” took a long time to incarnate, more than four years. There were several reasons for this: disputes over what the technical equipment of the ship should be, and the same disputes regarding its weapons.
On October 29, 2010, the first-born frigate “Admiral Gorshkov” solemnly launched into the water. The Russian Ministry of Defense made its final choice precisely at Severnaya Verf, and signed contracts with this plant involving the construction of seven more ships. Thus, it was the St. Petersburg shipyard “Severnaya Verf” that became the only enterprise that received the right to build Project 22350 ships.
The frigate "Admiral Gorshkov" is still not a full-fledged combat unit due to protracted testing. Construction of another ship called Admiral Kasatonov began in 2009, but it was launched only in mid-2015.
It is difficult to say about the reason for such slowness. The state, as well as shipbuilders, remain silent. Unlike forums, which, on the contrary, are full of all sorts of assumptions, versions and conjectures. In general, several basic assumptions are put forward on the forums to explain the slowness of domestic military shipbuilders. One version says that the Admiral Gorshkov had problems with the main engine turbine during testing. Replacing it with a new turbine turned out to be difficult, since such turbines were previously produced by one of the Ukrainian defense enterprises, which, due to well-known political events, refused to supply its products to Russia.
However, despite all sorts of problems and silence on the part of authorized authorities, the implementation of the project is proceeding as usual. In 2012, another frigate, Admiral Golovko, was laid down. After this, in 2013, they began to build the next ship, Admiral Isakov. Exactly when their construction will be completed has not yet been announced.
Tactical and technical characteristics of frigates of project 22350
For obvious reasons, most of these characteristics are unknown to the general public, and should not be known. However, many people are familiar with some general characteristics of the ships under construction from the new series:
- The hull is equipped with side stabilizers, the rudders of which will not be retracted. This device is necessary to ensure that the ship does not lose its performance during a storm;
- The superstructures will be made of special materials with composite characteristics. Such materials help reduce the radio-acoustic background of ships;
- The frigates will be equipped with Stealth technology. This technology makes ships stealthy, preventing enemy radars from detecting them;
- All will have a double bottom, which will help the ships stay afloat if damage occurs;
- A universal fire extinguishing system will be installed;
- The power of the propulsion system will reach 55 thousand horsepower;
- The maximum speed will reach 29 knots;
- Using economic propulsion (14 knots), the frigate will be able to travel 4,000 miles without stopping.
Most likely, when testing new ships, some of their initial characteristics will change.
Estimated armament of Project 22350 ships
The new ships are planned to be equipped with the most modern weapons:
- The most powerful armament of the frigates is expected to be the 16 Moskit anti-ship missile launcher;
- In addition, the vessels will be equipped with the A-192 universal automatic artillery mount;
- To destroy enemy submarines, the ships will be armed with Medvedka-2 anti-submarine systems;
- To assess the hydroacoustic underwater space, frigates are equipped with a special Vignette-M system. This system allows you to hear an enemy submarine at a distance of up to 60 kilometers;
- To protect themselves from air attack, they will use the Redut anti-aircraft missile system;
- For the same purpose, as well as for hitting unobtrusive targets on the surface of the water, they will be equipped with the Broadsword missile and gun system;
- All ships of this project must also have Ka-27 helicopters with the ability to take off and land on deck.
Again, it is quite obvious that in the future the ships’ armament can be supplemented or changed.
How will Project 22350 perform in the near future?
Only the Russian government and shipbuilders can answer how successfully the project is being implemented. The latest news claims that this year only one Admiral Gorshkov has been brought to full readiness. The long time it took to test it was dictated by practical considerations. The ship carried out thorough testing of the types of weapons that future ships would be equipped with. In addition to the weapons, the tactical and technical data of the ship itself were also carefully checked in order to prevent identified deficiencies on those frigates that are expected to be built in the near future.
The frigate "Admiral Golovko", laid down second, according to estimates, should be ready by the beginning of 2020. As for the frigate "Admiral Isakov", nothing is said about the specific date of its construction. It is even more unknown when construction of other vessels of this project will begin.
Of course, building ships is a long process. However, such a duration may mean that by the time it is built, some of the innovations that are planned may become outdated, and then the newly built ship will have to be improved in accordance with the latest advances in technology, electronics and weapons. In any case, many experts fear this. The shipbuilders themselves object to them in the sense that frigates are built with a solid foundation, and therefore there is no reason to fear that they will be outdated by the time they are built.
There is some merit to such objections. At the moment, Russian frigates of Project 22350 can be considered the most modern in the world, both in terms of technological features and in terms of aesthetics and design. Their weapons are also at the highest level. In any case, there are no ships similar to the new Russian frigates in any foreign fleet yet.
“Destroyer with jet weapons” pr. 58 with its appearance marked a revolution in domestic naval architecture, no less than what happened in the same years in civil architecture, where the Corinthian columns and “women with an oar” of the Stalinist Empire style were replaced by glass and concrete of the simple Khrushchevite new buildings. The style of Project 58, and especially its immediate successor Project 1134, is clearly visible in the silhouettes of all subsequent more or less large Soviet-built ships.
In accordance with the theoretical views of naval science, the destroyer Project 58 was conceived as a ship of small displacement, stuffed to the limit with weapons and radio electronics. On the ship, in addition to the massive antennas of radar stations for detecting air targets (Angara), it was necessary to place antenna control posts for anti-ship missiles (Binom), anti-aircraft missiles (Yatagan), artillery installations (Fut-B), and that’s not counting communications, radio intelligence and electronic warfare. For reliability, the ship was equipped with two Angara stations, and each P-35 missile control channel required a separate parabolic antenna. For high-quality signal transmission, it was desirable to bring the radar equipment as close as possible to the antenna.
Missile cruiser pr. 58 "Grozny".
Missile cruiser pr. 58 "Grozny" after modernization. 1985-1986
The overload of radar antenna posts determined the main architectural feature - the placement on the ship of two tetrahedral pyramidal tower-like masts with electronic equipment units installed in them. True, even at the technical design stage a more conventional lattice mainmast was envisaged.
Of course, the adopted architectural innovation also had a “reverse side of the coin.” Even the appearance of the ship raised doubts about ensuring sufficient stability. The weight of tower-like masts was reduced by the use of aluminum alloys, but their windage did not depend on the materials used in the construction.
Another feature of the Project 58 ship was the placement of anti-ship missiles in rotating (up to ±120° from the stowed position) quad SM-70 container launchers, raised for launch to a starting angle of 25° in 1.5 minutes. Horizontal guidance was carried out at a speed of 5 degrees/s. The main advantages of this scheme include the possibility of simultaneously launching missiles in one direction from the bow and stern installations. Like the frigates of the sailing fleet, Project 58 fired a salvo, turning broadside towards the enemy. With this arrangement of the launchers, the free flow of gas jets from both the main engine during the “race” and the starting unit directly during launch did not cause problems. There was no need for gas exhaust devices or special protection of ship structures. In addition, the onboard equipment of the missile control system was not required to provide a post-launch turn - the missile immediately flew in the direction of the target.
However, overall the launcher turned out to be too complex and heavy. The general design of the SM-70 launchers reflected the stereotype of thinking of naval gunners: the weapon must face the enemy, the projectile must be delivered from the magazine to the barrel. Further development went, firstly, in the direction of combining the functions of the missile storage and launcher, and secondly, transferring the solution to the task of turning to the target directly to the missile. On subsequent carriers, starting with Project 1134, anti-ship missiles were placed in stationary containers, usually fixed at the launch angle. The exception was the Project 1135 military-industrial complex built a decade later, equipped with launchers for anti-submarine missiles similar to the SM-70.
The reloading of the launcher also became a dead-end technical solution. Even in peacetime, this operation was successful only in relatively calm seas, and in a combat situation, the ship of Project 58 would almost certainly have been destroyed long before the completion of this operation. Nevertheless, on Project 58, the magazines for spare missiles took up a significant amount of space in the superstructure.
The enthusiasm for anti-ship missiles (and for them, in fact, the ship was built) gave rise to disdain for defensive weapons. The anti-aircraft complex placed on the tank with a fire performance of two salvoes per minute and a maximum firing range of the 4K-90 missile up to 15 km did not provide reliable protection even when attacked by single enemy aircraft on a collision course. From the aft corners, cover from an air attack was purely symbolic - a pair of twin 76-mm ZiF-726 machine guns.
The anti-submarine weapons of the Project 58 ship included two RBU-6000 Smerch-2 rocket launchers, which were used for the first time. They had a quite sufficient (in any case, with the clearly outdated Hercules-2 hydroacoustic station installed on the ship) a range of up to 6 km, and provided remote loading and guidance. But still, it was a weapon of the Second World War brought to the highest degree of perfection, ineffective in the fight against nuclear submarines. More promising were two built 533-mm torpedo tubes designed for homing anti-submarine torpedoes.
Launcher SM-70.
The obvious weakness of the defensive capabilities of Project 58 forced both in the constructions of naval theorists and in the practice of combat service, instead of the seductive, but reeking of German influence, concept of a single missile raider - “aircraft carrier hunter” - to move on to the implementation of a truly national idea “For three! » A naval strike group consisting of one “missile cruiser” and at least two large anti-submarine ships of Project 61 was supposed to operate in the sea.
Based on the results of consideration of many options, a hull with an elongated forecastle was adopted as the basis. This decision contradicted the smooth-deck architecture that best met the seaworthiness requirements, implemented in post-war destroyers and patrol ships. The choice of the forecastle hull was largely determined by the need to allocate large volumes to accommodate various equipment, missile storage facilities and combat posts. It should also be noted that the semi-tank architecture was also better suited to large missile launchers.
On the ship pr. 58, the requirements of anti-nuclear protection were implemented as fully as possible, which led to a deterioration in habitability conditions in peacetime. Not only the portholes in the sailors' quarters, but also the mirror glazing of the main command post became victims of the new requirements. For the first time on domestic ships on Project 58, the main and naval command posts, as well as the combat information post, were located below decks. True, to ensure safe navigation in peacetime, the ship had a traditional glazed pilothouse. But in a combat situation, officers and admirals would have to observe the surrounding reality like any submariners - through VBP-452 periscope-type optical instruments or using television means.
The inconveniences of the daily life of sailors were aggravated by the fact that Project 58 was created mainly according to the standards established for destroyers, and in our fleet they were considered ships intended for short-term military campaigns. In reality, the ships of Project 58 carried out many months of combat service in a subtropical and even tropical climate, the features of which were also not properly taken into account when designing the “destroyer”.
The power plant was generally traditional, steam turbine, and provided for a twofold increase in steam pressure in four KVN 95/64 boilers compared to pre-war models. The boilers provided steam for two main TV-12 turbo-gear units with a power of 45,000 hp each, as well as two 750 kW turbogenerators. The power supply was also supported by two 450 kW diesel generators. The power plant of Project 58 became the prototype for many subsequent ships, up to and including heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers. The echelon arrangement, in principle, was supposed to increase the survivability of energy in the event of combat damage, but the effectiveness of this solution for ships of such a small displacement when exposed to modern ammunition was more than doubtful.
The first steps in the implementation of the Stele technology can also be noted. Gas-air ejectors reduced the temperature of the gases leaving the pipes from 550 to 100 ° C, providing a reduced infrared signature of the ship.
The main tactical and technical elements of the ship - a speed of 34.5 knots, a cruising range of 3,500 miles - were sufficient for a fairly long combat service while maintaining the ability to “track by fire” American aircraft carrier groups in the Mediterranean Sea and nearby areas of the North Atlantic and Pacific Ocean. In principle, Project 58 ships could even briefly pursue an aircraft carrier strike group, keeping it within the missile launch zone. But the multi-day pursuit of an aircraft carrier going “in breakaway” was beyond the capabilities of the “destroyer with jet weapons.” These “probable adversaries” in the Cold War belonged to too different weight categories, in the most literal sense of the word.
Missile cruiser pr. 58 "Admiral Golovko".
The ship showed good seaworthiness. The main indicators of the strike missile system even exceeded the specified ones. The maximum range instead of 150 km was 200 km and was increased to 250 km during subsequent operation of the complex. The ammunition load of 16 missiles was twice as much as specified, although the ability to reload the launchers in real combat conditions was rather abstract.
In general, while positively assessing the full-fledged first-born of the domestic surface nuclear missile fleet, one cannot fail to note its main drawback - the weakness of the missile salvo! An impressive-looking pair of four-missile launchers, as well as hatches with an unambiguous purpose in the superstructure just opposite the “breech parts” of these installations, “eclipsed” the presence of only four parabolic antennas of the “Binom” systems, which made it possible to provide selective guidance only for the corresponding number of P-missiles. 35. True, there was the possibility of hastily carrying out another four-missile salvo in the so-called “reserve”, autonomous mode, with an independent choice of target for attack by the homing head. Most likely, such a target for all four second-tier missiles would be the nearest escort ship. However, an almost simultaneous salvo of eight missiles in the main and “reserve” versions, in principle, could, if not oversaturate the air defense system of enemy ships, then complicate the solution of its tasks, giving at least one P-35 a chance to reach the aircraft carrier.
The tactical and technical specifications for Project 58 were approved on December 6, 1956, and six months later a preliminary design of the ship appeared. In March 1958, the technical project was completed. Development at TsKB-53 was headed by V.A. Nikitin is a shipbuilder with extensive experience, having previously supervised the creation of pre-war leaders, as well as the first post-war destroyer, Project 41.
The lead ship in the series of 16 ships specified in the seven-year plan. “Grozny” was laid down at the Leningrad “Zhdanov Plant” (No. 190) on February 23, 1960. A little over a year later, on March 26, it was launched. The real rush to complete the ship began after the decision was made to visit the Northern Fleet by “our Nikita Sergeevich.” Everything that was not completed on the banks of the Neva was “finished” in the Kola Bay. "Grozny" took part in the most spectacular part of the program - a demonstration of missile firing of new ships. For the sake of increasing the prestige and material support of the officers of the excellently “shot” “Grozny”, the delighted Khrushchev, at the suggestion of S.G Gorshkov, even approved the reclassification of the destroyer Project 58 into “missile cruisers”. Apparently, he had to overcome his internal aversion to the term “cruiser”, which had formed over the years of the epic with attempts to somehow attach the unfinished ships of Project 68bis-ZiF.
As a result, the remaining three ships of Project 58, delivered to the fleet from November 28, 1964 to July 20, 1965 and built under serial numbers 782, 783 and 784, from October 30, 1962, instead of the “adjective names” adopted since the tsarist times for naming destroyers, were awarded the glorious names “Admiral Fokin” (formerly “Steregushchiy”, and before May 11, 1964 - “Vladivostok”), “Admiral Golovko” (instead of “Valiant”) and “Varyag” (formerly “Soobrazitelny” ), Only the already commissioned "Grozny" (serial number 781) retained the traditional name for the destroyer. This firstborn of missile cruisers soon returned to the construction plant for a number of modifications, and in the summer of 1965 it was first demonstrated to ordinary Soviet people during the traditional parade on the Neva. It became known to foreigners interested in our fleet due to their official duties much earlier - during the transition to the North in 1962.
The exceptionally spectacular and modern appearance of the Project 58 missile cruisers contributed to their active involvement in official visits to foreign countries. This ship became the main character in the feature films Neutral Waters and A Courtesy Visit.
The directory contains information about the ship composition of the USSR Navy as of December 1991. However, it traces the fate of the ships of the Soviet fleet until 2001. Data is provided on the warships that were in service, under construction and under design, their names, serial numbers, dates of laying, launching , entry into service, decommissioning of the fleet, modernization or re-equipment, enterprises (factories, firms) builders and design firms. The features of projects, design, construction, repairs and upgrades, the most typical accidents and important stages of active service are described. Appearance diagrams, longitudinal sections of all projects and their modifications, and numerous photographs are presented. The directory is published in four volumes: Vol. I. Submarines (in two volumes); T. I. Strike ships (in two volumes); Vol. III. Anti-submarine ships; Vol. IV. Landing and mine-sweeping ships. The appendices to each volume provide the main tactical and technical characteristics of the weapons of ships of the Soviet and Russian Navy: missile, artillery, anti-submarine, radio and aviation.
RKR Grozny as of 1975
– SU “Binom”
– number of PKR telecontrol lines 4 (to provide four control radars)
– system of IT and issuance of control documents from AVNP “Uspekh-U” ()
Anti-aircraft missile system:
– name “Volna-M”
– number of PU x guides
(PU type) 1 x 2 (deck guided ZIF-101)
– ammunition 16 missiles V601
– SU “Yatagan”
Artillery systems:
– number of AU x barrels (AU type) 2 x 2-76/60 (AK-726)
– ammunition 2,400 rounds
– SUAO “Turel” (MR-105)
– number of AU x barrels (AU type) 4 x 1-30 mm (AK-630M) ()
– ammunition 12,000 rounds
– quantity x type of SUAO 2 x “Vympel” (MP-123)
Anti-submarine:
– number of TA x pipes (type TA) 2 x 3-533 mm (TTA-53-57-bis)
– torpedo ammunition (type) 6 (SET-65 or 53-65K)
– PUTS “Typhon”
– number of RB x pipes (RB type) 2 x 12-213 mm (RBU-6 000)
– ammunition (type) 72 (RSL-60)
– PUSB “Storm”
Aviation:
– the method of basing is temporary
– number x type of helicopters 1 x Ka-25RTs
– lighting equipment for runways
Radioelectronic:
– BIP “Tablet-58”
– VZOR “More-U” system
– CS complex “Tsunami-BM”
– number x type of CC detection radar 2 x “-A”() “Angara”
– type of navigation radar “Don-2” to provide 2 or 3 () AP
– TV surveillance system
for close surface situation MT-45
– RTR station “Bizan-4D”-g “Zaliv”
– active jamming station “Ograda” (MR-262) () or “Ograda-M” (MR-262-M)()
– number of PU x guides (PU type) SPPP 2 x 16-82 mm (PK-16)
– KN system “Sluice” (ADK-ZM)()
31*
32* The Varyag was not installed on the RKR.
33* On the RKR Grozny, Varyag and Admiral Golovko.
34* On the RKR Varyag and Admiral Fokin.
35* At RKR Varyag.
36* At RKR Grozny.
37* At the RKR Admiral Golovko.
38* With antenna in the keel fairing.
1 – RBU-6000; 2 – launcher of the air defense missile system “Volna”; 3 – radome of the Hercules-2M GAS antenna; 4 – PU PKRK P-35; 5 – antenna radome of the ZPS station; 6 – wheelhouse; 7 – AP radar SU “Yatagan”; 8 – navigation bridge; 9 – stabilized post of the TV system for monitoring the near surface situation MT-45; 10 – AP radar SU “Binom”; 11 – AP radar “Don”; 12 – AP radar “Angara”; 13 – AP of radio direction finder; 14 – 533 mm TA; 15 – AP station “Zaliv”; 16 – AP station “Bizan”; 17 – AP radar SUAO “Turel”; 18 – 76-mm AU AK-726; 19 – Ka-15 helicopter.
At the initial design stage, Grozny was classified as a destroyer or as a "... ship with: jet weapons." It was assigned to the class of cruisers in September 1962. As can be seen from the diagram, in those. The ship's design was supposed to use a lattice mainmast (four-legged design), which ensured acceptable stability parameters. In the course of further work on Project 58, a decision was made (in particular, in connection with the need to place the AP of the Success-U system) to make it tower-like like the foremast.
RKR pr. 58 was developed at TsKB-53 under the leadership of V.A. Nikitina. It was the world's first specially designed ship with anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile weapons.
The main weapon of the Project 58 ship was the P-35 anti-ship missile system, which included the cruise missiles themselves, two four-container launchers aimed in the vertical and horizontal planes, magazines for spare missiles and the Binom control system.
To ensure firing, there was a control center system from external sources (from Ka-25RTs helicopters and Tu-95RTs type aircraft). The control system with two paired antenna posts on tower-like masts ensured the formation of salvoes of four P-35 missiles in telecontrol mode (standard) and four in autonomous mode (reserve). It is characteristic that the latter could be used at a distance of up to 150 km and had to be launched after missiles used in remote control mode. The Volna air defense system was placed in the bow of the ship (later it was modernized into the Volna-M UZRK) with the Yatagan control system, a two-beam homing launcher and a cellar in which the missiles were stored in two rotating drums.
To combat light surface ships and air defense, two AK-726 guns were placed linearly at the stern of the ship. During the modernization process, four AK-630M guns were added to them. Behind the aft 76-mm gun was equipped with a runway for a helicopter with support systems and an under-deck cellar for storing aviation ammunition.
I – RBU-6000; 2 – launcher of the air defense missile system “Volna”; 3 – radome of the Hercules-2M GAS antenna; 4 – PU PKRK P-35; 5 – antenna radome of the ZPS station; 6 – wheelhouse; / – AP radar SU “Yatagan”; 8 – optical periscopic sight of the conning tower (GKP); 9 – optical periscopic sight of the wheelhouse; 10 – navigation bridge; I 1 – AP radar SU “Binom”; 12 – stabilized TV post of the MT-45 near surface surveillance system; 13 – AP radar “Don” (later replaced by the radar “Don-2” to support two or three AP); 14 – AP radar “Angara”; 15 – AP of radio direction finder; 16 – 533 mm TA; 17 – AP system “Success-U”; 18 – AP station “Zaliv”; 19 – AP station “Bizan-4D”; 20 – AP radar SUAO “Turel”; 21 – 76-mm AU AK-726; 22 – Ka-25 helicopter; 23 – Runway.
1 – storage rooms for various purposes; 2 – chain box; 3 – department of hairpin machines; I – anchor spire; 5 – RBU-6000; 6 – cellar of jet depth charges; 7 – launcher of the air defense missile system “Volna”; 8 – SAM cellar; 9 – fuel tanks; 10 – room for units and drives of the Volna air defense missile launcher; II – personnel quarters; 12 – radome of the Hercules-2M GAS antenna; 13 – GAS Hercules-2M posts and ZPS stations; 14 – PU PKRK 11-35; 15 – turret compartment of the P-35 anti-ship missile launcher; 16 – antenna radome of the ZPS station; 17 – officers’ cabins; 18 – conning tower (GKP); 19 – BIP; 20 – posts of the Yatagan control system of the Volna air defense system; 21 – AP radar SU “Yatagan” SAM “Volna”; 22 – wheelhouse; 23 – AP radar “Binom”; 24 – radio communication posts; 25 – AP radar “Angara”; 26 – nasal MKO; 27 – premises for long-range radio communications and space navigation (they were supposed to be installed on ships of this type during the modernization process); 28 – compartment of the auxiliary boiler and stabilizer mechanisms; 29 – mechanical workshop; 30 – power plant; 31 – AP system “Success-U”; 32 – stabilization post; 33 – posts of the control system of the PKRK P-35; 34 – PEJ; 35 – feed MKO; ZG› – AP radar SUAO “Turels”; 37 – GG compartment; 38 – provision storerooms; 39 – 76-mm AU AK-726; 40 – cellar for 76 mm cartridges; -11 – turret compartment of the 76-mm AU Ak-726; 42 – control station for helicopter takeoff and landing; 43 – tiller compartment.
The ship's hull was made of steel, had an elongated forecastle, a longitudinal framing system and a double bottom throughout. The double bottom space was used to store fuel and water. The hull was divided by waterproof bulkheads into 17 compartments. The ship was equipped with active stabilizers in the form of onboard steerable rudders and zygomatic keels. The cruiser had an original superstructure architecture with pyramid-shaped tetrahedral main and foremasts. This decision was explained by the desire to optimally place antenna posts and equipment of advanced radio-technical weapons, the requirements of anti-nuclear protection and the structural strength of heavy antenna posts.
The superstructures (with the exception of the front wall of the bow and rear wall of the stern superstructure, reinforcements for the AP radar SU "Yatagan" and parts of the mast structures) were made of light alloys.
The main power plant is boiler-turbine, with a layered arrangement in two machine-boiler rooms. For the first time in domestic practice, it used high-pressure steam boilers with turbo-compressor air charging.
The Project 58 cruiser, with a relatively small displacement, had enormous strike capabilities for its time.
However, the ship had insufficiently powerful and sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons, as well as poor habitability, short autonomy and cruising range, frankly weak acoustics, a temporary helicopter (since it was located on the runway and did not have a hangar), as well as too bulky rotary anti-ship missile launchers. As operating experience has shown, recharging them at sea turned out to be extremely difficult, and in strong seas simply impossible. Initially, it was planned to build 16 RKR Project 58, but then the program was limited to four units, since priority was given not to “attack” but to “anti-submarine” ships.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Grozny, Varyag and Admiral Golovko missile systems underwent modernization, during which the anti-ship missile systems were improved for a more noise-resistant Progress missile, and instead of the Volna air defense system, the Volna-M air defense system and four AK guns were installed -630M with SUAO "Vympel", new active jamming stations and the "Gateway" space navigation system with equipment located in a new superstructure between the masts, improved communications. In addition, on ships of the Pacific Fleet, both Angara radars were replaced with two Angara-A radars.
As of December 2001, only one RKR pr. 58 remained in the fleet.
Grozny(factory no. 780). Shipyard named after A.A. Zhdanova (Leningrad): 02/23/1960; 03/26/1961; 12/30/1962
After entering service it was part of the Northern Fleet, from 10/05/1966 - part of the Black Sea Fleet ( and from 01/06/1984 - into the Baltic Fleet. From July 19, 1976 to January 1981, at the Sevmorzavod Shipyard (Sevastopol), the ship underwent a medium repair and modernization with the installation of four AK-630M AU and partial replacement of the RTV. On 04/01/1989, the cruiser was put into reserve and placed at Shipyard No. 29 (Liepaja) for medium repairs.
In mid-1990, any work on the ship was stopped. Grozny was supposed to be towed to Kaliningrad, but the Latvian authorities prevented these plans.
07/09/1991 Grozny was expelled from the fleet's combat composition and left at the wall of Shipyard No. 29 with dismantled mechanisms and equipment.
In March 1993, the ship sank in shallow water due to a malfunction of the bottom-outboard fittings, which arose due to the theft of part of the equipment by looters. Subsequently, the ship was raised and dismantled for metal.
Admiral Fokin(serial number 781 G until 11.05.1964 t.-Vladivostok, until 31.10.1962 t.-Steregushchiy). Shipyard named after A.A. Zhdanova (Leningrad): 10/05/1960; 05.11.1961; November 28, 1964
He was part of the Pacific Fleet (in the summer of 1965 he moved along the Northern Sea Route from Severomorsk to Vladivostok). Carried out combat service in the Pacific and Indian oceans. From November 26 to December 2, 1968, the ship paid a friendly visit to the port of Mombasa (Kenya), from January 2 to 27, 1969, to the port of Aden (South Yemen), from January 9 to 12, 1969, to the port of Hodeidah (North Yemen ), from April 5 to April 9, 1969 - the port of Mombasa (Kenya), from April 19 to April 23, 1970 and from March 10 to March 3, 1977 - Port Louis (Mauritius).
On June 30, 1993, the cruiser was expelled from the fleet and handed over to ARVI for disposal.
Admiral Golovko(No. 782, until 12/18/1962 t.-Valentine). Shipyard named after A.A. Zhdanova (Leningrad): 04/20/1961; 06/18/1962; 12/30/1964
After entering service, it became part of the Northern Fleet. In June 1967, while on combat duty in the Mediterranean, the ship provided assistance to the Egyptian armed forces. On March 22, 1968, the cruiser was included in the Black Sea Fleet. From May 8 to 13, 1970, he made a friendly visit to the port of Algeria, from August 3 to 7, 1972, to the port of Constanta (Romania), from August 21 to 26, 1975, to the port of Tunisia, and from June 22 to 27, 1978. .-port of Latakia (Syria).
From 06/04/1982 to 03/01/1989 at the Sevmorzavod shipyard (Sevastopol), the ship underwent a medium repair and modernization with the installation of four AK-630M AU and partial replacement of the RTV.
1 – 45-mm salute gun; 2 – RBU-6000; 3 – launcher of the air defense missile system “Volna”; 4 – radome of the Hercules-2M GAS antenna; 5 – PU PKRK P-35; 6 – antenna radome of the ZPS station; 7 – AP radar “Don-2”; 8 – wheelhouse; 9 – AP radar SU “Yatagan”; 10 – optical periscopic sight of the conning tower (RCP); 1 I – optical periscopic sight of the wheelhouse; 12 – navigation bridge; 13 – AP radar SU “Binom”; 14 – AP radar “Angara-A”; 15 – AP of radio direction finder; 16 – 30 mm AU AK-630M; 17 – AP radar SUAO “Vympel”; 18 – 533 mm TA; 19 – AP station “Zaliv”; 20 – AP station “Bizan-4D”; 21 – AP radar SUAO “Turel”; 22 – 76-mm AU AK-726; 23 – Ka-25 helicopter; 24 – Runway.
1 – RBU-6000; 2 – launcher of the air defense missile system “Volna”; 3 – radome of the Hercules-2M GAS antenna; 4 – PU PKRK P-35; 5 – antenna radome of the ZPS station; 6 – AP radar “Don-2”; 7 – wheelhouse; 8 – AP radar SU “Yatagan”; 9 – optical periscopic sight of the conning tower (GKP); 10 – optical periscopic sight of the wheelhouse; 11 – navigation bridge; 12 – AP radar SU “Binom”; 13 – AP station “Ograda”; 14 – AP radar “Angara”; 15 – AP of radio direction finder; 16 – ZO-mm AU AK-bZOM; 17 – AP RAS SUAO “Vympel”; 18 – 533 mm TA; 19 – AP system “Success-U”; 20 – AP station “Zaliv”; 21 – AP station "Bizan-4A"
History of the missile cruiser "Grozny"
Unfortunately, the history of our ship is still based on data from the Almanac magazine. The author described in detail the work on the project, construction, sea trials, tactical data of Project 58, many thanks to him... All other Internet sites about the Navy only copied or presented this same information in their own way. Further service is described by meager dates of visits to foreign ports. Thanks to Vladimir Danilets (Liepaja), there is data and documents about the last years of the cruiser. It turns out that she was afloat until 1995! Well, let's become red rangers, remember our youth, stop sitting on the rubble. Hiking again! Back into battle!
“Missile cruisers of Project 58” Captain 1st Rank V.P. Kuzin
Source: military-technical almanac “Typhoon” No. 1 1996
The project of a destroyer with guided jet weapons (as anti-ship cruise missiles were called at that time) of a new generation was developed in accordance with the resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers dated August 25, 1956. On December 6 of the same year, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral S.G. Gorshkov, approved the tactical tactics agreed with the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry. technical specifications (TTZ) for the development of a preliminary design of a new destroyer, and a little earlier (October 16 and 24), the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy approved the TTZ agreed with the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry, the Ministry of Aviation Industry, the Ministry of Defense Industry and the Ministry of General Machinery for the development of short-range anti-aircraft guided missile weapon systems (later the M-1 complex Volna) and shock (the term appeared much later - in the early 70s) jet weapons (later - P-35). Thus, the development of the project, which received the number 58, was carried out almost synchronously with the development of the main weapons. The design of the ship was entrusted to the Leningrad TsKB-53. V.A. Nikitin became the chief designer, and the observation group from the Navy was headed by engineer-captain 2nd rank P.M. Khokhlov. Sketch Project 58 was developed in mid-1957, and in September the Navy Shipbuilding Directorate issued an order for the development of a technical design, completed in March 1958. The lead destroyer, named "Grozny", was laid down at the Leningrad Shipyard named after A.A. Zhdanov on February 23, 1960. The ship was launched on March 26, 1961, and in June 1962. it was presented for state testing to a commission chaired by Vice Admiral N.I. Shibaeva.
During construction, the final classification of the ship was determined, which previously in official documents was called a “ship with jet weapons.” Apparently, the original views of the country's leadership on the role of surface ships, on the one hand, were affected, on the other hand, by the fear of using traditional terms - cruiser, destroyer, etc. The situation became clearer by the beginning of the 60s and the new ship was confidently classified as a class of cruisers, a subclass " missile cruiser", classed as a rank I ship. The previous name was only reminded by the name of the lead ship adopted for destroyers and the unprecedented mixed cruising-destroyer organization of the service. So in BC-5, only one division remained from the cruising organization instead of the required three, and instead of the second and third, groups were retained as on destroyers, i.e., ships of rank II. Note that the adopted classification “cruiser” did not reflect the traditional principles of designing ships of this class and, in fact, Project 58, in a constructive sense, continued the development of destroyers, albeit with a slightly larger displacement. Initially, the main purpose of the ship Project 58 was considered to be “the destruction of light cruisers, destroyers and large enemy transports and the conduct of a successful battle with enemy ships armed with short-range rocket weapons.” Subsequently, the tasks of destroying enemy aircraft carrier formations were added. Designing a new ship presented significant difficulties associated not only with the placement of weapon systems that constantly changed their tactical and technical characteristics (TTX) during the design process, but also with combining them into a single integrated system (“ship-weapon”). This concerned numerous radio engineering “products”.
For the prototype of the theoretical drawing of the hull, the theoretical drawing of the destroyer Project 56 was chosen, which had undergone a thorough and comprehensive “run-in” in theory and practice, as a result of which the development of the theoretical drawing of the cruiser Project 58 did not present any particular difficulties and was carried out at the preliminary design stage. However, model tests at TsAGI and TsNII-45 in regular seas required a more complete formation of the bow contours. At the same time, better results were obtained on all strokes in terms of reducing flooding and especially splash formation than on ships of Project 56. With a given composition of weapons, the best architectural form of the hull was considered to be one with a long forecastle and a slight rise to the stem. The hull itself was constructed using a longitudinal system and was divided into 17 compartments by waterproof bulkheads. The ship's unsinkability was ensured when any three adjacent compartments were flooded, but there were zones where the ship could withstand the flooding of four adjacent compartments. Low-alloy steel grade SHL-4 was used as the body material. The superstructures were mainly made of aluminum-magnesium alloys of the AMG-5V and AMG-6T brands. Only the front wall of the bow and rear stern superstructures, two tiers of the foremast, the mainmast turret, as well as reinforcements for the radar antenna posts were made of steel. It should be noted that despite the widespread use of AMG alloys (in addition to superstructures, the latter were also used for light bulkheads, platforms, decks, vestibules, MKO shafts, etc.), there were almost no proven rules for designing them and reliable methods for calculating strength. Concerns regarding the low fire resistance of AMG structures were expressed at the design stage, but no practical steps were taken.
The technical design included anti-fragmentation protection for the SAM cellar, but it was also rejected “for reasons of weight savings,” i.e., for the same reasons that led to the widespread use of AMG. The difference between the general arrangement of the ship and previously built ones was the following: the location of the main command post (MCP) complex in the hull, the absence of open combat posts and the presence of passages to them without access to the upper deck, a relatively small number of superstructures. Architecturally, the impressive unusual pyramidal foremasts and mainmasts attracted attention, which for a long time determined the appearance of many domestic warships of subsequent projects. This design of the masts was dictated by the need to obtain the necessary volumes to accommodate high-lying posts of high-frequency radar units, as well as to provide rigid reinforcement for a large number of antenna devices of numerous radio equipment, to better meet the requirements of anti-nuclear protection (PAZ) and anti-chemical protection (PCP), resistance to shock wave and better washability with water protection. The main power plant (GPU) of the ship was a further development of boiler-turbine installations of ships of previous projects using, for the first time in the domestic ship power industry, a fundamentally new boiler complex, consisting of a high-steam automated boiler unit with air blowing into the firebox from a turbocharger unit and a control system, which ensured higher characteristics of the ship's power plant.
However, to achieve the specified full speed (34.5 knots), it was necessary to boost both the main turbo-gear units and the boilers while maintaining the requirements of strict weight discipline and efficiency. In addition, special requirements were put forward for protection against weapons of mass destruction and for reducing the levels of physical fields, in particular the thermal field. TV-12 units were chosen as the GTZA in Project 58, which differed from the previous ones with a greater power of 45,000 hp. pp., lower (by 35%) specific gravity and higher (by 2-4%) efficiency with the same dimensions. This was achieved by increasing the contact stresses in the gear teeth of the gearbox, increasing the vacuum in the main condenser and increasing the flow rate of cooling water in it, as well as through the use of new materials and a number of design measures. The use of the KVN-95/64 boiler unit made it possible to double the voltage of the combustion volume and by 25% the power of the power plant without increasing its mass and increase the efficiency at full speed by 10% compared to the previously used KV-76 boilers. In addition, it was possible to significantly (60%) reduce the temperature of the exhaust gases. A completely natural consequence of these measures was a deterioration in the efficiency of the installation at low and medium speeds. During the creation of the installation, it turned out that the power could be increased to 50,000 hp. on one shaft.
The ship's electrical power system adopted three-phase alternating current with a voltage of 380 V. The main sources of electricity were two TD-750 turbogenerators with a power of 750 kW and two DG-500 diesel generators with a power of 500 kW, located in two power plants. At the same time, parallel operation of turbo and diesel generators was ensured both among themselves and at power plants. Thus, no special standby electric generators were provided and the operation of the mechanisms in the mentioned modes was provided by one of the turbogenerators with steam extraction from the auxiliary boiler. To a large extent, the general design decisions for the ship repeated those in the projects of previous destroyers, with adjustments due to an increase in displacement. So, for example, the dimensions of the anti-roll bars in Project 58 were increased to 3.2 * 2 m instead of 2.6 * 2.15 on Project 57 bis; Ship's watercraft (boats and a six-oar yawl) and unlike previous projects were made of AMG, but practical things were adopted completely unified.
The approved staff stipulated that the ship's crew would consist of 27 officers, 29 midshipmen and chief foremen and 283 sailors and foremen of conscript service. The habitability of personnel was, in comparison with previous projects, somewhat improved due to the allocation (for the first time on our ships) of a dining room, which provided accommodation for 2/3 of the foremen and sailors. In addition to eating, cultural events were held in the canteen - film screenings, lectures, meetings, etc. In combat conditions, an operational center was set up in the canteen. A great “achievement” in the field of habitability, as it was then believed, was the widespread use of lining, insulation, all kinds of cladding made from AMG, laminated plastics and even birch plywood. There is no need to prove that such a decision in practice showed itself from the worst side, but for this statement it took the death of the military-industrial complex “Votvazhny”, the EM “Sheffield”, fires and disasters on ships of our and foreign fleets. In general, the Project 58 cruiser was a fundamentally new and complex ship, if only because it was the first to house two missile systems for various purposes. In this regard, the tests of the lead ship were of particular interest. They were carried out in the White Sea from July 6 to October 29, 1962. During the tests, they fired both throwing blanks and combat missiles (in a telemetric version), single and salvo launches. The targets were stationary targets SM-5 - the former leader of the Leningrad and SM-8 - the former floating base of Project 1784 torpedo boats. The firing range was about 200 km. Ultimately, both targets were hit by missiles hitting the superstructures.
The tests did not always go smoothly; many defects and shortcomings were identified, but the vast majority of them were eliminated either on site or during the finalization of the complex. The main reasons for the defects were the hasty delivery to the ship of new weapons that were not fully tested, insufficient consideration of real ship and sea conditions, and individual design errors. Thus, the equipment of the Binom PUS system turned out to be unreliable. The actual interval between missile launches from one launcher turned out to be almost four times longer than the design one, and the diagram of the firing sectors of both bow and stern installations in practice turned out to be greatly “truncated.” Otherwise, the selection committee considered the P-35 complex to be in compliance with the Navy technical specifications and the contractual draft, although it required the elimination of a number of comments (about 100 points). The Volna anti-aircraft missile system was tested against PM-2 parachute targets and a MiG-15M target aircraft, conducting five actual firings. As a result, the same shortcomings of the M-1 air defense system were revealed that were discovered during testing of the complex on the Bravy destroyer: low reliability and short service life of individual components of the Yatagan control system, the inability to fire at low-flying targets, smaller affected areas. The latter circumstance on the ship of Project 58 was largely determined by the unsuccessful placement of the ZIF-101 launcher, which, due to the insufficient length of the bow end, was “pressed” against the SM-70 launcher. Because of this, the latter also had an unsatisfactory firing pattern. But in general, the Volna complex complied with the technical design and technical requirements.
The AK-726 artillery mounts had not yet been put into service at the start of testing on the missile cruiser (RKR) "Grozny", although they had already been installed on ships of projects 61, 35, 159. Five firings - three at air targets and two at sea targets - showed that the ship's artillery armament works reliably. However, at ship speeds above 28 knots, strong vibration of the installations was observed: the barrels oscillated in the vertical plane up to 9 mm. Reinforcements carried out by the plant made it possible to reduce vibration, but it was not completely eliminated. Ultimately, the installations were put into service, but the Turel system, like other radar fire control systems, took quite a long time to be brought into working order. The tests of torpedo weapons were successful, since serial and proven systems and mechanisms were installed on the ship. The same results were reached when testing RBU-6000. However, as on ships of previous projects, great criticism was caused by the operation of hydroacoustic means - primarily the GS-572 sonar system, which did not provide the necessary target designation due to insufficient range and strong dependence on sea hydrology. Tests of other radio equipment have shown that their main disadvantages are: unsatisfactory electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) during simultaneous operation, outdated hardware components, and weakness of electronic warfare equipment. The installation on the ship of two identical MP-300 radars, which naturally operated in the same frequency ranges and, as a result, interfered with each other, was also considered a failure. Moreover, such a decision was not only technically, but also tactically justified (during the operation of the general detection radar, strong interference was observed in the operation of the firing radars, especially the artillery one - Turel).
Unfortunately, the tests on the aviation side were far from being carried out in full. The helicopter did not participate in the tests, and the tests themselves had a modest name - inspection, but this also required numerous modifications to be made on the ship: solving the problem of runway de-icing, applying an anti-slip coating, making a special cover for the helicopter, improving signal lighting equipment, etc. .The test program also included testing the possibility of personnel staying in combat posts, premises and on the open deck during missile launch (anti-ship missiles and missiles) and work. The need for such tests was dictated by the fact that the new rockets had large specific thrust impulses of the starting engines (stages), which, in combination with short-term operation, created large shock loads. The influence of ultra-high frequency radiation (microwave) radar on people was noticed during the tests of the cruiser "Sverdlov" in 1952, but then it was not given due importance. Tests were carried out on experimental animals and revealed dangerous places for personnel to be during missile launches and operating radars. When firing missiles, personnel could be in all closed combat posts, and when firing anti-ship missiles, the presence of personnel in a number of rooms (even in gun mount No. 1) turned out to be unacceptable without special protection equipment. After testing, the time spent by personnel at open combat posts when the radar was operating was limited by special instructions.
As expected, the ship's main power plant was operating normally. However, it turned out that the specified maximum speed of 34.5 knots was achieved by boosting the power to 95,000 hp. With. The actual cruising range was 3,650 miles with an average operational speed of 18 knots (at least 3,500 miles were required). During tests in the North in the summer of 1962, an extraordinary event occurred in the life of the “Grozny”: the ship was visited by the leader of the country N.S. Khrushchev, accompanied by the Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovsky. The first commander of the cruiser, captain 2nd rank V.A. Lapenkov first took the cruiser out to sea and conducted demonstration firing with the P-35 complex. The management watched them from aboard the cruiser Murmansk. The firing turned out to be successful, the missiles went beyond the horizon and hit the target shield with a direct hit. After that, the distinguished guests went to the “Grozny” and examined the ship. N.S. Khrushchev was delighted with the ship and expressed a wish to make an official visit to Halifax in the near future. Looking ahead, in this regard, I would like to mention that “Grozny” underwent particularly careful finishing and appropriate additional equipment, including a polyvinyl chloride coating on the upper deck, which subsequent cruisers did not receive.
During the development of various options for the military shipbuilding program, the number of new missile cruisers fluctuated. At the maximum, it was planned to build at least 16 such ships. However, in fact, four ships were built at the Leningrad Shipyard named after. A.A. Zhdanov. Life has made serious adjustments, which were partly introduced into the subsequent Project 1134, which became a further development of the ships of Project 58, which improved them in many ways. Therefore, the Varyag, named after the famous cruiser and immediately received a guards rank upon construction, turned out to be the last ship of the series.
Cruisers pr. 58 served in all four fleets. They never underwent serious modernization. In the 70s, some of them were equipped with part of the radio-technical weapons that were not delivered at the time, the Success-U system (Admiral Fokin and Grozny), two-coordinate radars MR-300 were replaced with three-coordinate radars MR-310 (Admiral Fokin and "Varangian"). All ships received a second Don-2 radar (detection of surface targets), salute guns and, finally, two batteries of small-caliber six-barreled 30-mm AK-630 assault rifles with a radar and Vympel fire control system. Anti-aircraft missiles B-600 were replaced by more advanced B-601, anti-ship missiles 4K-44 (on some ships) - by Progress anti-ship missiles. In addition, according to individual decisions, complexes and systems not provided for by the design were installed on a number of cruisers: the MR-262 (Fence) active jamming station, the Password state identification system, the Gateway space navigation complex, etc.
By the beginning of the 90s, these cruisers had already exceeded their age limit. In 1990, the Varyag was the first to be withdrawn from the KTOF; in 1991, it was the turn of the Grozny, which was part of the DKBF; in 1993, the cruiser Admiral Fokin (KTOF) was decommissioned. Currently, the Admiral Golovko is still in service with the Black Sea Fleet, but it too is subject to decommissioning.
Missile cruisers Project 58 left a noticeable mark on the history of domestic shipbuilding and the fleet. It is often considered that they are “the world’s first missile cruisers that had no foreign analogues,” etc. These ships were, so to speak, “designated” as cruisers by a volitional decision. This is evidenced by the fact that the destroyers of the late 70s, both in our and the American fleets, almost doubled their displacement. But what is indisputable is that for the first time in practice, domestic scientists and designers were able to successfully solve the problem of creating a powerful compact ship with missile systems for various purposes, with a high saturation of new, at that time, electronic weapons and that met, as it seemed then, the requirements of warfare at sea . Project 58 missile cruisers became the first domestic surface ships with nuclear weapons and, therefore, with previously unprecedented and incomparable combat capabilities. The development and creation of the Project 58 cruiser was awarded the Lenin Prize in 1966, but neither the chief designer nor the actual chief observer of the Navy was on the list of those awarded. V.A. Nikitin, after completing his main creative work, went on a “well-deserved rest”, and P.M. Khokhlov was transferred to the reserve almost simultaneously with him. The latest drawings for Project 58 were also signed by A.L. as the chief designer. Fischer and V.G. Korolevich, and the main observer of the Navy was again M.A. Yanchevsky.
Board numbers of RRC "Grozny"
898 (1962), 239 (1965), 843 (1967), 860 (1968), 854 (1969), 943 (1969)
841 (1971-73, 1975-78, 1980-81), 846 (1970), 843 (1971), 858 (1971-1972), 847 (1973)
851 (1973), 855 (1975), 856 (1975), 147 (1981), 107(1982), 121 (1983), 155 (1984)
179 (1985, 1986), 145 (1988), 152 (1991)
261, 170 - unknown
“Admiral Golovko”: 299(1965), 810(1967), 852(1969), 845(1978), 847(1979), 121(1979), 118(1981), 844(1982), 110(1984), 105(1990), 118(1994), 849, 853, 854, 857, 859, 130, 170, 485
“Varyag”: 343(1965), 280(1965), 621(1966), 822(1967), 835(1968), 836(1974), 015(1976), 049(1981), 047(1982), 830 (1984), 043(1985), 012(1987), 032(1990), 641, 821, 079
"Admiral Fokin": 336(1964), 176(1966), 641(1968), 831(1971), 835(1971), 822(1977), 019(1977), 120(1981), 176(1990), 022, 017(1992), 823
Service in the Navy fleets:
Northern Fleet - 12/30/1962 - 10/05/1966
Black Sea Fleet - 10/05/1966 - 01/06/1984
Baltic Fleet - 01/06/1984 - 12/31/1992
Write-off:
1990 – “Varyag” (04/19), 1991 – “Grozny” (06/24), 1993 – “Admiral Fokin” (06/30), 2002 – “Admiral Golovko”
Official visits:
12-15.08.1967 paid a visit to Varna and Burgas (Bulgaria);
01/29-02/04/1968 - to Kotor and Zelenina (Yugoslavia);
07/20-27/1969 - to Havana (Cuba)
06-08.08.1969 - in Fort-de-France (Martinique);
04/20-25/1972 - to Casablanca (Morocco);
02-07.07.1973
g. - to Marseille (France);
November 20-25, 1974 - to Latakia (Syria).
In the period from July 19, 1976 to February 1982, a major overhaul took place at Sevmorzavod in Sevastopol. 01/06/1984 was transferred to the Baltic Fleet.
07/19-23/1984, 05/26-30/1985 and 07/18-23/1987 paid a visit to Gdynia (Poland);
05-08.10.1984, 07-11.10.1985 and 23-28.10.1987 - to Rostock (GDR);
07/19-24/1988 - to Szczecin (Poland).