The main problems of the creation and development of the EAEU. At the same time, there are objective obstacles to the expansion of the EAEU and deepening integration within its framework

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INTRODUCTION

On January 1, 2015, a new interstate integration organization emerged on the geopolitical map of the world - the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which united the Republic of Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation. During the year, the EAEU was replenished with two new members - the republics of Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. The EAEU is a fundamentally new object of socio-economic research; for this reason, the study of the nuances of its creation and functioning, as well as its place in the global process of globalization, is of great scientific interest.

Eurasian economic community is an international economic organization that is endowed with functions that are associated with the formation of common external customs borders of its member countries (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan), the development of a common external economic policy, tariffs, prices and other components of the common market. The organization, which became the legal successor of the Customs Union, was created in full accordance with the principles of the UN and the norms of international law. This is a clearly structured system with a rather rigid mechanism for making and implementing any decision. Union and its officials use the privileges and immunities necessary to perform the functions and achieve the tasks provided for by the agreement on the formation of the Eurasian Economic Union and treaties operating within the borders of the Union. The EAEU was created to effectively promote the processes of formation by member states of the Customs Union of the Common Economic Space, coordinating their approaches to integration into the world economy and the international trading system. One of the main vectors of the organization’s work is ensuring the dynamic development of the Community countries with effective use their economic potential in the interests of increasing the standard of living of the population.

The main goal of the work is to consider the prospects for the development of the Eurasian Economic Union.

This paper examines the prospects and problems of development of this Eurasian Economic Union, issues of integration within the Eurasian Economic Union, as well as its interaction with other CIS countries and far abroad. It is shown that the main problem of integration within the Eurasian Economic Union is the dominance of redistribution over production. The scale of oil and gas transfer from the Russian Federation to partners in the EAEU and the impact of the tax maneuver on its size are considered. It is shown that the creation of mechanisms for the redistribution of profits within the Eurasian Economic Union will contribute to the implementation of favorable economic effects from the conclusion of free trade agreements with non-CIS countries. The risks for the Eurasian Economic Union in connection with the introduction by the Russian Federation of a unilateral ban on the import of food products from countries on the sanctions list are considered.

1. EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION: HISTORY, FEATURES, PROSPECTS

Eurasian European integration sanctions

1.1 Stages of formation and development of Eurasian economic integration

The creation of the Eurasian Economic Union was the result of the Eurasian integration process, which was being prepared within the framework of the CIS, the Customs Union, and the EurAsEC. The development of Eurasian economic integration can be divided into two stages: the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space, as well as the EAEU stage. After the adoption of the Customs Code of the Customs Union in 2009, the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation functioned from 2010 to 2011. Its distinctive features were: firstly, the Unified Customs Tariff, as well as uniform measures for regulating external trade with third countries, and secondly, the free movement of products across the territory of member countries without customs declaration and state control (transport, sanitary, veterinary and sanitary , quarantine, phytosanitary), thirdly - the mechanism for crediting and distributing amounts of import duties, their transfer to the budgets of member countries (87.00% - Russian Federation, 7.25 - Kazakhstan, 4.65 - Belarus, 1.1% - Armenia).

The formation of the Customs Union made it possible for its participants to increase mutual trade turnover by 72.8% in two years, significantly reduce customs costs and form a common market for products with the exception of medicines, electricity, oil and gas. Per share Russian Federation accounted for from the total customs duties, more than 87% determined by it. In this connection, the existing procedure for transferring customs duties replenishes the budgets of the member countries of the Customs Union, and now the Eurasian Economic Union, at the expense of customs duties collected at the borders of the Russian Federation.

The success of the Customs Union has enabled its members to rise to higher high level integration: to form a single economic space from 2012 to 2014. Thanks to this, it became possible, firstly, the implementation of a coordinated macroeconomic policy to form a common market not only for products, but also a common market for services, capital and labor, and secondly, the formation of the Eurasian economic commission as a regulatory body for the creation of a single economic space and, thirdly, assigning the functions of the Eurasian Court to the EurAsEC Court in the format of judges from three countries.

About 20 interstate integration treaties and agreements covering issues became the foundation of the legal framework of the single economic space customs regulation, technical regulations, state and municipal procurement, development of competition, financial interaction, etc. As a result, in 2012 there was a positive dynamics of mutual trade turnover (Figure 1) and the active development of industrial cooperation, the formation of joint ventures (in 2015 only in Belarus there were 5,000 joint ventures with the Russian Federation, in Kazakhstan - 5,800). But the reserves inherent in the common product market were largely exhausted, barriers to economic cooperation remained (as of January 1, 2015, there were 300 barriers), the efficiency of the executive and judicial bodies of the common economic space was hampered by the lack of an internationally recognized integration organization. Because the Eurasian Economic Commission was no longer a body of the EurAsEC and, in legal terms, turned out to be a regulatory body without an organization. Which was probably the reason for the drop in mutual trade turnover in 2013-2014.

The adoption of the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union made it possible to give Eurasian integration the proper international legal form. The Eurasian Economic Commission and the EurAsEC Court received the necessary legal personality as bodies of the Eurasian Economic Union. At this stage of Eurasian integration, 71 barriers were removed and a program was outlined for the gradual, until 2025 inclusive, removal of the remaining barriers (229). As a result, over a relatively short period of time, economic cooperation between the member countries of the Eurasian Economic Union has successively passed through four levels of integration: zone free trade, Customs Union, single economic space, incomplete economic union, which formed the prerequisites for the creation of a full economic union, including a Monetary Union.

Figure 1. Volume of mutual trade between Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation

The basis of the Eurasian Economic Union is the principles of sovereignty, equality, voluntariness and economic interest. State powers delegated to the bodies of the Eurasian Economic Union are exercised on the principles of equality and consensus (all five countries have equal representation in the Council and Board of the Eurasian Economic Commission, as well as in the court of the Eurasian Economic Union). In addition, the action or inaction of the Eurasian Economic Commission can be challenged by states, as well as business entities in the Court of the Eurasian Economic Union.

As a result of the increase in members of the Eurasian integration, changes in deduction standards occurred customs duties: The Republic of Armenia receives 1.11% of all customs duties in the Eurasian Economic Union, the Republic of Belarus - 4.56, the Republic of Kazakhstan - 7.11, the Kyrgyz Republic - 1.9, the Russian Federation - 85.32%.

At the same time, it is obvious that the absence of a parliamentary structure of the Eurasian Economic Union, firstly, complicates the work on harmonization and unification of state legislation, and secondly, increases the role of national parliaments in this activity. The Eurasian Economic Union should manifest itself in full by the beginning of 2026, when common markets for medicines and medical equipment (2016), electric power (2019), and oil and gas (2024-2025) will be gradually formed. By 2025, it is planned to form a financial center of the Eurasian Economic Union in Astana. The creation of the parliamentary structure of the Eurasian Economic Union is postponed to a later date.

Over 10 years, by 2025, the GDP of the states of the Eurasian Economic Union due to the integration effect alone should presumably increase by 20%. This will, of course, be supported by targeted development within Eurasian competition based on the formation of equal economic conditions for business structures and employees of member countries of the Eurasian Economic Union. For example, competition among customs services has significantly accelerated and simplified customs clearance of goods. Competition between jurisdictions causes the flow of capital into states with best conditions management. For example, VAT in Kazakhstan is approximately 12%, in the Russian Federation - 18%, in Armenia - 20%. It is likely that, over time, Eurasian tax legislation will need to be harmonized and even unified.

There are a number of problems in the customs area. They were clearly manifested in the situation with the lack of a solidary reaction of the EAEU states to anti-state sanctions. Goods prohibited in the Russian Federation began to enter our market under the guise of transit or Eurasian goods. In this case, the rule for determining the origin of the goods was violated. If there are at least 50% of own costs in the goods of a subject of Eurasian economic integration. Obviously, the packaging of Norwegian salmon is not a sufficient condition for classifying it as a Eurasian product. For this reason, the priority task is to develop and adopt by 2016 the Customs Code of the Eurasian Economic Union instead of the Customs Code of the Customs Union in force since 2010. The new code needs to minimize references to national legislation, reflect new advanced customs technologies and provide for joint actions in the face of sanctions from third countries. In particular, to ensure the priority of electronic declaration of goods in relation to paper, the prompt re-establishment of the customs services of the three countries and the free admission of partners for control at the customs border of the EAEU.

The reserves for growth of mutual trade turnover associated with the common market for products of the Eurasian Economic Union have largely been exhausted. Seizures so far include alcohol, medicines, electricity, oil and gas. For this reason, priority must be given to the creation of a common market for services, capital, and labor. Which, in turn, presupposes mutual recognition of national licenses, convergence of investment conditions, administration methods, and business conditions in general. It is necessary to ensure a national regime of social and medical security for Eurasian workers.

1.2 EAEU and its geopolitical partners

At the end of 2011, the US government officially announced that it would oppose the formation of the EAEU, which it is implementing in practice. Consequently, the US activity in promoting the European orientation of the CIS states and all kinds of opposition to their Eurasian integration is explained by its interest in eliminating for Europe a Eurasian alternative to US resources and maintaining political tension in the world. In the events in Ukraine, the United States is fighting not for its European choice, but for the American choice of Europe. In this sense, the European orientation of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia is actually pro-American in nature and contradicts the fundamental long-term interests of the EU and the EAEU in the formation of a common European home from Lisbon to Vladivostok.

Extralegal economic sanctions of the European Union in relation to the Russian Federation, blocking the integration of the European Union with the EAEU determine the intensification of interaction between the Eurasian Economic Union and the states of Southeast and South Asia. Of particular importance is ensuring the confluence of the construction of the EAEU and the Silk Road Economic Belt. In this case, we are talking not only about the formation of a global transport corridor from Shanghai to the European Union through Moscow, but also about the development of cooperation with the People's Republic of China in all areas of the economy, the formation in the future of a common economic space of the Eurasian Economic Union - China. The first step towards this will be the adoption of an appropriate trade and economic agreement.

The choice of the Eurasian Economic Union as the main direction of the Silk Road economic belt is not accidental. Other options are: transit through the southern Caspian Sea, which is complicated by the fact that cargo must pass through an area of instability and conflict, and transit through the Caspian Sea is complicated by the lack of infrastructure and the need to cross many borders. Railway and car tracks from China to Western Europe through Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation are the safest, since there are no customs borders between Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation.

According to some expert estimates, the implementation of the Silk Road Economic Belt project will take 30 years and $7 trillion, and 60 states should be involved in this project. High-speed highways should unite the 28 states of the Silk Road economic belt. This project is intended to redraw the map of world business and throw the United States and Europe to the impoverished outskirts of the Atlantic Ocean.

The lack of infrastructure is a significant obstacle to expanding the export of mineral raw materials and agricultural goods of the Russian Federation to Asia. Today, transporting products from China to Europe via the southern sea route takes 45 days or more, and via the Trans-Siberian Railway - 18-20 days; along the Lianyungang - Hamburg highway through Kazakhstan 11-13 days Shanghai Cooperation Organization: model 2014-2015: workbook. No. 21/2015/ S. G. Luzyanin (director) and others; Ch. ed. I. S. Ivanov; Russian Council By international affairs(RIAC). M.: Spetskniga, 2015. P. 20. . China's implementation of large infrastructure projects on the territory of the states of the Eurasian Economic Union will have a stimulating effect on their economies during a period of decline. In this case, the competition of the new global transport infrastructure with the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Northern Sea Route will stimulate domestic investment in development and modernization.

Another geopolitical integration direction is the Transport Union of India, Iran and the Russian Federation, an agreement on which was signed in 2000 in St. Petersburg. After the lifting of sanctions against Iran this project can work at full capacity. As a result of the creation of Greater Eurasia, the EU’s interest in integration with the EAEU will rise significantly and we can predict the formation of the world’s leading association of integration unions, covering more than 54 million km with a population of about 4.5 billion people. What is significant is that the center of such an association will objectively be the EAEU itself.2 And this is not only about the geographical location of the Eurasian Economic Union. Even more significant is that our Union unites the cultural values of Western Europe and Asia.

Protestant (predominant in Western Europe and North America) culture - the culture of work as the basis of wealth, frugality, respect for law and morality, giving independence from the country, freedom of private initiative, protection of property, played a special role in the development of industrial capitalism. But now, as noted in a number of publications by foreign sociologists and economists, Western European civilization is experiencing a deep crisis. Research from the University of Cambridge showed that these are not only problems in the economy, but also about the growth of selfishness and permissive behavior, especially among senior managers and bankers, about a decrease in the self-identification of Europeans as Christians and a decrease in trust in religion in general, as well as in traditional political parties.

The crisis of Euro-Atlantic civilization and the existing system of government in many Muslim states is taken advantage of by extremism, which advocates the formation of a global caliphate with the help of jihad and forces that help the internal decay of the “civilization of infidels.” By these forces we mean Western and pro-Western “human rights activists”, essentially defending terrorists, and radical liberals, shaking the foundations of their countries, just as the Bolsheviks did in the Russian Federation during the First World War. The European bureaucracy, instead of instilling in immigrants respect for the cultural values of their countries, often, with the help of subsidies, receives parasites who hate the country that sheltered them. Various views of globalization have socio-economic roots international terrorism, for this reason, without the permission of these different views, it is impossible to defeat this evil of the 21st century.

Unlike Western European practice, the Eurasian concept, Eastern European in nature, is based on the centuries-old experience of peaceful coexistence and cooperation of peoples professing Christian, Muslim, Buddhist and Jewish religions. These peoples did not arrive from other states and not recently, but lived and worked together for centuries. The two main religions of Eurasia in terms of numbers of adherents - Orthodoxy and Islam, with all theological differences, have a fundamentally common feature that distinguishes them from Western Christianity - an orientation towards collectivism rather than individualism, rejection of the desire to increase wealth by any means, respect for the role of the country in conditions of a harsh continental climate and continuous external military threats.

Consequently, the EAEU, as the embodiment of European and Asian culture, with European priority, geographically, culturally, and, in the long term, economically, acts as a center uniting all parts of Greater Eurasia. But the success of the “integration of integrations,” as well as the success of our own Eurasian integration, is possible only under the condition of the active economic growth of each state of the Eurasian Economic Union. Eurasian integration can mitigate the miscalculations of domestic economic policy, but not replace it. A productive national economy of each EAEU state is a condition for the success of their integration efforts.

1. 3 On the Eurasian and European paths of integration in the CIS

The Eurasian Economic Union is the largest in terms of territory integration association with a potential market capacity of 4-4.2% of global GDP. The formation of the Eurasian Economic Union gives rise to the possibility of a geopolitical choice among CIS states not participating in it between associated relations with the European Union or full participation in the Eurasian Economic Union. In this case, the Eurasian Economic Union was established by the most successful CIS states: the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and Belarus, which, according to purchasing power parity, have per capita GDP of 25.6 thousand dollars, 24.2 thousand and 18.1 thousand dollars, respectively. The signatories Association agreements with the European Union of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, this figure amounted to only 8.6 thousand dollars, 7.5 and 5 thousand dollars, respectively.

The main difference between participation in the Eurasian Economic Union and association with the European Union is that in the Eurasian Economic Union the principle of equality of members prevails, and association with the European Union presupposes the dominance of the European Union. Thus, the formation in accordance with the Association Treaty of Ukraine with the European Union led the latter to the loss of its sovereignty in external economic activity. Now Ukraine’s decisions in this area must be approved by the Association Council, where Ukraine has only 50% of the votes, i.e. the European Union can block foreign economic decisions of the Ukrainian government. At the same time, the Association Council with Ukraine does not have any powers to influence relevant decisions of the European Union.

Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have been members of the association with the European Union for more than a year. They have taken on such obligations. Initially, have a free economic zone with the European Union (i.e. fully open your national markets). This forces the Russian Federation to introduce the same most favored nation treatment towards members of the association as for member countries of the Eurasian Economic Union (introduction of customs duties, quotas and restrictions). At the same time, countries that are not members of the European Union and have a free trade zone with it received unilateral access for their products to Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. As a result, for example, in the markets of Chisinau, Turkish grapes began to displace local products. Also, members of the association are obliged to switch to European technical regulations and phytosanitary standards, which leads to the destruction of Russian industry, loss of markets in Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and the Russian Federation and makes production cooperation with companies of the Eurasian Economic Union impossible. Thirdly, members of the association must switch to European standards in the field of migration. This, on the one hand, makes possible a visa-free tourist regime for three months in the European Union (Moldova has already received such an opportunity), on the other hand, it leads to increased migration control on the part of the Russian Federation, the main importer of labor migrants from Moldova and Ukraine.

Figure 2. - GDP per capita (PPP) of countries participating in the Eurasian Economic Union and members of the association with the European Union, 2014 (in dollars, according to the World Bank)

The results of the first year of the association for Moldova are mass protests of the population against the authorities, and in Ukraine there is a drop in foreign trade turnover with both the European Union (over 7 months of 2015 by about 30%) and with the CIS (over the same period - almost 60%). In other words, as a result of association with the European Union, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine did not gain new markets, but lost old markets. For this reason, the choice of the Republic of Armenia, which abandoned the Association in favor of membership in the Eurasian Economic Union, is logical.

When determining future geographical boundaries the Eurasian economic space needs to overcome two extremes. On the one hand, the desire to expand these boundaries is unjustified without the candidate state fulfilling all the necessary conditions, the main one of which is bringing the legislation of the candidate state into line with the legal framework of the EAEU. It is necessary to take into account the experience of the EU, when, based on the principle of the priority of politics over economics, its borders expanded to include states that were not ready for European unification. This in turn sharpened the differing views between western, central and southern parts of Europe.

On the other hand, the statement that “many Commonwealth states have already passed the “point of no return” to participation in integration processes is also unfounded.” In principle, it is wrong to deprive any CIS states and their peoples of the historical prospect of deep integration with the Russian Federation, Belarus and Kazakhstan. In this case, in practice, the connection of candidate states to Eurasian integration, as they are ready, can be multi-stage: free trade zone, Customs Union, Common Economic Space, full-fledged Eurasian Economic Union.

“Point of no return” for the integration of a number of CIS countries for a long time their entry into the World War was considered trade organization without agreeing in this case on customs tariffs with the main trading partner - the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia became full members of the Eurasian Economic Union, although their conditions for joining the WTO differed significantly from the conditions for Russia and Kazakhstan joining this international organization. The “European-associated” choice of the political elites of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, largely imposed from outside, can radically change by the will of the people, and these states then have the right to claim full participation in the Eurasian Economic Union.

2. PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS OF THE Eurasian Economic Union AT THE PRESENT STAGE

2.1 Different views Eurasian Economic Union and ways to resolve them

The economy of the Eurasian Economic Union has a number of significant nuances that distinguish Eurasian integration from European integration. The EAEU, initially, unites states - exporters and importers of resources. In contrast, the EU unites only resource importing states, i.e., this association of states poor in natural resources. Also, the EAEU formed states with a low level of monetization of the economy, and the EU united states with a significant level of monetization.

As a result, business entities in the EAEU have advantages, since they acquire inexpensive resources at domestic prices of exporting states. In the EAEU, resources are purchased at world prices. But credit resources in the EAEU are provided at higher interest rates than in the EU. This attracts some CIS countries to participate in European Union, despite the obvious advantages of the Eurasian choice.

For the success of the Eurasian unification, a number of different views must be brought to consensus. Let us consider in more detail the features of the territorial, sectoral and financial contradictions of the Eurasian Union.

Territorial and sectoral features determine two groups of different views in the Eurasian Economic Union: between exporters and importers of resources and between exporters. The first group of contradictions is manifested in the interest of importers to resell resources purchased at domestic prices outside the borders of the Eurasian Economic Union at world prices.

The different views of resource importers are reflected in different export duties. Thus, in the Russian Federation, the duty on the export of oil, given its significant price, was 10 times higher than the similar duty in Kazakhstan, in the Russian Federation, the duty on the export of scrap metal was 9 euros, and in Belarus there was none at all. Without the permission of these views, it is impossible to form a common market for electricity, oil and gas, that is, to ensure equal business conditions for the business of various states of the Eurasian Economic Union in the fuel and energy complex. It is possible to bring to a consensus different views between exporters and importers of resources by crediting export duties to the budget of the states of the Eurasian Economic Union - importers of resources (this practice took place in a number of cases in 2015 when exporting oil products produced from domestic oil). To resolve different views between resource exporters, it is important to agree on convergence in the level of export duties.

But all these are half-measures, implemented at the expense of the budgets of states that export resources and are of a non-systemic nature. It would be possible to follow the path of EU practice and transfer the main part of export duties to the EAEU budget. After which these funds could be directed to integration programs approved in the budget. But in the Eurasian Economic Union, unlike the European Union, there is not yet a common budget created not only through shared contributions of participants, but also through the delegation of part of national income to the integration center. For this reason, it is possible to radically solve the problems of the different views under consideration only by aligning the level of domestic prices for resources to the level of world prices, using all kinds of tax maneuvers (for example, increasing the mineral extraction tax). In this case, all economic entities in the Eurasian Economic Union will indeed be placed in the same conditions, and the national budgets of the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan will benefit. But energy costs will increase for all Eurasian companies, which will at the same time stimulate energy efficiency. This will take some time, for this reason the common electricity market is scheduled to be formed by 2019, and the oil and gas markets in 2024-2025.

Another problem of the Eurasian Economic Union is the reduced level of monetization of the economies of the participating countries, established as the ratio of the M2 money supply to GDP. It fluctuates in the Eurasian Economic Union from 11.7% in Belarus to 42.7% in the Russian Federation. The lack of finance leads, on the one hand, to significant interest rates on loans, and on the other hand, to the dollarization of the economy. All this increases the speed of money circulation and redistributes financial resources from the real economy to the trade and financial area. Even for infrastructure projects implemented by Rosatom, RusHydro, InterRao in the states of the Eurasian Economic Union, the Russian Federation allocates loans in dollars, not rubles.

Figure 3. Level of monetization in the CIS countries (M2: GDP)

The shortage of money supply causes the weak development of the common capital market, the formation of joint companies, and the implementation of infrastructure projects.

The accumulated direct investments of the Russian Federation at the end of 2013 amounted to 20.01 billion dollars, including in Armenia - 2.2, in Belarus - 7.9, in Kazakhstan - 9.27, in Kyrgyzstan - 0, 64 billion dollars. This, of course, is not enough for a successful large-scale Eurasian unification.

The level of monetization in the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan is 42.7 and 20%. This is significantly less than in China and Japan - 195 and 245%. For this reason, China and Japan really need to accumulate gold and foreign exchange reserves, cooling the national economy. In the Russian Federation, the existing $360 billion is quite sufficient and instead of accumulating gold and foreign exchange reserves, it is necessary to implement non-cash money emission. This conclusion, in our opinion, is also true for Kazakhstan, whose level of gold and foreign exchange reserves per capita exceeds the domestic one. Monetization of the economies of the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan will significantly intensify not only the mutual trade of the states of the Eurasian Economic Union, but also develop production cooperation and form joint companies.

The reciprocal of the level of monetization of the economy is the velocity of circulation of the money supply M2. The speed of financial turnover in an economy depends on its reproductive structure. It is normal when this value is in the amount of one revolution per year or a maximum of two. But we also do not observe such a situation in the economy of the Eurasian Economic Union, and in particular in the Russian Federation. Despite the positive trend towards a decrease in the velocity of money circulation, its level has not yet reached not only the normal, but even the threshold value.

Table 1 - Monitoring of mutual investments in the CIS countries (2014) Monitoring of mutual investments in the CIS countries 2014. EDB Center for Information Studies, 2014.

Figure 4. Level of monetization in the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, China and Japan (M2: GDP)

Figure 5. Velocity of money circulation M2 in the Russian Federation.

If the economy has a huge specific gravity accounts for high-precision engineering and high-tech products, and also provides extensive investment support for fundamental scientific studies, then the rate of financial turnover slows down, since these industries have a long production cycle. If the economy produces mainly consumer goods and services, the rate of financial turnover increases, since the production cycle in these industries is relatively short.

Laid out in the early 1990s. The model of demonetization of the Russian economy has not yet been eliminated for 25 years. Even on this moment the velocity of circulation of the money supply is 2.34 times, and previously the values were 9, 8, 7 times. With such significant turnover, it is impossible to ensure an equilibrium state of the economy and develop its real sector, including the area of high-tech and innovative goods. In such conditions, financial resources go to the financial and banking area (and then mainly to the interbank market and the currency exchange), to the area of trade, and also to the area of the virtual economy. “Extra” liquidity is transferred abroad. In such a situation, the market is dominated not by Russian or Eurasian goods, but by imported consumer and industrial goods. This is the paradox that when there is a shortage Money Within the state, the Russian and a number of other states of the Eurasian Economic Union, the banking system helps foreign producers of goods.

Figure 6. Dynamics of GDP growth, M2 monetary base and inflation in the Russian Federation as a percentage of the previous year

Opponents of the monetization of the Eurasian economy believe that inflation depends only on the volume of the money supply, and are confident that by reducing the volume of the money supply, they also reduce inflation, but practice does not confirm this. Of course, inflation correlates with an increase in the money supply, but initially, it depends not only on this factor; there is also a non-monetary reason for the formation of inflation. Figure 6 clearly shows the relationship: with an increase in the level of monetization of the economy, the rate of increase in GDP increases and the rate of increase in inflation decreases.

From 1999 to 2013, an increase in monetization by 3.53 times (from 12.1 to 42.7%) determined the growth of the real volume of GDP of the Russian Federation by 2.06 times. Note that the main foreign exchange earnings due to the increase in oil prices began in 2005, when the price of oil was $54.4 per barrel, and before this period it was in the amount of $20-30. In other words, for 2000- 2004 average annual rates The growth in real GDP amounted to 107.2% and was the most significant in the history of the Russian Federation in the 21st century, despite relatively low energy prices. In 2014, the increase in monetization stopped, or rather, remained at the same level, and for this reason, the increase in GDP in 2014 was only 0.6%.

Under the conditions of Western sanctions, the policy of Import substitution makes money emission extremely popular: Import substitution should be based on the policy of replacing foreign currency loans with ruble ones. In this case, we propose to carry out the issue in a non-cash form to finance investment projects of Russian and Eurasian commodity producers, the selection of which should take place on a competitive basis, with the help of refinancing by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation of commercial banks that meet certain criteria and are able to provide a multiplier effect from the non-cash money issue. Only this will allow increasing the monetization coefficient to a normal level, providing a quick and reliable source for the development of Russian and Eurasian production, replenishing the revenue side of the federal budget, and renewing investment financing. innovative projects, to develop the necessary competition that undermines the monopoly of imported products and, as a result, a decrease in prices over time, will ensure the protection and stability of the ruble and, with appropriate actions in Kazakhstan, the tenge. If the emission for imports is carried out correctly, it can be calculated using share premiums rather than foreign exchange earnings.

Note that monetization in the Russian Federation has significant territorial features. With a shortage of money supply, it is unevenly distributed across the regions of the country and is overly concentrated in Moscow and the Moscow region (65% of the total). Consequently, if the state average level of the monetization coefficient is 42.7%, then in the capital it clearly exceeds optimal rate(70%), and in other regions it is significantly less than this average level. Accordingly, when compared with the rest of the state, an inflated monetary demand has formed in Moscow, stimulating an increase in inflation.

For this reason, money emission should be aimed not only at additional financing of priority sectors, but also at supporting the regions of the Russian Federation and joint Eurasian projects. This, in our opinion, implies, initially, an increase in the role of regional banks in the financial and credit system, as well as the orientation of capital banks towards lending to regional and Eurasian programs. As a result, inflation will decrease and the levels of wages and prices in different parts of the state will be equalized. This, in turn, will reduce internal and external migration to Moscow and St. Petersburg and provide more uniform distribution labor resources and production across the territory of the Russian Federation, will smooth out the disproportions between the standard of living of the urban and rural population. Lending to Eurasian projects will also reduce migration to the Russian Federation from other states of the Eurasian Economic Union and ensure convergence of living standards of the population different parts union.

By stimulating an increase in profits, without disturbing in this case the proportion between the increase in labor productivity and wages, we will be able to ensure internal effective demand - the main engine of economic growth. Investment through the issue of additional significant Russian funds in priority sectors, production and social infrastructure of regions and states of the Eurasian Economic Union will create incentives for foreign direct investment in the real sector of the economy and will increase the demand for Russian currency.

The advantage of the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, and other states in the Eurasian Economic Union is that if the West has already used all its “trump cards”, and the PRC and the “Asian” tigers have problems with overheating of the economy, then in the Eurasian Economic Union there are no problems associated with either with one situation or another, he still had both potential and resources. Having made the right conclusions from world practice, having successfully brought the monetization of the economy to normal parameters, the states of the Eurasian Economic Union are able to take their rightful place in the international division of labor. With chronic demonetization of the economy, no other sources without monetization will be able to ensure sustainable economic growth and Eurasian integration.

Creation of conditions for increasing the role of national currencies in mutual settlements, reducing the volume of dollarization, improving payment and settlement relations between states, carrying out an agreed monetary policy, elimination of imbalances in the conduct of monetary policy are essential directions for deepening Eurasian economic integration. The result of the strengthening and development of the monetary system of the Eurasian Economic Union and, first of all, its leading national currencies - the ruble and the tenge - will be the formation of a payment system, and then monetary union EAEU. This will make it possible over time to transform the future financial center of the Eurasian Economic Union into a Eurasian Central Bank providing loans commercial banks Eurasian Economic Union at a low interest rate. A powerful basis for financial stability and modernization of the monetary system is formed by the colossal national wealth of the Russian Federation, which, according to the World Bank, amounts to $60 trillion (for comparison, the national wealth of the United States is estimated at $24 trillion) Statistics. Economic statistics. National wealth. www.Grandars.ru. Taking into account the national wealth of Kazakhstan, Belarus, and other member states, the EAEU will take a leading position in the world economy.

It is also necessary to take into account the fact that China, as well as other BRICS states, are forming an international financial system alternative to the Western one. The extensive use of the yuan in international payments in the future will lead to a radical weakening of the ability of the United States and the European Union to exert pressure on the Russian Federation and other countries of the world by introducing economic sanctions. In this case, we cannot allow the “dollarization” of the economies of the Eurasian Economic Union to be replaced by their “yuanization.” For this purpose, it is necessary to speed up the work on the formation of the Eurasian Monetary Union on the basis of a common Eurasian currency.

2.2 Prospects for integration

Discussion of the likely integration of the Russian Federation as a member of the EAEU with third countries intensified in 2011-2012, when the prospects for concluding agreements on free trade zones with New Zealand, Vietnam and the ASEAN states began to be discussed. Later, negotiations began on concluding a trade agreement with the European Free Trade Association (which includes countries such as Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, Liechtenstein), and in 2014 - with Israel. The possibility of forming free trade zones with India and the United States was discussed. Trade and economic integration with the European Union has been discussed since the Russia-EU summit in 2005. So far, none of these agreements have been signed, and some negotiations (with countries such as Norway, Switzerland, New Zealand, the USA, the EU) have been suspended, or did not even start for political reasons.

If we analyze the results of any trade agreements of the EAEU states with different partners, then, as in the case of other trade agreements, in addition to the general favorable impact on welfare due to a decrease in inefficiency due to the mutual weakening of trade restrictions, it is necessary to take into account industry effects, which, very significantly differ in the short and long term. For specificity, we will talk about lowering import duties, but the presented logic may well be applied to any type of trade restrictions, for example, to non-tariff barriers that have become increasingly significant in recent years.

In the short term, the reduction of customs duties on the import of goods within the borders of free trade zones causes four main effects:

a) increasing the real profit of the economy by lowering prices both for final-use products and for investment and intermediate products used Russian industry in production activities;

b) switching consumption from products produced in the EAEU and other countries to products of a partner in free trade zones;

c) an increase in the import of goods from the state - a partner in free trade zones and the displacement of Russian production, which, in turn, determines the redistribution of labor and capital from less productive industries to more productive ones;

d) partial compensation for the decrease in demand for Russian goods by increasing profits.

In the long term, lowering barriers, which increases profits and welfare, ensures an increase in savings and investment, which leads to a further increase in production in any sector, which can compensate and cover the decline due to increased imports of goods. In addition, increased competition stimulates increased efficiency, which causes increased productivity and production.

The quantitative effects of one or another free trade zone for the economy and different sectors of each member of the EAEU will depend on the existing value of zero duties, the sectoral structure of production and consumption, the sectoral structure of trade with each other and with the partner in the free trade zones. It is significant that the transfer of issues of joint trade policy to the supranational level means, in particular, that a trade agreement can only be concluded with the EAEU in general, and its terms will equally apply to each member of the EAEU. This may lead to the fact that, under specific conditions, despite a favorable outcome for the entire EAEU, some of the participants may face losses from such integration. The fact is that trade flows within the EAEU for some of its members can be reoriented to states that are partners in the trade agreement.

For regions separate state these losses can be compensated by internal budget transfers. In the EAEU, trade policy has been partly brought to the supranational level, but not budget policy; for this reason, for the full operation of the EAEU and the development of integration with other states, a mechanism for income redistribution is needed, which is not prescribed in the EAEU, although the redistribution of resources within the EAEU is present on a large scale (see. higher).

Today, one of the most popular and sought-after tools for analyzing the results of concluding trade agreements is a computational general equilibrium model (Computable General Equilibrium, CGE). The structural equations of this model reflect the general equilibrium in all markets, which makes it possible to analyze the impact of various foreign economic changes on the national economy. The most popular models assume perfect competition and capital accumulation.

The modeling assumes that imported products are differentiated, divided by national origin and state, and also imputes elements of monopoly power, which is exercised through their tariff rate. As a result of lowering tariffs, significant effects may arise from changes in the terms of trade due to the weakening of monopoly power. The differentiation of products of one industry depending on the state of origin (including Russian ones) is modeled using a function with constant elasticity of substitution (CES). With this form of aggregation of composite consumer products, Russian and imported products will not be completely either substitutes or compliments: in any equilibrium, all products are simultaneously consumed in strictly positive quantities. This property of the CES function allows us to model unequal costs for Russian and imported products and is consistent with the actual situation in which both Russian and imported substitute products are consumed in almost all countries.

Agreements on free trade zones, which imply only the mutual zeroing of import duties (the first stage of serious economic integration), provide favorable economic effects for the EAEU in general and for the Russian Federation in both the short and long term. From the point of view of the impact on the gross product, the largest income for the Russian Federation, which is quite natural, is achieved in free trade zones with the most significant trading partner - the European Union (about half of the total trade turnover) - from 15 billion (=0.8% of GDP) in short-term to $40 billion in the long term (=2.0% of GDP).

Other probable agreements give less significant results: the income of the Russian economy from free trade zones with the states of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) - from 6 billion (=0.3% of GDP) in the short term to 19 billion dollars (=0.9% of GDP) in the long term; from free trade zones with the states of the ASEAN bloc - respectively, from 1.5 billion (=0.08% of GDP) to 4.5 billion dollars (=0.25% of GDP); from free trade zones with Vietnam - respectively from 0.3 billion (=0.02% of GDP) to 0.9 billion dollars (=0.05% of GDP). Free trade zones with other countries bring in less income as a result of small trade turnover with them: in the long term, free trade zones with Israel will give the Russian Federation up to 250 million, with New Zealand - up to 50 million dollars.

Kazakhstan can also expect favorable effects in both the long and short term. But the same cannot be said about Belarus. If free trade agreements with developing countries give it favorable results, then free trade zones with developed countries mainly have a negative impact on the Belarusian economy due to the structure of the export of Belarusian goods to Russia, which will be greatly affected by the liberalization of the trade regime as a result of a shift in demand from the Russian Federation from Belarusian products to the products of partner states. Belarus may suffer the greatest losses from the free trade zones of the Customs Union with the European Union and the TPP states - up to $400 million; the smallest - from free trade zones with New Zealand - up to $ 4 million. It is clear that the losses of Belarus are significantly less than the income of the Russian Federation, not to mention the total income of the economies of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan, for this reason, resolving issues of income redistribution within the EAEU is necessary condition for integration with developed countries. At the same time, it is necessary to take into account the insufficiency of this condition: in order to develop integration with non-CIS countries in the investment sphere, it is desirable to create competitive industries and improve the investment climate within the EAEU.

It is possible to compensate for potential losses to Belarus from EAEU agreements with developed countries, for example, by temporarily changing in its favor the standards for the distribution of profits from import duties. At the same time, mutual transfers within the EAEU, despite their scale, are not taken into account when making any decision on free trade zones. Belarus, along with the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan, is a full member of the EAEU and has the right of veto on any significant issue. This led, for example, to the Belarusian side blocking in 2012 the formation of free trade zones with New Zealand, losses from which would initially appear in the dairy industry, financed, among other things, from resources received from the oil and gas transfer of the Russian Federation. At the beginning of 2014, the parties envisaged concluding an agreement with New Zealand precisely through the Russian Federation’s acceptance of an obligation to purchase Belarusian oil in the volumes desired for this state. A. Knobel. Economic issues. 2015. No. 3. P. 87--108.

2.2 Problems of the EAEU under sanctions

The ideology of an integration association with integration no less than a customs union is based on such main principles as:

1) coordinated trade policy in relation to other states;

2) creation and functioning of the customs territory. The use of retaliatory sanctions by the Russian Federation since August 2014 against food producers from countries such as the USA, EU, Australia, Norway and Canada, in the absence of such decisions in Belarus and Kazakhstan, violates the first basic principle: the trade policy of the EAEU members is becoming less coordinated. In this case, questions arise about the supply of goods from the above states to our country through the territory of two other members of the EAEU.

In the general design of the EAEU, this situation contradicts the functioning of the common customs territory, since when crossing the external customs border, products must move freely within the integration association. Under the new conditions, Belarusian products can be imported into our country without restrictions from Belarus, but food products from countries on the sanctions list are not allowed. The determination for all products, whether it is Belarusian or not, in the CIS is in practice regulated by the rules according to which a product is considered manufactured in the territory of a CIS state or the Customs Union if it is sufficiently processed or the cost of materials of foreign origin does not exceed 5% of the cost of the final product.

After Vladimir Putin’s recent visit to Central Asia, observers began talking about the possibility of expanding the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) at the expense of Tajikistan. Five years have passed since the Common Economic Space was created, and seven years since the creation of the Customs Union. What are the prospects for expanding and deepening the EAEU today?

At present, the prospects for both deepening integration into the EAEU and expansion seem very doubtful. As for enlargement, even potentially the only possible new member of the EAEU remains Tajikistan. Tajikistan’s accession to the EAEU, firstly, most likely, will not bring any additional economic benefits to the current members of the organization, and, secondly, apparently, does not arouse enthusiasm among the leadership of Tajikistan itself. Even from the point of view of geopolitical influence, Tajikistan’s accession to the EAEU does not necessarily strengthen Russia’s position in relation to this country - on the contrary, Russia loses the opportunity to threaten Tajikistan by tightening the migration regime for Tajik workers in the Russian Federation.

As for deepening integration, as far as one can judge, firstly, a number of EAEU countries fundamentally reject the possibility of deepening integration interaction (for example, Kazakhstan has repeatedly made it clear that no forms of political integration in the EAEU are acceptable for this country), and secondly, even on those issues where there is no fundamental opposition to deeper integration, redistributive conflicts between countries make reaching consensus impossible. Thus, deepening integration is possible only in some areas (for example, electric power), but we are hardly talking about a fundamental strengthening of the integration group. On the contrary, in recent years the positions of some supranational structures (for example, courts) have clearly weakened.

The above, however, does not mean that the future of the EAEU should be interpreted exclusively in black terms. The EAEU is, despite all the contradictions, a functioning customs union with a high degree of customs tariff harmonization. Countries still refrain from fundamental restrictions on domestic trade (for example, in 2015, Kazakhstan did not impose customs duties on Russian imports after the ruble depreciated), except on politically critical issues (for example, Russian food sanctions).

There are few examples of customs unions similar to the EAEU in the world. In other words, the EAEU certainly does not meet the expectations of those who saw in this organization an analogue of the EU or a qualitatively new “center of power” in the global economy; but it is a functioning institution of international cooperation in Eurasia, which has a significant impact on economic relations between member countries.

What significant positive effects are you seeing?

From the point of view of the classical effects of regional integration (trade creation), as far as one can judge, the effects of the EAEU are currently small. This is not surprising - in conditions of crisis in the member countries, one cannot, in principle, count on rapid growth in trade. In addition, it should be understood that even potentially small countries can benefit from the EAEU - for Russia, for example, due to the small size of other EAEU economies, the benefits from economic cooperation are small.

Perhaps the main potential factor that would allow the EAEU to provide positive influence on the economies of the member countries is the fact that the EAEU (with all the reservations) still “ties the hands” of the member countries, not allowing them to take measures based on excessive protectionism, rent-seeking or the influence of lobbyists. Over the past years of the work of the CU and the EAEU, there have been many cases when countries were forced to agree to a compromise, abandoning trade restrictions that they would otherwise have introduced. In other words, the advantage of the EAEU is not even in the positive agenda of this organization, but in the fact that it does not allow negative scenarios to materialize.

You mentioned the asymmetry of markets. To what extent is it a limiting factor of the EAEU?

In principle, there are no obstacles to the existence of customs unions of asymmetrical economies - the oldest customs union in the world, the South African Customs Union, is characterized by even greater asymmetry than the EAEU. However, in doing so, the integration organization must solve three problems.

First, as already mentioned, the benefits for the largest country in such a situation always remain limited - and this may reduce its interest in the structure. Secondly, if in integration group redistribution mechanisms arise, they inevitably become asymmetrical - the main costs are borne by the largest country (regional paymaster). Thirdly, asymmetry of economies leads to asymmetry of power, and this already scares away small countries that are afraid of excessive influence of a large country on decision-making in the structure.

In the EAEU, the first problem, as far as one can judge, is absent - Russia is interested in the functioning of the structure (albeit due to non-economic considerations - in Russia the EAEU is perceived as an element of its high geopolitical status). The second problem can become significant when internal economic problems in Russia itself, which might be unable to fulfill the function of regional paymaster.

The third problem is attracting increased attention in discussions about the EAEU. Today, apparently, the situation looks like this. With the exception of some politically significant issues (primarily related to the conflict between Russia and the EU), Russia is ready to “give in” to small countries in the EAEU, since for the Russian leadership the very existence of the EAEU is an important goal. In other words, in a “standard situation”, when Russia does not view certain EAEU decisions through the prism of geopolitical conflicts, it so highly values the need to maintain the EAEU that it is ready to support the functioning of the decision-making procedure in the EAEU, based on consensus.

In one of your interviews, you said that anti-Russian sanctions could turn the EAEU into a formal structure. Are your words confirmed?

The scale of Western sanctions today is such that they have not led to the exclusion of Russia from the world economy. This means that their impact on the EAEU remains limited (with the exception of the entire range of topics related to food anti-sanctions - they remain a constant topic of conflict).

A much more serious factor, potentially capable of making the EAEU a purely formal structure, turned out to be the growing passivity of the supranational bureaucracy - today EAEU officials are often so eager to avoid conflicts that in a situation of any contradictions they prefer to transfer the decision to the political level, which, of course, reduces efficiency organizations.

Is there any evidence that the EAEU helps the development of small and medium-sized businesses and industry in Russia? There have been separate reports that some enterprises in Russia have successfully reoriented themselves from the local Russian market to the EAEU market and, although the economic situation remains generally difficult, have they at least managed to secure their niches in the unified market?

First of all, most small and medium-sized businesses in Russia are focused exclusively on regional or local markets. Therefore, regional integration as such is not for them important factor. But even for relatively large companies that could reorient themselves to the EAEU markets, the economic crisis is a dominant factor - they must adapt to new situation long-term stagnation, which is now more important than changes associated with the EAEU. In other words, with the exception of some innovations in the field of regulation emanating from the EEC, small and medium-sized businesses in Russia face such challenges that the EAEU simply turns out to be not a very important factor.

How do you assess the situation with mutual investments in the EAEU? EDB statistics indicate some stability in this area in the EAEU, compared to the wider CIS market, but there has not been impressive growth. Is this a worrying sign that private investors do not yet value the EAEU highly enough, coupled with a decline in foreign FDI into the region?

The same applies to Russian foreign direct investment - the Russian economy is experiencing a crisis, and in such conditions, investments abroad are declining or stagnating. This is not a sign of problems of the EAEU as an institution - rather, the point is that the member countries (and especially Russia) are now experiencing serious economic difficulties, and the regime for regulating cross-border investment flows in such a situation is not fundamental.

Are the factors attracting foreign FDI and reciprocal FDI the same (political environment, sustainable legislation, rule of law, etc.)?

Yes, it seems to me that the fundamental factors for attracting FDI do not change. The EAEU has created certain opportunities for “arbitrage” - investors look for a country with the most favorable regulatory requirements and use it as an entrance to the EAEU market as a whole. But since the EAEU market as a whole is now unattractive (again, due to economic problems), the advantages associated with the creation of the EAEU do not fundamentally change the situation.

How do you assess the prospects for “integration from below” (you devoted to this in 2008) in Central Asia, provided that Uzbekistan, with its current leader, begins a more open policy towards its neighbors?

As for integration from below, in Central Asia, it seems to me that it is worth distinguishing between its two forms. The first is connections at the level of informal business networks, cross-border trade, etc. It existed even under tough regimes, and will certainly begin to intensify with increasing openness. The second is investments from relatively large business structures. These exist now only in Kazakhstan, but since the economic situation in this country is problematic, it does not seem to me that companies in this country are now ready to intensify their investments abroad. In addition, the main thing for integration from below is not political liberalization, but economic reforms, and for now there is little reason to assert that Uzbekistan is ready to, say, significantly denationalize its economy.

In general, my general comment on all your questions probably boils down to one phrase: in the current conditions of the economic crisis and the very likely long-term stagnation for business interaction, the specifics of the EAEU’s work are simply not very important. Companies cannot afford to expand abroad, develop new markets, etc. If the economic situation stabilizes, then the openness of markets through the EAEU may be useful, but for now there is no reason to expect an improvement in the economic situation.

IN last days February, Russian President Vladimir Putin made official visits to a number of post-Soviet Central Asian republics: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

It can be considered that the trips were made as part of further cooperation within the framework of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), since Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (along with Armenia and Belarus) are already members of this union, and Tajikistan is currently negotiating accession to this organization.

Thus, discussion of the problems and prospects of the EAEU was on the agenda of Putin’s meetings with the three Central Asian leaders. It should be noted that the idea of creating a Eurasian union was first voiced more than 20 years ago by Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev. Since then, several attempts have been made to form something like a single economic space within the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Since 2011, V. Putin has been involved in the implementation of the plan. On January 1, 2015, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, which were members of a pre-existing economic bloc called the Customs Union, formed the EAEU. The next day, Armenia joined the organization, and in August of the same year, Kyrgyzstan joined it.

However, the economic situation that prevailed at the time of the creation of the EAEU did not allow its members to experience the immediate results that they initially expected. This was largely predetermined by the impact of the economic crisis on Russia, as well as the deterioration of relations between Russia and the West.

However, some features within the new union turned out to be very useful for its individual members. Thus, positive changes associated with the status of labor migrants from Kyrgyzstan in Russia are obvious. They now compare favorably with the status of migrants from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. As a result, the number of labor migrants heading to Russia from Kyrgyzstan has increased, while the same figure for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan is decreasing.

If we translate the dynamics into numbers, the following picture emerges: if since 2013 the volume of remittances from Russia to Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan began to fall sharply, then in the first nine months of 2016, migrant workers from Kyrgyzstan (which became a member state of the EAEU ) sent transfers in the amount of 1 billion 286 million dollars, which is 21 percent more than in 2015.

It is obvious that the example of Kyrgyzstan makes membership in the EAEU attractive for Tajikistan. Even before the creation of the EAEU, approximately every eighth citizen of Tajikistan worked in Russia.

Unfortunately, at the moment the EAEU remains a group of allies in the economic sphere. Regarding political approaches and assessments, there is no unity among the members of the organization, which distinguishes the EAEU from the EU. The EAEU cannot act on the international political arena as a single force, since its members do not have a common position on the issue of Ukraine.

There are other internal complications. Thus, the short-term disagreement between Russia and Turkey after the incident with the downing of a Russian plane by Ankara in November 2015 on the Turkish-Syrian border did not pass by the interests of the EAEU member countries.

First of all, the difficulties were caused by the fact that Russia's decision (albeit temporary) to close its borders to goods coming from or going there from Turkey complicated the situation for Central Asia as a whole, but in particular it affected the Central Asian members of the EAEU such like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which have strong trade ties with Turkey.

There is also a complication associated with the Chinese factor. The Central Asian countries that are members of the EAEU have relations with China, which is, in fact, the leading investment and trade partner for all Central Asian countries.

Will the EAEU be able to become economically attractive for a group of countries, against the backdrop of the large-scale international trade project “One Belt, One Road” promoted by China, which aims to connect dozens of countries by rail, road and sea routes?

Aidar Khairutdinov

Kulagina Maria Viktorovna,

1st year master's student, Faculty of International Regional Studies and Regional Management, ISSU RANEPA

The Eurasian Economic Union was established on January 1, 2015. It is the most successful attempt at integrating post-Soviet countries after the collapse of the USSR. The goals of this integration association are comprehensive modernization, cooperation, increasing the competitiveness of national economies and creating conditions for stable development in the interests of increasing the living standards of the population of the member states. Thus, the main principle in the EAEU is the principle of four freedoms: freedom of movement of goods, services, capital and labor, as well as a unified and coordinated policy in sectors of the economy. If necessary, members of the union can use funds from the common Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development.

The EAEU includes: the Russian Federation, the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic.

The economic potential of this integration association can hardly be overestimated. It ranks first in the world in oil and gas production, second in the production of mineral fertilizers, third in electricity and fourth in wheat, coal and steel. But it is not only the concentration of the most expensive resources on the territory of the integration association that makes the West want its collapse. For the West, the unification of post-Soviet countries looks like repeated Sovietization, which is extremely unprofitable for it. In addition, the unification of large exporters of raw materials and the coordination of prices for resources only between them puts other states in a vulnerable position. Let us remember October 17, 1973, when the Arab countries - members of OAPEC, as well as Syria and Egypt, jointly raised oil prices during the year from three to twelve dollars per barrel, refusing to supply it to countries that supported Israel in the Yom Kippur War. The West is very afraid of a repetition of this scenario.

Saving time and money due to the absence of the need to go through customs procedures and pay duties allows participants to use funds to modernize and diversify markets. Unified rules for certification of goods make it possible to facilitate the trade process, since it is enough to undergo certification only in one of five countries. Transport costs between countries with a common border, for example between Russia and Kazakhstan, are reduced. Thus, business gets the opportunity to expand production abroad and cooperate production with its closest neighboring countries.

Not only private businesses, but also citizens of these five countries receive great benefits from participation in the EAEU. According to the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union, ordinary citizens have the following rights.

The right to work in the EAEU without special permission.
The right of access to social security on the same terms as citizens of the state.
Uniform tax conditions.
Mutual recognition of higher education diplomas.
Equal rights of access to all medical services guaranteed by the state.

Despite all the advantages of the EAEU, a number of pressing problems in the functioning of this integration association can be identified.

The first problem is related to sanctions and anti-sanctions. The fact is that Russia’s retaliatory sanctions against the European Union, the USA, Canada, Australia and Norway, introduced in August 2014, prohibit the entry of goods from these countries into the Russian market. A year later, sanctions also covered Montenegro, Albania, Liechtenstein, Albania and Turkey. Since 2016, sanctions have also been imposed on Ukrainian goods. At the same time, the EAEU member countries did not impose the same sanctions, so European, American, Canadian, Australian and other goods illegal in Russia still continue to enter their markets. According to the principle of a single customs territory, all these goods sanctioned for Russia can move freely within the EAEU, which runs counter to the interests and principles of Russia. The most favorable solution to this problem for Russia would be for the EAEU members to join the sanctions, but since this is not expected, either Russia will have to lift the embargo, or the internal conflict in the integration association will increase. Of course, the lifting of retaliatory sanctions will be a step back in the political game, so the only way to maintain relations with the main suppliers of sanctioned goods to Russia - Belarus and Kazakhstan - is to temporarily turn a blind eye to the “gray” re-export.

The second problem is that the participants in the integration association have directly opposing interests on some issues. For example, for Russia and Kazakhstan, joining the union of new states, such as Tajikistan, will be a winning step. At the same time, for Belarus, the accession of developing countries will be extremely unprofitable, since this will create additional competition within the union. Today, the main candidate for joining the EAEU is Tajikistan, which does not give a clear answer about its intention to become a member. The fact is that Tajikistan needs the EAEU, since it allows the integration association to “reach” the borders of Afghanistan, gain access to Pakistan, India, and also gain another common border with China, on the border with which a road has already been built through the Kulma Pass. This road could become a trade corridor between the EAEU and China, which could significantly reduce the delivery time of goods. Thus, if Tajikistan joins the EAEU, EAEU trade routes could be significantly expanded. Tajikistan, which is highly dependent on Russian and Kazakh imports, would also benefit greatly from joining an integration association involving these two countries. In social terms, citizens of Tajikistan will receive jobs in the territories of the EAEU countries. Concerning real prospects Tajikistan’s accession to the EAEU in the near future, the government of Tajikistan has not yet matured to give a clear answer.

The third problem, actively discussed today, is that the EAEU sets itself the goal of abandoning the use of the dollar within the integration association. True, for now it is the use of the dollar as a reserve currency that carries the least risks for international suppliers and buyers. At the present time, the currencies of the EAEU countries are the most volatile, so long-term planning of contracts in these currencies still seems quite risky. Until 2015, the project of creating a new common currency for all members of the EAEU to be used instead of the dollar was discussed, but the participating countries did not come to a common opinion. At the same time, the introduction of a new currency was planned no later than 2025. Among the possible options for the name of the new hypothetical currency were: nanoruble, altyn, Evraz. In April 2016, Aaly Karashev, Deputy Prime Minister of Kyrgyzstan, proposed resuming discussions on the creation of a common currency of the EAEU.

Forecasts and prospects for the development of a fairly young integration association vary among experts. If the EAEU was planned during a favorable period for Russia (Russian Spring, Olympics in Sochi), then today the economy and politics of Russia are significant pressure from the Anglo-Saxon world. In 2015, mutual trade decreased by about a quarter due to the general economic situation and a sharp drop in oil prices. Therefore, some experts do not believe at all that the integration association will survive. But, despite negative statements about possible fate The EAEU, over the year and a half of its existence, has done a lot of work within the framework of the unification of countries, which has had significant results: an increase in export volumes after the creation of the EAEU has been demonstrated by all member countries of the bloc. Significant work has been planned for the future: today negotiations are underway on the development of joint innovative projects and the creation of new technological platforms. At the summit in Astana on May 31, 2016, which was attended by five countries, there was talk of expanding free trade zones and removing internal barriers to trade. Vladimir Putin also said that “the union states are being connected to the import substitution program carried out in Russia.” Russia invites all partners to joint production of equipment and components in more than 25 sectors of the economy, including mechanical engineering, electronics and light industry, as well as Agriculture. By 2019, a common electricity market should be formed.

The signing of a number of international treaties was also planned at the summit. Today there is a prospect of profitable economic cooperation between the EAEU and China. China is interested in creating a free trade zone with the participation of the SCO and Asia-Pacific countries. Igor Shuvalov, First Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, said that in cooperation with China, Russian entrepreneurs will gain access to new markets. Igor Morgulov - Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation - expressed the opinion that

“the integration of Russian and Chinese initiatives will change everything Eurasian

space" .

The EAEU bloc is focused primarily on Asian countries and Asia-Pacific countries that have high economic potential and are not in political conflict with Russia. With the successful implementation of all planned projects, as well as with the involvement of new countries and blocs in international cooperation, the EAEU integration association has a high chance of creating worthy competition for other blocs in the Eurasian space.

List of sources

1. Treaty on the EAEU. URL: https://docs.eaeunion.org/docs/ru-

ru/0003610/itia_05062014 (date of access: 06/02/2016).

2. Official website of the EAEU. URL: http://www.eaeunion.Org/#about (access date: 06/02/2016).
3. Vladimir Putin’s speech at the summit in Astana on May 31, 2016. URL: http://www.vestifinance.ru/videos/27666 (access date: 06/02/2016).
4. Smityuk Yu. Integration of Russia’s, China’s Eurasian initiatives to reshape entire

http://tass.ru/en/world/818880 (access date: 06/02/2016).

5. Expert opinion: Igor Shuvalov. URL:

http://www.vestifinance.ru/videos/27666 (date of access: 06/02/2016).

6. Eurasian Economic Union Observer, Issue 1 / 2015 (4th quarter) - 12/18/2015. URL: https://infoeuropa.eurocid.pt/files/database/000069001-000070000/000069440.pdf (access date: 02/01/2016).
7. Hett F., Szkola S. The Eurasian Economic Union: Analyzes and Perspectives from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, February, 2015. URL: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id-moe/! 1181 .pdf (date of access: 06/02/2016).

Official website of the EAEU. URL: http://www.eaeunion.org/#about(aaTa access: 06/02/2016).
Treaty on the EAEU. URL: https://docs.eaeunion.org/docs/ru-ru/0003610/itia_05062014 (access date: 06/02/2016).
Speech by Vladimir Putin at the summit in Astana on May 31, 2016. URL: http://www.vestifinance.ru/videos/27666CaaTa access: 06/02/2016).
Expert opinion: Igor Shuvalov. URL: http://www.vestifinance.ru/videos/27666 (access date: 06/02/2016).
Quote According to the article: Smityuk Yu. Integration of Russia’s, China’s Eurasian initiatives to reshape entire Eurasia, September 4, 2015. URL: http://tass.ru/en/world/818880 (access date: 06/02/2016).

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The main problems of the creation and development of the EAEU. At the same time, there are objective obstacles to the expansion of the EAEU and deepening integration within its framework

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INTRODUCTION

1. EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION: HISTORY, FEATURES, PROSPECTS

1.1 Stages of formation and development of Eurasian economic integration

1.2 EAEU and its geopolitical partners

1. 3 On the Eurasian and European paths of integration in the CIS

2.1 Different views Eurasian Economic Union and ways to resolve them

2.2 Prospects for integration

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