MANPADS destruction height. MANPADS
The role of aviation in armed conflicts is increasing every year. The primary target of combat aircraft is enemy troops, not only in places of permanent deployment or on their own lines, but also on the march. This problem became acute during the Second World War, and it is still relevant today. It was partially solved only in the 70s of the last century, when the level of development of rocket technology made it possible to create portable anti-aircraft missile systems (MANPADS) effective against enemy aircraft and helicopters at low altitudes.
There are not many countries in the world capable of producing MANPADS. Currently, the leaders in this area are Russia, the USA, France and the UK. One of the most famous man-portable missile systems in the world is the 9K38 Igla MANPADS, the development and production of which began in the USSR. The 9K38 Igla MANPADS is in service with the Russian army; in addition, this complex was (and is) actively supplied for export; several dozen armies around the world are armed with it.
The Igla missile system has excellent characteristics; it is capable of not only confidently hitting enemy aircraft and helicopters, but also countering interference and recognizing false targets. The development of this weapon is carried out by the Kolomna Mechanical Engineering Design Bureau.
History of creation
Aviation became a formidable force already during the Second World War. German Stuka dive bombers were a real bane for the Red Army, and Soviet Il-2 attack aircraft instilled real terror in German soldiers. An effective means against attacks by front-line aviation has never been invented. The anti-aircraft missile systems that appeared after the war did not solve this problem, since they were designed to destroy enemy aircraft at high altitudes. The situation was further aggravated by the emergence of attack helicopters, which became ideal attack aircraft.
In the 60s, at approximately the same time, the USA and USSR began developing a mobile anti-aircraft missile system that could be used to arm an individual infantryman. Shooting was supposed to be done from the shoulder or a small tripod. The missile for the new air defense system had to be aimed at an air target itself and confidently destroy it.
In the USSR, the result of this work was the appearance of the Strela MANPADS, and in the USA - the FIM-43 Redeye man-portable missile system. These complexes belong to the first generation of these weapons. It was very effective, used in many conflicts and reliably shot down enemy aircraft. For example, with the help of the Soviet Strela-2 MANPADS, the Viet Cong shot down 205 American aircraft.
The Soviet Strela MANPADS received their baptism of fire in 1969; with their help, they managed to shoot down 6 Israeli Phantoms in one day. American MANPADS created a serious problem for Soviet troops in Afghanistan, especially when the Afghan Mujahideen began to be supplied with more advanced second-generation Stinger systems. During the years of the Afghan war, Afghan partisans managed to hit Soviet planes and helicopters 226 times using various types of MANPADS. 167 aircraft were shot down.
All of the above shortcomings were taken into account by the designers when developing the next generation MANPADS, which includes the Igla-1 complex.
The development of the 9K38 Igla MANPADS began in 1971, after a corresponding decree of the Soviet government. The designers were tasked with immediately improving a number of characteristics of the missile system. The lead developer of the Igla was KBM MOP under the leadership of S.P. Nepobedimy, the homing head for the missile was created by specialists from the LOMO association. A number of other USSR enterprises also participated in this project.
The military set the following tasks for the designers:
- increasing the security of the infrared homing head from traps that shoot at enemy planes and helicopters;
- increase the probability of hitting an air target in the event of a direct hit by a guided missile;
- increasing the target engagement range and the ability to fire on a collision course;
- clear identification of the ownership of the aircraft or helicopter to exclude the possibility of accidentally shooting at friendly forces;
- the ability to pre-target approaching enemy air targets by air defense control points at the tactical level.
The task turned out to be very difficult to implement, so work on the new complex was greatly delayed. Testing of the new MANPADS was supposed to begin in 1973, but they started only in 1980. The basis of the 9K38 Igla MANPADS was the 9M39 missile, equipped with a homing head with two photodetectors. They allowed the missile to confidently distinguish an enemy aircraft or helicopter from false decoy targets.
Due to a significant delay in the creation of the Igla anti-aircraft complex, in 1978 it was decided to begin the development of another MANPADS - Igla-1, which would differ from the basic complex in greater simplicity and lower cost. They were supposed to be adopted in parallel, speeding up and reducing the cost of the process of recruiting the USSR Armed Forces.
Also in 1978, work on creating a new missile for the Igla-1 MANPADS was completed; only the homing head (GOS) was not ready. It was decided to install a seeker from the Strela-3 complex on this missile and obtain a new man-portable anti-aircraft missile system in the shortest possible time. In 1980, testing of Igla-1 began, and a year later it was put into service.
The 9K38 Igla man-portable anti-aircraft missile system was put into service in 1983.
A more advanced modification of this weapon is the Igla-S, state tests of which were completed in 2001, and a year later it was adopted by the Russian army. There are several more modifications:
- "Igla-V". This MANPADS is designed to arm helicopters and ground military equipment. There is a block that allows the synchronous launch of two missiles at once.
- "Igla-D". This modification was developed for airborne units and has a collapsible launch tube.
- "Igla-N". The missile of this complex has a warhead with much greater power, which significantly increases the likelihood of destroying an air target.
There are several more modifications created by Ukrainian developers. They are distinguished by a more advanced homing head, which has greater accuracy and noise immunity.
Description of design
The most advanced modification of the Igla complex is Igla-S; this MANPADS has the highest tactical and technical characteristics. It was created as a result of a deep modernization of the 9K38 Igla MANPADS. This missile system is capable of countering not only enemy aircraft and helicopters, but also shooting down its drones and cruise missiles. The probability of hitting targets is 0.8-0.9.
Experts believe that the probability of hitting an F-16-type air target in the forward hemisphere is approximately 50%, taking into account the enemy’s use of all available active and passive interference and its intensive maneuvering.
The 9K338 Igla-S complex consists of a 9M342 rocket in a launch tube and a launch mechanism, as well as a Mowgli-2 night vision device. The complex also includes means of its maintenance: a mobile control point and test equipment.
Compared to the base model, the Igla-S MANPADS has a greater destruction range (it has increased to 6 km) and increased warhead power (both in terms of explosives and the number of fragments). Despite this, the weight of the missile system remained virtually unchanged. In addition, the missile has become even more noise-resistant, which allows it to hit even well-protected targets.
The maximum flight altitude of an air target is 3.5 km. Its speed can reach 340 m/s. The weight of the complex is 19 kg.
The homing head of the GSN 9E435 missile has two channels for receiving incoming signals, which allows it to carry out effective selection and separate false targets from real ones. When approaching the target, the missile deviates from the guidance point (that is, from the nozzle) and hits the central part of the aircraft, which is much more vulnerable. In terms of vibration and shock resistance, the 9M342 missile is significantly superior to its predecessors.
In addition, for the first time, a non-contact fuse was installed in the missile, which ensures detonation at a short distance from the target, causing more serious damage to it. The issue of interaction between contact and non-contact fuses was also resolved. Moreover, with a contact detonation, the explosion does not occur immediately, but after a certain time, after the missile warhead penetrates the skin of the target aircraft. This significantly increases the efficiency of detonation.
The fuel used in the Igla-S MANPADS missile has high detonation properties, which further increases the missile’s combat effectiveness, especially when used on a collision course.
Immediately after the missile takes off, the powder engine starts working, which directs the missile defense system to the lead point. All this happens without any human intervention.
It is very important to install a night vision device on the Igla-S MANPADS, which allows you to use this weapon at any time of the day. Modern aviation is increasingly making night raids, so such a device significantly increases the capabilities of the anti-aircraft complex. Using the Mowgli NVG, the shooter can aim and track a target without any problems.
When we talk about Igla MANPADS, we mean a whole family of man-portable missile systems. Despite the fact that modification “C” is the most modern and advanced, the army is armed with thousands of complexes of earlier modifications produced back in the Soviet period.
The dimensions of the Igla-S modification make it possible to fire missiles of older modifications. Moreover, the 9M342 missile can be used by the Igla and Igla-1 complexes. Mounting the Mowgli night vision device allows you to install this device on complexes of earlier modifications.
The use of the Igla-S modification does not require serious retraining from military personnel who have previously dealt with Igla or Igla-1.
The Igla MANPADS is equipped with a reliable friend-or-foe identification system, which guarantees blocking of a missile launch against its own aircraft or helicopters.
The complex is able to operate effectively in any conditions: at extremely high and low temperatures, in conditions of high humidity, during heavy rainfall, and even after immersion in water (0.5 meters for 30 minutes). The missile system in the package is not afraid of a fall from a height of two meters, strong vibration and numerous mechanical shocks.
To ensure the firing of two anti-aircraft missiles at once, the Dzhigit launcher was created. It is equipped with an external preliminary determination system (“friend or foe”), self-diagnostics and maintenance tools. The shooter is in a swivel chair, with missile launch tubes to the left and right of him. Targeting is done manually. Salvo firing increases the probability of hitting an air target by 1.5 times.
Combat use of Igla MANPADS
This portable missile system was first used during the Civil War in El Salvador. The rebels, supported by the USSR, managed to shoot down one Cessna A-37 attack aircraft and an AC-47 aircraft. Nicaraguan rebels shot down a DC-6 cargo truck using the Needle.
The first large-scale conflict in which the Needles were used was the Gulf War. In 1991, four Harriers were shot down using this MANPADS.
During the war with Bosnia, the Serbs shot down the French Mirage 2000 fighter with an Igla.
Chechen militants shot down five or six Russian helicopters using Igla MANPADS of various modifications. These included a helicopter with General Staff officers and a helicopter in which Deputy Minister Rudchenko and other high-ranking officials were flying, as well as a Mi-26 with 113 military personnel on board. Only in 2005 did the FSB manage to seize the last anti-aircraft complex from the separatists.
With the help of this MANPADS, several helicopters and government aircraft were shot down during the civil conflict in Syria. Separatists in eastern Ukraine use Igla MANPADS against government forces.
A little less than a month ago, the Kurds, using Igla MANPADS, shot down a Turkish AH-1 Super Cobra helicopter.
Below are the performance characteristics (TTX) of the Igla-S MANPADS.
Damage zone, m: - by range — in height | 6000 10 — 3500 |
Speed of targets hit, m/s: - towards - catch up | 400 320 |
Weight in firing position, kg | 19 |
Rocket caliber, mm | 72 |
Rocket length, mm | 1635 |
Rocket mass, kg | 11. 7 |
Warhead weight, kg | 2.5 |
Time to transfer MANPADS from traveling to combat position, s | 13 |
Time to transfer MANPADS from combat to traveling position, s | 30 |
Operating time of the onboard battery of the rocket, s | at least 15 |
Power supply replacement time, s | 15 |
Terms of Use: — temperature, C — air humidity - immersion in water - depth — rise to height in an unpressurized cabin - drop on concrete (packed) — overload (packed) | from -40 to +50 |
Air situation display area, km | 25.6x25.6 |
Selection of PEP 1L10-2 targets for tracking | auto |
Supply voltage, V | 12, 24±3 |
Temperature range of application, C | -50 to +50 |
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Dangerous skies of Afghanistan [Experience in the combat use of Soviet aviation in a local war, 1979–1989] Zhirokhov Mikhail Alexandrovich
MANPADS
The war in Afghanistan was the first conflict in which MANPADS were used en masse, both against helicopters and aircraft. It was here that Soviet specialists worked out measures and methods of combating MANPADS and enhancing the survivability of helicopters, and the Americans refined the methodology for using missile systems.
Note that, based on the experience of the war in Afghanistan, Soviet military experts ranked MANPADS in descending order by degree of danger as follows: “Jevelin”, “Strela-2M”, “Stinger”, “Blowpipe”, “Red Eye”.
Let's try to understand the effectiveness of using each complex, using the statistics of losses of helicopters of only one type - the Mi-24.
As impartial statistics show, the most lethal MANPADS in Afghanistan were the British Blowpipe and Jewellin.
Unlike the USSR and the USA, where the main emphasis in the development of MANPADS was on missiles with a thermal seeker, in the UK the main emphasis was on MANPADS aimed at the target using radio command systems. The Blowpipe complex began to be developed back in 1964 by Short Brothers and in 1972, after passing military tests, it was recommended for adoption.
Unlike IR-guided MANPADS, which implement the “fire and forget” principle, the operator of such a MANPADS, before launching a missile at a target, must aim the crosshair at it and keep it on the target at the time of launch. After launch, the missile was automatically kept on the target line. After the missile was automatically launched onto the guidance trajectory, the MANPADS operator switched to manual guidance mode. At the same time, observing the target and the missile through the sight, he had to combine their images, while continuing to keep the target on the crosshair.
One of the main advantages of this guidance method is that such systems practically do not react to the standard countermeasure systems used by airplanes and helicopters, which are designed primarily to divert missiles with an IR seeker.
However, with all the advantages of the Blowpipe, there were also many disadvantages. Thus, the operation of a radio link and tracers on a missile unmasks the guidance process and the location of the firing position; the use of manual control leads to a strong dependence of the effectiveness of the complex on the degree of preparation and training of the shooter, his psychophysical state. One should not discount the fact that after the launch, holding an eight-kilogram block with a transport-launch container on the shoulder while aiming was very problematic for many Mujahideen (among whom there were rarely heroes). For these reasons, helicopters were fired, as a rule, not from a maximum range of 3.5 km, but from a range of 1.5–2 km, which approximately corresponded to the capture range of the Stinger seeker. At the same time, the high visibility of the operator, together with the low - up to 500 m/s - maximum speed of the missile, allowed Soviet helicopter pilots to cover it with a Sturm or a pair of NARs, disrupting the guidance, or simply avoid the missile.
As a result, according to Soviet data, during the period from 1982 to 1989, only two Mi-24s were shot down by Blowpipe hits, and one of them, leaving for the base, was finished off by the Strela-2M. The same complexes were used to shoot down Su-25 attack aircraft, however, as with helicopters, the percentage of hits per number of launches was too small - the missile was only suitable for the slow, poorly maneuverable and poorly armed Mi-8.
A modification of the Blowpipe, the Jewelin complex, appeared as a completely different weapon. The missile of this complex had a maximum speed of 600 m/s; for guidance, the operator only needed to combine the sight mark with the target; commands were generated automatically, and the missile did not unmask itself with a tracer. Unlike its predecessor, “Jevelin” no longer had a manual, but a semi-automatic radio command system, and the warhead located in front broke through any armor. In addition, the weight of the Dzhevelina warhead was 3 kg, but, unlike the Stinger, it was more compact in length and had a significantly greater high-explosive effect. Although the warheads of the “Blowpipe” and “Jevelina” were almost identical: the two-module warhead of the latter was partially moved forward in such a way that the front 0.8-kilogram high-explosive charge created a hole for the penetration of the main 2.4-kilogram charge into the internal volumes of any target , including heavily armored. However, the main thing is that neither the LTC nor the Lipa impulses affected these missiles, although, in the end, they learned to jam the radio command channel.
Interestingly, the pilots unmistakably recognized the type of rocket “by behavior.” The weakness of both British missiles was the need to track the target until it hit or missed. This was widely used by helicopter crews on paired missions. In this case, the following tactics were used: the attacked helicopter maneuvered within 60–70 degrees, causing the missile to loop, after which the partner hit the MANPADS operator with “Sturm”.
According to impartial statistics, “Jevelin” turned out to be the most effective MANPADS in Afghanistan. Of the 27 complexes, four were captured, two were destroyed before launch. Of the remaining twenty-one, four missiles were fired at the Su-25 - one was shot down by a single hit, the other was severely damaged. Of the two launches against supersonic aircraft, one resulted in the loss of a Su-17 for us. In addition, six missiles were fired at the Mi-8, while only one missed, while the other passed right through the Mi-8 without exploding. Four Mi-8s were destroyed by one hit, killing the crew and troops.
Of the nine missiles fired at the Mi-24, five hit, three missed, and one lost guidance due to the destruction of the operator. As a result, four helicopters were shot down - three with one hit, one was finished off by the Strela-2M MANPADS, one was seriously damaged and returned to base. Despite the small number and sporadic use, the Jevelin missiles left a serious mark on the history of the Afghan war, shooting down ten aircraft.
The next most effective weapons used against Soviet aircraft were the Soviet Strela-2M and Strela-2M2 MANPADS. The Strela-2M2 modification (factory designation 9M32M2) was produced in the USSR in a small series of 700 pieces. Production was discontinued due to the advent of the Strela-3 MANPADS, so the Strela-2M2 was sent to “friendly countries,” including Afghanistan. The rocket was distinguished by cooling the sensor to minus 30 degrees with carbon dioxide. These missiles, brought in China and Iran almost to the level of Strela-3, combining an uncooled (for Strela-2M2 - cooled) IR sensor with a photocontrast one, had less protection from LTC. But they did not react at all to Lipa’s impulses. In addition, it turned out that these missiles could capture the Mi-24 with the EVA not from 1.5, but from 2–2.5 km. In addition, the 1.5-kilogram Strela-2M/2M2 warhead had a cumulative funnel, a steel casing of planned crushing (unlike the aluminum casing of the Stinger warhead) and carried 200 ten-gram spherical tungsten submunitions.
It is also worth saying that the Strela-2M could hit the Mi-24 with a cumulative jet at vital parts of the structure covered with armor, as well as cause damage to armored units in the event of a close explosion with heavy fragments. When hit and close to exploding, Soviet-made missiles were an order of magnitude more effective against any heavily armored aircraft - helicopters and attack aircraft.
In general, according to most experts, the Strela-2M caused more damage to our Mi-24s in Afghanistan than the Stingers. The advantage of the Strela over the Stinger was that with a perfect hit, the Stingers hit the engine, and the Strela hit the gearbox and stern, which was not protected by armor, and also pierced the gearbox armor with a scattered cumulative jet.
It is quite difficult to provide complete statistics on Strel launches, since after 1986 all defeats of helicopters and aircraft were traditionally attributed to the American Stinger. Today we can only operate with statistics from the pre-Stinger period, when at least four Mi-8s, two Mi-24s and two An-12s were shot down by these missiles.
And before moving on to the analysis of the use of Stingers in Afghanistan, it is worth saying a few words about the FIM-43A Red Eye. This complex was supplied to the Mujahideen during the initial period of hostilities and performed poorly in combat conditions. The complex was created to directly hit the target. Its main task was to hit the target with a high-explosive factor, then introducing heavy fragments into the airframe, which practically did not happen in real combat conditions.
Purely theoretically, a direct hit from the FIM-43A caused more damage than a direct hit from the Stinger, but the power of the warhead was clearly not enough to disable the vehicle, seriously damage it, much less bring it down. The Red Eye combat unit had certain advantages over the Stinger-A when attacking the Mi-24, which, however, was completely offset by the obsolescence of the Red Eye. Shooting the LTC reduced the probability of a hit by 80%; the low (500 m/s) initial speed of the rocket and poor controllability along the trajectory allowed the helicopter to easily escape with a couple of vigorous maneuvers.
A helicopter with an electronic device could be captured from a distance of no more than 1 km. For helicopters without electronic devices, launches were carried out almost exclusively on board from 1–1.5 km. But the limited angles and attack distance, which exposed anti-aircraft gunners to helicopter attack, as well as low accuracy, together with the “addiction” to the flight and flight center, were not the main problem. The unreliability of both non-contact and contact fuses led to the fact that a missile defense system could fly within a few centimeters of the body without exploding.
Note that with the help of FIM-43A missiles for 1982–1986. The Mujahideen shot down only two Mi-24s and one Su-25. After the massive installation of LBB-166 Lipa pulsed IR jamming stations on helicopters, the enemy himself abandoned the use of the remaining FIM-43A, since the probability of being hit was rapidly approaching zero.
The first to arrive in Afghanistan in 1985 were the Stingers of the first modification - FIM-92A. With similar characteristics to the “Red Eye”, the GPE of the “Stingers” was cut into the casing, in particular in the projection of the fuel tanks, causing a serious leak and sometimes a fire, the blades of the main and tail rotors were cut off, they could break the tail rotor control rods, pierce the hydraulic hoses, if lucky, without causing damage to the main units of the Mi-24, protected by armor. However, it was almost impossible to shoot down a Mi-24 with just one FIM-92A hit. Therefore, the Mujahideen practiced paired launches, launches of four MANPADS (partly taking into account the greater likelihood of a miss on a helicopter equipped with Linden), as well as entire anti-helicopter ambushes with six to ten Stinger complexes, spare TPKs and a pair of Strela-2M complexes ”, often supported by ZPU or even light MZA.
The appearance in less than a year of the next, more accurate and noise-resistant modification “Stinger-POST” (FIM-92B) with a warhead mass of 2.3 kg, as well as the improved FIM-92A, with power increased from 0.93 to 1.5 kg The warhead increased the high-explosive factor by 1.6 times for the 2.3-kg warhead and only 1.3 times for the improved 1.5-kg warhead FIM-92A.
From mid-1986, these improved missiles, along with the 800 remaining Stingers-A, were first used by the Mujahideen against the Mi-24. However, the very first hits confirmed the worst fears of the developers - it was almost impossible to shoot down a Mi-24 with a single Stinger hit unless the missile hit the ammunition load, tail boom or tail rotor of the helicopter, or did not cause a fire in the fuel tanks. That is, the relative miss of the Stinger was much more effective than a direct hit on the armor plate of a gearbox, a shielded electronic device, or an armored engine. Although a 2.3-kilogram warhead, due to the high-explosive factor and the density of the fragment field, often tore off the armor plate and damaged the engine, which was inaccessible to the Stingers with a 0.93- and even 1.5-kilogram warhead. In addition, the Stinger-POST (FIM-92B) simply cut off the GPE of the main rotor blade, which is why its efficiency dropped by 30–50%. But the vital, armored units were too tough for even the new modification FIM-92B.
Note that the latest modification of the FIM-92C “Stinger-RPM” used the same 2.3-kilogram warhead without changes, but when attacking a helicopter, the seeker was reprogrammed to the appropriate algorithm. However, even against the Mi-24, not to mention the Mi-28, such a warhead, without cumulative and armor-piercing elements, a rod circuit or equipped with heavy submunitions, was simply powerless.
As for the statistics of the Afghan war, only 18 helicopters were shot down by 89 Stinger hits on the Mi-24. Some of them were shot down by two or three missiles, as well as by a combination with an anti-aircraft launcher. Sometimes, after being hit by a Stinger, the Mi-24 would finish with the Strela. The 18 helicopters shot down accounted for 31 hits (out of 89). Interestingly, 58 hits caused non-critical damage.
However, after the Jewellin, which was not used en masse, the Stinger had the highest hit statistics: out of 563 launches against the Mi-24, 89 missiles reached the target - about 16%. The strength of the Stinger was that firing the LTC gave only 27% of the missile’s escape rate versus 54% for the Strela.
Against the Mi-8, the Stingers were very effective - only three Mi-8s survived a single hit from the Stingers and five after being hit by a Strela-2M. This was largely due to the fact that the LBB-166 Lipa station on the Mi-8 had a dead zone, and besides, the helicopter had significantly larger linear dimensions in all angles than the Mi-24, and relatively low speed and maneuverability.
In addition, the capabilities of the Mi-24 allowed helicopter pilots to perform an anti-missile maneuver called “Fatalist” or “Sassy”. In 65% of cases, when performing this maneuver, it was possible to avoid a seemingly inevitable hit, but on the Mi-8 such a maneuver was simply impossible.
The Stinger MANPADS were also very effective against jet aircraft. The vast majority of Su-22, Su-17 and MiG-21 were shot down by missiles of this type. Compared to the Mi-24, the percentage of launches to downed vehicles was significantly higher: 7.2% against jet combat aircraft in total; 4.7% against the Su-25 and 3.2% against the Mi-24. But 18% - if used against the Mi-8.
For the first time in Afghanistan (the combat debut of MANPADS took place in 1982 in the Falklands), the Stingers were used on September 25, 1986 in the Jalalabad region by a detachment of a certain “engineer Ghaffar” from the Islamic Party of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. That day, a group of 35 people set up an ambush in the area of the local airfield, firing at eight combat and transport helicopters of the 335th Helicopter Regiment returning from a routine mission to reconnaissance and destroy caravans.
The rebels damaged the Mi-24V of Lieutenant E.A. with two missiles. Burnt. The pilot ordered the rest of the crew to leave the helicopter, and he himself tried to forcefully land it. The attempt was partially successful: they managed to land the car, but Pogorely received serious injuries and died in the hospital. In addition, an Mi-8 exploded in the air. Only the right pilot survived, who was thrown out of the cockpit by the explosion. His parachute opened automatically.
This is how Colonel K.A. recalls these events. Shipachev, then a flight commander of the 335th regiment, who was on the ground: “Suddenly we heard a rather strong explosion, then another and another. Trying to understand what was going on, we jumped out into the street and saw the following picture: six helicopters were spiraling down right above us, and on the ground, at a distance of 100–300 m from the runway, a downed Mi-8 was burning. The pilots who jumped out were hanging in the air on their parachutes.
As it later turned out during the debriefing, the dushmans from an ambush made eight launches of the Stinger MANPADS from a distance of 3800 m from the runway at the group landing. After the first launch, the flight director gave the command to the crews to turn on their protective equipment and open fire on the attackers, but there was nothing to shoot with: all the ammunition had already been completely used up, and the combat helicopters were not even able to strike back. Everyone who timely activated the firing of heat traps was protected from the missiles, and two helicopters were shot down.
...Immediately realizing that the pilots were unable to give an adequate response to the enemy, the command post immediately transmitted the coordinates of the target to the rocket artillery position, and a retaliatory strike was launched against the bandits. A day later, we escorted the bodies of our fallen comrades back to their homeland, and on September 28 we again began to carry out our next tasks.”
It is a rare case for the Afghan war when there is a description of this remarkable event from the other side. Says Pakistani Brigadier General Mohammad Yusuf, who was responsible for preparing the rebel Stinger crews until August 1987: “The long wait for a suitable target was rewarded at three o’clock in the afternoon. Everyone peered into the sky to see a magnificent sight - no less than eight helicopters, belonging to the most hated enemies - the Mi-24 fire support helicopters, were approaching the runway to land. Gaffar's group had three Stingers, whose operators lifted the now loaded launchers onto their shoulders and stood in a firing position. The fire crews were located within shouting distance of each other, located in a triangle in the bushes, since no one knew from which direction the target might appear. We organized each crew so that three people fired, and the other two held missile tubes for quick reloading...
When the lead helicopter was only 200 m above the ground, Ghaffar commanded: “Fire!”, and the Mujahideen shouted “Allahu Akbar!” rose up with the rockets. One of the three missiles did not fire and fell without exploding, just a few meters from the shooter. The other two crashed into their targets. Both helicopters fell like stones onto the runway, shattering into pieces from the impact. There was a wild scuffle between the fire crews while the missiles were being reloaded, as each member of the team wanted to fire again. Two more missiles went into the air, one hit the target as successfully as the previous two, and the second passed very close, since the helicopter had already landed. I believe that one or two other helicopters were also damaged due to the fact that their pilots had to sharply land the machines... Five missiles, three targets hit - the Mujahideen were triumphant...
After the ceasefire, Ghaffar's men quickly collected the empty tubes and destroyed the unexploded missile by smashing it with rocks... Their return to base was uneventful, although about an hour after their departure they heard the roar of a jet in the distance and the sound of exploding bombs.
On that day, there was no immediate reaction to the downed helicopters in Jalalabad; the Russians were simply stunned. Then the airfield was closed for a month..."
As we see, the evidence of the parties is similar in some ways, but diverges in others.
Concluding the story, it is worth noting that the Soviet units were actually hunting for MANPADS systems. Consider, for example, the story of the capture of the first Stinger complex, which was claimed by two dozen people at different times and under different circumstances (I think their number will only grow over the years).
Most truthfully, in my opinion, the story of the first captured Stinger is described in an article by reserve colonel Alexander Musienko: “The first portable anti-aircraft missile system Stinger was captured by Soviet troops in Afghanistan on January 5, 1987. During aerial reconnaissance of the area, the senior reconnaissance group Lieutenant Vladimir Kovtun and Lieutenant Vasily Cheboksarov of the 186th separate special forces detachment under the overall command of the deputy detachment commander, Major Evgeniy Sergeev, in the vicinity of the village of Seyid Kalai, noticed three motorcyclists in the Meltakai gorge.” Vladimir Kovtun described further actions as follows: “Seeing our helicopters, they quickly dismounted and opened fire with small arms, and also made two quick launches from MANPADS, but at first we mistook these launches for shots from an RPG. The pilots immediately made a sharp turn and sat down. Already when we left the board, the commander managed to shout to us: “They are shooting from grenade launchers!” The twenty-fours covered us from the air, and we, having landed, started a battle on the ground.” Helicopters and special forces opened fire on the rebels, destroying them with NURS and small arms fire. Only the leading aircraft landed on the ground, and the leading Mi-8 with Cheboksarov’s group insured from the air. During the inspection of the destroyed enemy, Senior Lieutenant V. Kovtun seized a launch container, a hardware unit for the Stinger MANPADS and a complete set of technical documentation from the rebel he destroyed. One combat-ready complex, strapped to a motorcycle, was captured by Captain E. Sergeev, and another empty container and a missile were captured by the group’s reconnaissance officers who landed from a follower helicopter.”
Until the fall of 1979, the Soviet side tried not to advertise its participation in the war. Thus, border guards used Mi-8 in Aeroflot livery with false license plates
At the first stage of the war, Mi-8Ts made up the majority
Mi-6 helicopters played a very important role in supplying remote garrisons. But in the conditions of a mountain war, their crews suffered heavy losses
Due to the high mountain conditions, the Mi-8 was made as light as possible. Please note that there are no trusses for hanging weapons
Kabul Mi-8s served most of the posts around the capital
Mi-8MT at a high mountain post
Mi-8 50th smallpox parked in Kabul, winter 1988.
Due to their enormous size, heavy Mi-26s were used exclusively in the border area to supply border guards
Aviation played a significant role in the actions of border guards. Pictured is Mi-24
Escort flight was standard for Mi-24 crews
An-26 from the 50th Osap
Unloading Il-76 at Kandahar airfield
MiG-21s at the initial stage were the basis of the aviation group
MiG-23s were used mainly as fighter-bombers and only in the areas bordering Pakistan - as fighters
Su-25 takes off from the capital's airfield
Su-25 became a real discovery of the Afghan war
Su-17 fighter-bombers operated primarily from shy; border airfields
Su-17 in flight
Military experts come to the conclusion that modern MANPADS are not intended to destroy enemy aircraft and helicopters, but not to allow them to carry out their combat missions. An example is the military conflict in 2011 in Libya. Using Soviet Igla MANPADS, troops subordinate to Gadaffi practically prevented the bombing and quite successfully defended their airspace. NATO aviation was largely constrained by the fact that Gadaffi had portable air defense systems.
The main purpose of the 9K338 Igla-S is to defeat low-flying helicopters, airplanes, UAVs and missiles. Operates in various conditions of artificial and natural interference. Igla-S was the result of an in-depth modernization of the 9K38 Igla man-portable anti-aircraft missile system.
Now Igla-S has improved characteristics and new capabilities, replacing several air defense systems at once - a conventional MANPADS to counter helicopters and airplanes and an expensive air defense system used to counter cruise missiles and UAVs.
The main developer of MANPADS is the Kolomna Mechanical Engineering Design Bureau. The seeker for the Igla-S complex was developed by the Leningrad Association of Optical Mechanics. The complex is produced at the Degtyarev Kovrov plant. The main tests of the Igla-Super MANPADS took place in 2001, and in 2002 the complex was adopted by the Russian army.
You can use the complex from any media. In addition, the Igla-Super MANPADS has enormous potential for creating mobile carriers - its low weight and increased destruction characteristics will significantly increase the armament of any carrier and bring them closer to the level of short-range air defense systems. According to the accepted contract, the Russian Federation supplied Vietnam with 50 units of the new Igla-Super complex - the contract value is more than 60 million dollars.
The complex consists of
:
— one 9M342 missile located in a tube provided with a power source;
— trigger mechanism 9P522;
— PKP 9V866-2;
— KPA 9F719-2;
- NVD 1PN97 "Mowgli-2".
The main differences from previous complexes are an increased range of use from 5.2 to 6 kilometers, improved combat characteristics of the warhead - the mass of explosives has been increased and the number of fragments has been increased, despite the fact that the mass of the missile has remained unchanged. The 9E435 homing head uses two photodetectors that provide operation in different ranges, which has increased the level of selection of thermal interference.
The seeker also used a displacement scheme, which ensured the formation of control commands to drive the missile's rudder on approach to an airborne object - the missile begins a deviation maneuver from the main point of guidance (the object's nozzle) and the defeat will occur on the most vulnerable units of the object. According to the information provided by the developers, the homing head has fantastic characteristics of vibration sensitivity and shock resistance.
For the first time, a non-contact type target sensor is being used in a missile, which ensures the detonation of warheads when approaching the target closely. The sensor is fully integrated with the warhead and fuse - a delay has been introduced for detonating the warhead after it has been successfully triggered. Depending on the target, the delay is also set, for example, for an airplane it is set to the largest, since when the rocket approaches the structural elements of the airplane, the non-contact sensor will, of course, work, and the delay time will begin to expire (detonating the rocket immediately behind the nozzle will be ineffective).
The missile will have time to get close to the aircraft, and the detonation will occur from the triggering of a contact-type sensor; if it does not have time to get completely close, then after the delay the warhead will still detonate. The delay is set automatically and depends on the operating mode.
The overall dimensions of the rocket and the weight limit required the use of light warheads with the highest possible efficiency. It is achieved through in-depth contact-type detonation with adaptation to the speed characteristics of the target. Russian designers have created a “smart” fuse - having received data about the contact of the missile with the target, it waits for a response from the sensor for the penetration of the warhead into the aircraft and, taking into account the received data, gives the command to detonate. The result is that a light warhead causes maximum possible damage to the object.
It increases the capabilities of the warhead and the solid fuel charge of the main engine - it is also undermined by the detonation of the warhead. This solution, simple at first glance and not used by anyone abroad, made it possible to increase the combat effectiveness of the Igla-Super complex on a collision course up to three kilometers - the most common area for using missiles against air targets. After using the MANPADS, the missile picks up speed using a powder-type control engine, which deploys it at the lead point in automatic mode - no human intervention is required.
The Mowgli NVD used ensures the use of the Igla-S complex in the dark, in addition, it ensures the detection and identification of an airborne object, helps the shooter take aim and accompany him to the combat use of MANPADS. Nowadays, night operations have become more and more frequent - this opportunity has significantly increased the possibilities of using Igla-Super MANPADS.
The continuity of the complexes is striking in its capabilities - the dimensions and mountings of the Igla MANPADS of different modifications are completely the same, missiles from the new complex can be used in earlier versions of the complex, and missiles from the Igla and Igla-1 complexes can be used in the Igla-S MANPADS "
The trigger mechanisms are almost completely interchangeable. The “Mowgli” sight for shooting at night has additional fasteners, with the help of which it can be installed on earlier versions of the complex.
The portable anti-aircraft missile system is provided with reliable operation in a wide range of temperatures and humidity (98%). Unpretentious, withstands half-hour immersion in water, climbing to a height of up to 12,000 meters, transportation by any vehicle on any roads and terrain. Withstands falls from a height of up to 2 meters. A rocket can be launched even by an untrained shooter from any position at any time of the day or night.
Main Features
:
— range of application range/altitude – 6000/up to 3500 meters;
— speed of targets to meet/overtake – 400/320 m/s;
— weight 19 kilograms;
- ammunition caliber - 72 mm;
- warhead weight - 2.5 kilograms;
— rocket weight 11.7 kilograms;
- transfer to combat use - 13 seconds;
— reverse translation – 30 seconds.
The Igla-S MANPADS have a guaranteed service life of 10 years when stored in equipped premises. 7 years in unequipped premises, 4 years when saving in field conditions. 2 years with constant use and storage outside of boxes.
The 9K338 Igla-S man-portable anti-aircraft missile system is designed to engage low-flying air targets of various types on oncoming and catch-up courses in conditions of natural (background) and artificial thermal interference.
The complex is the result of a deep modernization of MANPADS 9K38 "Igla" and has greater capabilities in combating both traditional air targets such as airplanes and helicopters, replacing two or three Igla-type MANPADS, and new cruise missiles, replacing expensive and scarce anti-aircraft systems.
The developer of the complex is the Mechanical Engineering Design Bureau (Kolomna). The development of homing heads for the complex is carried out by the Leningrad Optical-Mechanical Association (LOMO). Manufacturer - "Plant named after Degtyarev" (Kovrov).
State tests of the Igla-S complex were completed in December 2001.
The Igla-S MANPADS can be used as part of various land-, sea- and air-based carriers. This opens up prospects for the creation of light mobile guided missile systems. On the one hand, this is due to the low weight and dimensions of the missiles, which make it possible to significantly increase the ammunition and firepower of the carrier, and on the other hand, in terms of its technical characteristics, the Igla-S MANPADS has approached the level of short-range anti-aircraft systems and is capable of solving broader problems .
In 2002, Russia transferred 50 Igla-S MANPADS to Vietnam as part of a contract worth $64 million concluded in the fall of 2001.
Compound
Functionally, the 9K338 "Igla-S" complex includes the following components:
- military means (see diagram) consisting of:
- rocket 9M342 in a 9P338 pipe with a ground power supply 9B238-1 (9B238);
- starting mechanism 9P522;
- maintenance means consisting of:
- mobile control point 9В866-2;
- set of test equipment 9F719-2;
- shooting support means - night vision sight "Mowgli-2" 1PN97.
The difference between the Igla-S complex and the prototype lies in the increased firing range (up to 6 km), the increased power of the warhead (both in terms of the mass of the explosive and the number of fragments) with an almost unchanged weight of the missile itself, in the effectiveness of highly protected air defense systems for air targets.
When creating MANPADS, the LOMO association developed the noise-resistant seeker 9E435. The use of two photodetectors operating in different spectral ranges in the homing head (GOS) made it possible to ensure selection of thermal interference. In addition, a so-called “displacement circuit” has been introduced into the homing head, which ensures the generation of control commands to the steering drive of the missile when approaching a target in such a way that the missile deviates from the guidance point located in the nozzle area to the center of the target, i.e. into its most vulnerable units. According to the developers, this seeker has record-breaking vibration sensitivity and shock resistance characteristics.
The Igla-S MANPADS is the first to use a non-contact target sensor in a missile of this class, which ensures detonation of the warhead when flying close to the target, which happens when firing at small targets. At the same time, the problem of not only introducing a non-contact target sensor into the warhead, but also its optimal operation with a contact fuse has been solved. This is achieved by introducing a certain delay for the detonation of the warhead after the non-contact target sensor is triggered. If during this delay time the contact sensor is triggered, then the operation from the non-contact sensor is blocked, and the warhead is detonated according to the contact detonation algorithm. So, for example, when shooting at an airplane (large target), the delay is set deliberately large, because when a missile flies relative to the structural elements of the aircraft, the non-contact sensor will work, but detonation of the warhead in this place will be ineffective, during the delay time, the missile will approach the aircraft body and the warhead will be detonated by the operation of the contact sensor, if this does not happen, then after a while delays, the warhead will be blown up. It should be noted that the delay times in the rocket are set automatically, depending on the operating modes.
The missile's dimensions and weight restrictions require the use of a relatively small warhead with maximum efficiency. Increasing the effectiveness of hitting air targets was achieved through buried contact detonation of combat equipment with adaptation of the depth level to the speed of encounter with the target. Russian specialists solved this problem by creating a “smart” fuse, which, having received information about the missile hitting the target, waits for information from the penetration sensor (there is one) of the warhead into the skin of the aircraft and, taking into account the time of receipt of these signals, issues a command to detonate. As a result, a small MANPADS warhead causes great damage to the aircraft.
To increase the effect of the warhead, the solid propellant charge of the main engine is made of a material capable of exploding from the detonation of the warhead. Such a solution, which despite its simplicity has not yet been reproduced abroad, made it possible to sharply increase the efficiency of MANPADS firing on a collision course in the area of the affected area by 1...3 km, i.e. the most likely area where the missile will meet the target.
After the rocket leaves the launch tube, the powder control engine begins to operate, turning the rocket to the lead point without human intervention.
The MANPADS have additionally introduced a removable night vision sight (NVG) 1PN72M "Mowgli", which allows the use of MANPADS in night conditions, ensuring the detection and identification of targets by an anti-aircraft gunner, aiming and tracking the target before launching a missile. Considering that night raids have recently become a common occurrence during combat operations, the presence of night vision devices significantly expands the capabilities of the complex.
High continuity in the operation of Igla-S has been maintained, "Needles-1" And "Needles". The dimensions of the new MANPADS, seats for mounting them and package dimensions remain the same. The missile of the Igla-S complex can be stowed in the existing stowage areas of previous missiles and installed on launchers previously created for the missiles of the Igla-1 and Igla complexes. The launching mechanism of the Igla-S MANPADS ensures the launch of the Igla-1 and Igla MANPADS missiles, and the launching mechanism of the Igla complex ensures the launch of the Igla-S complex with virtually no restrictions. The Mowgli NVG contains fastening elements that allow it to be installed on the Igla-1 and Igla complexes.
The Igla-S MANPADS maintains the following order: preparing combat weapons for firing, performing operations during combat work, and maintenance. Thus, a trained anti-aircraft gunner does not need to undergo retraining to work with the new complex. In the training process of training new anti-aircraft gunners to fire Igloy-S, training simulators created for the Igla complex can be used. At the same time, a new cool universal complex simulator “Konus” has been created for the Igla-S MANPADS to teach and train anti-aircraft gunners in the skills of detecting, aiming and launching missiles at various types of targets on oncoming and catch-up courses. It includes training facilities not only for the missiles of the Igla-S complex, but also for the Igla-1 and Igla complexes.
MANPADS "Igla-S" operates reliably in conditions of extreme temperatures and high humidity (up to 98%), with sudden changes in ambient temperature and condensed precipitation, after immersion in water (to a depth of 0.5 m for half an hour) and rise to in an unpressurized aircraft cabin to an altitude of up to 12 km, after long-term transportation by any type of transport, including cars and tracked vehicles, on any type of roads and off-road. When packaged, combat weapons can be dropped from a height of up to 2 m onto a concrete base, while they remain suitable for further combat use. The combat equipment of the complex allows exposure to random wide-band vibration and repeated mechanical shocks (up to 35g). They are resistant to dust, frost, dew, salty sea fog, cyclic exposure to temperatures (with an instantaneous change from +50°C to -50°C and back), solar radiation, rain and low atmospheric pressure, they are not afraid of mold fungi , marine flora, ants, termites and rodents.
The missile can be launched by an anti-aircraft gunner from the shoulder from any unprepared open area, from a trench, the body of a moving vehicle, from a railway platform and even from a reservoir.
Designated service life of the complex's combat assets in the Russian Army when stored in heated rooms in boxes 9Я710, 9P522.55.000 is ten years, including seven years in unheated conditions, of which four years in field conditions when stored in boxes, including two years of military operation outside boxes.
To increase the efficiency of using the Igla-S MANPADS, a set of means for supporting shooting at night (SOSN) 9S520 has been developed. This kit can be used for all types of man-portable air defense systems. This allows the squad commander of anti-aircraft gunners to receive notification of air targets, carry out target distribution between the gunners and then, after detecting an air target, carry out aiming, tracking, homing head acquisition and missile launch. SOSN 9S520 provides:
- reception of telecode notification information from control points of the following types: “Assembly” (9S-80M), “Rangier” (9C737), PU-12 (9S482M6, M7), MP-22R, radar P-19 (1RL134Sh3);
- displaying on the light indicator of a portable electronic tablet (PEP) the location of targets with signs of state affiliation and composition;
- introduction of topographic geodetic reference into the PEP, including space reference;
- orientation of support devices along magnetic azimuth;
- recalculation of the current coordinates of targets displayed on the PEP to the location of the anti-aircraft gunners;
- targeted transmission via cable over a distance of up to 50 m of target distribution information and the current target designation value to anti-aircraft gunners in azimuth and range to the target;
- search, detection and targeting of MANPADS at air targets at any time of the day;
- increasing the probability and range of target detection at any time of the day;
- physical and psychological relief of the anti-aircraft gunner while on combat duty and during combat;
SOSN 9S520 contains:
- a portable electronic tablet, including a radio station and a microelectronic terminal, designed to convert telecode information received from a control point of the 9S482M4 type, displaying on the indicator the location of targets with signs of state affiliation and the composition of targets (single-group), target distribution and issuing target designation to the support device;
- a group of support devices spaced at a distance of up to 50 m from each other (see. photo), each of which is made in the form of a folding tripod and stand with MANPADS fastening elements and is equipped with individual target designation means connected by separate communication lines to a microelectronic terminal;
- individual control equipment with an angular position sensor, electronic units, and a 1PN72M night vision sight. This allows the anti-aircraft gunner to receive information about the appearance of an air target, the direction of its movement and range;
- special packaging for storing, carrying and transporting (by all types of transport) the components of the SOSN.
The time of continuous operation from one set of autonomous power sources is at least 12 hours, from onboard ones - without limitation.
In 2009 A new version of the SOSN set - 9S935 "Barnaul", developed by Izmeritel OJSC (Smolensk), entered service.
MANPADS "Igla-S" is coupled with a support-launcher
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