From lies to history: The First Ukrainian Front. See what the “1st Ukrainian Front” is in other dictionaries Command of the 1st Ukrainian Front
The Ukrainian Front (First, Second, Third and Fourth Ukrainian Fronts) was of great importance for the liberation of the territory of the Soviet Union from invaders. It was the troops of these fronts that liberated most of Ukraine. And after that, Soviet troops with a victorious march liberated most of the countries of Eastern Europe from occupation. The troops of the Ukrainian fronts also took part in the capture of the capital of the Reich, Berlin.
First Ukrainian Front
On October 20, 1943, the Voronezh Front became known as the First Ukrainian Front. The front took part in several important offensive operations of the Second World War.
The soldiers of this particular front, having carried out the Kyiv offensive operation, were able to liberate Kyiv. Later, in 1943-1944, front troops carried out the Zhitomir-Berdichev, Lvov-Sandomierz and other operations to liberate the territory of Ukraine.
After this, the front continued its offensive in the territory of occupied Poland. In May 1945, the front took part in the operations to capture Berlin and liberate Paris.
Commanded the front:
- General
- Marshall G.
Second Ukrainian Front
The Second Ukrainian Front was created from parts of the Steppe Front in the fall (October 20) 1943. Front troops successfully carried out an operation to create an offensive bridgehead on the banks of the Dnieper (1943), controlled by the Germans.
Later, the front carried out the Kirovograd operation, and also took part in the Korsun-Shevchenko operation. Since the fall of 1944, the front has been involved in the liberation of European countries.
He carried out the Debrecen and Budapest operations. In 1945, front troops completely liberated the territory of Hungary, most of Czechoslovakia, some areas of Austria, and its capital Vienna.
The front commanders were:
- General, and later Marshal I. Konev
- General, and later Marshal R. Malinovsky.
Third Ukrainian Front
The Southwestern Front was renamed the Third Ukrainian Front on October 20, 1943. His soldiers took part in the liberation of the territory of Ukraine from the Nazi invaders.
Front troops carried out Dnepropetrovsk (1943), Odessa (1944), Nikopol-Krivoy Rog (1944), Yasso-Kishenevsk (1944) and other offensive operations.
Also, soldiers of this front took part in the liberation of European countries from the Nazis and their allies: Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, Austria, and Hungary.
Commanded the front:
- General and later Marshal R. Malinovsky
- General and later Marshal.
Fourth Ukrainian Front
The Fourth Ukrainian Front was created on October 20, 1943. The Southern Front was renamed into it. Front units carried out several operations. We completed the Melitopol operation (1943), and successfully carried out the operation to liberate Crimea (1944).
At the end of spring (05.16.) 1944, the front was disbanded. However, on August 6 of the same year, it was formed again.
The front conducted strategic operations in the Carpathian region (1944), and took part in the liberation of Prague (1945).
Commanded the front:
- General F. Tolbukhin
- Colonel General, and later General I. Petrov
- General A. Eremenko.
Thanks to the successful offensive operations of all Ukrainian fronts, the Soviet army was able to defeat a strong and experienced enemy, liberate its land from invaders and assist the captured peoples of Europe in liberation from the Nazis.
1st Ukrainian Front formed in the southwestern direction of the Soviet-German front on October 20, 1943 based on the order of the Supreme High Command Headquarters dated October 16, 1943 by renaming. It included the 13th, 27th, 38th, 40th, 47th, 60th armies, the 3rd Guards Tank and 2nd Air Armies. Subsequently it included the 1st, 3rd, 5th Guards, 6th, 18th, 21st, 28th, 31st, 52nd, 59th Armies, 1st and 4th Guards, 1st, 2nd, 4th and 6th I tank armies, 8th air army and 2nd army of the Polish Army.
On November 3-13, 1943, front troops carried out the Kyiv strategic offensive operation, during which they liberated Kiev on November 6 and advanced west from the Dnieper to 150 km. Then, from November 13 to December 22, 1943, they carried out the Kiev defensive operation, as a result of which they thwarted the plans of the German command to recapture Kiev and eliminate the strategic bridgehead of Soviet troops.
Subsequently, on December 24, 1943 - January 14, 1944, front troops carried out the Zhitomir-Berdichev operation, moving forward almost 200 km, deeply enveloping the German Army Group South from the north and creating favorable conditions for organizing offensive operations on the Right Bank Ukraine.
In the winter of 1944, the troops of the left flank of the front, in cooperation with the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, took part in the Korsun-Shevchenko operation (January 24-February 17), as a result of which over 10 enemy divisions were surrounded and destroyed. At the same time, the armies of the right flank carried out the Rivne-Lutsk operation (January 27-February 11, 1944) and took an advantageous position to strike the flank and rear of the German Army Group South from the north. The main forces of Army Group South were defeated in March-April by troops of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts.
Having carried out the Proskurov-Chernivtsi operation (March 4-April 17, 1944), the front troops reached the Carpathians and, in cooperation with the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, cut the strategic front of the German troops into two parts.
In the summer of 1944, during the Lvov-Sandomierz strategic operation (July 13-August 29), the German army group “Northern Ukraine” was defeated, the western regions of Ukraine, the south-eastern regions of Poland were liberated from the enemy, and a large Sandomierz bridgehead was captured on the left bank of the Vistula .
In the winter of 1945, front troops carried out the Sandomierz-Silesian operation (January 12-February 3), during which the southern regions of Poland were liberated, the Oder was crossed and military operations were transferred to German territory. In February, as a result of the Lower Silesian operation (February 8-24), front troops reached the Neisse River and took an advantageous position for an attack on Berlin.
In the second half of March 1945, the troops of the left flank of the front carried out the Upper Silesian operation (March 15-31), surrounded and then destroyed the Oppeln and Ratibor enemy groups.
In April-May 1945, front troops participated in the Berlin Strategic Operation (April 16-May 8), and then in the Prague Strategic Operation (May 6-11), during which the defeat of the German armed forces was completed.
The front was disbanded on June 10, 1945 based on the directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters of May 29, 1945; its field department was reorganized into the department of the Central Group of Forces.
Front commanders: Army General N.F. Vatutin (October 1943 - March 1944); Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov (March-May 1944); Marshal of the Soviet Union I. S. Konev (May 1944 - until the end of the war).
Members of the Military Council of the Front: Lieutenant General N. S. Khrushchev (October 1943 - August 1944); Major General, from March 1944 - Lieutenant General K. V. Krainyukov (October 1943 - until the end of the war).
Chiefs of the front headquarters: Lieutenant General Ivanov S.P. (October-November 1943); Lieutenant General Bogolyubov A.N. (November 1943 - April 1944); Army General V.D. Sokolovsky (April 1944 - April 1945); General of the Army Petrov I.E. (April 1945 - until the end of the war).
The chapter is devoted to the combat activities of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in the preparatory period and during the Berlin offensive operation. It includes about 30 documents, both combat and reporting, which give an idea of the glorious and heroic path of the 1st Ukrainian Front, its associations and formations at the final stage of the Second World War. Some of the published materials (like the documents of the 1st Belorussian Front) are imbued with the spirit of persistent and hardly justified competition for the right to be the first to enter Berlin. Naturally, the compilers could not include in the collection all the documents available in the archives about the actions of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front. We selected mainly those that reveal the most striking episodes of hostilities: crossing the river. Spree, capture of the southwestern part of Berlin, capture of Brandeburg, attack on Prague.
No. 99. Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to the commander of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front on the preparation and conduct of the Berlin offensive operation
1. Prepare and conduct an offensive operation in order to defeat the enemy group in the Cottbus area and south of Berlin. No later than 10–12 days of the operation, seize the line of Beelitz, Wittenberg and further along the river. Elbe to Dresden. In the future, after capturing Berlin, keep in mind to attack Leipzig.
2. Deliver the main blow with the forces of five combined arms armies and two tank armies from the Triebel area in the general direction of Spremberg, Belzig.
In the breakthrough area, attract six breakthrough artillery divisions, creating a density of at least 250 guns of 76 mm and above per kilometer of the breakthrough front.
3. To provide the main front grouping from the south with the forces of the 2nd Polish Army and part of the forces of the 52nd Army, launch an auxiliary attack from the Kolfurt area in the general direction of Bautzen, Dresden.
4. Tank armies and combined arms armies of the second echelon should be introduced after breaking through the enemy’s defenses to develop success in the direction of the main attack.
5. On the left wing of the front, go to a tough defense, paying special attention to the Breslav direction.
5th Guards change the army and use it for an offensive in the main direction.
6. Establish from April 15, 1945 the following demarcation line with the 1st Belorussian Front: to Unrushtadt the old one and then to lake. Ensdorfer-See, Gross-Gastrose, Lübben. All points, except Lubben, for the 1st Belorussian Front inclusive.
Responsibility for ensuring the junction remains the same.
7. Start of the operation according to the instructions you personally received.
I. Stalin
Antonov
RF. F. 3. Op. 11556. D. 18. L. 91–92. Copy.
No. 100. Report from the head of the Political Directorate of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army about political and educational work with new additions from among citizens liberated from fascist captivity
During the fighting on German territory, formations and units of the front somewhat made up for their combat losses in men at the expense of Soviet citizens of military age freed from German captivity. As of March 20, more than 40,000 people were sent to the unit.
The vast majority of this replenishment consists of Ukrainians and Russians under the age of 35. Among the new recruits there are military personnel who were in German captivity, including officers with the rank of junior lieutenant, lieutenant, senior lieutenant. lieutenant, captain. Some soldiers and officers released from German captivity have wounds and government awards received in battles with the German invaders before their capture by the Germans.
Almost all young fighters have incomplete or complete secondary education and only a small part have higher and primary education. Only a few people are illiterate or semi-literate.
Among the 3,870 people who arrived in February to replenish the units of the formation, where the head of the political department was Major General Voronov, there were 873 former military personnel, 2,997 people were newly drafted into the army, including 784 women. By age: under 25 years old - 1922, under 30 years old - 780, under 35 years old - 523, under 40 years old - 422 and over 40 years old - 223 people. By nationality: Ukrainians - 2014, Russians - 1173, Azerbaijanis - 221, Belarusians - 125, Armenians - 10, Uzbeks - 50 and other nationalities - 125 people. Of the total number of this replenishment, 70% worked in German industry, 15–20% in agriculture, and up to 10% were prisoners in German prisons and concentration camps.
Of the 100 new recruits who entered the 36th Plastun regiment of the formation, where the head of the political department was Lieutenant Colonel Petrashin, they were in Germany: up to 1 year - 5, from 1 year to 2 years - 55, from 2 to 3 years - 34 and over 3 years - 6 people.
The new addition of Soviet citizens liberated from German captivity is significantly infested with hostile elements. Among him, many German spies, saboteurs, Vlasovites, and people who served in the German army and institutions were identified. Most of these people were specially left or sent by the German command for espionage and sabotage activities. In the formation, where the head of the political department is Colonel Kladovoy, 15 spies, saboteurs and other criminal elements were identified among the new recruits. In the formation where the head of the political department, Major General Voronov, 11 traitors to the Motherland were identified among the new recruits, among whom were three former Soviet soldiers who voluntarily went over to the enemy’s side, two Gestapo agents and one Volks-Storm soldier - Boris Grigorievich Becker, a native and resident city of Stalingrad, born in 1912, accepted German citizenship in 1942, joined the German punitive detachment, actively participated in the executions and beatings of Soviet citizens and pilots captured by the enemy. In 1943, Becker voluntarily evacuated to Germany, where he worked at a military factory. He joined the Volkssturm, underwent special training and was left by the Germans in our rear to fight the Red Army.
In the minds of many of the new recruits, the fascist false propaganda, under the influence of which they were for a long time, left a noticeable mark.
There was no time to promote young fighters in the reserve regiments, since the combat situation urgently required the rapid introduction of reinforcements into battle. All this imposed on political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations of the front even greater responsibility for the education and training of reinforcements directly during the battles.
Political and educational work with new additions
Political agencies and party organizations of formations and units of the front are carrying out a lot of intense political and educational work with new recruits, using all the accumulated rich experience. The basis of all political work with new additions is Comrade Stalin’s book “On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union” and order No. 5 of 23.2.45, as well as orders of gratitude in connection with new victories of the Red Army. In the light of Stalin's instructions, widespread propaganda is carried out among the recruits about the glorious victories of the Red Army, the combat traditions of formations and units, the heroic deeds and dedication of soldiers and officers in the fight against the enemy, the great labor feat of the Soviet rear. Recruitment is brought up in the spirit of deep awareness of the noble goals of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War, hatred of the enemy, devotion to one’s Motherland, the Bolshevik Party, in the spirit of love for one’s unit, perseverance, courage, self-sacrifice in battle and high offensive impulse.
Political and educational work with the new recruits begins at the collection points through which Soviet citizens freed from German captivity pass.
Workers from the political departments of the armies have been allocated for political work at assembly points. They, together with the officers of these points, conduct newspaper readings, group and individual political conversations, question and answer evenings with repatriated Soviet citizens, identify moods, needs, requests, and study these people in the process of work.
At assembly point No. 49, operating in the junction zone, where the head of the political department, Major General Voronov, carries out extensive and continuous political work with Soviet citizens. Three POARM employees have been allocated for this purpose. The premises are decorated with slogans and posters. At the point, political information is held daily, newspapers are issued to citizens, readings are held with them, political conversations, question and answer evenings. Soviet films are often shown to them. During the last days of March, conversations were held with Soviet citizens at this point on the topics: “Glorious victories of the Red Army”, “Heroic work of the Soviet rear”, “Crimean conference of the leaders of the three allied powers”, “Atrocities and bullying of the German invaders against Soviet citizens and prisoners of war” , "International situation of the Soviet Union".
Political and educational work is being carried out in a more organized, purposeful and much better manner with new reinforcements in the army and front-line reserve regiments, to which all those called up for service in the Red Army from among Soviet citizens liberated from German captivity are sent. Here, political and educational work is organized and carried out with them by qualified personnel of commanders and political workers. Workers from the political departments of the armies, special units, propaganda machines and Red Army amateur artistic ensembles are sent to assist the party political apparatus of the reserve regiments. Political classes and political conversations are regularly held with young fighters, lectures and reports are given to them. The text of the military oath is studied with them. Young fighters are solemnly sworn in.
In the reserve regiment of the formation, where the head of the political department is Colonel Korolev, POARM lecturers and agitators provide continuous assistance to the party political apparatus. The regiment is provided with a propaganda machine, literature, maps, slogans and posters for visual propaganda. An army ensemble often performs for young soldiers. An information desk has been organized for them, which provides explanations about benefits for military families and other issues. To supplement this, a large number of lectures and reports were given. Only POARM employees gave reports and lectures within one month on the topics: “International situation” - 8, “Let’s finish off the fascist beast in its own lair and hoist the Victory Banner over Berlin” - 6, “The great feat of the Soviet people in the Patriotic War” - 5 , “Historic decision of the Crimean Conference of the Leaders of the Three Powers” - 8, “Iron discipline and high vigilance are the key to an early victory over Nazi Germany” - 22, “Military oath - the sacred oath of a warrior of the Red Army” - 18, “Atrocities of the Nazi invaders” - 14, “Combat path of the army” - 6.
A lot of work has been done in this regiment with new additions according to the text of the military oath. The text of the oath was given to each fighter. He read and explained deeply. Excerpts and slogans from the text of the military oath were posted in prominent places. Experienced fighters told young fighters how, on the front line and in battle, they fulfilled the oath, considering it the highest law of the Red Army warrior. The oath of the new recruits was taken in a solemn atmosphere by the regiment commander, who, after taking the oath, congratulated them on the title of Red Army soldiers and wished them success in battles with the hated enemy. Young soldiers treat taking the military oath with great feeling, as the most important moment in their lives, and swear to be honest, courageous and fearless warriors of the Red Army.
New reinforcements from among Soviet citizens freed from German captivity are sent from reserve regiments almost exclusively to active rifle units. It is outfitted before dispatch.
From reserve regiments, fighters are sent to replenish rifle formations in separate teams, accompanied by officers and political workers. Along the route with reinforcements, political conversations are held on the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief about new victories of the Red Army, according to reports from the Sovinformburo, about discipline and vigilance on the march.
In rifle formations and units, new additions are met in an organized, warm and welcoming manner. The meetings of young fighters are attended by division and regiment commanders, heads of political agencies, deputy regiment commanders for political affairs, employees of the prosecutor's office, military tribunal, counterintelligence SMERSH and staff officers. For the arriving soldiers, sanitary treatment, a good lunch are provided, and conditions for rest after the march are provided. As a rule, when new reinforcements are welcomed to formations or regiments, rallies are held under battle flags. Commanders, political workers, Heroes of the Soviet Union, order bearers and young soldiers speak at them. At these rallies and in the first political conversations, new soldiers are told about the military traditions of the unit, its heroes and immediate combat missions. After the rallies, films are shown to the soldiers and Red Army amateur performers perform. When welcoming a new addition, a brass band often plays. The presentation of military weapons to young fighters is carried out by commanders in a solemn atmosphere, often with a story about who owned this weapon and how he beat the German invaders with it.
At the meeting of new reinforcements in the 915th joint formation, where the head of the political department, Colonel Golubev, a meeting was held, which was opened by the regimental commander, Colonel Grishko. He told the soldiers about the military path of the unit, about outstanding battles and their heroes, called on them to religiously maintain discipline, multiply the combat traditions of the regiment, and be its heroes. After him, the battalion commander, two experienced warriors - order bearers, one of the young fighters, and, finally, the deputy regiment commander for political affairs, Major Kostyrkin, spoke. After the meeting, the fighters were distributed among units. In the evening, before the formation, the battalion commanders handed them military weapons.
All further political work with replenishment is carried out in units by commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations, taking into account the backwardness of young fighters from Soviet reality and the certain influence of fascist propaganda on them during their stay in Germany. In most formations with new recruits, political and educational work is carried out separately, according to special plans. There is a separate topic for political conversations. The best agitators of the units are assigned to work with young fighters, and they are given instructions on certain topics of political conversations. In a number of units, especially in those in which there is a significant number of reinforcements, some young fighters, after careful checking, are nominated as agitators, readers, and are entrusted with carrying out various public assignments.
In the formation where the head of the political department, Major General Grishaev, after a thorough check, up to 200 unit agitators were selected from among the new reinforcements, two-day seminars were held with them and systematic instruction was provided.
As a rule, new recruits are distributed among units so that there are no compatriot groups, so that the influence of experienced warriors on young fighters is exerted.
The new reinforcements that arrived at the formation, where Colonel Svetlov was the head of the political department, were distributed among the units so that in the rifle companies there were 3-4 young fighters for each experienced warrior.
Political departments often organize meetings between young fighters and experienced warriors, who share their combat skills and pass on the combat experience they have accumulated.
In the 36th Plastun regiment of the formation, where the head of the political department, Colonel Petrashin, in March a meeting of new recruits was organized with the Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant Shishkin. He held an instructive conversation about the battles of his division, the crossing of the Dnieper and Vistula rivers, of which he was a participant, and told why he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. This meeting made a great impression on the young fighters. Red Army soldier Pechenitsky, after listening to the conversation, said: “We need to fight the way Lieutenant Shishkin fights, and earn government awards with our military deeds.”
Experienced warriors teach young fighters combat skills, courageous and courageous behavior in battle, and help them quickly master the formidable military weapons that the Soviet people entrusted to them. An experienced warrior from the formation where the head of the political department was Yakushkin, mortarman Shikarenko gathered 10 young soldiers, told them how to fire a mortar, and fired 5 shots at the enemy in their presence. Each fighter was trained by him in aiming and firing techniques from a mortar. Komsomol member Challenge told the soldiers about the rules of firing at night from a rifle and machine gun. At the same time, he demonstrated fire with tracer bullets.
In the education of new recruits, sending letters to the homeland of distinguished fighters, declaring gratitude for excellent mastery of military weapons, exemplary service, and rewarding for the first military successes in battle are widely used.
The political and moral state of the majority of the new recruits is healthy and fighting. They sincerely strive to go into battle in order to take revenge on the Germans for all the suffering they have endured, to relieve themselves of guilt before their Motherland, to earn a government award, and to return home with victory.
Red Army soldier Sharipov said: “I hate the Germans like vile bastards. Being in German slavery opened my eyes to many things. There is no country better than our Soviet state. We need to fight especially in order to erase from ourselves the shameful stain of fascist captivity.”
Red Army soldier Ivanchenko: “I was behind the barbed wire when the roar of Soviet guns reached us. You can imagine what I went through together with my comrades, expecting freedom or destruction at the hands of the fascist executioners. Now I am free, I have the full opportunity to take full revenge on the Germans with arms in hand. I assure my comrades that I will fight bravely for my Motherland.”
Red Army soldier Wojtek: “It is better to die the death of a hero in battles for your beloved Motherland than to be a slave of the Germans or a traitor to your homeland.”
In battles with the German invaders, the vast majority of the new recruits behave steadfastly, courageously, and bravely. Often young soldiers make self-sacrifice in the name of the Soviet Motherland.
The rifle battalion of the formation, where the head of the political department, Guards. Colonel Kladovoy, who consisted of 80% new recruits, repeatedly fought in difficult combat situations. He had to fight off counterattacks from a numerically superior enemy. All fighters […] to the Germans for all their atrocities! And he shot 7 Nazis point-blank. In this battle he died a hero's death.
The squad leader from the same battalion, Skripnikov, who spent two years in captivity of the Germans, skillfully and courageously controlled his fighters operating as part of a tank landing force. His squad killed 50 Germans in one battle. Skripnikov personally destroyed 10 and captured 9 Nazis. In another battle, Skripnikov’s squad successfully repelled 4 counterattacks by superior German forces. Skripnikov replaced the platoon commander who dropped out in battle.
New recruits Karpenko and Kunakov noticed up to 20 Germans in the rear of their battalion. Having flanked them on both sides, they suddenly opened fire on the Germans with machine guns, as a result of which 12 were killed and five Germans were captured.
In the stubborn battles for the city of Strehlen, many new recruits showed courage and bravery. Private Pirogovsky, skillfully camouflaging himself, crawled up to the crew of a German machine gun, destroyed it with a grenade and captured a serviceable enemy machine gun. Red Army soldier Tsybulya killed 4 Germans in one battle.
Such examples are not isolated.
Difficulties in working with a new addition
Firstly. Young fighters drafted into the Red Army from among the liberated Soviet citizens who were in German captivity or captivity are poorly trained militarily. In the reserve regiment, new reinforcements underwent combat training according to a 7-day program, which is extremely insufficient. Joining the front line units, young fighters, as a rule, were immediately introduced into battle; there could be no question of any systematic training, since the front units fought continuous, intense offensive battles with the Germans.
Due to insufficient cohesion and combat training, some fighters from this replenishment, individual units in battles showed instability, cowardice, panic, and took the path of desertion and self-mutilation.
Rifle battalion of the formation, where the head of the political department was Lieutenant Colonel Oshchepkov, who served on? of the new recruits, during a German counterattack, he shamefully fled from the battlefield. On the spot, the commanders shot five cowards and alarmists in order to restore order.
In a formation where Colonel Korolev was the head of the political department, when repelling a German counterattack, a young fighter threw his rifle, destroyed his documents and fled from the battlefield. In the same formation, the commander of the military operations department, Lieutenant Latrugin, shot three new recruits in a combat situation for fleeing the battlefield.
In the formation where the head of the political department of the guard was Colonel Miloslavsky, the new fighters Tarasyuk and Cheburko categorically refused to take the military oath, explaining this by the fact that they were evangelists. Cheburko said: “I am following in the footsteps of Christ, I will not take up arms and will not kill people.” Cheburko and Tarasyuk were arrested and tried by a military tribunal.
In a formation where the head of the political department was Lieutenant Colonel Petrashin, a new recruit Vikhrenko showed cowardice in battle and committed self-mutilation. He was shot in front of the line.
Secondly. Some fighters from this replenishment express unhealthy and sometimes clearly anti-Soviet sentiments, sow provocative rumors, and express dissatisfaction with service in the Red Army. All this is a consequence of the long-term influence of false fascist propaganda and the presence in the ranks of new recruits of enemy elements who were in the service of the Germans and have not yet been exposed by us.
Red Army soldier Grishko spread a provocative rumor among the soldiers that allegedly “the Germans launched 3,000 tanks in the Berlin direction, crushed the troops of Marshal Zhukov and occupied more than 3,000 settlements. That's why we stopped here." Grishko was arrested.
During political classes, fighter Kuleshov, a kulaks who was captured by the Germans, said: “In Germany, the peasants have a lot of land, they say that it was all stolen. In Russia, the kulaks had less land and livestock. It was not stolen by them, but acquired through labor. Why were they dispossessed? My father is also dispossessed. Before the war I was not drafted into the army, but now I am. It turns out that you made a concession to the kulak? I don’t agree with all of this.”
Red Army soldier Voronkin, in a conversation with soldiers during the construction of the defense, said: “We were betrayed in 1941 and will be betrayed now, so it’s in vain that we are digging these holes. It was better for me with the Germans. I made a fatal mistake in not going deep into Germany. Once the fighting starts, it will be possible to escape.”
Red Army soldier Bersonev, having arrived at the unit, asked: “Does the company have a car, otherwise when the Germans go on the offensive, you won’t be able to escape from them on foot.”
Negative and hostile sentiments are taken into account when carrying out political and educational work with new recruits and are suppressed. Obviously hostile elements are isolated by counterintelligence agencies SMERSH.
Third. An exceptionally difficult situation has arisen in parts of the front regarding the provision of uniforms for new reinforcements. Despite the acute, far from being met, need for people, new recruits are often delayed in reserve regiments and convalescent teams due to lack of uniforms and shoes.
In the group of Lviv hospitals, 3,600 soldiers were not sent to active units for 15 days due to lack of uniforms. In the formation, where Major General Grishaev was the head of the political department, various tattered shoes and clothes were collected from rear units and institutions to outfit the new reinforcements sent to the units. Nevertheless, due to a lack of uniforms, more than two thousand soldiers were detained in the reserve regiment, while the active units, due to a lack of people, sometimes did not carry out combat missions.
Often young fighters can be found in active units in bad shoes, without tunics or underwear, in various jackets instead of overcoats. This causes serious complaints from the fighters and leads to a loss of military appearance.
Quartermaster Directorate of the Front since January of this year. g. has an order for 65 thousand sets of uniforms for new replenishment, but, despite repeated requests, this uniform has not yet been received.
I ask for your help in resolving this issue.
Conclusions:
1. The political and moral state of the overwhelming majority of soldiers drafted from among Soviet citizens who were in German captivity is healthy. Having experienced all the horrors of German captivity and fascist captivity, the recruits strongly hate the German occupiers and express impatience with arms in hand to take revenge on them on the battlefield.
Most of the new recruits fight steadfastly in battles, and many show courage and bravery.
2. At the same time, among this replenishment there are persons who, during their stay in Nazi Germany, were in the service of the Germans, were recruited by them and, for the purpose of sabotage against the Red Army, were left by the Nazis on the territory we occupied. Once in the ranks of the Red Army, these traitors try to carry out their vile work: spreading false rumors, praising life in Germany, expressing dissatisfaction with service in the Red Army. Many of them have already been exposed and isolated. There are also individuals infected with false fascist propaganda, under the influence of which they have been for a long time.
All this requires the political agencies of the front to pay close attention to the study of the new recruits, to the issue of vigilance, and the skillful organization of political and educational work among the new recruits.
3. Political agencies and party organizations of the front have done and are doing a lot of work in this direction. Various forms and methods are widely used to instill in the new recruits endless love for the Soviet Motherland, for the Bolshevik Party, for Comrade Stalin, hatred for the German invaders, instilling love for their unit, the desire to increase its glory with new military exploits.
4. Some political agencies have not yet studied the new recruits deeply enough, are slow to respond to existing negative phenomena in the behavior of these fighters, and do not always skillfully, taking into account all the features, carry out educational work with the new recruits.
The Military Council and the political department of the front drew the attention of political agencies and party organizations to these and other shortcomings in working with new recruits.
Head of the Political Directorate of the 1st Ukrainian Front of the Guard, Major General Yashchechkin
RF. F. 32. Op. 11289. D. 680. L. 1-10. Script.
No. 101. Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to the commander of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front on providing assistance to the left flank of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front
The Supreme Commander-in-Chief ordered:
Set a task for one flight of the Pe-2 bomber air division in order to assist the left wing of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front.
The time and mission of the air division [to be specified] at the direction of the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front.
Antonov
On the document there is a handwritten resolution by G. K. Zhukov: “T. Rudenko. Prepare a telegram for Konev setting the task of bombing the enemy in front of Kolpakchi.”
RF. F. 233. Op. 2307. D. 185. L. 211. Copy.
No. 102. Combat order from the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the commander of the 3rd Guards Army on the continuation of offensive operations at night due to the failure to complete the task of the first day of the operation
The army did not complete the task of the day. The front commander ordered: with the onset of darkness, actions should not be suspended, but units of the second echelons and reserves would continue to carry out the task.
On April 17, 1945, the task was in accordance with operational directive No. 00211/op. The start time of action on the morning of April 17, 1945 [will be announced] later.
Report the orders given.
Army General Iv. Petrov
RF. F. 236. Op. 2712. D. 346. L. 89. Original.
No. 103. Operational report from the headquarters of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the head of the operational directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army at 24.00 on April 16, 1945.
1. The troops of the front strike group on the right wing crossed the river on April 16, 1945, after powerful artillery and air preparation. Neisse, broke through the enemy’s heavily fortified positions to the west. bank of the river Neisse in the sections of Forst - Miskau; Rothenburg - Pentsikh, only 45 km along the front.
Fighting in difficult conditions of a wooded area and overcoming a developed system of enemy engineering obstacles, in the conditions of forest fires that arose, they fought their way to a depth of 13 km.
As a result of the fighting, cities and heavily fortified enemy strongholds were captured: Muskau, Rothenburg, Gedwigshütte and 80 settlements.
On April 16, 1945, over 2,000 prisoners were captured from the Brandenburg MD, 342, 545, as well as the 208 and 359 enemy infantry regiments.
2. By the end of the day, the troops of the front’s shock group captured the lines: 3rd Guards. army - 76 sk, 287 sd at the same line. 106th Infantry Division captured the east. part of Forst. 120 sk, 149 sd captured the south. part of the city of Forst and fought for the south. env. Eilo. 127th infantry division at the line: east. env. Nossdorf, Damsdorf. 197th Infantry Division in the second echelon of the corps in the northern forest. - app. Groß-Bademeisel 21 sk, 329 sd - (claim) Damsdorf, north. env. Groß-Ztaxdorf; The 253rd Infantry Division captured Groß-Ztaxdorf and fought to the east. env. Zimmersdorf. 58th Infantry Division in the forest southwest. Groß-Bademeisel. 389 Infantry Division - army reserve, on the march to the Gros-Bademeisel crossing, 25 tons are fighting for Nosedord. STORM is in the same place.
3. 13th Army - 27 Infantry Division, 147 Infantry Division fought at the line: (claim) Zimmersdorf, Ioxdorf. 117 SD - (claim) Joksdorf, Klein Kelzig. 172 SD - (claim) Klein Kelyshg, Gros Kelzig. 102 sk, 6 guards sd - Gedwigschotte, Debern. 350 SD - (legal) Debern, Dubrutsk, 1.5 km south. 280 Infantry Division in the second echelon of the corps is concentrated in the forest in the southwest. Erishke. 24 sk in the second echelon of the army is transported to the west. river bank Neisse. 395 Infantry Division in the area of Zelz 121 Guards. sd in the Groß-Zerchen area. STORM is in the same place.
4. 5th Army - 32nd Guards. sk, 95 guards sd - Dubrautsk south, north. - east env. Tzpernitz (Chernitz). 13th Guards sd - east okr Tzpernitz, (leg.) Klein-Dauben. 97 Guards SD in the second echelon of the corps is concentrated in the Emlits area. 34th Guards sk, 58 guards SD - Klein-Duben, 15th Guards. sd (sq.) high. 128, 5, Vossinka, Glashütte, Berg. 14th Guards SD - Miskau, Keula, north. env. A tan. 33 Guards sk - in the second echelon of the army, concentrated in the area: 9th Guards. VDD - Klein-Zerchen, forest. zap. Kwohlsdorf. 118th Infantry Division - Kwolsdorf, railway Art. Tepferstedt. 78th Guards sd. - in the Braunsdorf area in readiness for the crossing to the west after dark. river bank Neisse. 4th Guards tk - in the battle formations of the 95th Guards. sd. STORM is in the same place.
5. 2nd Army of the Polish Army - 10th Infantry Division at the same line in the east. bank of the river Neisse. 7 pd - one sp to the east. bank of the river Neisse in the Zernitz section, (claim) Tormerodorf, crossed the river with two points. Neisse and is fighting on the railway. line of the river bend section, (leg.) Rothenburg. 9th Infantry Division - Rothenburg, Jacobheiser, forest east. The 8th Infantry Division fought to the west. the shore of the lakes, which is 1 km west. Bihain. 5 Infantry Division in the second echelon of the army, concentrated in the northern forest area. - east Bihain. 1 tk is concentrated in the forest west. Nieder-Neudorf. The 16th Tank Brigade fought for the railway. on the Gorka site, high. 188, 3. STORM in the same place.
6. 52nd Army - 73 sk, 254 rd - south. env. Werkirch, Monkenwein railway Kodersdorf station. 50 sd - 1 km east. high 182, 2, further along the edge of the forest to the west. Gross Krausha, 111 SD - (lawsuit) Gross Krausha, count. Noy-Krausha, north. part of Tsodel and further to the river. Neisse. 78 sk, 373 rd captured the northern flank. part of Penzi kirp. zap. Nieder-Langenau then fought at the same line. 31st and 214th infantry divisions at the same positions. 48 sk at the same level. 213 Infantry Division - army reserve on the march to the western forest area. Zintendorf. 7th Guards MK on the march to the crossings. STORM is in the same place.
7. 3rd Guards TA, 6th Guards. TC - in the Damsdorf region, Gross Zschachsdorf. 7th Guards tk - in the area of Klein Keltsig, Debern - 9 mk - at the crossing in the area of Klein Bademeisel. STORM is in the same place.
8. 4th Guards TA, 10th Guards. as they fought for Friedrichsuay; 6th Guards MK is concentrated in the Emlits region. 5th Guards MK: 10 MBR was transported to the west. river bank Neisse in the northern region. Kebeln. The main forces of the corps are in the region of Braunsdorf, Birkenstedt, Tepferstedt. 93 selection - in the northern forest. Zibelle. 22 Sabr - northern forest. - east Gebers-dorf. STORM is in the same place.
9. 1st Guards KK set out at the crossing to the Nieder-Bilau area.
10. The 6th Army fought in separate assault groups. 181 SD, 74 SC captured the 106th quarter. The position of the remaining army troops remains unchanged. STORM is in the same place.
11. The 21st and 59th armies strengthened the occupied lines, conducted reconnaissance and fired fire at a number of points. There were no changes in the battle formations of the troops.
12. The front air forces carried out 3,376 sorties per day to bomb and attack enemy troops. 37 enemy aircraft were shot down in air battles. Enemy aircraft carried out 220 sorties during the day.
13. Weather for the day: in the first half of the period it is clear, in the second - an increase in cloudiness to 3–7 points, cloud height 800 - 1000 m, haze in places. Visibility 4 - 10 km, in haze 1–3 km. Wind southeast. quarters 2–5 m/s. Air temperature +10°, +15°. The passability of dirt roads is good.
Aviation flight weather; satisfactory for artillery operation.
Deputy beginning Operations Directorate Colonel Fedulov
Head of the Information Department, Lieutenant Colonel Budakovsky
RF. F. 236. Op. 2673. D. 2487.1–4. Script.
No. 104. Combat order from the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the chiefs of the front's engineering troops, the 3rd and 5th Guards, 13th armies, the commanders of the 6th and 3rd pontoon brigades with the requirement to ensure the fastest crossing of the river. Spree
On the routes of our troops to Berlin, the last water barrier is the river. Spree. I order:
1. All privates, sergeants, and officers of the front engineering troops must ensure a quick and organized crossing of the river. Spree with our troops. The main thing is the fastest crossing of tanks from the armies of Rybalko and Lelyushenko.
2. Bring transportation facilities closer to the troops. Show the drive and ingenuity of the heroic soldiers of our front to quickly overcome the river line. Spree. The homeland will not forget your heroic deeds.
3. Soldiers! Boldly and decisively storm the last water obstacle on the way to Berlin, open a non-stop path for our glorious troops to Berlin.
4. The order is conveyed to all army engineering troops and all privates and officers.
Konev Krainyukov
RF. F. 236. Op. 2712. D. 259. L. 23. Original.
No. 105. Combat order from the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the commander of the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank, 3rd and 5th Guards and 13th Armies on accelerating the crossing of the river. Spree
From midday on April 17, 1945, the enemy retreated across the river in small groups. Spree. Small groups of tanks and aircraft along the roads in the main directions are trying to delay our advance east of the river. Spree in order to withdraw the broken parts beyond the river. Spree.
I order:
1. Rapidly develop the offensive on the shoulders of the enemy, on the night of April 17, 1945, cross the river. Spree, preventing the enemy from gaining a foothold at the turn of the river. Spree.
2. Be bolder in maneuvering tanks and infantry outside main roads, decisively bypassing populated strong points, and not getting involved in protracted frontal battles. Mobilize everyone with passion to beat the Germans and break the resistance. Striving only forward!
Our troops must be the first in Berlin, they can do this and fulfill the order of the Great Stalin with honor.
3. Pull up artillery and shells to the river. Spree and in case of enemy resistance, launch a powerful artillery strike on the morning of April 18, 1945.
Konev
Krainyukov
RF. F. 236. Op. 2712. D. 259. L. 221 (v). Script.
No. 106. Combat order from the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the commander of the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies on crossing the river. Spree and the rapid advance towards Berlin
In pursuance of the order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, I order:
Commander of the 3rd Guards. TA
1. During the night from April 17 to 18, cross the river. Spree and develop a rapid offensive in the general direction of Fetschau, Golsen, Barut, Teltow, the southern outskirts of Berlin. The army's task on the night of April 20-21, 1945 was to break into Berlin from the south.
2. Commander of the 4th Guards. TA
During the night from April 17 to 18, cross the river. Spree north of Spremberg and develop a rapid offensive in the general direction of Drebhau, Kalau, Dame, Luckenwalde. The army's task, starting on April 20, is to capture the area of Belitz, Troenbritzen, and Luckenwalde. On the night of April 20-21, 1945, capture Potsdam and the southwestern part of Berlin. When the army turns to Potsdam, the Troenbrietzen area will provide 5 microns. Conduct reconnaissance in the directions: Senftenberg, Finsterwalde, Herzberg.
3. In the main direction, with a tank fist, push forward bolder and more decisively. Bypass cities and large populated areas and not get involved in protracted frontal battles. I demand a firm understanding that the success of tank armies depends on bold maneuver and swiftness in action.
Point 3 of the order should be brought to the attention of corps and brigade commanders.
4. Report the execution of given orders.
Konev
Krainyukov
RF. F. 236. Op. 2712. D. 359. L. 24–25. Script.
No. 107. Report from the commander of the 3rd Guards Tank Army to the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front about crossing the river. Spree and continued advance towards Berlin
1. The enemy, with the withdrawing units of the 21 TD, part of the forces of the 10 TD and the 10 SS TD, thrown out from the Berlin area, re-entered the battle, tried to delay the army’s advance.
2. Army troops, having crossed the river by the morning of April 19, 1945. The Sprees, having broken, defeated and scattered significant parts of its manpower, developed an offensive in the direction of Fetschau, Golsen, Baruth and by 19.00 reached the line: Wowlitz, Gross-Lubenau, Buchow.
3. 6th Guards Tk, having crossed the Spree, developed an offensive in the direction of Fetschau, Golsen and by 14.30 captured Fetschau in battle. By 19.00 they left: 51st Guards. TBR - Vovlitz, 53 Guards. TBR - Gross-Lübenau, 52 Guards. TBR - Fetschau, 22nd Guards. The IRB continued to clear Fetschau of small groups of the enemy and with part of its forces pulled up artillery to Fetschau.
4. 7th Guards Tk, having crossed the Spree, developed an offensive in the direction of Kalau, Lyukkau and by 19.00 captured Kalau 54 Guards. Tbr captured Vukkov with battle, 56th Guards. TBR captured Kalau in battle, 55th Guards. TBR and 23 Guards MRB on the move for the 56th Guards. tbr.
5. In reserve, 9 MK, having crossed the Spree, advanced in the second echelon of the army and by 19.00 reached the Fetschau-Ogrodzen line. During the day of the battle, up to 500 prisoners were taken.
6. Decided: by the end of April 19 to reach the Virtu area and by April 20, 1945 to continue the offensive in the direction of Berlin.
Rybalko
Bakhmetyev
RF. F. 315. Op. 4446. D. 20. L. 487. Original.
No. 108. Combat order from the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the commander of the 3rd Guards Tank Army on overcoming the Barut line
Moving your gut again. One brigade is fighting, the whole army is standing. I order: the Barut, Luckenwalde line through the swamp to cross along several routes in a deployed battle formation. A bolder maneuver to overcome the Barut line. Deliver the execution.
Konev
Krainyukov
RF. F. 236. Op. 2712. D. 359. L. 35. Original.
No. 109. Combat order from the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the commander of the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies on the need to enter Berlin before the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front
Marshal Zhukov's troops are 10 km from the eastern outskirts of Berlin. I order you to be the first to break into Berlin tonight. Deliver the execution.
Konev
Krainyukov
RF. F. 236. Op. 2712. D. 359. L. 36. Original.
No. 110. Combat order from the commander of the 3rd Guards Tank Army to the commanders of the 6th, 7th Guards Tank and 9th Mechanized Corps on the start of the attack on Berlin
The troops of the right neighbor are located 10 km east of Berlin. I order: at any cost, by the morning of April 21, 1945, break into Berlin. Task according to my order dated April 19, 1945.
Rybalko
RF. F. 315. Op. 4446. D. 20. L. 497. Original.
No. 111. Order from the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the commander of the 33rd Rifle Corps of the 5th Guards Army on the need to improve the organization of combat operations
Lately, the 33rd Corps under your command has been systematically disrupting the implementation of combat orders. The meaning of the combat order is lost. The corps lacks demands on troops in carrying out combat orders. The fight is poorly organized. The enemy's forces are overestimated, and one's own are underestimated. All this leads to indecision in the actions of troops and to marking time in front of a weak enemy. The troops are not accustomed to forest combat, and a small forest area poses an obstacle for the corps troops. Poor maneuvering of troops on the battlefield.
For failure to comply with combat orders by corps units, unsteady control of the corps in battle and indecisiveness, I reprimand you and warn you of incomplete service compliance. I warn you, Comrade Lebedenko, that if you do not draw conclusions for yourself and reorganize yourself, I will be forced to remove you from your position.
Konev
Krainyukov
RF. F. 236. Op. 2712. D. 259. L. 37, 37 vol. Script.
No. 112. Combat order from the commander of the 4th Guards Tank Army to the commander of the 10th Tank Corps for the capture of the southwestern part of Berlin
I confirm my verbal order: bypassing Luckenwalde, continue a rapid offensive in the direction of Bergholz - Rebrücke, Stopsdorf, Zehlendorf […] April 21, 1945, capture the southwestern part of Berlin.
I demand special decisiveness and swiftness of action.
Lelyushenko
Gulyaev
Upman
RF. F. 324. Op. 4761. D. 54. L. 180a. Script.
No. 113. Combat order from the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the commander of the 3rd Guards Tank Army to prevent the enemy from retreating to Berlin
The enemy, according to the prisoners, is retreating from Cottbus to Berlin.
I order: one brigade with a self-propelled regiment to strike from the Zossen area on Bonsdorf, with the task of preventing the retreating enemy from entering Berlin.
Report [about] execution.
Konev
Krainyukov
RF. F. 236. Op. 2712. D. 359. L. 46. Original.
No. 114. Report from the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the capture of Cottbus
On April 22, 1945, troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front completely captured the city of Cottbus, an important junction of railways and highways and a heavily fortified German stronghold on the southeastern approaches to the city of Berlin.
Konev
Krainyukov
Petrov
RF. F. 236. Op. 2673. D. 2448. L. 57. Original.
No. 115. Report from the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief about the defeat of the remnants of the Spremberg enemy group
Surrounded in the forests to the west of the city of Spremberg, the remnants of the Spremberg enemy group defeated in battle (parts of the 10th SS TD, TD "Fuhrer's Guard", 344 Infantry Division) were completely destroyed and partially captured by the morning of April 23, 1945.
During the liquidation of the encircled enemy group, 4,640 soldiers and officers were destroyed. Captured: 3,850 prisoners, 58 tanks, 27 SU, 185 armored personnel carriers, 162 various guns and over 1,300 vehicles.
Konev
Krainyukov
RF. F. 236. Op. 2712. D. 346. L. 132. Original.
No. 116. Report from the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the completion of the encirclement of Berlin from the west and the capture of the city of Brandenburg
4th Guards Lelyushenko's tank army, developing the 6th MK offensive, captured the city of Ketzin and at 23.30 on April 24, 1945 in the Bukhov-Karptsov area (6 km north - east of Ketzin), united with units of the 1st Belorussian Front, thereby completing the encirclement Berlin from the west. 6 microns 4 guards TA at 23.00 24.4 completely captured Brandenburg.
Konev
Krainyukov
RF. F. 236. Op. 2712. D. 346. L. 134. Original.
No. 117. Intelligence report from the headquarters of the 4th Guards Tank Army on the damage inflicted on the enemy from April 16 to April 23, 1945.
Shot down and destroyed:
Tanks………………. 129
SU…………………. 50
Guns of various calibers………423
Machine guns…………….. 530
Aircraft…………….. 34
Armored personnel carriers……….. 92
Cars……………. 1050
Motorcycles……………. 309
Bicycles……………. 2185
Carts with military cargo……… 2023
Mortars…………….. 315
Armored vehicles……………. 13
Rifles and machine guns………. 4633
Warehouses from the military. property……. 20
Captured:
Tanks………………. 14
SU………………… 44
Guns of different calibers…….. 71
Armored personnel carriers……….. 14
Machine guns…………….. 477
Cars…………….. 1496
Motorcycles……………. 251
Aircraft in good working order……….. 223
Faulty aircraft……… 265
Rifles and machine guns………. 5697
Mortars…………….. 18
Bicycles……………. 1511
Gun barrels………… 350
Steam locomotives…………….. 52
Cars………………. 1462
Aircraft engines……………. 362
Spotlights……………. 332
Parachutes……………. 1000
Tractor units……………… 2
Air bombs……………… 3000
Anti-aircraft shots……….. 24,000
Warehouses with ammunition, prod. and other property……………… 301
Released:
Prisoners of war………….. 19,000
Of these, Russians……………2500
Military factories and industrial enterprises……………. 31
Workshops with equipment…… 10
11,495 enemy soldiers and officers were killed. 4,490 soldiers and officers were captured.
Chief of the RO Headquarters of the 4th Guards Tank Army of the Guard, Colonel Bzyrin
RF. F. 236. OP. 2721. D. 166. L. 258–259. Script.
No. 118. Combat order from the commander of the 3rd Guards Tank Army to the commander of the 71st Mechanized Brigade to destroy enemy troops breaking through to the west
The enemy continues to break through in separate groups to the west in the Yakhtsen-Brik area.
The army commander ordered:
1. The 71st infantry brigade set out in a forced march from Zossen and reach the Spremberg area with the task of preventing the enemy from leaving to the west. Having barriers on the roads, block the road southwest of Spremberg between the lakes, intercept the road at Klausdorf and the road on the northern shore of Lake Möhlen See.
Have a maneuver group in the Rehagen area.
Take all measures to destroy and capture the breaking through enemy.
2. Have contact with the 54th Infantry Division. Division CP - Neykhov.
3. Report to me every hour.
Deputy Chief of Staff of the 3rd Guards Tank Army of the Guards. Colonel Eremenko
RF. F. 315. Op. 4440. D. 526. L. 55. Original.
No. 119. Appeal from the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front with a request to change the direction of attack of the 8th Guards and 1st Guards Tank Armies
The troops of the army of Comrade Rybalko and Comrade Luchinsky today, April 28, 1945, are fighting with the right flank to the Anhalt station (the right demarcation line of the front), the ledge and the left flank are fighting for Wilmersdorf, Halensee.
According to a report from Comrade Rybalko, the armies of Comrade Chuikov and Comrade Katukov of the 1st Belorussian Front were given the task of advancing to the northwest along the southern bank of the Landwehr Canal. Thus, they cut up the battle formations of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front advancing to the north.
I ask for orders to change the direction of advance of the armies of Comrade Chuikov and Comrade Katukov.
Please let me know about your decision.
Konev
Krainyukov
Petrov
RF. F. 236. Op. 2712. D. 346. L. 152. Original.
No. 120. Report from the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief about the capture of the area where the General Staff of the German Army is located
In the forest 2 km southeast of Zossen, the area where the general headquarters of the German army ground forces was located from the beginning of 1941 to March 1945 was captured.
The General Staff was located in 24 two-story, carefully camouflaged above-ground buildings and two underground structures at a depth of 35–40 meters with a total number of rooms up to 200.
In one of the underground structures there are installed: two automatic and one long-distance telephone exchanges with a total capacity of over 10 thousand numbers, a telegraph center for 60 telegraph devices, pneumatic mail and a time bureau.
All structures were provided with autonomous power supply, having a powerful battery, two diesel engines with 1,500 horsepower and 18 electric units.
At the same time, in the Belitz area, 40 km southwest of Berlin, the transoceanic receiving radio center of Germany, with the help of which Germany maintained radio and building communications with Tokyo, Shanghai and other remote points of the world, was captured.
The radio center consists of 50 main high-quality receivers, building communications installations and autonomous power supply.
Measures have been taken to protect the captured objects and further study them.
Konev
Krainyukov
Petrov
RF. F. 236. Op. 2712. D. 359. L. 60. Original.
No. 121. Order of the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the Military Councils of the 28th and 3rd Guards Tank Armies on setting up posts on the roads leading to Berlin to temporarily detain the population returning to the city
The German civilian population, who fled Berlin when our troops broke through there, is currently returning to Berlin in droves. Along with the civilian population are disguised prisoners of war, Volkssturm soldiers, and police.
All this can lead to increased resistance in the city, increased espionage, and complicate the cleanup of the city.
I order:
Until the complete liberation of Berlin, do not allow the return there of citizens who previously fled the city.
Posts should be set up on the roads leading to Berlin to ensure that the population returning there is detained and sent for temporary residence in cities and villages located beyond a 25-kilometer zone from the front line.
Konev
Krainyukov
RF. F. 236. OP. 2712. D. 346. L. 165. Original.
No. 122. From the intelligence report of the headquarters of the 1st Ukrainian Front on enemy actions for the period from April 15 to April 30, 1945.
1. Combat activity of enemy troops
During the second half of April, the troops of the 4th TA and part of the forces of the enemy's 9th Army fought heavy defensive battles with our advancing troops.
Since the morning of April 16, in the southern section. Gubena, north In Görlitz, the enemy, with units of the 342nd Infantry Division, 545th Infantry Division, and the Brandenburg Infantry Division, with fire and infantry counterattacks, stubbornly resisted the advance of our troops. By the end of the day, in a number of areas the enemy was thrown back from the first line of trenches.
In an effort to prevent the success of our troops from developing, the enemy, during April 16–18, hastily transferred to the breakthrough site: 21 TD, TD "G. Goering", TD "Fuhrer's Guard", 10 SS TD, 20 TD, 275 Infantry Division and strong infantry attacks supported by 20-40 tanks tried to delay the advance of our troops.
As a result of the fighting, by 20.04 the troops of 4 TA and 9 A were cut up. A tank group consisting of subunits and units of the 10th SS TD, 21st SS TD, and the Fuhrer's Guard TD with a total number of up to 4000–5000 people, up to 100 guns and over 25 tanks was surrounded in the Spremberg area.
The enemy, trying to rescue the encircled group, transferred 214 infantry infantry from the 1st Belorussian Front to the Cottbus area, 344 infantry infantry from the left flank to the southwest area. Spremberg unsuccessfully tried to assist the encircled units.
The enemy, having lost the ability to organize resistance, in subsequent battles under the blows of our troops continued to retreat to the west, north. and sowing - app. directions.
As a result of our units entering the Berlin area and the river. Elbe, front troops, together with troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, completed the encirclement of units and formations of the 9th Army in the southeast region. Berlin, consisting of eleven infantry divisions (303, 169, 712 Infantry, 32 SS Infantry, Regener Infantry, 391st Guard Division, 36 SS Infantry, 342, 275, 214 Infantry, 35th SS Police Division), two motorized divisions (23 SS MD, Kurmark MD), divisional group 21 TD, five brigades, four separate infantry and two artillery regiments, six departments. art. divisions and up to forty different departments. battalions, with a total number of up to 90,000 soldiers and officers, over 1,400 guns, up to 100 tanks and SU and up to 500 mortars.
Subsequent strikes by our troops, together with the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, on April 24, 1945, completed the encirclement of the enemy’s Berlin group.
Trying to delay the further advance of the advancing troops, the enemy sent six hastily formed infantry divisions to the active sector of the front (18th Infantry Division, Friedrich Infantry Division, Saxony Infantry Division, Theodor Kerner Infantry Division, Scharngorst Infantry Division, von Hutten Infantry Division) and two divisions (1 apd, 9 aad), withdrawn from the area east of Berlin.
At the same time, in the Görlitz area, the enemy regrouped troops, transferred units of the 17th Infantry Division, 72nd Infantry Division, 20th Infantry Division, and the G. Goering" to the northern region. - app. Gerlitz and for 11 days took active actions in a northern direction.
As a result of 15 days of stubborn fighting, the troops of 4 TA and 9 A were thrown back from the river line. Neisse 100–140 km in a western direction, and in the section Wittenberg, Meissen - to the west bank of the river. Elbe.
During the battles from 16 to 30.04, the enemy was driven out of the cities of Forst, Cottbus, Miskau, Weyaswasser, Rothenburg, Niski, Lübben, Lubenau, Goyerswerda, Senftenberg, Falkenberg, Potsdam, Wittenberg, Essen, Torgau, Riesa, Grossenhain, from the southwest. and south the outskirts of Berlin, from the inner ring of defense of the city and on April 30 fought in the center of Berlin.
In the area of Breslau, the encircled enemy units fought stubborn defensive battles and were knocked out of sixty-seven city blocks and nineteen other objects.
In the center and on the left wing of the front, the enemy continued to defend the previous lines during the second half of April, in some areas he fought to improve the positions he occupied and carried out reconnaissance with up to an infantry company.
Enemy aviation, in groups of up to 24 aircraft, operated against our troops, transported cargo in single aircraft to the encircled Breslav group and conducted reconnaissance of the battlefield, roads and rear facilities. Over 3,000 aircraft sorties were recorded. In air battles and by fire, 301 enemy aircraft were shot down.
2. LOSSES (from 15 to 29.4.45)
Tanks and SU
Destroyed
1067 (destroyed and shot down)
Captured
Conclusions:
1. On the right wing of the front, troops of 4 TA and part of the forces of 9 A fought stubborn defensive battles.
In an effort to delay the successful advance of our troops, from April 16 to April 30, the enemy transferred thirteen divisions to the active sector of the front, of which: five tank divisions (10 SS tank divisions, 20, 21 tank divisions, Fuhrer's Guard division, G. Goering division), seven infantry (214, 275 Infantry Division, Friedrich Infantry Division, Saxony Infantry Division, von Hutten Infantry Division, Scharngorst Infantry Division, Theodor Kerner Infantry Division), one motorized division (18 infantry division), three assault gun brigades, three separate tank battalions, three special brigades, two art. shelf, ten art. divisions, fourteen different regiments and one hundred and seven separate battalions.
2. As a result of the battles, nine divisions were defeated: 10 SS TD, 21 TD, Fuhrer's Guard TD, Brandenburg MD, 36 SS Infantry, 545 NGD, 342, 275, 214 Infantry, one brigade of assault guns, two art. min. brigades, three special brigades, one tank destroyer brigade, four detachments, two anti-tank battalions, six anti-aircraft divisions, eight different regiments and sixty separate battalions.
3. As of April 30, the following continue to apply in front of the front:
eighteen infantry divisions (Von Hutten Infantry Division, Scharngorst Infantry Division, Theodor Kerner Infantry Division, Friedrich Infantry Division, Saxony Infantry Division, 17, 72 Infantry Division, 6 NGD, 20 Infantry Division SS Estonia, 100 LPD, 208 , 359, 269 Infantry, 31 Infantry SS, 45, 168, 254 Infantry, 609 Don), one motorized division (18 Infantry Division); two tank divisions (TD "G. Goering", 20 TD), two anti-aircraft divisions (17 and 10 air defense), twelve different brigades, three divisional groups (div. gr. 344 Infantry Division, 545 NGD, MD "Brandenburg"), one otp, eight dep. art. regiments, thirteen divisions. art. divisions, six departments ptd, six departments zen divisions, twenty-two departments. regiment and one hundred and sixteen different battalions and combat groups.
Chief of Staff of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Army General I. Petrov
Chief of the RO Staff of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Major General Lenchik
RF. F. 236. Op. 2721. D. 159 L. 141–143, 158–160. Script.
No. 123. Certificate from the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 3rd Guards Army on enemy losses for the period from April 16 to April 28, 1945.
Army troops for the period from 16.4. by 28.4.45 the following losses were inflicted on the enemy:
For the beginning RO headquarters of the 3rd Guards. TA Guards Lieutenant Colonel Mikhalev
RF. F. 236. Op. 2721. D. 166. L. 260. Original.
No. 124. Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to the commander of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts on the establishment of new demarcation lines and the attack on Prague
The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:
1. Establish from 24.00 on May 6 the following demarcation line between the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts: to Lübben the same and further to Wittenberg, for the 1st Ukrainian Front inclusive.
2. The commander of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, no later than May 4, replace the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in their new demarcation lines, using for this the vacated armies of the left wing of the front (3rd, 69th and 33rd armies).
3. The commander of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, no later than May 3, complete the liquidation of the encircled group of Germans in the area east of Luckenwald and clear the enemy from the territory of Berlin in their border lines. After the change, the troops of the right wing of the front should be used for a rapid offensive in the general direction of Prague. The advanced units of the front's right wing reach the river. Mulde. 4. Report the orders given.
Headquarters of the Supreme High Command
I. Stalin
Antonov
RF. F. 3. Op. 11556. D. 18. L. 132. Copy.
No. 125. Combat order from the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front to all army commanders on the need to prioritize the capture of airfields during the offensive
[To] prevent German planes from flying to the west, I order:
1. When attacking, first of all capture airfields and aircraft in the front zone.
2. During the surrender of the Germans, throw mobile units, tanks, infantry guns on vehicles to the remaining airfields to capture aircraft, radios, and equipment.
3. Report [about] execution.
Konev
Krainyukov
RF. F. 236. Op. 2712. D. 346. L. 190. Original.
No. 126. Combat order from the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the commander of the 4th Guards Tank Army on the immediate capture of the village of Beneshov
I order you to immediately occupy Benesov (20 km southeast of Prague). Prevent the Germans from withdrawing to join the Allies. Stop the celebrations [in] Prague.
Report [about] execution.
Konev
Krainyukov
RF. F. 236. Op. 2712. D. 346. L. 198. Original.
No. 127. Order of the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the Military Councils of armies and individual corps on the creation of barrage posts for the collection and capture of German military personnel
Military personnel of the defeated and capitulated German units are moving in groups along roads and populated areas without any security. Without being captured, they go home. I order: immediately organize barrage posts to collect, capture and send them to prisoner-of-war camps.
Konev
Krainyukov
Shaver
RF. F. 236. Op. 2712. D. 346. L. 203. Original.
No. 128. Order from the commander of the “Russian Liberation Army” to all personnel to immediately defect to the side of the Red Army
I am with the commander of the 25th Tank Corps, General Fomin. I order all my soldiers and officers who believe in me to immediately go over to the side of the Red Army.
The servicemen of the 1st Russian Division of Major General Bunyachenko, who are located at the location of Colonel Mishchenko's tank brigade, are immediately transferred to his disposal.
Everyone is guaranteed life and return to their homeland without reprisals.
Lieutenant General Vlasov
RF. F. 236. OP. 2727. D. 30. L. 184. Original.
No. 129. Report from the commander of the 25th Tank Corps to the Military Council of the 1st Ukrainian Front about the capture of the commander of the ROA Vlasov A.A.
1. The 25th Tank Corps, operating from the Hořovice area, west of Prague, to the south and southwest with the task of pursuing the retreating enemy of the defeated SS troops and units of the ROA Vlasov, by 12.00 on May 11, the advance detachment reached the western outskirts of Klatovy , with the main forces in the area of Nepomuk. Having reached the indicated areas, the corps penetrated deeply into the location of American troops, thereby creating a difficult situation for the enemy, who had the intention of bypassing our units and surrendering to American troops.
Further advance of the corps was suspended due to the fact that the command of the American units considered the indicated areas to be their border.
After meeting with the American units, I decided to stop the corps and set up ambushes, pickets, and conduct reconnaissance on the main directions and road junctions with the task: in case of detection of SS units and Vlasovites, destroy and capture.
2. Through reconnaissance in the area of Brzeznice and to the west, as well as from interviews with captured Vlasovites, it became known that in this area there was Vlasov’s 1st division under the command of former General Buyanichenko and Vlasov’s headquarters led by him.
Having such data, I set the command of 162 TB the task of finding and capturing Vlasov at any cost. And if he ends up at the disposal of American units, then steal Vlasov.
Having this task, the units searched for the division headquarters and Vlasov.
3. On May 11, 1945, the 162nd Tank Brigade, commanded by Colonel Mishchenko, established that the 1st Vlasov Division and its headquarters were located in Brezhi and the surrounding area of Brezhi.
At 16.00 on May 12, 1945, Colonel Mishchenko set the task for the commander of the mechanized battalion of the 162nd Tank Brigade, Captain Yakushev, to go to the location of the 1st ROA Division and capture Vlasov with his headquarters and the division commander Buyanichenko.
South of 2 km of Brezhi, Captain Yakushev met the commander of the 2nd battalion of the 3rd regiment of the 1st ROA division, Captain Kuchinsky, who indicated that a column of passenger cars was ahead with the division headquarters, where Vlasov himself was located.
Captain Yakushev overtook the convoy in his car and blocked the road with his car.
In the first stopped car, the division commander Buyanichenko was found, to whom Comrade. Yakushev offered to follow him, but Buyanichenko categorically refused.
At this time, Vlasov soldier Kuchinsky informed Captain Yakushev that Vlasov was in the same column.
4. After the first inspection by comrade. Yakushev did not find Vlasov, but one of the convoy drivers showed the car in which Vlasov was.
Approaching Vlasov’s car, comrade. Yakushev found Vlasov covered with a blanket and obscured by the translator and the woman sitting in the car.
On the orders of Comrade Yakushev, Vlasov refused to get off the car and follow him to the headquarters of the 162nd Tank Brigade, citing the fact that he was going to the headquarters of the American army and was located at the location of American troops.
Only under the threat of execution Comrade. Yakushev forced Vlasov to get into the car. On the way, Vlasov tried to jump out of the car, but was detained.
Following to the location of the brigade headquarters, comrade. Yakushev met the brigade commander, Comrade. Mishchenko. Comrade Yakushev handed Vlasov over to Colonel Mishchenko.
Vlasov in a conversation with comrade. Mishchenko again stated that he had to go to the headquarters of the American army.
5. After a survey and conversation with Vlasov, I suggested that he write an order to all units to surrender their weapons and come over to our side.
Vlasov agreed and immediately wrote the order with his own hand.
Vlasov's order was printed in 4 copies and again signed by Vlasov.
He immediately reported Vlasov’s capture to the commander of the 13th Army and to front headquarters.
At 22.00 on May 12, 1945, Vlasov, accompanied by the chief of staff of the 25th Tank Corps, Colonel Zubkov, and the head of SMERSH counterintelligence, Lieutenant Colonel Simonov, was sent to the headquarters of the 13th Army, where on May 13 he was transferred to the SMERSH counterintelligence department of the 13th Army.
2 days later, on May 15, the commander of the 1st division Buyanichenko, the chief of staff of the division Nikolaev, the officer for special assignments Olkhovik, and Vlasov’s personal translator Ressler were captured.
6. As a result of the capture of Vlasov on May 13 and 14, 1945, the 1st Division of 9 thousand people was disarmed.
5 tanks, 5 self-propelled guns, 2 armored personnel carriers, 3 armored vehicles, 30 passenger vehicles, 64 trucks, 1378 horses were taken.
Commander of the 25th Tank Corps of the Guard, Major General T/V. Fominykh
Chief of Staff Colonel Zubkov
RF. F. 236. Op. 2727. D. 30. L. 180–182. Script.
No. 130. Directive from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to the commander of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front to conduct an operation to force the river. Oder. No. 11062. April 6, 1945
No. 131. Report of the Military Council of the 2nd Belorussian Front to the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft on the occupation of the island of Bornholm (Denmark) and the political problems that arose in connection with this. May 14, 1945 14.05
No. 132. From the report on the combat operations of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front for April - May 1945 - brief results of the combat activities of the front troops in the Oder operation and the surrender of German troops in the front offensive zone. February 20, 1946
No. 133. Certificate from the operational department of the headquarters of the 2nd Belorussian Front on the number of released prisoners of war and civilians for the period from April 20 to May 9, 1945... May 10, 1945
No. 134. Certificate from the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 2nd Belorussian Front on enemy losses for the period from April 29 to May 15, 1945... May 1945
06.04.2015 - 0:01
Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk is completely confused about who liberated whom during World War II.
Before the noise had time to subside after Yatsenyuk’s sensational accusation against the bloody aggressor of the USSR, who treacherously attacked Ukraine and Nazi Germany, at a meeting of the Ukrainian government, Yatsenyuk was indignant that Russia was “illegally arrogating to itself the victory over fascism.” According to the politician, the lion's share of 40% of the total losses of the USSR in the Second World War belonged to Ukraine.
“Russia, which is trying to carry out revisionism and revision of history, declares that Russia won the Second World War without Ukraine, does not have the right to privatize the common struggle against Nazi Germany”, Yatsenyuk said on March 31.
However, already on the first of April, having arrived in Germany on a visit, Yatsenyuk remembered a different mantra and again started talking about how valiant Ukraine was holding back the hordes of Russian barbarians who were ready to wipe out German statehood from the face of the earth and build the Berlin Wall again.
Yatsenyuk’s behavior is the apotheosis of postmodernism: not everyone can afford such a ferocious game of meanings and construction of phrases today. Or rather, not only not everyone can afford it, few people can do it.
In connection with the unsinkable topic around the Ukrainian essence of the 1st Ukrainian Front, we propose to thoroughly understand, based on documents, who fought as part of the Ukrainian Front:
Falsifiers of history in a new way
Surely everyone has already set their teeth on edge by the conversation about the “great historical discoveries” of two “merry fellows” from Poland and Ukraine, who, as if on command in unison, announced that the composition 1st Ukrainian Front who liberated Poland and all of Eastern Europe from German Nazism, there were often Ukrainians, and not just Ukrainians, but heroic lads from the Zhitomir and Lvov regions. The fact that this was a deliberate provocation, of course, is obvious to everyone, especially since the first “merry fellow” graduated from the Faculty of History University of Wroclaw, and the second’s dad is an associate professor of history Chernivtsi National University. However, nevertheless, we cannot ignore this obvious provocation, especially in the year 70th anniversary of the Great Victory.
This kind of provocation has been accompanying the victory of our people and the role of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War for decades. Suffice it to recall the perestroika fables of Mr. A. N. Yakovleva and Co. regarding “secret protocols” 1939 years, or what August 23, 2009 The European Parliament, by an overwhelming majority of votes, established a new pan-European “holiday” - “Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Stalinism and Nazism”, deliberately timing its proclamation to coincide with the 70th anniversary of the famous Soviet-German “Non-Aggression Pact”, better known as the “Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact” "
Meanwhile, it has long been well known what a vile role the Western “democracies” played in the pacification of German Nazism when they signed with A. Hitler and Rome "Pact of Concord and Cooperation" (1933), and the Anglo-German Treaty "On Naval Armaments" (1935), and criminal Munich Treaty (1938)…
And now, in essence, a new provocation of the fascists G. Schetyn and A. Yaitsenyuk.
As is known, 1st Ukrainian Front- operational-strategic unification of Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War, - was formed October 20, 1943 year based on the order of the Supreme Command Headquarters dated October 16, 1943 by renaming Voronezh Front as part of the 13th, 27th, 38th, 40th, 47th, 60th combined arms armies, the 3rd Guards Tank Army and the 2nd Air Army. Subsequently, at various times until the end of the war, it included: 1st, 3rd and 5th Guards, 6th, 18th, 21st, 28th, 31st, 52nd and 59th Combined Arms Armies, 1st and 4th Guards, 1st, 2nd, 4th and 6th Tank Armies, 8th Air Army and 2nd Army of the Polish Army.
From the moment of its transformation until the surrender of Nazi Germany, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front took an active part in many major operations in the final stage of the war, carried out on the territory of Ukraine, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Germany, including Kyiv, Zhitomir-Berdichev, Korsun-Shevchenko , Proskurov-Chernigov, Rivne-Lutsk, Lviv-Sandomierz, Sandomierz-Silesian, Lower Silesian, Upper Silesian, Berlin and Prague offensive operations.
June 10, 1945 year, on the basis of an order from the Supreme Command Headquarters, the front was disbanded, and its field administration was reorganized into the administration of the Central Group of Forces of the Armed Forces of the USSR.
Over the entire period of its existence, three commanders stood at the head of the front: a native of the Voronezh province, army general Nikolai Fedorovich Vatutin(October 1943 - March 1944), native of Kaluga province, Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov(March - April 1944) and a native of the Vologda province, Marshal of the Soviet Union Ivan Stepanovich Konev(May 1944 - June 1945).
During the same period, the chiefs of staff of the front were: a native of the Smolensk province, Lieutenant General Semyon Pavlovich Ivanov (October - November 1943), a native of the Kazan province, Lieutenant General Alexander Nikolaevich Bogolyubov (November 1943 - April 1944), a native of the Grodno province, Army General Vasily Danilovich Sokolovsky (April 1944 - April 1945) and a native of the Oryol province, Army General Ivan Efimovich Petrov (April - June 1945).
Finally, the members of the Military Council of the front were: a native of the Kursk province, Lieutenant General Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev (October 1943 - August 1944) and a native of the Saratov province, Lieutenant General Konstantin Vasilyevich Krainyukov (October 1943 - June 1945).
Thus, almost the entire leadership of the 1st Ukrainian Front, i.e. 9 marshals and generals, were natives of the Great Russian provinces, and only one person, Army General V.D. Sokolovsky, was born not in the Great Russian province, but on the territory that during the Russian Empire it belonged to the category of Western Russian provinces.
Moreover, all these persons, even Comrade. N. S. Khrushchev, who so loved to show off in Ukrainian embroidered shirts, wrote “Russian” in the nationality column in all his profiles. In a similar way, their nationality was indicated in all personal profiles, autobiographies and award lists.
Now let's see what the national composition of the army commanders of the 1st Ukrainian Front was, taking into account their actual location (operational subordination) to this front.
13th Combined Arms Army (October 1943 - June 1945) - commander, native of Kaluga province, Colonel General Nikolai Pavlovich Pukhov.
27th Combined Arms Army (October 1943 - February 1944) - commander, a native of the Oryol province, Colonel General Sergei Georgievich Trofimenko.
38th Combined Arms Army (October 1943 - November 1944) - commander, Colonel General Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko, a native of Yekaterinoslav Province.
40th Combined Arms Army (October 1943 - February 1944) - commander, a native of the Volyn province, Colonel General Philip Feodosievich Zhmachenko.
47th Combined Arms Army (October 1943 - February 1944) - commander, a native of Kostroma, Lieutenant General Vitaly Sergeevich Polenov.
60th Combined Arms Army (October 1943 - April 1944) - commander, native of the Kyiv province, Colonel General Ivan Danilovich Chernyakhovsky.
3rd Guards Tank Army (October 1943 - June 1945) - commander, a native of the Kharkov province, Colonel General of Tank Forces Pavel Stepanovich Rybalko.
2nd Air Army (October 1943 - June 1945) - commander, a native of the Mogilev province, Colonel General of Aviation Stepan Akimovich Krasovsky.
Later, the composition of the 1st Ukrainian Front changed several times and at different times the following armies were included in its operational control:
1st Guards Army - (November 1943 - August 1944) - commander, native of the Don Army Region, Colonel General Andrei Antonovich Grechko.
3rd Guards Army (April 1944 - June 1945) - commander, a native of the Ufa province, Colonel General Vasily Nikolaevich Gordov.
5th Guards Army (July 1944 - June 1945) - commander, a native of the Oryol province, Colonel General Alexey Semenovich Zhadov.
6th Combined Arms Army (December 1944 - June 1945) - commander, native of Tiflis (Tbilisi), Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseevich Gludzovsky.
The 18th Combined Arms Army (November 1943 - August 1944) was commanded by a native of the Kutaisi province, Colonel General Konstantin Nikolaevich Leselidze, and after his death in February 1944, a native of the Chernigov province, Lieutenant General Evgeniy Petrovich Zhuravlev.
1st Combined Arms Army (January-June 1945) - commander, native of Simbirsk province, Colonel General Dmitry Nikolaevich Gusev.
28th Combined Arms Army (April-June 1945) - commander, native of Kyiv, Lieutenant General Alexander Alexandrovich Luchinsky.
31st Combined Arms Army (April-June 1945) - commander, a native of the Kazan province, Colonel General Pyotr Grigorievich Shafranov.
52nd Combined Arms Army (October 1944 - June 1945) - commander, native of the Kharkov province, Colonel General Konstantin Apollonovich Koroteev.
59th Combined Arms Army (December 1944 - June 1945) - commander, a native of the Saratov province, Lieutenant General Ivan Terentyevich Korovnikov.
1st Guards Tank Army (November 1944 - June 1945) - commander, a native of the Moscow province, Colonel General of Tank Forces Mikhail Efimovich Katukov.
2nd Guards Tank Army (April 1945 - June 1945) - commander, a native of St. Petersburg, Colonel General of Tank Forces Semyon Ilyich Bogdanov.
4th Guards Tank Army (February 1944 - June 1945) - commanded by a native of the Simbirsk province, Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Vasily Mikhailovich Badanov, and after his serious injury in March 1944, a native of the Don Army Region, Colonel General of Tank Forces Dmitry Danilovich Lelyushenko
8th Air Army (July-August 1944) - commander, native of Samara province, aviation lieutenant general Vasily Nikolaevich Zhdanov
2nd Army of the Polish Army (March-June 1945) - commander, Warsaw-born General of Armor Karol Świerczewski
Thus, from 25 army commanders - 14 the generals were natives of the Great Russian provinces and the Don Army Region, whose territories after the revolution became part of the RSFSR, 2 generals were natives of the Caucasus, which became part of the Georgian SSR, 7 generals were natives of the Little Russian and Novorossiysk provinces, which during the years of Soviet power became part of the Ukrainian SSR , and 1 general each were natives of ethnic Poland and the Mogilev province, which later became part of the Belarusian SSR. As for the ethnic composition of these persons, judging by personal files, various profiles and autobiographies, as well as award lists, 16 generals were Russian - V. M. Badanov, S. I. Bogdanov, V. A. Gludzovsky, V. N. Gordov, D. N. Gusev, A. S. Zhadov, V. N. Zhdanov, E. P. Zhuravlev, M. E. Katukov, I. T. Korovnikov, K. A. Koroteev, A. A. Luchinsky, V. S. Polenov, N. P. Pukhov, S. G. Trofimenko, P. G. Shafranov, Ukrainians 6 generals - A. A. Grechko (although in the encyclopedia he is listed as Russian), F. F. Zhmachenko, D. D. Lelyushenko, K. S. Moskalenko, P. S. Rybalko, I. D. Chernyakhovsky, Belarusian - General S. A. Krasovsky (although in the encyclopedia he is listed as Russian), Georgian - General K. N. Leselidze and the Pole - General K. Sverchevsky.
It should be noted that almost all Ukrainian generals most likely became such during the period of the so-called forced "Ukrainization", held on the territory Ukrainian SSR V 1920 's former "Borotbists" (Svidomo Social Revolutionaries), who formed the core of the entire party and state apparatus of the Ukrainian SSR, - head of the press department Central Committee of the Communist Party (b)U A. A. Khvyley, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and Chairman State Planning Committee of the Ukrainian SSR G. F. Grinko, People's Commissar of Justice and Prosecutor of the Ukrainian SSR N. A. Skrypnik, People's Commissar of Finance of the Ukrainian SSR M. N. Polozom, People's Commissar of Education of the Ukrainian SSR A. Ya. Shchumsky and Chairman of the Kyiv Provincial Executive Committee P. P. Lyubchenko, when all bearers of “Little Russian” surnames ending in “chuk”, “ko” and “o” were recorded in the category of “Ukrainians”. Although, it is quite obvious that such an ending to the surname initially did not carry an ethnic load. Suffice it to remember that one of the khan’s commanders Uzbek (1312–1342) there was someone Fedorchuk, who went on a ruinous campaign against Tver in 1327, and was a close boyar of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich Matvey Bogdanovich Khitrovo, whose ancestors also came from the Golden Horde.
Meanwhile, all this information is not a “closed secret”, and is available to anyone not only from archival documents (personal files and award lists of Soviet commanders), which are available not only in Central (Podolsk) Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, and at the Research Institute (military history) of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, but also in various printed publications, for example, “The Great Patriotic. Commanders. Military biographical dictionary" M., 2005.
Armies, 3rd Guards Tank and 2nd Air Armies. Subsequently it included the 1st, 3rd, 5th Guards, 6th, 18th, 21st, 28th, 31st, 52nd, 59th armies, 1st and the 4th Guards, 1st, 2nd, 4th and 6th Tank Armies, 8th Air Army and 2nd Army of the Polish Army.
From November 3 to November 13, 1943, front troops carried out the Kyiv strategic offensive operation, during which they liberated Kyiv on November 6 and advanced west from the Dnieper to 150 km. Then, on November 13 - December 22, 1943, they carried out the Kyiv defensive operation, as a result of which they thwarted the plans of the German command to recapture Kiev and eliminate the strategic bridgehead of Soviet troops.
Subsequently, December 24, 1943 - January 14, 1944, front troops carried out the Zhitomir-Berdichev operation, moving forward almost 200 km, deeply enveloping the German Army Group South from the north and creating favorable conditions for organizing offensive operations on the Right Bank Ukraine.
In the winter of 1944, the troops of the left flank of the front, in cooperation with the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, participated in the Korsun-Shevchenko operation (January 24 - February 17), as a result of which over 10 enemy divisions were surrounded and destroyed. At the same time, the armies of the right flank carried out the Rivne-Lutsk operation (January 27 - February 11, 1944) and took an advantageous position to strike the flank and rear of the German Army Group South from the north. The main forces of Army Group South were defeated in March - April by troops of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts.
Having carried out the Proskurov-Chernivtsi operation (March 4 - April 17, 1944), the front troops reached the Carpathians and, in cooperation with the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, cut the strategic front of the German troops into two parts.
In the summer of 1944, during the Lvov-Sandomierz strategic operation (July 13 - August 29), the German army group “Northern Ukraine” was defeated, the western regions of Ukraine, the south-eastern regions of Poland were liberated from the enemy, and a large Sandomierz bridgehead was captured on the left bank of the Vistula .
In the winter of 1945, front troops carried out the Sandomierz-Silesian operation (January 12 - February 3), during which the southern regions of Poland were liberated, the Oder was crossed and military operations were transferred to German territory. In February, as a result of the Lower Silesian operation (February 8 - 24), front troops reached the Neisse River and took up an advantageous position for an attack on Berlin.
In the second half of March 1945, the troops of the left flank of the front carried out the Upper Silesian operation (March 15 - 31), surrounded and then destroyed the Oppeln and Ratibor enemy groups.
In April - May 1945, front troops participated in the Berlin Strategic Operation (April 16 - May 8), and then in the Prague Strategic Operation (May 6 - 11), during which the defeat of the German armed forces was completed.
The front was disbanded on June 10, 1945 on the basis of Directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 11096 of May 29, 1945; its field department was reorganized into the department of the Central Group of Forces.
On July 6, 1944, the 1st and 2nd cavalry mechanized groups were formed as part of the front to participate in the Lvov-Sandomierz strategic operation.
Troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front participated in the following operations:
- Strategic Operations:
- Berlin Strategic Offensive Operation 1945;
- Vistula-Oder strategic offensive operation of 1945;
- East Carpathian strategic offensive operation of 1944;
- Dnieper-Carpathian strategic offensive operation of 1943-44;
- Kyiv strategic offensive operation of 1943;
- Lviv-Sandomierz strategic offensive operation of 1944;
- Prague strategic offensive operation of 1945.
- Front-line and army operations:
- Bukrinskaya offensive operation of 1943;
- Upper Silesian offensive operation of 1945;
- Dresden-Prague offensive operation of 1945;
- Zhitomir-Berdich offensive operation of 1943-44;
- Carpathian-Dukla offensive operation of 1944;
- Carpathian-Uzhgorod offensive operation of 1944;
- Kyiv defensive operation 1943;
- Korsun-Shevchenko offensive operation of 1944;
- Cottbus-Potsdam offensive operation 1945;
- Lviv offensive operation of 1944;
- Lyutezh offensive operation of 1943;
- Lower Silesian offensive operation of 1945;
- Operation to expand the bridgehead in the Sandomierz area in 1944;
- Proskurov-Chernivtsi offensive operation of 1944;
- Rivne-Lutsk offensive operation of 1944;
- Sandomierz offensive operation of 1944;
- Sandomierz-Silesian offensive operation of 1945;
- Stanislav offensive operation of 1944;
- Sudetenland offensive operation 1945;
- Stremberg-Torgau offensive operation of 1945.