The first Russian machine gun. Large-caliber machine guns of Russia and the world
The situation with machine guns in the Russian army during WWI:
As already noted, Russia did not draw the proper conclusions from the defeats during the Russo-Japanese War. This, alas, refers to the tactics of using machine guns in battle, and the saturation of troops with machine guns.
In 1914, in each infantry regiment we had one machine gun team (8 Maxim heavy machine guns). The crew of each machine gun is 5 people. This is all.
The regiment had 14-16 companies of more than 200 soldiers each. There was 1 machine gun for 2 companies...
The First World War quickly showed that this was catastrophically insufficient.
In other armies, the saturation of troops with machine guns was little better, but the powerful industry of Germany, France and England quickly coped with the machine gun “shortage”.
The stunted defense industry of Tsarist Russia could not quickly organize the production of the number of machine guns required by the army.
General Manikovsky wrote: “... the machine gun department of the Tula plant was designed to produce 700 machine guns per year, everything seemed quite prosperous, especially since two years before the war, an order for a lightweight type was literally snatched from the Tula plant and transferred to Vickers in England machine gun developed by this and this last one just before the war, at the beginning of 1914 was forced to produce an average of only 48 machine guns per month, i.e. The top officials were obviously not interested in the capacity of this department of the Tula plant.”
As we see, the “effective managers” of the tsarist era, on the eve of the war (!!!), managed to transfer the order for the production of Maxims from their native Tula plant to England. This not only undermined the production capacity of their plant, but also led to the departure of skilled workers from it. But it must be said that the production of Maxims was VERY complex and required highly qualified specialists. Suffice it to say that a number of its parts required manual (!!!) grinding and adjustment. The loss of such specialists was very painful for the plant.
As in the case of rifles, we had to urgently (and at great expense, of course) place orders for the production of machine guns abroad:
“...thanks to the assistance of the British War Office, by the end of 1916, through the Kitchener Committee, it was possible to place orders for the following number of machine guns and submachine guns, with deadlines no later than 1916.
In America, ordered and received before 1/I-I9I7.
Colt company received 2.850 before 1/I-I9I7 -
To the Marlin plant (for Colt machine guns) 12,000 9,437
To the Sauvage plant (for Lewis machine guns) 10,000 9,437
Birminol plant (for Lewis machine guns) 1,000 9,437
In England ordered received
VICKERS company, together with Colt and Pratti Vitkey (for Maxim machine guns, chambered for 3-line cartridge) 10,000 128
Hotchkiss submachine guns 500 540
In France there are 4,800,500 Shosha submachine guns
And the total ordered is 41,150;
before 1917 received - 10,565 pieces
Then during 1917 (until October 1) the following was also received:
From America Maxim 900 machine guns
Colt machine guns 13.871
Lewis submachine guns 9.600
From England Lewis submachine guns 1.862
Shosha 5.600 submachine guns from France
Total: 31,833
A total of 42,398 received.”
As you can see, the Russian army received the bulk of machine guns from abroad in 1916-1917, when it was gradually decomposing and rapidly losing its combat effectiveness.
Please note that we had to urgently order from abroad in huge quantities light (“light”) machine guns (such as “Lewis”, “Hotchkiss”, “Shosh”), which the tsarist industry did not produce at all.
But also A.N. Kuropatkin, analyzing the results of the Russian-Japanese War, warned about the importance of saturating troops with machine guns:
“At the beginning of the war, our army had a small number of machine guns. Meanwhile, the Japanese, having appreciated the full power of the machine gun, quickly introduced it into their army and widely supplied the troops. Our army did the same. Already in the summer of 1904, machine gun companies and teams began to arrive in the army in significant numbers. The machine gun system did not satisfy the tactical requirements: 1) lightness and 2) ease of application to the terrain.
It is necessary to develop a type of machine gun that would be carried by hand even in the front line.
Our machine guns, tall, bulky, with shields, were more like lightweight cannons.
The inconsistency of the design and the difficulty of applying it to the terrain created the opinion that machine guns in positions should be combined into machine gun batteries and located as covered as artillery. This opinion is extremely erroneous.
The enormous firepower of machine guns requires their placement in combat areas at the most important points or in small groups in assault columns. In order to use their strength, if necessary, at all distances, machine guns should accompany the forward chains during an attack, and during defense they should be located in the combat unit. The existing organization of machine gun companies, which grouped machine guns into large formations, did not satisfy the above tactical requirements.
Machine guns should be assigned to regiments at a rate of 4 machine guns per battalion.”
The war revealed the need to have light (light) machine guns in the troops, which could be freely carried during the battle directly in the chains of the attackers, or moved along communication lines in the trenches.
There was only one such type of machine gun in the world at that time: the Madsen light machine gun. It was developed by the Danish Major Madsen (future general and minister of war of Denmark).
Russia then purchased 450 of these light machine guns.
At that time it was a very formidable weapon. Its light weight (9 kg), decent rate of fire, and mobility made it possible to use it with a crew of 2 people (and not 5, as was the Maxim crew), both in the offensive and in defense.
The horse-mounted machine-gun teams were also armed with the Madsen machine guns we purchased.
However, the lack of skills in its maintenance and combat tactics did not allow our troops to use the capabilities of these weapons to the fullest.
An opinion arose about its low reliability and uselessness in battle.
The Russian army did not make any more purchases of light machine guns until the First World War...
Caution from A.N. Kuropatkin and the lessons of fighting on the hills of Manchuria were ignored by our commanders. ..
Need forced us to remember about the “bad” Madsen: In 1915, still suitable machine guns were sent to the front through the Petrograd warehouse. 1902. Some of them were modernized at the Sestroretsk Arms Factory before being sent. In October 1915, the Danish Arms Company approached the Russian military department with a proposal to supply Madsen machine guns. Denmark agreed to supply the Russian Empire with 7,500 Madsen system machine guns modernized for the 7-mm Mauser cartridge; 2,500 weapons were delivered to Russia immediately upon conclusion of the contract and 1,000 each month.
But if our commanders had listened to the advice of A.N. Kuropatkin, then they could purchase them not at exorbitant prices, and not in the heat of battle of the World War, but in advance, in peacetime, having time to train machine gunners and develop tactical techniques for the combat use of light machine guns.
But... “there is no prophet in his own country” and “we are all strong in hindsight.”
.
And this is the final picture of the supply of machine guns to the Russian army:
“...in January 1917, the picture of supplying the army with machine guns was presented as follows:
Number of machine guns available at the front and in warehouses:
I. Heavy, Russian billet 10.831
Colt, American blank 1.584
Maxima (German under Russian cartridge) 390
Maxima, chambered for German cartridge 81
Schwarzlose, chambered for the Austrian cartridge 1.145
And that on the European front 14,031
On the Caucasian front 1,200
Total 15,231
2. Submachine guns:
Madsena 355
Hotchkiss 450
Lewis 500
Total 1.405
3.Aviation
Lewis 338
Vickers 600
Total 938
And in total by January 1, 1917 17,574
The given figures were reported at the conference by the Field Inspector General of Artillery, Grand Duke Sergei Mikhailovich.”
General Manikovsky’s response to the “private initiatives” of Russian entrepreneurs to assist the country in the production of machine guns is also interesting.
The experience showed an EXTREMELY negative result. There were a lot of promises from “Russian entrepreneurs” in this regard, they asked for an incredible amount of government money, and the result was zero:
“...despite the completely negative attitude of the G.A. Directorate, acquired through knowledge and experience, to any proposals to create a new private machine gun production, this Directorate “was nevertheless asked to subject to detailed discussion four proposals for the construction of a machine gun factory in Russia: one - from famous Kyiv millionaire M.I. Tereshchenko.
I. M.I. Tereshchenko proposed to produce 10,000 Maxim machine guns in three years at a price of 2,700 rubles each, subject to “providing him with advances, transportation, currency, technical assistance, the required number of barrels, etc.
(the cost of a machine gun with two spare barrels at the Tula plant was -1,370 rubles).”
Other proposals of the Russian bourgeoisie were even worse...
“Summarizing the general results of supplying our army with machine guns during the great war of 1914-1918, we see:
total abroad: ordered, received, sent:
In America 50,952 34,252 33,794
In England 3,240 3,240 2,436
In France 10.400 6.100 6.100
And that 64.592 43.592 42.330
Adding this to the rest, we get the following total. 1914 1915 1916 1917 Total
Members of the army at the beginning of the war: 4,152 - - - 4,152
Procured in Russia 833 4,251 11,072 11,320 27,477
Procured abroad - 1,060 9,430 31,840 42,330
Captured - - - - 2,000
Total 4,935 5,311 20,502 43,160 73,959
We saw above that by January 1, 1917, the number of machine guns in the army increased by 4.5 times compared to the one with which we entered the war.
- By October 1, 1917, it had already reached a figure of more than 50,000, i.e. increased approximately 12 times.
In total, all receipts of machine guns were: 1. Condition at the beginning of the war about 5%
2. Procured by the Tula plant about 36%
3. Procured abroad about 57%
4. Captured from the enemy about 2%"
In the next chapter we will talk about the situation with cartridges in the Russian army during WWII.
In the photo: machine gunners of the Russian brigade in France. Hotchkiss machine guns, number 2 in the photo is the future Minister of Defense of the USSR and Marshal of the Soviet Union Rodion Malinovsky.
Most likely the summer of 1917.
There is no longer any discipline in our brigade, the soldiers have their hands in their pockets, etc.
MACHINE GUN, a small automatic weapon, installed when firing on a specially designed support for it and designed to hit various ground, surface and air targets with bullets.
The automatic operation of most modern machine guns is based on the use of recoil of the barrel during its short stroke or on the principle of removal of powder gases through a hole in the barrel wall. The machine gun is fed with cartridges from a belt or magazine. Firing from a machine gun can be carried out in short (up to 10 shots), long (up to 30 shots) bursts, continuously, and for some machine guns - also with single fire or a burst of a fixed length. The barrel is usually cooled by air. For targeted shooting, the machine gun is equipped with sights (mechanical, optical, night). The machine gun crew consists of one, two or more people.
There are machine guns of small (up to 6.5 mm), normal (from 6.5 to 9 mm) and large (from 9 to 14.5 mm) caliber. Depending on the design and combat purpose, machine guns are divided into hand-held (on a bipod), mounted (on a tripod, less often on a wheeled machine), large-caliber infantry, anti-aircraft, tank, armored personnel carrier, casemate, ship, and aviation. In a number of countries, in order to unify the machine gun chambered for a rifle cartridge, the so-called. single machine guns that allow firing both from a bipod (light machine gun) and from a machine gun (machine gun).
A machine gun, as a rule, consists of the following main parts and mechanisms: barrel, receiver (box), bolt, trigger mechanism, return spring (return mechanism), sight, magazine (receiver). Light and single machine guns are usually equipped with butts for better stability when firing. Thanks to the use of a massive barrel, easel and single machine guns provide a high practical rate of fire (up to 250-300 rounds/min) and allow intense shooting without changing the barrel up to 500, and large-caliber ones - up to 150 shots. When overheating, the barrels are replaced. Light machine guns are in service with motorized rifle (infantry, motorized infantry) squads, and single ones - with platoons and companies (in some armies and squads). Large-caliber infantry machine guns mounted on wheeled or tripod mounted machines are used in these units to combat lightly armored ground targets. Infantry machine guns are usually used as anti-aircraft, tank, armored personnel carrier, casemate and ship-mounted ones, somewhat modified taking into account the peculiarities of their installation and operation at sites.
Depending on the rate of fire, machine guns come in normal (up to 600-800 rounds per minute) and high (up to 3 thousand rounds per minute or more) rates. Machine guns with a normal rate of fire are conventional single-barrel with one chamber. High-speed machine guns can be single-barrel with a rotating chamber block (drum) or multi-barrel with a rotating barrel block. High-speed machine guns are used to fire at fast-flying air targets from ground and aircraft. installations, as well as against ground targets from aircraft. (helicopter) installations. The effective range of modern machine guns is usually 1-2 km.
The first machine gun was invented by the American H. S. Maxim (1883) and first used in the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902. It was also used in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. At the beginning of the 20th century. light machine guns were developed (Danish - Madsen, 1902, French - Shogpa, 1907, etc.). Heavy and light machine guns were widely used in the 1st World War in all armies. During the war, machine guns began to be used on tanks and aircraft. In 1918, a large-caliber machine gun appeared in the German army (13.35 mm), then in the French (13.2 mm Hotchkiss), British (12.7 mm Vickers), American (12.7 mm Browning), etc. armies. The Soviet Army adopted the 7.62-mm light machine gun of V. A. Degtyarev (DP, 1927), 7.62-mm aviation. machine gun of B. G. Shpitalny and I. A. Komaritsky (ShKAS, 1932), 12.7-mm heavy machine gun of Degtyarev and G. S. Shpagin (DShK, 1938). During World War II, machine guns continued to be improved. The Soviet Army developed a 7.62 mm heavy machine gun by P. M. Goryunov (SG-43), a 14.5 mm heavy machine gun by S. V. Vladimirov (KPV) and a 12.7 mm aircraft gun. universal machine gun M. E. Berezin (UB).
After the war, new machine guns with higher characteristics entered service with the armies:
Soviet light and single machine guns designed by Degtyarev and M. T. Kalashnikov;
American hand-held M14E2 and Mk23, single M60, large-caliber M85;
English single L7A2; West German single MG-3.
Soviet military encyclopedia
I. G. Yesayan
At the beginning of the 20th century, despite the achievements of the colonial wars (Transvaal, Sudan, Hong Kong), on the European continent machine guns were initially introduced into the arsenal of fortresses, on fortress carriages, as stationary weapons. A war participant who served in the Kovno fortress characterizes the fortress machine gun as follows: “We had Maxima machine guns, and their carriages were such that I have never seen such machine guns anywhere else, either before or after. The wheels were about a meter high, the same huge shield, they were attached to the carriage on a bracket. The correct part had a pivot foot more than a meter long; they fit very well behind the shell box. That’s how they were transported; you couldn’t drag them onto a cart.” Before the Russo-Japanese War, machine guns were perceived not as a means of supporting infantry, but as a type of regimental artillery. Machine gun teams and companies were still organized like artillery units.
In the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. The machine gun asserts its position as the most powerful infantry weapon, which resulted in both an increase in the number of machine guns in the opposing armies during the war itself, and a sharp saturation of the armies of all countries of the world with them immediately after its end. Participants in the war unanimously testified that the presence in the Japanese army of a large number of machine guns (compared to the Russians) was one of the reasons for the defeats of Russian troops in tactical battles.
Letters from the front noted that machine guns strengthened the defenses of Japanese troops and also successfully supported enemy attacks. As for the quantity, during the final battle of the Russo-Japanese War - the Mukden operation - the Japanese had more than 200 machine guns, while the Russians had only 56. Quartermaster General of the 3rd Manchurian Army M.V. Alekseev, in a letter dated April 16-17, 1905, about the results of the Mukden battle, indicated: “We do not have machine guns, the Japanese did not have them at the beginning of the campaign either. Now we have almost none either; the Japanese have their own company of machine guns of 8-10 [units] in each regiment. This formidable weapon at times sweeps away our attacking infantry.” Only towards the end of the war did the Russian Manchurian armies receive a sufficient number of machine guns.
Despite the valuable experience and proven importance of machine guns, the great European powers were in no hurry to saturate their ground armies with more of this type of weapon, although work on its improvement continued: “after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. machine guns are significantly lighter in weight, but do not receive numerical development in the army, to a certain extent due to the unnecessary high cost of transportation for them: each machine gun required two expensive gigs, valuable ammunition and seven horses.”
An active promoter of new weapons in the Russian guard was the commander of the 24th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, P.A., who distinguished himself in Manchuria. Lechitsky. The future outstanding commander-9 of the First World War, awarded the Order of St. George IV degree and the Golden Arms for the Japanese War, in 1906-1908. commanded the 1st Guards Infantry Division. An officer who served under his command recalled: “The majority already understood that this was the weapon of the future, although the young machine gunners were even more interested in gigs, horses and any other semblance of artillery. Lechitsky was going to introduce compulsory machine gun training for everyone in the regiment and most non-commissioned officers. Unfortunately, nothing came of this project. We learned machine gun business, each at our own risk, during the war.”
During the interwar period, the approach of various powers to improving the machine gun was determined. At the same time, the Maxim system machine gun remained a priority. It was in service with Russia, Germany and Great Britain; the Austrian system of Mannlicher and the French system of Hotchkiss were inferior to the invention of the American. Improvement followed the path of making the machine gun lighter and increasing its rate of fire, since after 1905 it was clearly realized that the machine gun was the most powerful infantry weapon. In Germany, the body of the machine gun was placed on a kind of lightweight sled, which made it possible to move the weapon on the battlefield and, above all, in the trench, since the machine gun was superior to an infantry rifle platoon in terms of defensive capability. In Russia, which adopted an active offensive doctrine, they decided to put the machine gun on wheels.
In 1910, Colonel A.A. Sokolov designed a low wheeled machine gun for the machine gun. On a campaign it could be carried in a gig, and in the cavalry - on a pack. In battle, it could be freely moved by one machine gunner. The weight of the machine gun is 66 kg, including the body of the machine gun - 20 kg, the machine - 40 kg, the shield - 8 kg. At the same time, Russian designers managed to achieve a large increase in the machine gun’s rate of fire. Russian 7.62-mm Maxim machine guns fired at a rate of 600 rounds per minute, while the Germans' 7.92-mm machine guns of the same Maxim system fired only 450 rounds per minute. Each machine gun produced in Russia cost the treasury almost a thousand rubles less than a machine gun purchased abroad (2,220 rubles versus 3,100). The total savings reached 4 million rubles. Already in 1910, Russian gunsmiths “provided complete interchangeability of parts, including parts of the lock, which was not the case in English and German-made machine guns. Many “design changes and improvements” were made that were of decisive importance for the light machine gun.”5
The machine guns of the infantry regiments were organizationally united into special machine gun teams. Each team relied on 3 officers - the team leader and 2 junior officers. Before the war, each infantry regiment was armed with 8 machine guns. At the same time, the wish was expressed that the maximum possible number of soldiers in the regiment should be trained in machine gun training. So, after the start of the First World War, on August 4, 1914, the commander of the 72nd D.D. Orlov ordered: “Now prepare 2 or even 3 good gunners for each machine gun”7 (the 72nd division was of secondary importance, that is, it was created during mobilization, and therefore there were no pre-trained machine gun team personnel here). Machine gun crew: chief, gunner, number two, two cartridge carriers, driver. Total - 7 people per machine gun.
For personal weapons, machine gunners received not heavy infantry three-line rifles, but convenient short carbines. The future Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya., who served as a machine gunner, remembered better than anyone else the movement of a machine gun team in battle. Malinovsky: “[the team] consisted of paired machine-gun gigs of the Sokolov system and the same cartridge gigs - these are 16 war chariots, into which, if necessary, carry-over pairs were harnessed. The machine gun gig was harnessed to the riding horses of the platoon non-commissioned officer and the machine gun chief, and the cartridge cart was harnessed to horses numbered seven and eight, also riding horses. The machine gunner, the assistant gunner and the third number sat in the designated places on the machine-gun gig, and the fourth, fifth and sixth numbers on the cartridge gig.
So the machine gun team turned into a mounted unit, acquiring the necessary mobility. Therefore, the machine gunners tried to distinguish themselves from the infantry and behaved somehow differently, proud of their military specialty. And the authorities, realizing that this was the main firepower of the regiment, protected the machine gunners and usually did not send them on the offensive in chains along with the infantry. They were a little behind to support the infantry chains with the fire of their weapons”8 (Fig. 4). The variation in the number of machine guns in the armies of the great powers by July 1914 was very large. Twice superior to the Austro-Hungarians in machine guns, the Russian army was three times inferior to the Germans - even the Russians and French taken together had fewer machine guns than Germany alone. By the beginning of the war, France had about 5 thousand machine guns in its troops, Germany - 12 thousand, Austria-Hungary - a little more than 2 thousand, Russia - about 4.2 thousand. Including: first-line infantry units - 2848 (in 352 machine gun teams), secondary units - 960 (120), cavalry - 256 (32), mobilization reserve - 69, Trans-Amur Border Guard - 24 (6)9.
At the very beginning of the war, it became clear that the enemy outnumbered the Russians in the number of machine guns, and urgent measures were required to correct the situation. However, the increase in troops did not allow the personnel divisions to be equipped with machine guns, since Russian secondary divisions at the beginning of the war had only a few machine guns per division and required replenishment of their equipment. As the Russian military leader recalled, “Measures were taken to increase the number of regimental machine guns. This, on the one hand, was hampered by the need to form new machine gun teams for the continuously formed new infantry regiments, and on the other hand, difficulties in fulfilling orders for the supply of two-wheeled machine guns.”
In the first year of the war, the infantry had neither light machine guns nor battalion or regimental guns. It was necessary to supply the infantry with heavy machine guns, and the offensive battle was supported by artillery strikes, and the machine gun dominated the defense. The Soviet researcher rightly noted: “During the very first battles, it was discovered that the power of small arms and artillery fire is one of the most important conditions for success in battle. The weapon that had a dramatic impact on the course of the battle was the machine gun. The machine gun began to dominate the battlefield, and this circumstance gave the first impetus to the saturation of the infantry with these automatic weapons. The strength of rifle and machine-gun fire, together with the trenches, made the defense stronger than the offensive.”11 Machine-gun fire made it possible to replace a mass of riflemen, which increased the stability of the defense not only of the infantry, but also, importantly, of the cavalry. One of them wrote home that “all the fighting ardor of the reserves disappears at the sight of an enemy machine gun, and only the personnel units keep the reserves from fleeing in front of the machine guns.” The total number of machine guns in the opposing armies of the Eastern Front in 1914 was small. There were about half as many of them as guns. In such a situation, the outcome of the battles was decided, first of all, by artillery fire, and machine guns reinforced the defending infantry.
The course of hostilities, which from the very beginning was marked by unprecedented losses, forced the command to increasingly replace people with technical means of combat. The experience of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, which the leaders of military machines relied on when there was a significant break between operations, turned out to be inapplicable on the fields of European battles. In the same way, the calculations on the power of small arms did not come true. If in 1904 85% of losses were caused by rifle and machine-gun fire, then in 1914 this figure dropped to approximately 40-45%. Trench warfare will further emphasize artillery fire as the leading means of inflicting casualties on enemy personnel (75%). As soon as the professional riflemen trained before the war died in battle, the machine gun began to become increasingly important in defense. By early 1915, “just as new technology and new tools made skill accessible to all, so the machine gun replaced the trained corps of marksmen and put in the hands of one man a weapon equal in its firepower to a platoon or even a company.”
The moral effect of machine gun fire turned out to be so great that, according to the testimony of war participants, one machine gun already replaced a company of infantry. It is clear that the decline in machine gunners, who now bore the brunt of the infantry battle, became great. The command now trained machine gunners not only to make up for losses, but also in reserve, since the rear trained machine gunners for the front only in a separate 1st reserve machine gun regiment, which was located in the capital of the country - Petrograd. The machine gunners being trained were put into machine gun teams, received equipment, and only after that were sent to the front. This approach could not compensate for the demands of the front, although the machine gunners trained in Tsarskoye Selo were better trained than their comrades in the front units.
The production of machine guns in the country did not keep pace with the needs of the front. Machine guns of the Maxim system in Russia were produced only at the Tula Arms Plant, because “machine gun production is even more complex and difficult than rifle production. The maximum accuracy in a machine gun is up to half a thousandth of an inch, while in a rifle it is one thousandth, and some parts of the machine gun lock must be made with the precision of patterns without any tolerance and fit “into grinding in.” Therefore, the production of machine guns could only be entrusted to those factories that were engaged in their manufacture, and there were no such factories in Russia, except for the Tula Arms Plant.” At the same time, light machine guns came from the VickersMaxim company, since after behind-the-scenes intrigues two years before the war, an order for a lightweight type of machine gun was wrested from TOZ and transferred to the English Vickers.
Despite the inflated price (1,750 rubles for a machine gun versus 1,000 rubles in Tula), the British won this tender. In the first half of 1914 alone, the Russian War Ministry handed over 40 million rubles worth of orders to Vickers. On the one hand, these actions were objectively a consequence of the Entente alliance, and on the other, subjective, the usual corruption of the Minister of War V.A. Sukhomlinov and his associates16. Thus, the high degree of manufacturing complexity was the reason that in Russia only TOZ was used for the production of machine guns, although there was a catastrophic shortage of machine guns. Thus, in January-March 1915, TOZ delivered 672 machine guns, converted 26 captured machine guns to Russian cartridges, and repaired another 140 pieces. The troops lacked machine guns, which made it possible to successfully replace losses in machine gunners, but this success was based not on the systematization of training, but on a simple lack of material. For example, the front's need for machine guns in May 1915 was determined by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command at 800 units per month, and TOZ provided only 272 machine guns - almost 3 times less than required.
Before the war, it was believed that troops would lose no more than fifty machine guns per month, and on the basis of the general mobilization task, the General Staff ordered that the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) replenish wartime supplies in the amount of 454 machine guns per year (the Tula Arms Plant could provide 700 units ). But already in May 1915, a standard of 800 machine guns per month was developed, in the fall - 2078 (that is, an increase compared to pre-war assumptions - 36 times). This state of affairs persisted throughout the entire first year of the war, and subsequently Russian machine gun productivity lagged significantly behind that of other great powers, both allied and enemy. Therefore, “due to the circulation of manufactured machine guns in new formations and for armament of armored vehicles, the supply of machine guns to the advanced reserves of armies began only in November 1914 and by January 1, 1915 reached 523.” Total in 1914
The Tula Arms Plant supplied the army with 1,184 machine guns. But this production was still pre-war: until the end of 1914, despite increased requests for machine guns, TOZ was only able to fulfill the pre-war order, producing machine guns that were missing according to mobilization standards - 828 units. In 1915, 4251 were produced (plus 1067 supplied by the Allies), and the increase in production (more than 400 per month) began only in July. According to incomplete data provided by the military department, by the beginning of 1916, the troops received 227 thousand rifles in 1914, and 1321 thousand in 1915, as well as 731 machine guns in 1914 and 5363 machine guns in 1915 ( including 680,170 rifles and 1,067 machine guns from abroad)18. According to the testimony of front-line soldiers, the vital minimum of machine guns for an infantry regiment should be 32 units. However, under the current conditions there was no need to even think about this.
At the end of 1915, the norm was only 8 machine guns per regiment, which was covered by the production of the Tula Arms Plant. A small “surplus” went to the new formations. Assistant Minister of War M.A. Belyaev (at the same time he was the acting head of the Main Directorate of the General Staff) in August 1915 believed that the active army needed 12,039 machine guns. One could only dream about this figure: by November 15, there were 3,177 machine guns in the field armies, with a minimum requirement of 4,426 units. At the same time, the production of machine guns steadily increased from month to month during the difficult days of the war.
In 1916, production increased to almost 1,200 units per month, but still, “the total monthly requirement of the Russian army was determined at 4,430 machine guns - comparable to the number with which they were going to fight the entire war in 1914.” It must be said that this figure was more than three times lower than that of the German side. If in 1914, when the mobilization of industry had not yet taken place, German factories provided the troops with no more than 200 machine guns per month, then from August 1915 this figure increased to 800 units. By August 1916, the Germans were producing 2.3 thousand machine guns per month, and at the beginning of 1917 - 7 thousand.
At the beginning of the war, the Germans had 1,578 machine guns, and by January 1, 1917 - about 18 thousand. After the adoption of the Hindenburg Program, the productivity of weapons in Germany increased by 1.5-2 times or more. The peak of machine gun production was August 1918 - 11,350 pieces. In total, more than 27 thousand machine guns were produced in Russia during the war (10 times more in Germany), of which about 15 thousand were lost in battle. You can see how much the production of weapons has increased compared to the pre-war period.
Production of machine guns at the Tula Arms Factory before the war21: 1906 - 148, 1907 - 525, 1908 - 911, 1909 - 379, 1910 - 700. Then light machine guns began to be produced according to the method of Colonel A.A. Sokolov: 1911 - 596 (including lightweight model 1910 - 160), 1912 - 735 (585), 1913 - 788 (732), total - 4,782 machine guns. In 1912-1913 heavy machine guns were no longer produced. On July 27, 1914, the head of artillery technical institutions ordered TOZ to produce 80 machine guns per month. But already on September 23, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief ordered the production of 180-200 machine guns per month, and 3 million rubles were allocated to expand production.
True, the official number of machine guns in the Russian troops is most likely slightly lower than the real one. Captured machine guns, as a rule, were immediately put into service and did not appear in any reports or reports. A war participant recalls: “In all Headquarters reports about captured trophies, attention is drawn to the small number of machine guns, compared with the number of captured guns.” The reason for this is that the troops took captured machine guns for themselves and “did not show them among the trophies, because captured ones were supposed to be handed over to the high artillery command. Therefore, in reports of trophies, the regiments showed a small number of machine guns - so that the authorities did not suspect that the regiments were hiding machine guns.
This is how the infantry solved the problem of re-equipping it with fire fighting vehicles.”22 A machine gun was shown as captured only if it was taken in a battle for which an officer or group of soldiers could receive a reward. In the conditions of the arms crisis of 1915, when an infantry attack could not always begin with an artillery fire raid and was not supported by artillery fire throughout the entire battle, the machine gun also became an offensive weapon. For example, an order for the 9th Army of the Southwestern Front dated September 15 established: “the fight against a counterattack should be based on an attack on the flank of the counterattack, on barrage artillery fire and machine gun fire...
In all cases, machine guns must follow the lines of the attackers.” The winter of 1915/1916 was the first long respite for the Eastern Front, while the Western Front froze in trench warfare as early as November 1914. During this period, the parties took advantage of the temporary lull to better prepare their armed forces. The Russian “background” of the winter operational pause, for example, was expressed in the victory of the Brusilov breakthrough. In particular, during the Brusilov breakthrough, among the Russian trophies, only according to official data (undoubtedly understated), there were 1,795 Austrian machine guns. This is all the production of Austrian factories from the beginning of the year until the start of the Russian offensive. The Austrians produced fewer machine guns, taking advantage of German support both on the battlefield and in the supply of weapons: machine guns in Austria-Hungary were made only by the plant in Steyr, which only from the second half of 1915 began to produce 320 pieces per month.
As for machine gun units, the massive supply of equipment by industry made it possible to form not a reserve of machine gunners, but entire reserve machine gun teams. The report to the emperor dated November 24, 1915 indicated that the reserve battalions did not have machine guns at all, therefore the Reserve Machine Gun Regiment could not provide personnel, and the peak of orders for machine guns for 1916 should fall in the month of August25. However, the ensuing calm on the Eastern Front made it possible to overcome the negativity. The relative small number of machine guns in the Russian army and the organization of recruitment itself now made it possible to cope with training quite well: by the beginning of 1916, there were only 4,100 machine guns of the Maxim system at the front, and 200 of the Colt system; there were exactly the same number (4300) of three-inch field guns. However, the number of weapons was replenished every day, which, in the absence of active hostilities (an operational pause on the Eastern Front), should have led to the accumulation of the required minimum of weapons.
According to the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief M.V. Alekseev at a meeting on February 24, 1916 at Headquarters, by this time the army had 6 thousand machine guns, not counting the 1375 units that the factories were supposed to produce by April. With the help of allied supplies and the expansion of our own production, the crisis in machine gun armament was largely overcome by May 1916. On September 6, by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, it was ordered that 2 machine guns per company or 32 per regiment be considered the norm - 4 times more than the assumptions of 1910, according to the mobilization decisions of which the Russian army was deployed in August 1914. With all that, the optimal number of machine guns, so to speak, the smallest limit for assessing the outcome of battles, is 12 machine guns per battalion27. For Russian 4-battalion regiments, therefore - 48 machine guns per regiment.
That is, only by the beginning of the Brusilov breakthrough the “starvation ration” in relation to machine guns was relatively overcome, but the Russian army never “reached” the maximum in life - with the exception of those units that were armed with captured, mainly Austrian, machine guns. At the same time, the French battalion was armed with 8 heavy and 24 light machine guns; German battalion - 6 easel and 12 manual. The deployment of offensive combat operations in 1916 and a sharp increase in the number of machine guns prompted the command to think about some changes in the system of education of machine gun teams. By order signed by Alekseev dated October 23, each regiment was to have two 12-machine-gun teams of Maxim machine guns and one 8-machine-gun team of Lewis or Colt light machine guns. By order of December 2, one of Maxim's teams was to be a pack team, the other - a wagon team. Finally, in February 1917, in each company, one department began to be trained in machine gun operation in order to be able to timely replace machine gun servants who were out of action.
By January 1, 1918, the infantry was supposed to have 2 machine guns per company (before the war, per battalion). This is 21,760 machine guns for 616 infantry and 226 cavalry regiments. There are another 750 machine guns in spare parts. Plus 50% stock. Total - 33,365 units of heavy machine guns alone, although there was a catastrophic shortage of light machine guns. The 1917 campaign was intended by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Emperor Nicholas II, to be decisive. Already at the end of 1916, the highest headquarters, offering to take advantage of the lull at the front, ordered all ranks to prepare for the upcoming campaign, which should be decisive and victorious. As for machine guns, for example, the order for the 7th Army of the Southwestern Front dated December 1, 1916 prescribed: “A soldier must know his weapon, its properties and use both during the offensive and during the defense perfectly.
At the same time, every fighter must be able to conduct trench warfare and be well aware of the use of gas masks. The lower ranks should be trained not only as ordinary soldiers, but also as personnel managers and chiefs when staffing units with future replacements. Now let’s start preparing a reserve of specialists: machine gunners, bomb throwers, communications officers, etc.”29. Only on the eve of the revolution did the generals finally deign to pay attention to the fact that the loss in machine gunners was being made up by specially trained people from machine gun teams, while up to half of the infantrymen were trained in machine gun training by the Germans. The Russian command saw with blatant amazement that this “excludes the possibility of inactivity of machine guns due to loss of personnel.” And only on February 3, order No. 186, signed by... O. Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief V.I. Gurko about the need for training on machine guns (including captured ones) for at least one squad per company.
However, there were also objective reasons for this delay: firstly, the relatively small number of machine guns in general (by the beginning of 1917 - only twice as many as the number of artillery pieces); secondly, the almost absolute predominance in the Russian army of heavy machine guns rather than light machine guns. If a light machine gun requires one trained fighter, then an easel machine requires a team, not an individual. Thus, the instructions issued in the 9th Army before preparing the June offensive of 1917, in particular, said: “Every soldier must firmly know that, having captured the first line [of enemy defense], he must definitely move forward to the next advantageous line , lie down and open fire [on the second line]…
The machine gun is an attack element and the most terrible melee weapon. The machine gun should move forward as far as possible - behind the stopped chain... only in front does it allow the infantry to move forward under cover of fire..."31. The evolution of cartridge weapons during the First World War underwent dramatic changes unimaginable before August 1, 1914. By 1917, the Allies completely curtailed the production of heavy machine guns, transferring their troops to light machine guns as the best means of close infantry combat. In France, the army still had 13 thousand heavy machine guns, but there were already more than 90 thousand light machine guns. Great Britain switched its machine gun industry to the production of heavy light machine guns of the Lewis system. And this was at a time when in Russia there were only about 25 thousand machine guns, of which light machine guns constituted a clear minority. But machine-gun teams required a mass of horses, and, accordingly, fodder, gigs, and other elements necessary for horse-drawn transport. At the inter-allied Petrograd conference in February 1917, V.I. Gurko asked the Allies for 110 thousand light machine guns for 1917. The order for machine guns was based on the calculation of 128 pieces for an infantry regiment and 36 for a cavalry regiment.
In reality, about 17.5 thousand arrived, and even then mainly from American factories. True, the supply of weapons from abroad continued even after the February Revolution. Moreover, due to the general increase in productivity and the satisfaction of its own needs, in 1917 the Russian army received more weapons and military equipment than in the previous period, although the Allies at the same time reduced the expected supplies of raw materials and equipment. For 1915-1916 41,150 machine guns were ordered abroad, 10,565 were received (including 9,437 from the USA from the Marlin and Sauvage factories and 663 from the UK). In 1917, 31,833 machine guns were received (Maxim heavy machine gun - USA - 900, Colt heavy machine gun - USA - 13,871, Lewis heavy machine gun - USA - 9600, Lewis light machine gun - Great Britain - 1862, Shosha light machine gun - France - 5600 ). Total - 42,398. In total, the Russian Empire received only 8,630 machine guns from the allies, and about 33 thousand from the USA, of which light machine guns made up less than a third. Own production amounted to 27,571 machine guns of the Maxim system. Ultimately, in percentage terms, Russian machine guns for 1914-1917. represent the following figures: consisted at the beginning of the war - 5%, made at the Tula arms factory - 36%, sent from abroad - 57%, captured - 2%. In 1914, the Russian army was armed with 4,152 machine guns and 7,909 guns. In 1917 - 23,800 machine guns and 9,815 guns. Thus, the number of machine guns increased by more than 5 times, and guns - by a quarter. In 1914, 2 guns accounted for 1 machine gun, and in 1917, on the contrary, 2 guns accounted for 5 machine guns.
By 1917, the Russian infantry division had 72 machine guns, the German - 324 (including 216 manual), the French - 574, the British - 684. This allowed a number of scientists and researchers to believe that the gap between the Russians and Germans in technical terms during the war increased, not decreased. However, Russia did not fight the war alone. And if we calculate the total potential of the Entente allies, then German superiority begins to fade. In addition, in September 1916, it was decided to simultaneously form 605 8-machine-gun Colt teams for the infantry by the spring, in connection with a sharp change in the replenishment of the army with equipment - almost 5 thousand machine guns and 195 teams for the cavalry. This event required 34,485 horses in the state, 57 heads for each unit - or approximately 7 horses for each machine gun.
These teams were formed by the 2nd reserve machine gun regiment in Oranienbaum, combined with the Officer Rifle School. 64 teams were to be formed per month in order to complete the formation of all 605 teams by June 15, 1917. For winter battles in mid-October 1916, the Inspector General of Artillery, Grand Duke Sergei Mikhailovich, ordered the Koltov teams to be equipped with “ski machines and sleighs” through the efforts of the Officers shooting school.
The formation of machine gun teams with machine guns of the Maxim system was still carried out by the 1st reserve machine gun regiment. Each team required a month for its training and equipment, and the 1st Regiment could not cope with the deadlines set for the winter operational pause. Therefore, the 134th (quartered in the city of Petrovsk) and 244th (Buzuluk) infantry reserve regiments stationed in the Kazan Military District were transferred to the staff of the 3rd and 4th machine gun reserve regiments. As for the cavalry, at the beginning of the war the Russian cavalry was armed with submachine guns of the Danish Madsen system.
Back in 1912, these machine guns were removed from cavalry service and sent to fortresses, but the fire weakness of the cavalry, along with the unforeseen scale of the war, prompted the Madsen machine guns to be transferred to the troops again. In addition to the Madsen weapons, the cavalry also had its own machine gun team, modeled on the infantry, and the machine guns were transported in special packs. In 1912, the cavalry division had 12 Maxim system machine guns. During the war - 4 machine guns in each regiment36. In the fall of 1916, the general for assignments under the Supreme Commander-in-Chief B.M. PetrovoSolovo asked for the opinions of senior cavalry commanders on the upcoming cavalry reform, according to which it was planned to form infantry infantry squadrons under cavalry regiments. Among other things - artillery reinforcement, foot squadrons, etc. - the cavalry commanders asked to increase the number of machine guns in the cavalry regiments. So, according to the commander of the Guards Cavalry Corps G. Khan Nakhichevansky, 2 Madsen submachine guns were required per cavalry squadron, and each rifle division in the cavalry division should have 8 machine guns - 2 for each rifle squadron.
After the February Revolution of 1917, the Eastern Front began to gradually fall apart - the country was leaving the war. But even during the June offensive, in a situation where entire corps threw down their weapons and went into their trenches after the first success, the Austro-Hungarian front in Galicia was broken through - 30 thousand prisoners and 120 captured guns - confirmation of how the Russians were prepared army for the 1917 campaign. Question: what would have happened if the disciplined armada of the imperial army had attacked in the spring? One can only guess what the Russian Armed Forces could have done for the further course of the war, if they had weapons equivalent to the enemy in quantity and quality.
Back in the First World War, a fundamentally new and terrible weapon appeared on the battlefield - heavy machine guns. In those years, there was no armor that could protect against them, and the shelters that were traditionally used by infantry (made of earth and wood) were generally penetrated right through by heavy bullets. Even today, heavy machine guns are an excellent means of destroying enemy infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers and helicopters. In principle, they can even shoot down airplanes, but modern combat aircraft are too fast for them.
The main disadvantages of all such weapons are their weight and dimensions. Some models (including the frame) may well weigh more than two hundredweight. Since its crew most often consists of only two or three people, there is no need to talk about any kind of fast maneuvering at all. However, heavy machine guns can still be quite mobile weapons. This was first confirmed during the First World War, when they began to be installed on jeeps and even small trucks.
DShK
In 1930, the famous designer Degtyarev began to develop a fundamentally new machine gun. This is how the history of the legendary DShK began, which is still in service in many countries around the world. The gunsmith decided to design it for the then new B-30 cartridge with a 12.7 mm caliber bullet. The well-known Shpagin created a fundamentally different belt feeding system for the new machine gun. Already at the beginning of 1939, it was adopted by the Red Army.
Shpagin's improvements
As we said, the original version of the weapon was developed in 1930. Three years later, serial production began. Despite many positive features, it had two very serious drawbacks: the rate of fire was only 360 rounds per minute, and the practical rate of fire was even lower, since the original design assumed the use of heavy and inconvenient magazines. Therefore, in 1935, a decision was made to stop the serial production of a machine gun, which did not really correspond to the realities of its time.
To rectify the situation, the legendary Shpagin was involved in the development, who immediately proposed using a drum power circuit with a belt feed of ammunition. By introducing a swinging lever into the weapon system, which converted the energy of the powder gases into rotation of the drum, he obtained a perfectly functioning system. The advantage was that such a rework did not involve any serious and expensive modifications, which was fundamentally important for the young Soviet Republic.
Re-adopting
The machine gun was reintroduced into service in 1938. It is especially good thanks to the multi-purpose machine, with the help of which the DShK turns into a universal weapon: it can easily be used to suppress enemy ground forces (including the destruction of fortifications), destroy helicopters and low-flying aircraft, as well as to immobilize lightly armored vehicles. To destroy airborne objects, the machine unfolds while raising the support bipod.
Because of its highest combat qualities, the DShK enjoyed deserved popularity in almost all branches of the military. At the very end of the war, the machine gun underwent minor modifications. It affected some components of the power mechanism and the bolt assembly. In addition, the method of attaching the barrel was slightly changed.
The latest modification of the machine gun, adopted for service in 1946 (DShKM), uses a slightly different automation principle. Powder gases are removed from the barrel through a special hole. The barrel is non-replaceable; fins (like a radiator) are provided to cool it. To level out strong recoil, various designs are used.
The main difference between the two modifications of the machine gun is in the design of the feed mechanism. Thus, the DShKM uses a slider-type system, while its predecessor uses a drum-type system. However, the Kolesnikov system machine has remained completely unchanged since 1938, since it is not possible to fundamentally change anything about it. The machine gun on this frame weighs 160 kilograms. Of course, this does not have a very good effect on its usability. However, this weapon is most often used as an anti-aircraft weapon, and is also used to combat enemy light armored vehicles, which makes the use of a heavy machine necessary.
Modern use of DShK
During the Great Patriotic War, about nine thousand machine guns of this model were made at USSR factories. However, even after the war, the DShK enjoyed enormous popularity all over the world. Thus, its modification, DShKM, still continues to be produced in Pakistan and China. There is also information about the stocks of these machine guns in the reserve warehouses of the Russian army. Very popular for Russia in conflicts in Africa.
Veterans recall that the burst of this weapon literally cuts down thin trees and pierces right through trunks that are quite large in girth. So against poorly armed infantry (as is common in those parts), this “old man” works excellently. But the main advantage of a machine gun, which is especially in demand in the case of poorly trained troops, is its amazing reliability and ease of operation.
Note
However, some military experts are skeptical about the DShK and even the DShKM. The fact is that these weapons were developed under the realities of the Second World War. At that time, our country practically did not have normal gunpowder, and therefore experts took the path of enlarging the cartridge case. As a result, the ammunition has significant weight and not very high power. So, our cartridge is 12.7x108 mm. NATO uses similar ammunition from Browning... 12.7x99 mm! And this is provided that both cartridges have approximately the same power.
However, this phenomenon also has a positive side. Domestic ammunition of both 12.7 and 14.5 mm caliber is a real treasure trove for modern gunsmiths. There are all the prerequisites for creating more powerful cartridges that will retain their mass-dimensional characteristics.
NSV "Utes"
Back in the 70s, they began to switch en masse to a machine gun designed by Nikitin, Volkov and Sokolov - “Utes”. The weapon, which received the abbreviated name NSV, was put into service back in 1972, but to this day remains the main heavy machine gun of the Russian army.
One of its distinguishing features is its extremely low weight. The NSV heavy machine gun weighs only 41 kilograms together with the machine! This allows the crew to really quickly change their location on the battlefield. If we compare the new machine gun with the same DShKM, its simple, laconic and rational design immediately catches the eye. The flash suppressor on the barrel has a conical shape, by which one can immediately “recognize” the Utes. This weapon is also known for a completely different reason.
"Anti-sniper"
The NSV became famous for the fact that at a distance of one kilometer (!) the radius of spread of bullets does not exceed one and a half meters, which is almost an absolute record for this type of weapon. During both Chechen campaigns, the light machine gun received the respectful nickname "Anti-sniper". In many ways, this specificity of its use is due to the relatively weak recoil, which makes it possible to install almost all modern modifications of powerful sights for this type of weapon on it.
There is also a tank version, which has the abbreviation NSVT. It is installed on tanks starting from the T-64. The flagship of domestic armored vehicles, the T-90, also has it in service. Theoretically, the NSVT on these vehicles is used as an anti-aircraft weapon, but in practice it is used precisely to suppress ground targets. It is theoretically possible to shoot down a modern combat helicopter (not to mention airplanes) with an anti-aircraft machine gun, but Russian missile weapons are much better suited for these purposes.
CORD
KORD stands for “Kovrov Gunsmiths-Degtyarevtsy”. Work on its creation in Kovrov began immediately after the collapse of the USSR. The reason is simple: the production of Utes by that time ended up on the territory of Kazakhstan, which in no way met the strategic interests of the country.
The main designers of the new project were Namidulin, Obidin, Bogdanov and Zhirekhin. The classic NSV was taken as a basis, but the gunsmiths did not limit themselves to its banal modernization. Firstly, the light machine gun finally received a quick-change barrel. Almost an entire research institute labored over its creation, but the result was worth it: it was made using a special technology that ensures the most uniform cooling of the material when firing. Just because of this feature alone, the shooting accuracy and accuracy (compared to the NSV) almost doubled! In addition, KORD became the first machine gun for which there is an “official” version chambered for NATO.
Finally, this weapon is the only one in its class that allows effective fire from a bipod. His weight is 32 kilograms. It's far from fluffy, but two people can carry it away. The target firing range for ground targets is about two kilometers. What other Russian heavy machine guns are there?
KPV, KPVT
And again the brainchild of Kovrov. It is the most powerful representative of the class of heavy machine guns in the whole world. This weapon is unique in its combat power: it combines the power of an anti-tank rifle and a machine gun. After all, the cartridge of the KPV heavy machine gun is “the same”, the legendary 14.5x114! In the recent past, it could be used to knock out almost any combat helicopter or light armored vehicle of a potential enemy.
The talented gunsmith Vladimirov began developing it back in 1943, on his own initiative. The designer took the B-20 aircraft cannon of his own design as a basis. It should be noted that shortly before this she lost to ShVAK at the State tests, but still her design was quite simple and reliable for the purpose set by Vladimirov. Let's digress a little. The gunsmith was fully able to bring his plan to life: his large-caliber machine guns (photos of which are in this article) are now known to every tanker who served on Soviet tanks!
When designing, Vladimirov used a classic design with a short barrel stroke, which had proven itself well in the Maxim. The automatic machine gun allows only automatic fire. In the infantry version, the KPV is used in an easel version, resembling a light cannon. The machine was modernized several times, and during military operations, soldiers often did this on their own, depending on the nature of the battle. Thus, in Afghanistan, all parties to the conflict used a CPV with a homemade optical sight.
In 1950, development of a tank modification of a well-proven weapon began. Soon, Vladimirov’s heavy machine gun began to be installed on almost all tanks produced in the USSR. In this modification, the weapon is seriously modified: there is an electric trigger (27V), there are no sighting devices, instead of which optical tank sights are used at the gunner's and commander's workplace.
In Africa, these Russian heavy machine guns are terribly popular among everyone without exception: they are used by both official troops and entire hordes of motley gangs. Our military advisers recall that the fighters serving as part of the UN troops were very afraid of the CPV, since it easily dealt with all the light armored vehicles that were everywhere in service with Western troops in those parts. Now almost all “light” armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles of a potential enemy are well protected from this heavy machine gun. In any case, the frontal projection is completely “closed” for him.
However, all large-caliber machine guns of Russia (USSR at that time) were extremely popular among the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. It is believed that about 15% of Soviet Mi-24s lost due to combat reasons were shot down with this weapon.
Name |
| Cartridge | Sighting range, meters | Weight, kg (machine gun body) |
NATO heavy machine guns
In countries, the development of these weapons largely followed the same directions that were typical for our country (for example, the calibers of machine guns are almost the same). The soldiers needed a powerful and reliable machine gun that could equally successfully hit both infantry hiding behind parapets and enemy light armored vehicles.
However, there are also fundamental differences between the two weapons schools. Thus, the German Wehrmacht did not have heavy machine guns in service at all. Therefore, NATO mainly uses a single M2NV, which we will talk about now.
М2НВ Browning, USA
The US Army is famous for its preference to quickly replace used weapons with newer and more promising ones. In the case of M2HB, this rule does not work. This "grandfather", designed by the legendary Browning, has been in service since 1919! Of course, the MG-3 machine gun, which is in service with the Bundeswehr and is a modernized copy of the MG-42, “Hitler's saw,” can be compared with its ancient pedigree, but it uses a NATO caliber 7.62x51.
The machine gun entered service in 1923. In 1938 it was modernized by adding an extended barrel. In fact, it still exists in this form. Since then, they have repeatedly tried to write off the “old man”, constantly holding competitions to replace it, but so far there is no adequate alternative to the well-proven weapon.
The history of its development is very interesting. The American army urgently needed a large-caliber machine gun that would ensure reliable defeat of enemy aircraft (the order came from General Pershing, commander of the expeditionary forces). Browning, pressed for deadlines, acted simply and elegantly.
Since the basis of any weapon is the cartridge, and the Yankees did not have an adequate machine-gun caliber in those years, he simply took the 7.62 cartridge of his own design and doubled it. This measure was considered as temporary, but the decision turned out to be amazingly successful: almost all heavy machine guns in the West use this particular ammunition.
By the way, it’s worth making a lyrical digression at this point. You probably noticed that the cartridge used by domestic and Western weapons in this category is almost the same. We have already talked about the reasons for this phenomenon, but we will say a few more words. If you look closely at the comparison tables, you will see a complete absence of 14.5 mm cartridges among NATO heavy machine guns.
This is again explained by the difference in military doctrine: the Yankees assume (not without reason) that the old ammunition developed by Browning copes well with the tasks of this type of weapon. Everything that has a larger caliber, according to the Western classification, already belongs to “small guns”, and therefore is not a machine gun.
HQCB machine gun (Belgium)
Despite the fact that Browning's classic brainchild turned out to be surprisingly successful, not all Western armies were satisfied with its characteristics. The Belgians, who have always been famous for their high-quality weapons, decided to independently modernize the American machine gun. In fact, Herstal initially intended to do something of its own, but due to the need to reduce the cost of the process and maintain continuity with old developments, the specialists were forced to compromise.
However, this in no way affected the improvement of weapons. Belgian gunsmiths equipped it with a heavier barrel with a simplified hot-swappable mechanism. This greatly improved the combat qualities of the weapon. In the early modifications of the “purebred” American “deuce”, at least two people were required to replace the barrel, and the work was extremely dangerous. Quite a few crews of anti-aircraft modifications of the M2NV lost their fingers during it. Naturally, they had little love for this weapon. The anti-aircraft modification was largely for this reason replaced by Oerlikon cannons, which were not only much more powerful, but also did not have such a drawback.
In addition, improved chrome plating was added to the inner diameter of the barrel, which dramatically increased its survivability even in intense combat conditions. The good thing about shooting from this type of machine gun is that only one person is required to change the barrel, the number of preparatory operations is reduced to a minimum, and there is practically no risk of getting burned.
Oddly enough, it was the chrome plating that made the machine gun cheaper. The fact is that before this, barrels with stellite coating were used. It was much more expensive, and the service life of such a barrel was at least two times less than that of its chrome-plated counterparts. Today, the Belgians produce various modernization kits, thanks to which any old M2HB can be converted into an M2 HQCB by regimental specialists.
L11A1 machine gun (HMG)
And again before us is “the same” Browning. True, in the English version. Of course, significantly modernized and improved. Many experts consider it the best among the entire line of M2VN “offsprings”.
Among the innovations is “soft fastening”. Lyrics aside, this is a system for damping recoil and vibration, thanks to which a heavy machine gun becomes a very, very accurate weapon. In addition, His Majesty's gunsmiths presented their version of a quick barrel replacement system. In general, it is in many ways similar to the scheme proposed by the Belgians.
Name | Rate of fire (rounds per minute) | Cartridge | Sighting range, meters | Weight, kg (machine gun body) |
М2НВ Browning | 36-38 (depending on year of manufacture) |
|||
Browning M2 HQCB | ||||
L11A1 machine gun (HMG) |
Some conclusions
If we compare the data from this table with information about domestic heavy machine guns, it becomes clear that this class of weapons is in many ways similar. The difference in the main technical characteristics is small, the differences are noticeable in weight. Western heavy machine guns weigh noticeably more. This is due to the fact that their military doctrine practically does not imply their use in infantry, providing for the installation of such weapons on military equipment.
The most common in the armies of the NATO bloc are machine guns of 5.56 and 7.62 caliber (their standard, of course). The insufficient firepower of the units is compensated by a large number of well-trained snipers and the covering of units operating in a combat situation with aviation groups and/or armored vehicles. And in fact: one large-caliber tank machine gun has tens of times greater combat power, so this approach has a right to life.
01
Apr
2017
All machine guns of the Russian Army (Fedoseev Semyon)
ISBN: 978-5-699-76457-0, Series: Small arms. Collectible Encyclopedia
Format: PDF, Scanned pages
Fedoseev Semyon
Year of manufacture: 2015
Genre: Small arms
Publisher: Eksmo
Russian language
Number of pages: 304
Description: The most complete encyclopedia of machine guns of the Russian Army - from the first “shotguns” and “quick-firing guns” tested by our troops in the Balkans, Central Asia and China, to the Russo-Japanese, Great and Civil Wars. All about the great weapons revolution, which forever changed military affairs and ushered in the era of automatic weapons.
KINGS OF THE BATTLEFIELD - this title was earned by machine guns on the fronts of the First World War, where they were massively used not only by infantry, but also by aviation, air defense, navy, armored cars, armored trains, tanks, and the machine gun cart became one of the main symbols of the Civil War.
In this book you will find comprehensive information about all machine guns of the Russian Army - not only domestic, but also purchased abroad and captured, both easel (Maxim, Vickers, Colt, Schwarzlose, MG.08), and and manual ("Lewis", "Madsen", "Hotchkiss", "Shosha", Fedorov's hand-held submachine gun), about their design, production, procurement and features of combat use.
06
Jan
2008
Banners and Standards of the Russian and Imperial Army
Genre: Military/history
Author: T. Shevyakov
Publisher: AST-Astrel
Country Russia
Year of manufacture: 2002
Number of pages: 48
Description: The book covers in detail the history of Russian banners and standards, as symbols of the military valor of the Russian Imperial Army. The author not only provides detailed information about the evolution of banners and army symbols, but also traces the fate of many Russian banners in the First World War. The book is addressed to a wide range of readers interested in military history.
Quality: OCR without errors
Format: PDF
15
Oct
2017
1812 Memoirs of soldiers of the Russian army (Petrov F. (comp.))
ISBN: 5-244-00404-2
Format: PDF/DjVu
Quality: Scanned pages + recognized text layer
Author: Petrov F. (ed.)
Year of manufacture: 1991
Genre: Military history
Publisher: Mysl
Russian language
Number of pages: 518
Description: The collection publishes for the first time the diaries and memoirs of participants in the Patriotic War of 1812, stored in the collection of the State Historical Museum. They reflect the largest battles of 1812 and the foreign campaigns of the Russian army of 1813-1814. Images of famous Russian commanders and partisans are captured. The published memoirs are provided with scientific and reference...
14
but I
2017
Jews in the Russian army. 1827 - 1914 (Yohanan Petrovsky-Stern)
ISBN: 5-86793-202-8, Historia Russica
Format: FB2, eBook (originally computer)
Author: Yohanan Petrovsky-Stern
Year of manufacture: 2003
Genre: History
Publisher: New Literary Review
Russian language
Number of pages: 560
Description: This book is about the meeting between the traditional Jewish community and the Russian army, the socio-political and spiritual circumstances of this meeting, as well as its consequences. The author traces the history of the relationship between the military department and the Jews of Russia and the Kingdom of Poland from the first Jewish conscription in 1827 until the beginning of the First World War. Explore...
05
Feb
2017
Armament of the Russian army in the 19th century (Fedorov V. G.)
Author: Fedorov V. G.
Year of manufacture: 1911
Genre: Small arms, Monograph
Publisher: Main Artillery Directorate of the Military Ministry
Language: Russian (pre-reform)
Number of pages: 433 + 38
Description: The work “Armament of the Russian Army in the 19th Century” was written by an officer of the Main Artillery Directorate of the Military Ministry, Guards. Colonel V.G. Fedorov, later major general of the tsarist army and lieutenant general of the engineering and technical service of the Red Army and the Soviet Army. Fedorov V.G. In Soviet times, he became a prominent specialist in theory and practice...
05
Apr
2017
Russia forgotten and unknown. Revived regiments of the Russian army in the White struggle in the South of Russia (Volkov S., (comp.))
ISBN: 5-227-01764-6,
Series: Forgotten and unknown Russia
Format: PDF/DjVu, Scanned pages + recognized text layer
Author: Volkov S., (comp.)
Year of manufacture: 2002
Genre: Military history
Publisher: Tsentrpoligraf
Russian language
Number of pages: 574
Description: The book “Revived Regiments of the Russian Army in the White Struggle in the South of Russia” is the seventh volume of the series dedicated to the history of the White movement in Russia according to the memoirs of its participants. With a few exceptions, the materials contained in the volume have never been published in Russia, and those published abroad represent bibliographies...
19
Sep
2015
Captured in battle. Trophies of the Russian army in the First World War (Alexey Oleynikov)
ISBN: 978-5-4444-1676-1, Military Archive
Format: FB2, OCR without errors
Author: Alexey Oleynikov
Year of manufacture: 2015
Genre: journalism
Publisher: Veche
Russian language
Number of pages: 372
Description: New book by A.V. Oleynikova talks in detail about the trophies of the Russian army captured during the First World War: about banners, armored cars and guns obtained by Russian soldiers on the battlefields. Particular attention is paid to military personnel of the German, Austro-Hungarian and Turkish armies who found themselves in Russian captivity. By comparing various documents, the author analyzes the damage inflicted on the enemy by the Russian army. ...
16
May
2009
Infantry weapons of the Third Reich. Part 7. Machine guns
Author: S. B. Monetchikov
Year of manufacture: 2005
Genre: Reference
Publisher: Tekhnika Youth
Number of pages: 69
Series: Infantry weapons of the Third Reich (special issue of the magazine "Weapons")
Format: PDF
Description: The history of the development of machine gun weapons in Germany in the first half of the twentieth century. Descriptions of the infantry and aviation machine guns in service and prototypes from the First World War, the interwar period and the Second World War are given.
16
May
2009
Infantry weapons of the Third Reich. Part 4. Submachine guns
16
May
2009
Infantry weapons of the Third Reich. Part 3 - Submachine guns
29
but I
2012
Raikin, Shirvindt, Zadornov and all, all, all in funny stories (Alexander Hort)
Author: Alexander Hort
Year of manufacture: 2010
Genre: Humor
Publisher: ARDIS
Performer: Vladimir Samoilov
Duration: 06:31:47
Description: In the life of pop artists: on stage, behind the scenes of concerts, during tours and even in everyday life, a lot of oddities and funny incidents happen. Comedians and satirists, entertainers, readers, and actors themselves love to tell funny stories, organize improvisations and practical jokes. Their witty sayings are transcribed into quotes. Listen to jokes, stories, funny episodes from the life of popular artists, including such names...
16
Jan
2013
We download films, books, music, magazines, computer games and programs, culinary recipes, photographs, files and everything, everything, everything from the Internet (Grishaev M.P., Prokdi R.G.)
Format: audiobook, AAC, 128 Kbps
Author: Jansson Tove
Year of manufacture: 2015
Genre: Fairy tale
Publisher: DIY Audiobook
Artist: Captain Abr
Duration: 01:05:14
Description: Dear friend! This book - a story about a great flood - was written very first in 1945, when the Second World War ended, when not only you, but also your mother and father were not yet in the world. On the pages of this book, the Moomins appeared for the first time: the kindest Moominmama, the absent-minded dad, and the main character himself - their son - the famous Moomintroll.
Add. information: Breakdown: no Breakdown...
18
Oct
2012
Winnie the Pooh and All-All-All (Boris Zakhoder, Alexander Alan Milne)
Format: audiobook, MP3, 128kbps
Author: Boris Zakhoder (retelling), Alexander Alan Milne
Year of manufacture: 2009
Genre: Fairy tale
Publisher: Audiobook
Performer: Alexey Shishigin, Antonina Klikacheva, Yulia Mironova, Kostya Panchenko
Duration: 05:34:21
Description: Winnie the Pooh is a rather fat little bear who loves to eat more than anything else. And besides this, he composes songs, puffs, sniffles and chants for all occasions. You know many of them from cartoons about Vinnie. But his friends - Christopher Robin, Piglet, Eeyore, Rabbit, Tigger, Kanga and Roo - do not love him for this. Even if Winnie the Pooh is not very...