Prince Walid bin Talal of Saudi Arabia. War of Thrones: how a Saudi prince with $18 billion ended up in custody
Elena Mordashova, the ex-wife of the “steel king”, lives in Moscow. Today she works in a commercial company and does not want to discuss the fate and actions of her husband. She considers her attempt six years ago to take revenge for her ruined life and abandoned son to be stupid and naive. She is not going to repeat it. The one who has more money is right, she is sure.
Mordashov’s son, Ilya, did not want to take his father’s surname and took his mother’s surname. Ilya studies at the institute, where he is known not as the exiled heir to the steel empire, but as a taciturn and reserved guy. Ilya doesn’t tell anyone about his father, whom he last saw more than seven years ago.
The former general director of Severstal, Yuri Lipukhin, after his “overthrow” from the post of general director of the plant, gave only one long interview. Lipukhin's children and relatives protect their elderly father from the obsessive attention of the press and those who are trying to use the former head of the plant to attack Mordashov. Most of the time Lipukhin lives in Sochi, reading books and tending to the garden.
In his new marriage, Alexei Mordashov had three children...
$21 billion
Prince al-Waleed bin Talal bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud
Prince Al-Walid bin Talal bin Abdul Aziz Al-Saud
The wealth of the ruling Saudi dynasty is not usually associated with business acumen, financial luck or hard work. The only exception is the multi-billion dollar fortune of Prince al-Waleed bin Talal bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud. Becoming chairman of his own company at age 14 and a billionaire at age 31, Prince al-Waleed, now 51, is a typical Western-style businessman, a self-made man with a net worth now estimated at $21 billion.
At the beginning of the 20th century, King Ibn Saud, with fire and sword, managed to unite the disparate tribes of the Arabian Peninsula into one state. Since 1932, the Saudi dynasty has been the ruling royal dynasty of Saudi Arabia and the custodian of one of the main Muslim shrines - the Kaaba temple in Mecca. The Al-Saud clan numbers more than a thousand princes and princesses. The most famous of them, Prince al-Walid, stands out not only for the size of his fortune, but also for his high hierarchical position in the clan: he is the nephew of the current king of Saudi Arabia.
Al-Waleed was born in 1957 from the marriage of a prince of the blood of the royal family of Saudi Arabia and the daughter of the first prime minister of Lebanon. The parents divorced when the child was three years old, and the boy lived with his mother in Beirut until his 11th birthday. The young scion of the royal family was sent to America to receive an education. Here the prince graduated from Menlo College in San Francisco (he has a bachelor's degree in business administration) and a master's degree in social sciences from Syracuse University in New York.
The adherent and guardian of Wahhabism in America became addicted to morning jogging, loved Coca-Cola, mastered the ability to wear business suits and, they say, was even an active participant in riotous student parties.
The prince began his business activities in 1979 by providing intermediary services to foreign companies that wanted to do business with Saudi Arabia. Given the prince's closeness to the royal family and his informal influence in the region, the start was successful. In 1980, al-Waleed bin Talal established the Mamlaka company (in English, Kingdom). He himself says that he created the business with the help of $30,000 borrowed from his father and a $400,000 loan secured by a house donated by his parent. Al-Walid continued to actively take advantage of his privileged position, receiving lucrative construction contracts and purchasing land plots at reduced prices for subsequent resale. However, according to al-Walid himself, his contracts and real estate transactions in the Riyadh region were nothing more than “a blip on the radar screen.” The metaphor used by the prince cannot be called anything other than a Freudian slip: at that time the war occupied the prince even more than business.
The war in Afghanistan was sacred for devout Muslims. The Saudi dynasty, at the head of Wahhabism, could not remain aloof from the events in Afghanistan. And al-Walid actively helped the Afghan Mujahideen in the fight against the Soviet Union. In 1981, the prince even had a chance to visit training camps in Peshawar, where the Mujahideen underwent combat training. However, after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989 and the outbreak of civil war in that country, al-Walid stopped sending money there. According to him, he made his last donation to the Mujahideen in April 1990, giving them $5.4 million.
Prince Khalid ibn al-Walid al-Saud is a typical hipster. He wears Converse sneakers and a hoodie, takes Uber, and doesn't eat animal products. He has a goal in life - to rid the world of animal farms. And he also has huge funds to achieve this goal.
ALEXEY ALEXEEV
student child
Few people in Russia have heard the name of the Saudi prince Khalid ibn al-Walid al-Saud. There is no article about him in the Russian-language Wikipedia, and a Russian-language Google search produces several articles from vegetarian sites and thousands of links to articles about the prince’s father, a multibillionaire investor.
Prince Khalid bin al-Walid al-Saud was born in 1978 in California. Not the most common place of birth for a member of the Saudi royal family, right? How did he get there?
This story can begin from the middle of the last century. Since John Russell, a professor at the little-known American Menlo College, decided to spend his vacation in Saudi Arabia. He told Saudi acquaintances that he worked in a small private business school that provided a very good education for a lot of money. The professor could hardly have predicted what would happen next.
Soon the first students from Saudi Arabia appeared at the college. After the oil boom of the 1970s, their numbers began to grow rapidly. To date, more than 100 members of the Saudi royal family have graduated from Menlo College. Other elite Saudi families also began sending their sons to study at Menlo, and one family even decided to give an American education to their daughter! Statistically, the percentage of Saudi Arabian students in the college population is higher than that of any other US institution.
In 1975, Prince Al-Waleed bin Talal bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, grandson of the founder and first king of Saudi Arabia, entered the college. Years later, this prince, an MBA from Menlo College, would be called Saudi Arabia's Warren Buffett.
The prince will argue with Forbes magazine because it underestimates the size of his fortune. The magazine's latest estimate puts it at $18.7 billion, making Prince al-Waleed the 45th richest person on the planet. Bloomberg in November estimated his fortune at $17.8 billion.
But then, 43 years ago, he was just a moderately well-fed young man who came to California to learn how to make money. The following year, student al-Walid married his cousin Dalal. Their firstborn was Prince Khalid.
From college to university
Having received his bachelor's degree, Prince al-Walid, his wife and one-year-old son returned to their homeland. He completed his master's degree at Syracuse University in sociology in absentia. In his free time from studying, he worked part-time. Mortgaged the house given by his father. Sold a necklace given by his father to his wife. Invested the money wisely. He was involved in real estate, construction, and bought banks. Slowly he became an international investor and became a billionaire.
His only son and heir, Prince Khalid, lived with his father in the palace. When Prince Khalid was four years old, he had a younger sister, Reem. A little later, the parents divorced. Then dad married again and divorced again.
In 1997, a family consisting of a single father with two teenage children celebrated their housewarming by moving into a new palace in the center of Riyadh. There were 317 rooms in the palace, almost every one had a TV. Italian marble, oriental carpets, gold taps in the bathrooms, five kitchens (for Lebanese, Arabic, European Continental and Asian dishes and a separate one for sweets). In the courtyard there is a swimming pool, in the basement there is a cinema hall. The single father also had a yacht purchased from the American developer Donald Trump, several personal planes and three hundred cars, and one Rolls Royce was considered his daughter’s.
Even when buying a personal yacht, Prince Al-Waleed showed himself to be a talented investor. He purchased it at a reduced price from the developer D. Trump during a falling real estate market. In the photo - Prince Al-Walid with his son Khalid and daughter Reem
Photo: Balkis Press/ABACAPRESS/Kommersant
Of course, Princess Reem didn't drive it herself. Not because she was 15 years old, but because the laws of the kingdom prohibited women from driving.
In the year of the housewarming, Prince Khalid turned 19. And two important events took place in his life, which largely determined the future of the prince. Following in his father's footsteps, he entered an American business school. True, not to Menlo College, popular among the Saudi elite, but to the University of New Haven. Then he worked in a bank and moved to his father’s investment holding Kingdom Holding Company.
But my father’s example in another area of life turned out to be even more important. Despite five kitchens and a crowd of chefs capable of preparing dinner for 2,000 people in an hour, Prince Al-Walid decided that he needed to lose weight and generally lead a healthy lifestyle.
If as a student he weighed 90 kg, then along with billions of dollars came additional kilograms. Al-Walid began counting calories. Islam did not allow him to drink alcohol, and his own beliefs did not allow him to smoke. The great investor became a vegetarian.
Livestock farms - consigned to the dustbin of history
“Prince Khalid is considered to have Western, progressive views on many issues, including the role of women in Saudi society. He, like his father, has a business mind, but at the same time he is simple and sweet.” This characterization of Prince Khalid is contained in the files of the private American intelligence and analytical company Stratfor, published by WikiLeaks. Journalists who interviewed him write the same thing about the prince.
In Saudi Arabia he wears traditional clothes, but in America he wears jeans, a hoodie, a baseball cap and black Converse sneakers (faux leather tops, of course). True, during trips abroad he lives in Four Seasons hotels, which can hardly be called budget. But he does this not at all out of a desire to spend extra money, but on the contrary, out of savings: his father is a co-owner of this network.
The prince most clearly demonstrated his progressive Western views in 2005, when he married a girl not from the royal family, but from a simple family - the daughter of the country's finance minister.
Khalid is not just the heir to his father's business empire. In 2013, he founded his own company, KBW Investments. He has business interests on all continents. But in addition to investing in traditional business areas (construction, mining, automotive, hospitality, media), Prince Khalid also invests in high technology - mobile payments, smartphone applications, energy saving. He helped launch TechnoBuffalo, a popular website dedicated to consumer electronics and new technologies.
The prince is very concerned about environmental issues. He abandoned investments in oil and gas, an industry primarily associated with Saudi Arabia. He has only one car - a Tesla electric car. Outside his native kingdom, he prefers Uber. Khalid believes that the world is facing an environmental disaster due to climate change, caused in particular by excessive meat consumption.
In 2008, Khalid watched two American documentaries: Food, Inc. and Food. The price of the issue" (Food Matters). The first talks about how inhumane the meat industry is and what harm it causes to the environment. The second is about which foods benefit the body and which cause harm. According to the prince, the films literally opened his eyes. The prince had another reason to think about food. Khalid at that time weighed 105 kg. His blood cholesterol levels were greatly elevated. Thanks to veganism, he lost weight to 82 kg in seven months and brought his cholesterol back to normal. Before and after photos are now posted on his Facebook.
Last summer, Prince Khalid said in an interview: “My main goal is to consign cattle farms to the dustbin of history. This must happen in my lifetime."
The prince estimates that he can achieve the goal within 10 years through strategic investments in new agricultural methods that will provide the world's population with enough plant-based proteins.
Shortly before this interview, the prince started a page on Facebook. It opens with the motto: “Stand up for what you believe in, even if you do it alone.” However, he is not alone. Prince Khalid managed to convince his father to become not just a vegetarian, but a vegan.
As Prince Khalid writes on his Facebook, if the world sticks to the traditional diet, disaster is inevitable: “We must boycott fast food restaurants and take care of our health and the health of our children before this disaster occurs.”
Last February, the first vegan gourmet restaurant opened in the Kingdom of Bahrain with a very simple name - Cafe Plant. It is also the first restaurant outside of North America by chef Matthew Kenny, a guru of raw-vegan cuisine.
Prince Khalid initially thought of paying a franchise to an American chef, but then he came up with a better idea - investing in the Kenny restaurant chain. The Cafe Plant restaurant became part of this chain. It is conveniently located opposite the most prestigious English-medium school in the country.
Thanks to Prince Khalid, the first vegan restaurant opened in Bahrain, part of the chain of establishments of the legendary chef Matthew Kenny (pictured in the center)
Photo: Stephen Lovekin/Getty Images for NYCWFF
Over the past year, many rave reviews about the restaurant have appeared on travel websites. Everyone, even people who are far from vegan, unanimously admire the taste of the dishes, but not everyone is delighted with the prices.
Prince Khalid intends to increase the number of such restaurants in the region to 10 by 2020. He realizes that this will not change the situation much, but it will be a step in the right direction.
The prince financed the filming of the documentary “Eating Our Way To Extinction” (“If we eat like this, we will become extinct”). The film is planned to be released this year. Another documentary film, which is being filmed with the prince's money, is dedicated to UFC mixed martial arts champion James Wilkes and other vegan athletes. Prince Khalid believes that documentaries can influence viewers to change their views, as he once did.
Last May, he attended a summit in New York for the Reducetarian Foundation, a foundation that advocates for a global reduction in meat consumption to protect human health, the environment and humane animal agriculture.
Last September, Prince Khalid's company was among investors who invested $17 million in San Francisco-based startup Memphis Meats. This company is working on technology to create “clean meat” grown from animal cells in the laboratory. Among the investors who supported the startup are Bill Gates, Richard Branson and the Draper Fisher Jurvetson venture fund, which previously invested in Baidu, SpaceX, Tesla, and Twitter. Interestingly, the foundation is based next door to the town of Atherton in Silicon Valley, where Prince Khalid was born 40 years ago.
That same month, the prince became a member of the board of directors of the Hampton Creek food company, which produces and sells vegetarian food products. The company is also developing “clean meat” and plans to bring it to market this year.
One day, Prince Khalid walked into the vegan cafe Life"n One in Dubai. The cafe has a slate board on which visitors can write their continuation of the sentence “Before I die, I want...”
The prince wrote: "End animal farms."
Every reporter who takes an interest in Saudi Prince Alwaleed bin Talal can hope to one day receive a small gift from His Highness. The driver will bring a bulky green leather bag with the logo and name of al-Walid's Kingdom Holding company, which weighs at least 4.5 kilograms. Like a nesting doll, the green leather bag contains a green leather bundle, which in turn contains an annual report bound in green leather. The only thing not wrapped in leather is a dozen of the world's most famous magazines, each with a photograph of the prince on the cover.
These magazines are the most telling item in an expensive pile of information. On the cover of Vanity Fair, he appears as a typical member of high society: in mirrored glasses, a pale blue sports jacket and an open-necked shirt. He can be seen on the covers of two Time 100 issues: once in a collage alongside the likes of George Soros, Li Ka-shing and Queen Rania, and once alone, dressed in the traditional Saudi tawb and ghutra. There's even Forbes, on the cover of which he, dressed in a Steve Jobs-style turtleneck, gazes imperiously at the reader, and the caption reads: "The world's most astute businessman." But one important detail does not change: all the magazines are not real. Instead of simply sending out newspaper clippings, the prince's staff made from scratch or edited magazine covers and mounted them on top of articles that mentioned the prince, printed on fine glossy paper.
For Prince al-Waleed, image is everything, with particular emphasis placed on those who can provide further proof of his status. He meets very important people. Ask him yourself. It's like his staff prepares a press release with a photo every time he meets someone significant (Bill Gates), someone who might one day become significant (Twitter CEO Dick Costolo), or someone who seems significant (Ambassador of Burkina Faso to Saudi Arabia).
In 2003, he was photographed standing behind George W. Bush, King Abdullah of Jordan, Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. When his authorized biography, Alwaleed: Businessman, Billionaire, Prince, was published in 2005, this photograph was featured on the back cover, this time with Alwaleed in the foreground thanks, as the prince later admitted in a conversation with Forbes, to Photoshop. For several months, starting in the second half of 2011, the prince even began to blind carbon copy me almost daily or send me his messages: some were addressed to the wife of the president of a European country, others to a well-known top manager of a large technology company in the United States, some to leading talk shows on cable channels. The content was conveyed under confidentiality conditions, but the desire to make an impression was quite obvious.
But in terms of external validation, his first priority, according to seven people who used to work for him, is the Forbes billionaires list.
"He wants the world to measure his success or his position in society through this list," says one of the prince's former aides, who, like most of his former colleagues, preferred to remain anonymous for fear of retaliation from the Arab world's richest man. “This is extremely important to him.” Former employees say the palace officially sets goals such as placing in the top ten or twenty.
However, for several years now, al-Waleed's former managers have been telling me that the prince, although indeed one of the richest people in the world, systematically exaggerates his wealth by several billion dollars. This prompted Forbes to take a closer look at the prince's holdings and come to the following conclusion: at times it seems as if he is taking the valuation of his holdings from another reality, including in relation to Kingdom Holding, whose shares are traded on the stock exchange. Their price falls and rises according to factors that, oddly enough, have more to do with the Forbes billionaire list than economic fundamentals.
Al-Waleed, 58, declined to speak to Forbes for this story, but his chief financial officer, Shadi Sanbar, was emphatic: “I would never have thought that Forbes would stoop to cheap sensationalism and rumor.” The discrepancies we've noticed about the prince's wealth say a lot about him and how to determine the true extent of someone's wealth.
Luxury and persistence
The prince first came to Forbes' attention in 1988, a year after our first billionaires issue. The source is the prince himself, who contacted a Forbes journalist to talk about the success of his company Kingdom Holding for Trading & Contracting - and make it clear that he should be included in the next list.
This message marked the beginning of a series of persuasion and threats that have been going on for a quarter of a century and related to the prince’s position on the list. Of the 1,426 billionaires on the list, not a single one - not even the vain Donald Trump - made much effort to influence their ranking. In 2006, when Forbes concluded that the prince was actually worth $7 billion less than he claimed, he called me at home the day after the list came out and seemed almost in tears.
"What do you want? - he pleaded, referring to his personal banker in Switzerland. “Tell me what you need.”
A few years ago, he had Kingdom Holding's chief financial officer fly to New York from Riyadh to make sure Forbes was using the numbers he was reporting. The financial director and his companion refused to leave the editorial office until they received guarantees (after a detailed discussion, the editor convinced them to leave, promising to double-check everything). In 2008, at the prince's request, I spent a week with him in Riyadh, where I toured his palaces, planes and jewelry, which he said was worth $700 million.
Keeping up with Prince al-Waleed, as I learned during my week with him, requires stamina—and a lot of caffeine. He regularly goes to bed no earlier than 4:30 in the morning, sleeps for 4-5 hours, and then everything repeats. “Those who worked with the prince had no life,” recalls a former employee. “The working hours were extremely strange: from 11:00 to 17:00, and then from 21:00 to 2:00.” Even his wife of twenty-something years, Amira al-Tawil, must adapt to this schedule (she is his fourth wife; the prince has always been married to only one woman at a time). While I was there, a driver drove her every evening in a dark blue Mini Cooper to her own palace.
Every day he is surrounded by unimaginable luxury. His main palace in Riyadh has 420 rooms: marble, swimming pools and his portraits.
If the prince needs to go on a business trip, he has his own Boeing 747, like Air Force One, but unlike the president's plane, there is a throne. When al-Waleed wants to slow down, he heads to his “resort,” located on 120 acres of land on the outskirts of Riyadh. There are five artificial lakes, a small zoo, a scaled-down replica of the Grand Canyon, five houses and several verandas where his entourage dine.
This dinner is very important for al-Walid. To stay in shape, he eats one large meal a day, around 8 p.m., although given his biological rhythms, he calls it "lunch." On one side of him are the “palace ladies” who run the household in the house where the prince is currently located, on the other - male servants. As a rule, all eyes in this semicircle are directed at the TV. And just in case anyone forgets the prince's spotlight, CNBC is usually on.
Call of blood
This desire for success, albeit in a veiled form, was inherited by him. If ever anyone felt obligated to succeed, it is Prince al-Waleed, grandson of the founders of two independent countries. His maternal grandfather was the first Prime Minister of Libya. His paternal grandfather, King Abdulaziz, created Saudi Arabia. “So he found himself in a position where he needed to prove his superiority in something,” says Saleh al-Fadl, a manager at Saudi Hollandi Bank who worked with the prince for several years from 1989 at his United Saudi Commercial Bank. While his royal cousins are involved in Saudi Arabia's political life - one serves as interior minister, others serve as governors - al-Waleed, al-Fadl said, "wants to make a name for himself in the business world."
Al-Walid's father, Prince Talal, had a penchant for entrepreneurship and attempted reforms as finance minister in the early 1960s until he was ousted for his progressive views. During the same period, when al-Walid was seven years old, he divorced his wife, the daughter of Libya's first prime minister, who returned to her homeland with the young prince. There, according to his authorized biography, he developed a habit of sneaking out of the house for a day or two and sleeping in unlocked cars. Al-Walid later attended a military school in Riyadh and still adheres to the strict discipline he learned then.
Prince acquired a Western mentality while attending Menlo College in Atherton, California. Upon his return to Saudi Arabia, he became known as the go-to guy for foreign companies if they needed a local partner. When he talks about the beginning of his career, he usually explains that he received a gift from his father of $30,000, a $300,000 loan and a house. Although even his biography does not make it clear how much more he received from family members, it was probably a lot, since by the age of 36 (in 1991) he was in a position to make life-changing decisions in business.
While regulators were forcing Citicorp to increase its capital base in the face of bad loans in developing countries, al-Waleed, then unknown to anyone outside Saudi Arabia, amassed a stake worth $800 million. This enormous bet grew during two Wall Street booms and by 2005 was already worth $10 billion, which at that time made al-Waleed one of the 10 richest people in the world and earned him the nickname, the popularity of which he contributed to, “The Buffett of Saudi Arabia.”
But unlike Warren Buffett, who spent decades picking winners, al-Waleed has not proven himself to be a consistent investor.
Over the past 20 years, he has backed losers like Eastman Kodak and TWA. Major media investments (Time Warner and News Corp.) did not live up to expectations. And although he had some successes, notably eBay and Apple, al-Waleed missed another chance when he sold most of the latter's shares in 2005. In other words, he has yet to replicate his success with his Citi investment. “It was his biggest deal and it brought him into the limelight. It was a big risk, a big sum, a big bank,” a manager formerly close to al-Walid told Forbes. “He hasn’t done anything close to comparable since then.”
Yet in al-Walid's hyperbolic world, everything is clear. On the home page of the Kingdom Holding website there are four words in large font: “The world's best investor.”
When the prince decided to take Kingdom Holding public in July 2007, the decision looked strange on paper. Although the CFO makes the usual arguments for publicity, the prince already owned 100% of the company. It consisted of holdings whose shares were already listed on the stock exchange, and a pitiful 5% were in free float. In other words, he had no partners whose interests should be taken into account, no liquidity problems and no desire to raise large capital - the three main reasons for carrying out an IPO and putting up with all the attendant difficulties. Shares listed on the Saudi stock exchange are trading thinly. Not a single analyst specifically monitors them. Inside the company, the mood is similar to the mood of the glossy magazines produced by employees. "It was just fun," says al-Waleed's longtime collaborator. - It was fun to go to the stock exchange. There's a buzz in the media."
How much money does the prince have?
Of course, media hype is only "fun" when the stock is trading well. The Prince, who, as always, was concerned about his image, had no doubt that this would be the case. “I'm glad the IPO is going well,” he told Arab News on the day the flotation took place. “This means the Saudis recognize the potential of the No. 1 company in the kingdom.” Never mind that oil giant Saudi Aramco has flooded the economy with money and supported legions of royals for decades. “He sets out to become a rich man and a public figure, and he has achieved that,” says Al-Fadl of Saudi Hollandi Bank. “It will be much more difficult to maintain status.”
These words were confirmed shortly after the IPO. At the time of the offering, when Kingdom was valued at $17 billion, most of the company consisted of Citi shares, worth almost $9.2 billion. But the summer of 2007 marked the beginning of a long and precipitous decline that was accelerated by the onset of the global financial crisis. Since July 2007, Citi's share price has declined nearly 90%. Kingdom Holding shares fell between early 2008 and early 2009, losing 60%. As a result, the prince’s fortune decreased by $8 billion and at the time of the release of the Forbes list of billionaires for 2009 reached only $13.3 billion.
But then, in early 2010, Kingdom Holding's shares magically took off, with their price up 57% in the 10 weeks leading up to the February day Forbes completes its list of billionaires, while Citigroup's shares fell 20%. The prince rose sharply in the Forbes ranking to 19th place ($19.4 billion).
In 2011, the situation repeated itself. In the 10 weeks before Forbes completed the list, Kingdom Holding's shares were up 31%, while the Saudi Arabian stock exchange index was up 3% and the S&P 500 was up 9%. (That year, Prince al-Waleed was ranked 26th in the world, with an estimated fortune of $19.6 billion.) The same thing happened in 2012, when Kingdom shares rose 56% in the 10 weeks to mid-February, while the Saudi market was up just 11% and the S&P 500 was up 9%. This time, al-Waleed took 29th place, with a fortune of $18 billion, after Forbes did not take into account his claims to many assets not owned by Kingdom Holding.
At the same time, several former managers close to al-Walid began telling Forbes the same story: the prince used his political weight to inflate his fortune.
Their evidence was based on close observation of stocks rather than direct evidence. But one manager said he could find no other explanation for the fact that the share price was rising sharply at the same time as a key asset, a significant stake in Citi, was falling.
"It's a national sport," says one of al-Waleed's early managers, offering his own explanation for the market's sudden swings. - There are few players. They come with significant funds and buy from each other. There are no casinos in the country. This is a gambling house for the Saudis." This is also said by an analyst who watches Saudi Arabia, but chose to remain anonymous because his remarks could damage his business connections: “This market is extremely easy to manipulate,” and even easier if you, like Kingdom Holding, “ there are few shares in free float.” CFO Sanbar responds: “No one can provide a rational explanation for short-term changes in stock prices or market trends.”
Whatever the driving force, last year was a record year. In 2012, Kingdom Holding's net income grew by only 10.5% to $188 million, the Saudi Arabian stock exchange index rose 6% and the S&P index rose 13%, but Kingdom's share price jumped 136%. Sanbar refers to "the market's confidence that the company can deliver on its promises over time and deliver significant returns to shareholders."
Currently, Kingdom Holding's capitalization is 107 times its revenue - this does not fit into the value strategy that the prince uses as an investor. There are examples of such valuation: Amazon's market capitalization is 224 times its 2012 pre-tax revenue. Sanbar also points out that Tadawul had many other securities whose price increased by more than 130% in 2012.
The problem with Kingdom is the discrepancy between the share price and the actual assets or economic fundamentals.
One-fifth of Kingdom's net assets are financially invested in the stock, which trades at 82% below its holding. And it hardly makes sense for investors to invest in the rest, because it is almost impossible to find out what the company owns. When the company went public, it issued a detailed 240-page prospectus listing shares in 21 companies, including mostly U.S. firms such as News Corp., Apple and Citi, as well as stakes in various hotels and real estate properties in Saudi Arabia.
But while the prince's press office issues almost daily releases about those he meets, annual reports and financial filings in recent years lack the names of the shares or holdings the company currently holds, and do not even mention the 7% voting shares in News Corp. . We know about this acquisition from documents that News Corp. filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Ernst & Young, Kingdom's auditors, also raised concerns about the discrepancy between price and assets. In 2009 and 2010, they signed annual reports, but both times noted a large difference between the market valuation of the shares and the valuation given by the holding. The difference was so great, auditors noted, that the prince invested 180 million of his own Citi shares, worth $600 million, at no cost to Kingdom, simply to avoid having to lower the share price. In other words, the prince was transferring private assets that he owned 100% to a public company where he only owned 95%, free of charge, in order to improve reporting and possibly market performance. What did Ernst & Young say in 2011? Nothing. They were replaced by Pricewaterhousecoopers at the annual meeting in March this year.
Sunbar told Forbes that no shares have been traded since 2008, but we don't know what shares were traded (if any) between July 2007 and the end of 2008. In January 2012, Kingdom published a press release claiming that it had invested $300 million in Twitter: half of the funds came from Kingdom Holding, half from the prince's personal funds. Sunbar confirmed that ownership stakes in Apple, eBay, PepsiCo, Priceline, Procter & Gamble and several other companies have not changed. But as an investor in Kingdom, you wouldn't know that from the annual report. A note to the 2012 financial statements lists $2.1 billion in private assets that were not audited and states in one sentence: "The Equity segment's operations are concentrated in the United States and the Middle East." This minimum level of disclosure "certainly wouldn't pass a common-sense test in the United States," says Jack Sisilsky, publisher of The Analyst's Observer newsletter.
Sanbar's response? “We are not a mutual fund, and there is no regulation that we have to disclose the composition of our portfolio to anyone.”
While the value of public companies is usually determined by the market, given Kingdom's lack of transparency, low shares outstanding, and questionable trading practices, Forbes decided to focus on real assets. We estimated the returns on the hotel management interests of Four Seasons, Movenpick and Fairmont Raffles and worked with an investment banker specializing in the hotel industry to apply a high ratio for public companies. We also calculated the net-of-debt value of equity interests in more than 15 Kingdom-owned hotels.
Taking into account other holdings we have been able to identify, including real estate in Saudi Arabia and a portfolio of shares of companies in the US and the Middle East, we value the prince's stake in Kingdom Holding at $10.6 billion, or $9.3 billion less than the market grade.
Even if the prince were to attribute most of his reported $9.7 billion assets outside Saudi Arabia: Sanbar listed properties in Saudi Arabia valued at $4.6 billion, stakes in Arab media companies valued at $1.1 billion (Forbes discounted this figure because the prince uses the current net value of future earnings, and we use the current earnings multiplier) and another $3.5 billion in investments in public and private companies around the world - and even if you include numerous planes, yachts, cars and jewelry, Forbes' final estimate does not exceed $20 billion. Still the richest man in the Arab world. Still $2 billion more than last year. But $9.6 billion less than the prince himself claims. And since Forbes prides itself on conservative valuations, in this case we believe the proceeds would be even lower if the assets were sold.
Prince's orders
A week before Forbes completed its calculations, the prince gave his chief financial officer direct instructions that his place on the 2013 Forbes list be in line with his wishes: more specifically, that his fortune be valued at $29.6 billion, which would bring him back in the top ten of the ranking - the place he dreamed of so much. Our source, who is not an employee of the company and is well acquainted with the prince's way of thinking and speaking style, claims that the direct order to Sanbar was formulated as a requirement to "go to extreme measures."
This was followed by four detailed letters from Sanbar criticizing our journalists and our methodology for being biased against the prince. “Why does Forbes apply different standards to different billionaires, is it because of our background?” - asked Sanbar.
In one letter, Sanbar insisted that the value of Kingdom's holdings had skyrocketed, but did not go into detail. He did, however, mention that Kingdom has reduced unrealized losses across the portfolio by nearly $1 billion since 2008. In another letter, he says the Saudi Securities Market Commission spent 12 months reviewing Kingdom's 2007 IPO. “This is detrimental to the establishment of Saudi-American relations. Forbes' actions are offensive to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and inconsistent with the pursuit of progress."
Finally, Sanbar insisted that al-Waleed's name be removed from the list of billionaires unless Forbes increased its estimate of his wealth. As Forbes asked increasingly specific questions as it fact-checked the story, the prince unilaterally announced through his office the day before publication that he was going to “sever ties” with the Forbes billionaire list. “Prince Alwaleed made this decision because he felt he could no longer participate in a process that is based on distorted data and appears to be aimed at discrediting investors and institutions in the Middle East.”
“Over the years, we have been a willing partner of the Forbes team and have repeatedly pointed out flaws in our methodology that needed to be corrected,” Sanbar said in a statement. “However, after several years of our efforts to correct errors being ignored, we concluded that Forbes was not going to improve the accuracy of their assessment of our holdings and decided to move forward.”
And how did the prince tell us about his decision? Via a press release.
Translation by Natalia Balabantseva
From the editor. In 2013, Prince Al-Waleed bin Talal filed a lawsuit against Forbes magazine, accusing the publication of understating his fortune and with $20 billion, he took only 29th place in the Forbes ranking. The prince himself estimated his fortune at $29.6 billion, with which he would be in the top ten richest people in the world. In 2015, both sides said that the legal conflict had been settled “on mutually acceptable terms.” In the global ranking of billionaires in 2017, the prince took 45th place.
The fabulous wealth of Arab sheikhs has long become the talk of the town. Documents obtained by WikiLeaks detail how members of the Saudi royal family divide the proceeds from black gold.
Saudi Prince Al-Waleed bin Talal lives with his wife and children in a huge palace. In total there are 317 rooms, three swimming pools, and a cinema hall. There are five kitchens. Each has its own specialization, based on a certain culinary tradition - Arabic, Far Eastern and European. One is used only for preparing desserts. The chefs working in the palace are able to prepare food for two thousand people within an hour.
The 56-year-old prince has 200 luxury cars in his garage, including Rolls-Royce, Lamborghini and Ferrari. Al-Walid also has a “flying palace” rebuilt in a special way. And he can relax on the same one that starred in the James Bond film “Never Say Never Again.” The prince's fortune totals billions of dollars.
[NEWSru.com, 11/14/2007, “Saudi prince buys A380 to turn it into a flying palace”: Prince Waleed, nephew of King Abdullah Al Saud of Saudi Arabia, owns an indirect stake of 3.6% of Citigroup shares through the Saudi company Kingdom he controls Holding and, according to Forbes magazine, ranks 13th in the list of the richest people in the world (according to other sources - fifth). The prince knows a lot about luxury and is the owner of several prestigious hotels in the world, such as the George V in Paris, the Plaza in New York, the Savoy and Four Seasons in London, and the Nile Plaza Four Seasons in Cairo. - Insert K.ru]
It turns out that there is a system of "scholarships" for members of the royal family. Moreover, it is arranged strictly by rank. In the mid-1990s, the children of the founder of Saudi Arabia could receive 200-270 thousand dollars a month. Grandchildren were paid 27 thousand, great-grandchildren - 13 thousand, and the next generation - 8 thousand. The first king had several dozen sons. The royal family grew to seven thousand people. Its representatives also receive “bonuses” of several million dollars. This is in case the princes wanted to get married or build a new palace. In addition, the inner circle also manages overall purchases - worth several billion dollars a year.
Prince al-Waleed bin Talal bought the Airbus A380 “flying palace” for $300 million. Its finishing will cost another $300 million
Original of this material© "RBC", 02/15/2008, Photo: Forbes
Golden Airbus: The reality of an Arab sheikh, the dream of a Russian billionaire
Last year, the world community was excited by the news from the Le Bourget air show. An anonymous buyer ordered an Airbus A380 to make it into a flying palace. […]The mysterious owner of the A380 turned out to be Prince Al-Waleed bin Talal bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud.
[RBC, 06/22/2007, “Purchase of the year: $600 million for a flying palace”: A lot has been said about the A380 in recent years. Let us remind you that this is the largest aircraft in the world, costing about $300 million. In passenger configuration, the double-decker giant can take on board about 840 people. It is clear that a private buyer does not need so many cramped seats - naturally, the aircraft will undergo a complete refurbishment. And there is no doubt that tuning the A380 will become a unique project in the aviation business. According to some reports, the alteration may take about a year and will cost the owner a pretty penny. Surely the owner of the future heavenly palace will not waste time on trifles and will order a breathtaking design and a lot of additional options. In this case, the cost of an exclusive airliner will almost double, i.e. up to 600 million dollars.
Airbus representatives' announcement of an unprecedented deal has intrigued aviators around the world. It’s hard to even imagine what will appear in the giant’s cabin instead of the standard passenger seats. 900 sq. m of area provide ample opportunities to realize any fantasies. It is unlikely that we will ever see the result of the designers’ work: the plane is private. But you can get a rough idea by looking at the A380 VIP model, which was presented at the recent business aviation exhibition in Geneva. According to Airbus designers, the flying palace must have a cinema projection hall in the form of an amphitheater with a capacity of 15-20 seats, as well as a conference room. Jacuzzi at an altitude of several kilometers? Easily! There must be a garage for cars on the lower deck.
The only problem with a superjet is that not every airport is able to accommodate such a colossus. But this is unlikely to upset its owner. Such a powerful aircraft, having lost the weight of 840 passengers and seats, becomes simply a monster. “The flight characteristics of such an airliner will change greatly for the better,” says Rustem Arinov, deputy commercial director of the Moscow Sky company. - The speed will increase, and fuel consumption will sharply decrease. There will be the possibility of almost round-the-world non-stop flights.” “In addition, the A380 is made using space technology using composite materials, without rivets. This significantly reduces air resistance,” said R. Arinov. - Insert K.ru]
The prince will be able to move into his flying residence in two years. But already now the first details are appearing about what modifications the giant aircraft will undergo. The most interesting of them will catch the eye of everyone who sees the prince’s plane. Moreover, in good weather, even from the ground you can guess that Al-Walid bin Talal bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud is flying above your head. The plane will shine in the sun - the prince decided to literally gild his airbus. Coating the aircraft body with precious metal will cost an Arab luxury lover $58 million. For the A 380 itself, the prince paid 300 million. According to experts, remaking it will cost the same amount.
The interior of the flying palace will be no more modest than the exterior. Approximate design options for the interior decoration of the flying palace have already appeared. So far, information has leaked to the press that there will be a swimming pool and a sauna on board the ship. The onboard dining room for the prince will be clad in marble, and the walls of some other rooms will be decorated with huge high-tech panels using fiber optics with landscapes of the Arabian desert. On long flights, bin Talal will not only indulge in hedonism, but also work out in his own gym. Fortunately, the internal usable area of the A380 is enough to accommodate more than one volleyball court, for example.
To get a rough idea of the size of the A380, it is worth knowing that in its basic version this aircraft can carry 840 passengers! Its height is 24 meters, length - 73 meters, wingspan - 79.4 meters. The only disadvantage of this size is that the A380 is not capable of accepting any airport. But the prince is unlikely to be upset by this circumstance. After all, his fleet already has a plane, and probably more than one. […]
In mid-April 2004, one of the brightest and most powerful players, an Arab field commander, left the political scene in Chechnya. A significant part of his life passed in the shadow of another famous Arab commander -. And even now, more than two years after the “Black Arab” left for another world, the identity of his deputy, as well as the circumstances of his death, are still shrouded in mystery. We can lift the veil of this mystery only to a small extent, because any information about this character is unlikely to be complete and reliable.
Abu al-Walid's real name is Abd al-Aziz al-Ghamidi. He was born in 1967 in the Saudi Arabian province of Baljurashi in the family of a real estate, wood and paint merchant, Saeed bin Ali al-Ghamidi. Since Abd al-Aziz was the second of the eleven sons of Said ben Ali, he did not have to count on any significant part of his father’s inheritance. Perhaps that is why he chose the turbulent life of an ideological mercenary, fighting equally for money and for religious beliefs.
Abd al-Aziz’s family background also contributed to this. The fact is that al-Ghamidi is an old Saudi surname, descended from the Hamid tribe and always distinguished by significant religious zeal. Individual members of this family managed to achieve high positions in the Saudi hierarchy. Thus, until recently, the Saudi consul in Moscow was Abdullah al-Ghamidi. However, Abd al-Aziz, the son of a merchant, hardly hoped to become consul and from the very beginning could only rely on his own energy. Two other “scions of a noble family”, Ahmad Ibrahim al-Khaznawi al-Ghamidi and Said al-Ghamidi, who on September 11, 2001, together with two other terrorists, hijacked a Boeing 757 that crashed in Pennsylvania, also counted on the same thing. it is now believed to be a result of the struggle between passengers and air pirates.
In general, Abu al-Walid’s family ties are quite complicated. On the one hand, his parents' family is alive and well in Saudi Arabia. In Chechnya, Abu al-Walid married a Chechen woman, who bore him two sons - Omar and Saleh. On the other hand, for some reason there are persistent rumors among Chechen militants that Abu al-Walid was a cousin of the Jordanian Khattab. But, one way or another, al-Walid really spent most of his combat biography as a kind of “younger brother” of the “Black Arab,” working for him “in the wings” and considering himself his viceroy.
Young Abu al-Walid took his first steps as a fighter in Afghanistan, fighting there with Khattab against the Soviet army. Later, after the establishment of the Taliban regime, he visited Afghanistan several times, took additional training courses there and was considered one of the first-class explosives specialists.
After Afghanistan, Abu al-Walid was seen in Yugoslavia, where he fought on the side of the Bosnian Muslims. His participation in the first Chechen campaign is questionable: at that time he was learning the intricacies of mine explosives in a camp near the Afghan Taliban. His first reliable appearance in Chechnya can be dated back to 1997: he made his way to the territory of the rebel republic from Afghanistan through Tajikistan. Moreover, he almost immediately became Khattab’s confidant and his right-hand man, being responsible for issues of supplies and salaries for the militants. True, at first he held relatively modest positions in the gangster hierarchy: for example, according to documents captured in Grozny in February 2000, Abu al-Walid was listed with the rank of lieutenant colonel and deputy commander of the battalion of the Islamic Khattab Regiment, which consisted mainly of Arab veterans. mercenaries.
During the existence of Maskhadov’s “Ichkeria,” the republic was in the field of Osama bin Laden’s closest attention. He had high hopes for independent Chechnya, intending to turn it into a springboard for the forces of international terrorism, from which it would be convenient to launch an attack on Dagestan with the goal of turning the Caucasus into a “Wahhabi fortress” and one of the strongholds of the future “caliphate.” Of all those of Chechen origin, probably only the one killed on February 28 of this year could boast of personal contacts with terrorist No. 1. However, the main vertical of power in Wahhabi Chechnya was built exclusively from Arabs.
Four Arab “international” terrorists were responsible for Chechnya before Osama bin Laden: Khattab, Abu Jafar, Abu Umar and Abu al-Walid. The first three, as is known, were liquidated during the second Chechen campaign. And only now the Chechen militants have lost al-Walid, for whose liquidation the Russian authorities once announced a reward of 100 thousand dollars.
Together with Khattab, Abu al-Walid took an active part in the attack on Dagestan, hoping to turn this republic, like Chechnya, into a “Sharia state.” But this time the militants’ affairs were not nearly as successful as in the first Chechen war. And when they were forced back into Chechnya and the second Chechen campaign began, things went really badly for the Arab mercenaries.
Al-Walid's luck also ran out. In March 2000, a group led by Achimez Gochiyaev, trained by al-Walid to carry out terrorist attacks in Russia, failed and was neutralized. Of all the gang members, only Gochiyaev himself managed to escape. And in the same month, al-Walid’s relative Yaqub al-Ghamidi was killed.
Before Khattab had at his disposal about a thousand experienced Arab fighters, many of whom began to fight with him in Afghanistan and Bosnia. Using the cover of the Chechens and Dagestani Wahhabis, Khattab was able to retain most of his forces and withdraw them to Chechnya. In the fall of 1999, difficult times came for them. Despite the fact that they could still count on the support of the population, especially in the southern regions of Chechnya, among the masses of ordinary Chechens there was growing rejection of the order that Khattab, Abu al-Walid and other Arab field commanders brought with them.
However, Khattab still had two main trump cards in his hands - firstly, his “Islamic Regiment”, and secondly (and more importantly), control over the funds coming to Chechnya on behalf of various extremist and terrorist organizations, primarily from "Muslim Brotherhood".
Along with the first defeats, discord began among Chechen and Arab commanders over the distribution of these funds. The Chechens (and some foreign “sponsors”) reasonably accused the Arabs of misappropriating a considerable part of the material assistance. Gradually, the financial flow to Chechnya began to dry up - most of the funds, as an investigation by the Muslim Brotherhood showed, was stolen by Khattab and his inner circle, like Abu Umar or Abu Sayyah. During the war, Khattab, in collusion with some functionaries of the Muslim Brotherhood, was able to appropriate several tens of millions of dollars.
Abu al-Walid, although Khattab's right-hand man, was not directly and openly involved in this theft. Therefore, he was tipped for the post of plenipotentiary representative of the Muslim Brotherhood in Chechnya, that is, in Khattab’s place. The latter, of course, could not stand and watch as he was being brushed aside from big money and from sole power over the militants.
Of all the commanders, Khattab truly trusted very few. He has always been his confidant, but this can be explained more by the coincidence of interests of the two leaders than by sincere trust between them. At the same time, Khattab always positioned Basayev as the formal head of the militants, preferring to be a “gray eminence” himself and rule from behind Basayev’s back. For example, as soon as in 2001, commander Ramzan Akhmadov began to emerge as the leader of the Wahhabis based on his “combat merits,” Khattab immediately ordered his elimination, which was carried out by the Arab Yakub from Akhmadov’s detachment.
It can now be considered proven that in the fall of 2001, “a black cat ran between two Arab commanders.” Abu al-Walid, as the “chief quartermaster,” began an investigation into the disappearance of money intended for the militants, and, without receiving direct evidence, nevertheless came to the conclusion that Khattab was behind it. Since the “public opinion” of the militants was on the side of al-Walid, who presented himself as something of a selfless fighter for the faith, Khattab found himself in a dangerous position. But he began to think about the possibility of leaving Chechnya long before that.
During the summer and autumn of 2001, Khattab was able to eliminate almost all of his associates involved in his machinations. Moreover, this was done most often by the hands of the Russian military, since Khattab sent these field commanders on difficult and dangerous missions. This is how Abu Darr, Abu Umar and Abu Yaqub were destroyed, and later Abu Sayyah.
Meanwhile, behind Khattab's back, Abu al-Walid began to weave a conspiracy to remove his boss. He was able to directly contact Muslim Brotherhood officials such as Abu Rabia, and began to try to control the distribution of funds himself. Khattab, of course, could not forgive this.
Back in September 2001, he brought charges against Abu al-Walid that the latter was plotting something against him - and threatened to kill him. During the winter of 2001-2002, Khattab developed an operation to destroy his deputy. To this end, Abu al-Walid was put in charge of the danger zone south of Grozny.
Abu al-Walid understood perfectly well what kind of action his boss was preparing, and decided to take the lead. First of all, he prepared a “back-up option” - Abu Rabia, who was in Tbilisi, prepared documents, civilian clothes and a route to Georgia for him. Having secured a possible escape route, Abu al-Walid began to act.
To begin with, he enlisted the support of responsible persons from the Muslim Brotherhood group named Shagran and Abu Qutayba. Abu al-Walid was able to convince them that Khattab and no one else was to blame for the decline in terrorist activity, since he was embezzling money, preventing the recruitment of new militants, the purchase of weapons, explosives, ammunition and equipment.
Death was getting closer and closer to Khattab. In January 2002, the last (after Abu Yaqub and Abu Sayyah) financier of Khattab, Oybek Rasimov, nicknamed “Uzbek,” was killed. With his death, Khattab lost his last close commander, whom he could completely trust.
But Abu al-Walid could not “overthrow” Khattab as long as he had influential defenders in the Muslim Brotherhood organization. One of these people was a certain Abu Jaber, who all the time tried to embellish Khattab’s achievements and attributed to his sponsors clearly inflated military results. An example of such activity is the bandit operation in Argun in December 2001, carried out by people from the so-called “Argun jamaat” led by Ismail Eskiev. The latter, before the start of the operation, tried to get money through Abu al-Walid, who clearly set him against Khattab, wanting to provoke a serious “showdown” with the latter. However, Eskiev died in battle, and Abu Jaber was able to attribute all the results to Khattab.
Convinced of the impossibility of removing Khattab through the sheikhs of the Muslim Brotherhood organization, Abu al-Walid decided to eliminate Khattab physically, which he managed to do at the end of February. True, after this even such supporters as Abu Qutayba turned away from Abu al-Walid. But the position of Khattab's deputy ultimately ensured that al-Walid took his place after the death of the Black Arab.
Balancing on the contradictions between field commanders and their foreign patrons, Abu al-Walid al-Ghamidi was able to acquire the same dominant position in the distribution of financial flows as Khattab, who was killed with his help, occupied. Thus, for just one terrorist attack in the Moscow metro on February 6, 2004, Abu al-Walid received four and a half million dollars, most of which he appropriated for himself.
However, in the two years since Khattab’s death, the situation in Chechnya has become much less favorable for the militants, and much less money has been received for terrorist acts, and it has become increasingly difficult to carry them out. Therefore, Abu al-Walid, according to many experts, was planning, like Khattab, to leave Chechnya and move to other regions of the world, where he could still make good money by waging a terrorist war.
The subsequent missile and bomb attack on the mountain base where al-Walid was located on April 16, 2004, put an end to his presence in Chechnya. And it doesn’t matter whether he was killed (as most likely happened) or faked his own death in order to leave Chechnya. The important thing is that this was the last major representative of Khattab’s Arab “old guard” to act in connection with international terrorists and receive money from them. Those who now remain in Chechnya are mostly privates and non-commissioned officers of the terrorist army. They still have the strength to make daring attacks, but it is unlikely that sufficient authority will ever appear to force serious international terrorists to respect themselves the way Emir Khattab and his “younger brother” Abu al-Walid al-Ghamidi did.