“For the first time in history, China’s nuclear arsenal will be immune to a first strike.” Such assessments, which frighten the Pentagon and radically change the US attitude towards the Chinese nuclear program, were voiced by American military analysts. The development of Chinese strategic nuclear forces is truly lately is proceeding at an extremely high pace.

By the end of this year, China intends to launch the latest strategic nuclear submarine cruiser with sea-based ballistic missiles capable of reaching the US coast. As American analysts note, in this way China “will for the first time receive a reliable sea-based nuclear deterrent.”

“For the first time in history, the Chinese nuclear arsenal will be invulnerable to a first strike,” said Nicholas Giacometti, an expert at the Washington Center for Strategic and International Studies. “This is the final step China needs to achieve an assured nuclear retaliatory strike capability.”

The report submitted to Congress also states that “to determine high accuracy the number of nuclear ballistic missiles China has at its disposal and nuclear warheads“is not possible due to the secrecy of its nuclear program.” The authors of the document specify that latest information The Pentagon's information about China's nuclear arsenal dates back to 2006.

According to Defense News, the United States is currently trying to identify the length of Chinese tunnels intended for storing nuclear weapons and the number of nuclear warheads in China. Barack Obama recently signed a law to develop a new concept national security, according to which the US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) was ordered to submit a report on “the underground network of tunnels in the People's Republic of China and the ability of the United States to use conventional and nuclear forces to neutralize such tunnels and destroy what is stored in them.”

Americans judge new Chinese submarines from space images. Thus, according to space intelligence data, the new Chinese nuclear-powered submarine belongs to the 094 Jin class. The boat was photographed by satellite while it was stationed at the Xiaoping Dao base near Dalian (Yellow Sea). In its appearance with the developed fencing of its missile silos, the nuclear submarine is reminiscent of the Russian missile carriers of Project 667BDRM "Dolphin" (according to NATO classification - Dhelta-IV). The first Project 094 boat was put into operation in 2004 and is intended to replace the Project 092 Xia nuclear submarine.

According to incomplete data from open sources, the Chinese Navy's submarine forces currently have 57 submarines, including one Xia-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), five Han-class submarines, four Kilo-class submarines (Russian Project 636 attack submarines), seven Song-class submarines, 18 Ming-class submarines and 22 submarines Soviet design type Romeo (project 641). Beijing also ordered eight more Improved Kilo-class submarines (Project 887 Varshavyanka) from Russia.

The modernization of China's submarine fleet frightens the US military. Thus, the latest report “Chinese Military Power” contains the following recommendations addressed to the US administration: “The construction of Chinese submarines should push the Pentagon to accelerate the expansion of US anti-submarine warfare capabilities, which are the lowest in history due to the decrease in the number of specialized ships, aircraft and anti-submarine defense helicopters."

According to the Americans, type 094 boats carry 16 JL-2 type ballistic missiles with a range of 8-12 thousand km. It is believed that these missiles are an underwater version of the latest Chinese land-based strategic missiles DF-31.

“China is striving to create a full-fledged nuclear triad, the same as those of Russia and the United States,” Vladimir Dvorkin, former head of the 4th Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense, which studies the development and consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, told the newspaper VZGLYAD. “The appearance of a naval ballistic missile was only a matter of time.”

The success of the Chinese program to “domesticate” the DF-31 land-based missile is indicative of the fact that China was the first among nuclear powers to create a unified land- and sea-based ballistic missile. Just recently, the Russian Bulava, intended to arm the 955 Borei-class strategic nuclear-powered missile cruisers, could have become like this. In any case, rocket designer Yuri Solomonov has repeatedly said that one of the goals of creating a new complex is to make it as unified as possible for different deployment capabilities. But apparently Russian designers something didn’t work out, since following the adoption of the Bulava naval missile into service, the ground group of the Strategic Missile Forces received a new RS-24 Yars missile system, which rather inherits the generic features of its predecessor, the Topol-M complex, than sea ​​relatives.

As for the Chinese DF-31, according to experts, its capabilities are comparable in combat characteristics to the Soviet RT-2PM Topol ballistic missiles. Their distinguishing feature- in the speed of start. It travels faster than most other ballistic missiles. According to some data, the acceleration section of the rocket's trajectory from the moment of launch to reaching the ballistic parabola lasts no more than five minutes. During this time, it is not only very difficult to detect from a satellite the very fact of a missile launch, but also to try to intercept it. In addition, the entire family of rockets “Topol”, “Topol-M” and “Yars”, thanks to several dozen auxiliary engines located on the rocket, does not fly in a classic ballistic parabola, but in a “snake”. This makes it difficult to determine its exact location and, accordingly, aim the anti-missile missile at the target.

On the basis of the DF-31, China has created a mobile - ground-based - version of the missile, similar to the Russian RT-2PM Topol. The first launch of this machine took place in September of this year and caused a lot of noise in Washington. Assessing the tests, American analysts noted that for the first time Beijing demonstrated not only a desire to equalize its nuclear potential with Russian and American ones, but, most importantly, raised it to a completely different qualitative level.

“During a period of threat, mobile systems can be dispersed throughout huge territory, where it will be simply impossible to detect them, the former boss told the newspaper VZGLYAD headquarters of the Strategic Missile Forces Victor Esin. “These complexes can deliver a retaliatory nuclear strike from any point along the route.”

The appearance of mobile launchers in the USSR seriously changed the balance of power in the confrontation with the United States. This is not the first year that Washington has been trying to implement a global program (with the exception of polar regions located above 65 degrees north and south latitude), all-weather, round-the-clock, constant monitoring of areas of interest from the point of view of tracking mobile missile systems. It is expected that in 2015-2020 a constellation of 21 satellites will be launched into orbit. However, they will not guarantee complete control over the movement of mobile launchers.

“The appearance in China of the latest nuclear missile submarines further strengthens the stability of the Chinese nuclear triad in the event of a nuclear war,” says Vladimir Dvorkin. - Tracking an underwater missile carrier is much more difficult than a mobile launcher. This means that Beijing retains the possibility of a retaliatory nuclear strike against the aggressor.”

Currently, China's nuclear potential is not as great as that of Russia and the United States. However, according to Western experts, the new generation of Chinese missile forces is capable of really threatening Moscow and Washington. It consists of 60 ground-mobile solid propellant complexes DF-21 (analogue Soviet system RSD-10 "Pioneer") and 20-30 ICBMs DF-31/31A (analogue Russian system RS-12 "Topol"). It is expected that after the successful testing of the DF-31B by 2015, the total number of mobile missile systems China will reach 130-140 units.

In the near future, it may be supplemented by another DF-41 complex - this modification of the missile will be able to fly 14 thousand km and carry a multiple warhead of 6-10 nuclear warheads. This car is already being compared in terms of capabilities to the Russian Topol-M. JL-2 ballistic missile submarines appeared. Let us also recall that at the beginning of December, China conducted the third flight test of a new hypersonic glide vehicle. aircraft WU-14. It was reported that the ultra-high-speed missile is capable of penetrating the US missile defense system.

In the future, as in Russian strategic nuclear forces, all these missiles may receive new combat equipment- hypersonic maneuvering nuclear units. This is evidenced by the successful tests of the WU-14 hypersonic glide vehicle. On the basis of which, most likely, China will develop them.

Vladimir Dvorkin notes: the main thing is that Beijing is taking its nuclear triad to a fundamentally new level, significantly increasing the effectiveness of nuclear forces in the event of a global military conflict. Apart from Russia and the United States, until recently, no country with nuclear weapons in its arsenal had such an opportunity. As a result, China's nuclear arsenal of even about 200-240 warheads will make it, and not France, the third nuclear power in the world. And Moscow and Washington will have to take into account a new factor in building a multipolar world.

After China last year successfully tested a solid-fuel mobile intercontinental ballistic missile with a multiple warhead capable of reaching anywhere in the United States, word spread around the world that Beijing now has a powerful nuclear deterrent and the Americans will henceforth have to reckon with the new status of the Asian dragon. However, if you throw away the propaganda husk and analyze the real state of affairs in the Chinese strategic nuclear forces, a completely different picture opens up - the PRC is simply “eating up” the remnants of Soviet technologies, kindly provided in the 50-60s of the 20th century, as well as sold by Russian specialists in the era of chaos of the 90s . The USSR built entire industries in China from scratch - rocket science and nuclear fusion - with hundreds of factories and research centers, trained tens of thousands of Chinese specialists and transferred all the technological documentation for all its projects. Despite such a fantastic gift, over the 60 years of large-scale nuclear missile programs and multibillion-dollar investments, Beijing has not acquired either a nuclear triad or even a more or less sufficient arsenal effective means delivery of warheads to the target. The reality is that in a real nuclear war, China will not last even an hour against America.

Modern Chinese military industry was born in the 1950s with the help of the USSR. We created a military-industrial complex that was modern at that time, capable of producing the entire range of military products required by the National Liberation Army of China (PLA). The numbers are impressive: the Soviet Union built 763 full-fledged factories in China with all the infrastructure and the most modern equipment, 97 scientific and technological centers, 11 testing grounds, including 4 underground. More than 120 thousand Chinese students studied for free in Soviet technical universities on military topics, and about 6 thousand domestic scientists, 85 thousand technologists and other technical specialists visited China itself on long business trips. Enterprises built then, for example, aviation complexes in Shenyang, Harbin, Xi'an and Chengdu, a tank factory in Baotou (Inner Mongolia, the so-called plant No. 617), a complex of enterprises for the production of small arms and artillery weapons in the northeast of the country and many others to this day have since been the basis of the Chinese military-industrial complex.

The USSR transferred licenses to the PRC to produce a full range of weapons and military equipment - from aircraft to communications equipment and engineering equipment. Strategic weapons were not left out either: before the Sino-Soviet gap, China managed to obtain a huge amount of documentation and equipment necessary to create a full production cycle of nuclear weapons. Moscow also took care of the development of Chinese rocket science, providing Beijing with samples of the R-1 and R-2 rockets and their manufacturing technology. The R-2, by the way, is the first Chinese medium-range ballistic missile - the famous DF-2, which at one time greatly frightened Japan.

In 1951, a secret agreement was signed between the USSR and the PRC to provide scientific and technical assistance to the Chinese in the field of nuclear research in exchange for their supply of uranium ore, within the framework of which the Union transferred to China technologies for uranium enrichment, the construction of centrifuges and other stages of the production process. By the way, the centrifuges themselves are of the latest generation Soviet made were eventually imported from Moscow and given away along with all the necessary documentation, because Chinese specialists were never able to master their production at Soviet factories in their homeland. The Chinese general in charge of the nuclear project, Hong Tzu, wrote in a letter to Lavrentiy Beria: “The process of mastering the production of gas centrifuges cannot be established. I ask you to send a group of specialists to Khayon again to debug the equipment and train our engineers. Unfortunately, we will have to postpone the launch of plant 651 for the fifth time. I hope that this time the technologists will still be able to fully convey all the subtleties of the technology...”

The same thing happened with the development of rocket production. For 6 years, Chinese specialists were unable to produce even a prototype based on the X-31 project transferred by the Union. As a result, in 1957, the USSR concluded another agreement - on the transfer of the Celestial Empire Soviet missiles new technologies with a full cycle of training for local specialists using Soviet universities. As part of this agreement, the Beijing Institute of Physics and Atomic Energy was created, where nuclear research began, and in Lanzhou, the construction of a gaseous diffusion plant for uranium enrichment began. The turning point for the Chinese was the launch of an experimental heavy-water nuclear reactor with a thermal power of 7 megawatts and a cyclotron supplied by the Soviet Union at Plant No. 601 in the capital of the People's Republic of China. In honor of this event, a holiday was declared in the country, and the newly born daughter of the PLA commander was named after the cyclotron. In 1958, under cover of the strictest secrecy Soviet government was open nuclear test site in the area of ​​Lake Lop Nor in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Okrug, where Chinese strategic forces still conduct all their testing.

After setting up combat duty Soviet missiles short range R-2, China received R-11 medium-range operational-tactical ballistic missiles, which were already equipped with nuclear warheads in the Soviet Union. As a result, specialists from the Ministry of Medium Engineering of the USSR at Soviet factories launched the R-2 into mass production under the name “Dongfeng-1”, or “type 1059” (“Dongfeng” - “East Wind”). The first formation of the new type of troops was a training brigade with Soviet R-2s, formed in 1957, and a combat missile division, loudly called strategic, appeared in 1960. By 1961, the Chinese People's Liberation Army already had 20 regiments equipped with Dongfeng-1 and R-11 missiles (Chinese designation "Type 1060"). In addition, the Celestial Empire acquired technology for the production of jet bombers - front-line Il-28 (in China "Hun-5") and long-range Tu-16 ("Hun-6"), which in the USSR performed the tasks of carriers
nuclear bombs. Even earlier Soviet Union sent a large number of Il-28s to the PRC, as well as 25 heavy Tu-4 piston bombers.

With Khrushchev coming to power, Moscow fell out with Beijing and stopped providing such large-scale patronage to its southeastern neighbor, which immediately affected the course of China’s entire nuclear program. The production of the Il-28 and Tu-16 strategic bombers was established only in 1967 and 1968, respectively, and even then every second copy of the aircraft refused to take off.

While the USSR has already begun mass production of mobile missile kits with active system installation of decoys and missiles with a range of up to 15 thousand km. On October 27, 1966, the first Chinese strategic ballistic missile Dongfeng-2, developed on the basis of the Soviet R-5M model of 1956, delivered a 12-kiloton uranium warhead to a range of 894 km. The Chinese government was overjoyed: for the first time, the Chinese defense industry managed to create a full-fledged nuclear missile weapon. Special commemorative coins and chocolates were issued for this occasion.

On June 17, 1967, the first Chinese hydrogen bomb was dropped from the experimental long-range bomber "Hun-6" (Tu-16), assembled in 1959 from Soviet components. A two-phase charge based on uranium-235, uranium-238, lithium-6 and deuterium exploded at an altitude of 2960 m, showing a yield of 3.3 megatons. And a combat hydrogen charge with a TNT equivalent of 3 megatons, in which the Chinese first used plutonium (to initiate thermonuclear fusion), was tested in the form of a tactical bomb on December 27, 1968, by being dropped from a front-line Hun-5 (Il-28) bomber. The PLA Air Force combat units received “nuclear” bombers in the “Hun-5A” and “Hun-6A” versions. Then the more advanced Qiang-5 appeared, which was developed on the basis of the Soviet MiG-19 fighter, mass-produced in China under a Soviet license (J-6).

Since then, the quality of China's nuclear missile forces has remained virtually unchanged. Senior researcher Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences Vasily Kashin described their state as follows: “Until now, China’s strategic nuclear forces consisted of rather primitive and bulky liquid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missiles. In addition, they put into production mobile solid fuel missiles Dongfeng-31 and Dongfeng-31-A, which had range limitations and could only carry one warhead, which reduced their value and their ability to overcome American missile defense. The largest and heaviest missile, Dongfeng-5, is capable of hitting most of the United States, but it is a huge and very vulnerable liquid-propellant missile, which takes at least 2 hours to prepare for launch. There is another missile, it’s not quite the intercontinental Dongfeng-4, but after modernization its range has exceeded 5,5 thousand kilometers. However, it does not reach the continental US and is even more primitive. It can’t even be based in a mine, it’s launched from a launch pad.”

There are only ten of these Dongfeng-4s left. There is a mobile missile "Dongfeng-31", which has a range of about 8 thousand kilometers and can slightly hit some cities
on the West Coast of the continental United States. The first truly real deterrent weapon is the Dongfeng-31-NA missile. It is mobile, has a range of about 11 thousand kilometers and also has a monoblock warhead. This is the only missile that has a chance of surviving the first US strike and hitting a city on the US Pacific coast, a number of cities in the northern US, that is, for example, destroying Los Angeles and San Francisco. But China has only 15 of them (the United States has about 2 thousand similar missiles). In total, the Chinese have about seventy intercontinental missiles, but they do not pose a serious threat to America. In the 1990s, based on technology stolen from Russia, a program was launched to create heavy solid rocket"Dongfeng-41". Its range is about 14 thousand kilometers and it is capable of carrying up to 10 warheads. However, this missile will be able to enter combat duty in at least 20 years, the entire history of Chinese missile programs tells us this: 20-30 years pass from the moment of the first launch to actual deployment.

Experts are very skeptical about the capabilities of Chinese strategic nuclear forces against the United States. When asked how many Chinese missiles the Americans could intercept today, Vasily Kashin replies: “The Chinese do not yet have missiles with multiple warheads, but they had research in the field of decoys, that is, some kind of payload that ensures reaching the target, Chinese strategic missiles may well carry. Another thing is that if the US strikes first missile strike, they will destroy a very significant part of China's nuclear offensive capabilities. In any case, it will most likely be that only a few Chinese missiles will reach US territory. It’s quite possible that none of them will actually make it.”

Moreover, from the traditional nuclear triad - missile forces, submarine fleet and strategic aviation - only one has been created in China. They have one nuclear submarine armed with strategic missiles - this is Project 092 - the so-called Xia type. The range of its missiles is only 1,700 kilometers. But even this only submarine missile carrier with antediluvian missiles has never gone on combat duty, because, firstly, it constantly breaks down, and secondly, the boat is very noisy - as soon as it starts its engines, it will be detected by all its neighbors. Construction has now begun on a new generation of nuclear missile submarines with new Julan-2 missiles with a range of over 8 thousand kilometers - these are Project 094 boats. This missile was tested for many, many years - 22 years of unsuccessful tests and 40 scientists and officers. And the new submarines themselves are somehow (most likely through espionage and technology leakage from the Russian chaos of the 90s) copied from the 1976 Soviet project “667 BDR”. But it was not possible to copy them completely - according to the Pentagon, their technical characteristics correspond to those of Soviet boats only from the early 1970s. In terms of noise level, it is the second generation (the Russian Federation and the USA are now already fifth). You also need to keep in mind the fact that they don’t exist yet, and the first copy will be completed in about 5 years. Thus, in the field of naval nuclear deterrent forces, the Chinese do not pose a serious threat to the United States.

As for aviation, the situation here is even more deplorable. The carriers of nuclear weapons are currently considered to be one regiment of old bombers of the Tu-16 type, which the Chinese, actively using the “brains” of Russian scientists (according to various estimates, up to 500 technical specialists from aircraft manufacturing research institutes left for China)
were able to modernize. Now it is called "Hun-6K". Thank God, we managed to come to an agreement with Russia regarding the supply of engines - as a result, the aircraft uses newer D-30KP engines. Of course, they are not considered new here (they were written off back in the late 80s), but they are better engines"Tu-16" of the Stalin era. The Khun-6K is capable of carrying cruise missiles that are an exact copy of the old Soviet X-55, but for 30 years they have not been able to develop a miniature nuclear warhead for them - this requires special technologies for producing charges. All attempts to steal or buy these technologies failed - Hu Jintao also begged us, offered billions for help, but the Kremlin turned out to be adamant. In 2008, Beijing showed interest in the Tu-22M3 and was even ready, in exchange for this aircraft, in addition to money, to provide a special favorable treatment for Russian goods on the Chinese market. But Moscow did not consider this issue from a practical perspective at all.

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SpaceX's manned program successes should not be misleading. Elon Musk's main goal is satellite Internet. His Starlink project is designed to change the entire communications system on Earth and build a new economy. But the economic effect of this is not obvious now. That is why the EU and Russia began implementing more modest competing programs

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In addition to the eight federal districts, Russia will now have twelve macro-regions. Agglomerations are recognized as the most progressive form of settlement. And each subject of the federation is assigned a promising specialization. The “expert” tried to find grains of common sense in the recently approved Spatial Development Strategy

April 4 website spacewar.com posted a rather large and very interesting article about China's nuclear potential. It is no secret that this arsenal is constantly being improved and expanded. Probably, China has set itself the goal of achieving such a development of nuclear potential by 2020 that will allow the Celestial Empire to no longer look back to either the West or Russia. The assessments of the prospects for the development of Chinese strategic forces presented in this article are worthy of attention.

“China's stockpile of nuclear warheads has increased dramatically. This is due to the adoption of DF-31A mobile ICBMs and JL-2 sea-launched strategic ballistic missiles, which are China’s new generation of strategic weapons.

The build-up of the combat capabilities of Chinese nuclear forces began in 1995. Until this time, the PLA Second Artillery Corps (PLAAF, or People's Liberation Army Second Artillery Force) was often teased as a "military service in need of an exit strategy." The fact is that at that time, most personnel of the PLA were engaged in non-combat training and development of new types of weapons, and raised vegetables and pigs.

This sad situation was dictated by large-scale arms reduction measures between the USA and the USSR. However, after 1995, China began to refocus its strategic weapons development on the Taiwan issue in order to have sufficient capabilities to effectively deter possible US military intervention in the Taiwan Strait.

This strategy encouraged China to reform its military from the concept of “balanced nuclear and conventional power” to the creation of a “concentrated nuclear strike capability.” The PLA Air Force Command has adopted a course for the accelerated development and deployment of mobile DF-31 ICBMs and JL-2 naval missiles.

In order to buy time to deploy new systems, China produced additional quantities of the legacy DF-5A ICBM, DF-4 Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile, and DF-3 IRBM. With the beginning of the deployment of more strategic missiles, the number of long-range missile brigades in the VAK increased. In addition, two new Type 094 SSBNs were put into service in addition to the existing Type 092 boat.

There are indications that the number of DF-4 ballistic missiles in the Delinghayuan area in western Qinghai Province has been increased. In the area where the missile base is located, several hundred kilometers of highways have been built, the existing hard surface has been repaired, and new missile positions have probably been built. This indicates that China will deploy more mobile ICBMs to replace older missiles.

Probably the strategic missile brigades, armed with DF-5 and DF-5A missiles, are numbered 801 and 804. The 813th brigade is located in Nanyang, Henan Province. This brigade should be equipped with the DF-31. The 809th and 812th Brigades, stationed in Qinghai, as well as the 803rd and 805th Brigades, stationed in Hunan, are equipped with DF-4 ICBMs.

Some brigades equipped with the DF-4 ICBM have probably already begun to receive the DF-31. In Chinese operational documents, the DF-4 and DF-31A strategic missiles are called long-range missiles rather than ICBMs, while the DF-5 is considered an ICBM.

There is an assumption that the 818th Missile Brigade is already armed with DF-31 missiles, but this has not yet been confirmed by official sources. Currently China does not have sufficient quantity ICBMs with a firing range of over 10 thousand kilometers (approximately 6,200 miles), and therefore, work to extend the service life and modernize the DF-5 missiles will most likely continue.

The increase in nuclear warheads in the PLA Second Artillery Corps aims to deter others nuclear powers from “nuclear blackmail” against China. This country has very rich uranium resources and sufficient reserves to produce nuclear materials for strategic warheads. It is believed that the production of weapons-grade plutonium has been going on for a very long time. Western military experts believe China has enough nuclear material to produce 1,000 nuclear warheads.

Since the DF-31 ICBM and JL-2 SLBM have new types of carriers, China is recent years made great efforts for scientific research in the field of creating individually targetable nuclear warheads. As a result of this work, the DF-31 and JL-2 will be equipped with new types of warheads with MIRV (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles) technology. Western analysts believe that China has set missile developers the task of equipping them with MIRVs with at least 3 warheads.

Regarding the number of ICBMs in each missile brigade, it is reasonable to assume that Chinese, like Russian ICBM divisions, could each be equipped with 9 missiles. If this is the case, then it can be calculated that China, with three brigades equipped with DF -5/DF -5A ICBMs and four to five brigades with DF -5 or DF -31, has approximately 63-72 ICBMs and long-range missiles.

The number of warheads could be as follows - if each of the DF -5/5A missiles and at least two brigades armed with the DF -31A is equipped with three warheads, then we get 135 warheads. If two or three long-range strategic missile brigades with DF -4 are equipped with missiles with a single warhead, then in total we get 18-27 monoblock warheads on DF -4 missiles.

This means that total quantity Chinese strategic nuclear warheads reach 153-162 units. This confirms the fact that China has been intensively modernizing long-range missile brigades.

China's development of the naval component of its strategic forces aims to create a capability equivalent to the arsenal of the Second Artillery Corps, but at sea. Build intensity marine components was quite impressive.

China currently has two Type 094 SSBNs, which are equipped with 24 new-generation strategic missiles of the JL-2 type, giving a total of 72 nuclear warheads. Adding to these the 12 monoblock JL-1A SLBMs deployed on Type 092 SSBNs, we conclude that China has a total of 84 nuclear warheads on its submarines. Thus, the total number of land- and sea-based strategic nuclear warheads could be 237-246 units.

Over the next five years, China plans to build new Type 094 SSBNs, which could result in a significant increase in the number of naval nuclear warheads. If only five Type 094 SSBNs are built, then even then the number of warheads on them will reach 180. Therefore, adding the warheads on Type 092 SSBNs, we can conclude that in the next five years, the Chinese naval strategic arsenal will include 192 warheads.

In addition, there is reason to believe that the deployment of mobile DF-31 ICBMs will only accelerate. IN Western media There were estimates that China would deploy at least 50 launchers of this type, bringing the number of warheads on them to 150 units. Development of the new Type 096 SSBN has already begun. Chinese central television showed an image of an SSBN capable of carrying 24 SLBMs, presenting it as the “new generation of the Chinese fleet.” In this case, the number of warheads will increase significantly in the near future.

If we talk about the power of nuclear warheads, then early modifications of the DF -5 ICBM were equipped with a 1 Mt warhead. Judging by the power of nuclear tests previously carried out in China, the maximum power of warheads can reach 1-3 Mt. The new DF-31A ICBMs are equipped with multiple warheads with individually targetable warheads, the yield of which can be approximately 100-500 kt.

Leonid NIKOLAEV (translation),

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How many nuclear weapons does China have?

Penetrating the secrets of the underground Great Wall of China

Shortly after the end of the Cold War, American defense official Phillip Karber traveled to Russia as the person charged with preparing the visit. former minister defense Frank Carlucci (Frank Carlucci). "We met with Russian generals“,” recalls Mr. Karber, “and met, among other things, with one lieutenant general who told us that they had 40,000 warheads, not 20,000 as we thought.” It was a stunning discovery. While legions of CIA analysts, Pentagon military officials and arms control specialists were sometimes devoting their entire work to the task of determining the size of the Soviet arsenal, the United States miscalculated the actual figure by a factor of two.

Mr. Carber, who has worked for various administrations and major congressional leaders (of both parties) and now heads the Asian Arms Control Project at Georgetown University, tells this story as a preface to his latest work. . In 2008, he was tasked by the Pentagon's Defense Threat Reduction Agency—which handles everything from arms control compliance checks to nuclear explosion detection and forensics—to deal with a mysterious Chinese project known as "The Underground Great Wall of China." The investigation has forced Mr. Karber to question long-held assumptions about the size and purpose of China's top-secret nuclear arsenal.

The agency's interest in this subject reached its peak after the devastating earthquake on May 12 this year in Sichuan province. Along with regular rescue teams, Beijing has deployed thousands of radiation safety experts from the Second Artillery Corps, the People's Liberation Army unit in charge of the country's strategic nuclear forces, including most of China's nuclear weapons, to the area. The participation of the Second Artillery Corps was not entirely surprising, since Sichuan is home to key nuclear facilities, including the Chinese version of the Los Alamos laboratory. More interesting were the reports of collapsed slopes, which resulted in huge areas of destroyed concrete structures being revealed. Rumors arose that much of China's nuclear arsenal, which was stored in underground tunnels and storage facilities, may have been lost as a result of this earthquake.

Mr. Karber tried to find out more with the help of a team of students, using satellite imagery, Chinese sources and other materials - all of which are publicly available but rarely paid attention to in the West. History also helped.

Tunnel building has been part of Chinese military culture for approximately two thousand years. They were a particular obsession of Mao Tse Tung, who dug a vast underground city in Beijing and in the late 1960s ordered the construction of the so-called Third Line of Defense in central China to counter a Russian nuclear attack that Beijing feared. The colossal project included an underground nuclear reactor, warhead storage facilities and bunkers for China's first generation of nuclear missiles.

The Chinese tunnel-digging mania did not end with Mao's death. If anything, it has, on the contrary, intensified. In December 2009, as part of the 60th anniversary celebrations of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) announced with great fanfare that the Second Artillery Corps had dug a total of three thousand miles of tunnel network, with half of it them - in the last fifteen years.

“If, for example, you start in New Hampshire,” Mr. Carber notes, by way of comparison, “and move toward Chicago, then Dallas, then Tijuana in Mexico, that would be about three thousand miles.”

Why did the Second Artillery Corps need to dig so many tunnels? After all, there are other ways to secure a nuclear arsenal. And even with a labor force as plentiful and cheap as China's, the cost of these tunnels—well-built, brightly lit, asphalt-filled, high-ceilinged, and about six miles long—is enormous.

The sheer size of the tunnels was also difficult to reconcile with the supposedly small size of China's nuclear arsenal, which is generally believed to range from 240 to 400 warheads. “So they built 10 miles of tunnels for each warhead? - Mr. Karber recalls how he asked himself this question. “This doesn’t make sense, this is beyond reason.”

That consideration led Mr. Karber to take a closer look at Western estimates of the size of China's arsenal. In the late 1960s, the US military predicted that China would be able to field 435 warheads by 1973. Straightforward extrapolation from this assumption would lead to the calculation that China would have about three thousand warheads today. According to a 1984 Defense Intelligence Agency estimate, China would have 818 warheads by 1994 and more than a thousand by today. More recent reports in Chinese media say the number is now between 2,350 and 3,500 units. And in last decade the annual average production of new warheads is more than two hundred. In contrast, the US National Resources Defense Council's assessment reports that the Chinese arsenal peaked around 1980 and has remained more or less unchanged since then.

How accurate are each of these numbers? Without on-site inspections, it is impossible to judge with certainty: as a Council on Foreign Relations report noted a decade ago: “China is one of the least transparent states currently regarding its nuclear weapons situation.”

But despite the opacity, China experts generally tend to agree with the lower estimate. Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists insists China is "not committed to achieving nuclear parity with the USA or with Russia: they do not hide hundreds of missiles in these tunnels.” The tunnels, he adds, are "a typical Chinese game to hide what they have and protect their relatively limited missile forces."

Mr. Carber is not convinced. “One kilometer of tunnels is roughly equivalent to the cost of four or five nuclear weapons, as well as several delivery systems,” he notes. “Why would China throw such enormous resources into building a protective network of tunnels, and at the same time allocate significantly less funds for the weapons themselves that these same tunnels are designed to protect?”

Well, in addition, there is the question of whether Beijing’s declared nuclear policy can be trusted. Beijing insists it has a policy of “no first use” (of nuclear weapons). But in 2005, Major General of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) Zhu Chengdu told The Wall Street Journal that China would attack "a hundred or two hundred" American cities with nuclear missiles if the United States came to Taiwan's aid in the event of a war between the island and the mainland.

Beijing also says it has a policy of maintaining a small nuclear force, which one Chinese general called the "minimum means for retaliation." And here Mr. Karber has his doubts.

China is in the midst of a major modernization of its nuclear capabilities, including the construction of a new generation of intercontinental ballistic missiles that are reportedly capable of delivering multiple warheads. China fields an estimated 1,300 tactical theater missile systems that can be armed with both nuclear and conventional warheads. This duality in itself gives China enormous strategic leverage in the event of war.

Mr. Karber also suspects China may have up to five missiles for each of its mobile launchers. If so, there could be talk of "recharge" capabilities, which would go a long way toward explaining the discrepancy between the observed number of Chinese launchers - one reason to believe China has relatively few missiles - and Mr. Karber's suspicions about actual size Chinese arsenal.

What purpose could China's large and supposedly invulnerable arsenal serve? For decades, nuclear experts believed that the key to “winning” a nuclear exchange was to have effective opportunities to retaliate, which in turn requires significant and survivable forces. The Second Artillery Corps itself gave rise to several possibilities when it announced the completion of the underground Great Wall of China in 2009, noting that it gave China the ability to “withstand nuclear strikes”; that “an independent Taiwan could fall into despair”; and that China no longer has any reason to "fear a decisive battle with the United States."

Analyzing the state of the nuclear potential of our closest and most important neighbor - the People's Republic of China, and its position on the many facets of nuclear policy seems to be quite difficult, since of all the powers possessing nuclear weapons, both officially recognized and unofficial, China's nuclear program and plans are the most The nuclear area is one of the most closed. And it is no coincidence that Chinese representatives at international disarmament forums invariably and in very firm terms oppose openness or, as they say, transparency nuclear activities. Chinese experts usually explain this by saying that China has “small and poorly deployed nuclear forces, which makes them easy targets for an enemy with effective intelligence.” Therefore, they say, China has “concerns about nuclear transparency, especially about publicly disclosing the number of nuclear weapons in its arsenal and where they are deployed.”

Because of this, it is inevitable to reckon with the fact that most of the available information about the Chinese military atomic program is based on media reports, as well as statements and assessments of various foreign government agencies, intelligence communities and independent experts, primarily American ones. A thorough analysis of Chinese official statements on the nuclear issue also sometimes requires considerable effort due to the fact that it is not always easy to understand the subtle nuances of the changes that are made from time to time in the official line pursued by the Chinese leadership on nuclear issues.

China's nuclear missile arsenal

According to authoritative international sources, including SIPRI yearbooks and reference books of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, China's nuclear arsenal is estimated at 400–450 nuclear warheads intended for deployment in the nuclear triad, that is, on land-based, air-based and sea-based assets. Nuclear weapons, judging by available data, are also deployed on non-strategic systems, including artillery, although recent statements and documents of the PRC have publicly objected to states conducting “research and development of nuclear weapons of low yield and easily adapted for use.” The 2002 Handbook of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace systematically estimates that China has approximately 270 warheads deployed on land- and sea-launched missiles, 150 warheads on bombers, and 120 warheads deployed on short-range missiles. artillery systems and on other means of delivery.

Since its first nuclear test on October 16, 1964, China has carried out 45 nuclear explosions, the last of which took place on July 29, 1996, shortly before the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) opened for signature.

The basis of the nuclear triad is ground-based nuclear forces. Intercontinental ballistic missiles DF-5A With a range of 13,000 km, enough to reach the United States, they are liquid-fueled, they are deployed in Henan province, their four- to five-megaton warheads are believed to be stored separately from the ICBMs. In addition, there are over 100 intermediate-range missiles deployed in such a way that they are capable of hitting targets in the territories of Russia, India, Japan and others Asian states. According to the Carnegie Endowment, the time required to launch liquid-propellant rockets, the lack of protected missile silos, and the lack of mobile missile systems make the Chinese leadership concerned about the survivability of this component. nuclear missile potential countries .

China has one nuclear submarine Xia, armed with 12 solid-fuel two-stage SLBMs Julang-1 with a range of 1,700 km, however, the nuclear submarine operates only in coastal waters, which does not pose a threat to the United States, as American experts note. According to the authors of the 2004 SIPRI yearbook, this nuclear submarine may not even have reached operational combat readiness. The aviation part of the nuclear triad consists of 120 bombers N-6 and 30 aircraft Q-5 medium and shorter range, capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Bombers N-6 based on Soviet bomber technology Tu-16, and their range is over 3,000 km. China purchases multi-role aircraft from Russia Su-30 And Su-27, while it is assumed that they are being converted to perform combat missions related to nuclear weapons. Finally, there are missiles in service DF-11 with a range of 280 km, as well as other non-strategic weapon systems (artillery, nuclear landmines, short-range missiles). China has satellite missile guidance systems.

Because China has limited retaliatory strike capabilities, it is particularly concerned about the prospect of a missile defense system. Such a system protecting the United States, along with advanced theater missile defense systems that the United States could sell to Japan and Taiwan, would significantly complicate Chinese military planning. In this case, the United States would have a theoretical opportunity to destroy the Chinese deterrent forces. If China's security concerns increase significantly, and if military modernization takes precedence over economic modernization, Beijing will likely be forced to increase the number of deployed delivery vehicles and warheads, increase production of planned weapons systems, and begin building and the deployment of means to counter missile defense systems.

China is very concerned about Japan's decision in 2003 to invest the first billion dollars in a sea- and land-based missile defense system being developed by the Americans, which will require several billion dollars more before it is fully deployed, probably not until 2011. The system , although rhetorically designed to repel a North Korean missile attack, could be used to defend against a Chinese missile threat, and its sea-based component could be deployed to defend Taiwan.

China's nuclear buildup continues, according to SIPRI yearbooks and Carnegie Endowment guides with links to US government communications. The US Department of Defense estimated in 2002 that China had about 20 ICBMs capable of reaching targets in the US, with this number expected to increase to about 30 in 2005 and possibly 60 by 2010 d. According to CIA forecasts, the total size of the Chinese strategic nuclear missile arsenal will increase to 75–100 warheads within 15 years, deployed “primarily against the United States.” According to the 2003 SIPRI Yearbook, a US Department of Defense report states that China does not appear to be pursuing large strategic forces, and although modernization of these forces continues, they are still small.

Since the mid-1980s. China is developing three new ballistic missiles: a mobile three-stage and a solid-fuel ICBM DF-31 (CSS-X-10), new version DF-31 with extended range and SLBMs Julang-II("Big Wave") Three ICBM test launches were carried out DF-31, the last of which took place in November 2000. Another ICBM is being developed - DF-41 with a range of 12,000 km, which will be deployed in the coming years and will be capable of hitting targets throughout the United States. The creation of the Project 094 nuclear submarine, which will be equipped with the 16th SLBM, is also ongoing. Julang-II.

Published CIA estimates indicate that China may have sufficient technical capabilities for the development and deployment of systems with MIRVs, including MIRVed IN, but it does not seem to be doing this yet. If China tries to master MIRV technology in the near future, then, according to CIA estimates, one option could be to use a missile DF-31 for the development of simple MIRV or MIRV IN systems on existing ICBMs DF-5. According to experts, “a key area of ​​modernization and growth is increasing the number and increasing the accuracy of medium- and shorter-range ballistic missiles.”

A major espionage scandal that broke out in the United States in 1999 and lasted for several years, resulting from China’s attempts to allegedly “steal” nuclear secrets from the American Los Alamos laboratory, was associated with the PRC’s intentions to create compact nuclear warheads for MIRVs. There were reports in the American press that the Chinese were also trying to gain access to targeting technologies for potential Russian targets. heavy missiles with MIRV IN. Some experts can't help but wonder whether China's continued refusal to ratify the CTBT is explained by its desire to maintain the ability to conduct nuclear tests to develop MIRV warheads if the Treaty never comes into force due to US opposition?

As for tactical nuclear weapons, according to data given in SIPRI yearbooks, several low-yield nuclear tests in the early 1970s. and military exercises in 1982, which simulated the use of such weapons, suggest that the development of tactical nuclear weapons may also be carried out.

According to the latest Pentagon report from July 2005, China expects to develop “within several years” a new mobile ICBM and a new SLBM, which was tested in June 2005. China's current arsenal of 20 ICBMs capable of reaching the United States, according to the US military department, can increase five times.

The exact volumes of Chinese production of weapons-grade fissile materials are, of course, unknown. The Carnegie Endowment cites analyst estimates that China has produced 2 to 6 tons of weapons-grade plutonium and 15 to 25 tons of HEU. From 1964 to 1987, China produced HEU at two sites - Lanzhou and Heping, plutonium was also produced at two sites - Jiuquan and Guangyuan from 1968 to 1991. Experts believe that China stopped the production of weapons-grade plutonium in 1991, and the production of HEU in 1987. Chinese nuclear weapons are thought to be particularly dependent on weapons-grade uranium, with 20–30 kg of HEU per warhead. An average of 3–4 kg of weapons-grade fissile material is used for a plutonium charge.

Most of the weapons-grade nuclear materials produced were used to make warheads. It is assumed that reserve stocks of such materials amount to more than three tons of weapons-grade HEU and one ton of plutonium, from which China can equip an additional 200 nuclear warheads in addition to the existing ones.

The growing modernization program of the Chinese armed forces is evidenced by data on the growth of the country's military budget. China's defense spending in 2005 increased by 12.6% compared to the previous year and amounted to almost $30 billion. This amount, however, does not include most of the allocations for arms purchases abroad. According to Washington, the country's real military budget will be three times larger than the officially announced one.

As reported Washington Post April 12, 2005, “In recent weeks, President Bush and his senior staff, including Secretary of Defense D. Rumsfeld, Secretary of State C. Rice and Director of Central Intelligence P. Goss, have expressed concern about the recent growth of China's military capabilities and their impact on the regional balance of power."

Doctrinal strategic guidelines of the PRC

It should be noted that from the very beginning of the appearance of Chinese nuclear weapons publicly China's announced nuclear policy is distinguished by a certain consistency. Immediately after the first nuclear test conducted in 1964, the Chinese leadership announced this and notified other states that China “will never, under any circumstances, be the first to use nuclear weapons.” Subsequently, China, in order to develop this statement, officially proposed in 1994 that other nuclear powers conclude an agreement on a mutual obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

In practical military activity, according to experts, until the early 1980s. China's military strategy was to prepare for "early war, large-scale war, nuclear war." However, in 1985, the Chinese military leadership changed strategy, shifting the emphasis from the possibility of general war to preparing the country for a limited war. At the same time, analysts of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) began to pay more attention to the strategy of deterrence as a means of defense against a possible enemy.

Currently, China's nuclear doctrine, according to most experts, is based on maintaining “minimum nuclear deterrence,” that is, the ability to retaliate against a small number of high-value targets (such as cities and industrial centers) after a nuclear attack by a potential adversary. At the same time, the structure and nature of the deployment of China's nuclear forces are determined by two key factors: the need to survive the retaliatory strike capability and taking into account the potential deployment of the system missile defense. As Russian expert I.F. rightly notes. Bocharov, “the modern Chinese nuclear doctrine of deterrence, represented by the relatively small size of nuclear forces, is based on the concept of a retaliatory “counter-value” strike, that is, the destruction of enemy cities. According to the Chinese leadership, this state of affairs contributes to the refusal of any American president to attempt a nuclear strike on this eastern state. The characteristics of nuclear weapons on Chinese strategic delivery vehicles - monoblock warheads of the megaton class up to five megatons - logically confirm the doctrine of a “counter-value” retaliatory strike.”

It appears that the United States cannot ignore these Chinese capabilities in its nuclear planning, and therefore nuclear deterrence in relation to this country, it occupies one of the priority places in American nuclear policy. The 2001 Department of Defense Quadrennial Review noted "the danger that the region ( East Asia) a military rival with enormous capabilities will emerge" and that one of the US's "long-term interests" is to "prevent hostile dominance in critical areas," including the coastal areas of Northeast and East Asia, defined as "the region extending from the South of Japan, through Australia up to the Bay of Bengal."

Great value The indisputable fact also plays a role that the high rates of development of the Chinese economy require more and more energy and raw materials, which the country is less and less able to provide through internal capabilities. In such a situation, China will be objectively forced to enter into competition, primarily with the United States, for foreign markets for obtaining these resources. Of particular interest is inevitably the Middle East with its huge oil reserves. As American analyst B. Schwartz recently wrote, although American strategic superiority in East Asia will increase rather than decrease in the coming years, the problem is that China “will eventually become, as Pentagon strategists believe, an “equal rival” of the United States in Asia, that is, into a great power with economic and military muscle, capable of challenging America's predominant position in a region that is sure to become the economic center of this century." In the author's opinion, this issue dominates national security issues during President Bush's second term. Published in 1996 by China's PLA National Defense University, Guofang Lilong (The Theory of National Defense) explains both the history and contemporary status of deterrence in Chinese national security doctrine. The book argues that while deterrence has played a predominant role in international strategic thinking since the end of World War II, its roots can actually be traced back to military practices in ancient China.

At the same time, the authors refer to the sayings of Sun Tzu two thousand years ago, who advocated “suppressing the enemy without war.” The book identifies two main objectives of deterrence in the Chinese understanding - protecting national interests and dispersing threats to the country. It argues that Chinese deterrence is limited to self-defense, while other states, especially the United States, use deterrence as a component of an offensive military strategy and reserve the right to be the first to use nuclear weapons in any conflict.

From the point of view of the authors of this book, deterrence is a complex strategy; it is neither war nor peace, but something in between, existing at many levels. Deterrence can be divided into conventional deterrence (i.e. deterrence through conventional weapons), nuclear deterrence, space deterrence, etc. Conventional deterrence, in turn, can be either universal, using conventional armed forces to deter a global war, or limited to the framework of a regional conflict. For a general or people's war, China will mobilize its vast population and resources to prevent the conflict from escalating into a full-scale war. Containment on regional level will be used to counter “hegemonic aggression” and expansion in areas adjacent to China. Limited nuclear deterrence will be used to counter a possible nuclear war directed against China. Such nuclear deterrence is considered as a retaliatory strike against specific targets on enemy territory. Finally, China may develop a limited space deterrent capability in order to be able to compete with other nuclear powers in the military use of outer space.

Thus, as follows from this analysis possible scenarios deterrence considered by Chinese military experts, it can take on both forceful and non-forceful forms, rely on both conventional weapons and nuclear weapons, which seems quite adequate to the real military, nuclear and steadily growing economic potential China.

As Chinese-American expert Ming Zhang, who visited Beijing in 1998, testifies, his conversations with senior Chinese officials confirm that although the PRC leadership avoids recognizing the role of nuclear deterrence, it continues to pursue a policy of maintaining sufficient nuclear forces to ensure “limited nuclear deterrence.” ". It follows that China will maintain and modernize the nuclear forces it needs in case it becomes necessary to launch a retaliatory strike in response to nuclear attack enemy.

According to some analysts, Chinese military experts, starting around 1987, have been using the term “limited deterrence,” which implies that the country maintains a balance intermediate between the minimum and maximum levels of deterrence, which, in their opinion, provides sufficient capabilities to deter global powers in if they are involved in regional conflicts near the Chinese borders. In accordance with this doctrinal approach, the PRC asserts that it has the means and ability to prevent the escalation of such conflicts, confirming the presence of a survivable retaliatory strike capability, even in the event of the use of nuclear weapons at the theater level by a potential adversary.

In practical terms, experts believe, the doctrine of “limited deterrence” was reflected during large-scale complex exercises of the Chinese armed forces in the Taiwan Strait in March 1996, during the period of another deterioration in relations between Beijing and Taipei. Then the PRC launched several missiles into the waters adjacent to Taiwan. One of the purposes of these launches was to assess a possible US response. Despite the high level of involvement of various branches of the PRC military during the exercises, the United States, which deployed an aircraft carrier force to the Taiwan Strait area, did not at the political level refer to the possibility of launching a nuclear strike on the PRC, as happened during the Taiwan crisis of 1954–1955. , which allowed the Chinese side to conclude that the likelihood of a retaliatory strike by China is taken into account by the Americans and, therefore, we can talk about the effectiveness of the “limited deterrence” doctrine.

Last time great attention Political-military analysts, especially in the United States, were attracted by a statement made in July 2005 by the dean of the Chinese National Defense University, Major General Zhu Chenghu, about the possibility of China using nuclear weapons in the event of a conflict with the United States over Taiwan. As follows from a special publication by the American Institute of Global Security, the reaction of experts in the United States was very critical. Chinese experts, who published their comments in this publication, expressed great skepticism regarding the possibility of changing the current nuclear doctrine of the PRC on the no-first use of nuclear weapons. Official Chinese authorities hastened to disown the statements of General Zhu Chenghu.

China's reaction to nuclear tests in South Asia

Relations with its most important southern neighbor, India, have occupied a significant place in Chinese military-strategic planning and foreign policy almost since the founding of the People's Republic of China. Since India's defeat in the 1962 war with China, tensions between the two countries have flared up and down, always being a matter of concern for the leadership of both countries. At the same time, not only the territorial issue, which continues to remain a “bone of contention” between them, but also the very fact of the existence side by side of the two largest and fastest growing Asian states cannot but predetermine the special and very complex nature of the relationship between both powers, their rivalry in the Asian region . Sino-Pakistani cooperation, including in the nuclear field, also could not help but strengthen mutual mistrust between India and China. It is not surprising, therefore, that under these conditions, after the armed conflict of 1962 and the first test of Chinese nuclear weapons that soon followed, India set a course for mastering nuclear potential.

Beijing's initial reaction to India's first round of nuclear tests on May 11, 1998 was total silence. But just two days later, China joined the general stream of criticism of India’s actions, with a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman saying that “the Chinese government expresses serious concern about Indian nuclear tests” and that these tests “contradict the existing trend in international relations and are not in line with the interests of maintaining peace and stability in South Asia." After the second series of Indian tests on May 13, China reacted immediately and this time more sharply: in a statement, the Chinese Foreign Ministry emphasized that “the Chinese government is deeply shocked and hereby expresses its strict condemnation.” A few days later, Chinese President Jiang Zemin gave an interview to the agency Agence France-Press, which stated that "India is making China a potential target for its nuclear weapons and must bear responsibility for the new flare-up of tensions in South Asia." PLA publications and statements by its senior representatives contained an even more critical assessment of India’s actions.

After two series of Indian tests, Pakistan held urgent consultations with the Chinese government, sending Foreign Secretary Sh. Ahmad to Beijing on May 18. As Pakistan Radio announced, its purpose was to “confidentially inform China, its time-tested friend, of the measures that must be taken to ensure national security.” When the Pakistani representative returned to Islamabad, the agency Xinhua reported that “he should be completely satisfied with the results of his visit.” Pakistan conducted its nuclear tests on May 28 and 30, and Chinese leaders appeared to approve of Pakistani authorities' plans to conduct the tests, although for public consumption they expressed "regret" after they were carried out.

However, there were reports in the press that in response to an appeal from US President Clinton, Chinese President Jiang Zemin on the eve of the Pakistani nuclear tests seemed to appeal to the Pakistani government with a request not to conduct tests. But at the same time, support for Pakistan’s actions was actually voiced: an official representative of the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that “the current situation in South Asia is solely the result of India’s policies; Pakistan’s nuclear tests were a reaction to intimidation by India.”

At the same time, it should be recognized that there were no drastic changes in the Chinese strategic course after the Indian nuclear tests. In July 1998, i.e. two months after these tests were carried out, a white paper was issued in Beijing " National Defense China”, in which, on the one hand, the critical line towards India was continued: in it, in particular, it was stated that India, by conducting tests, “threw a blatant challenge” to the international community, “thus provoking a nuclear arms race in South Asia,” Pakistan only “followed it,” doing so “in response to Indian nuclear tests.” But at the same time, the White Paper, giving an assessment of the situation in the world in the field international security, noted that “peace and development are the main themes of the current era. […] Today's international security situation continues to evolve in the direction of easing tensions.”

The White Paper declares that China is pursuing a “military strategy of active defense,” which is to achieve “superiority by striking only after the enemy has struck,” and based on the principle: “We will not attack until attacked.” on us." And it goes on to say: “China has a small amount nuclear weapons solely to meet the needs of self-defense." China "upholds the principle of self-defense by all the people and strategic concept national war."

About the situation around Taiwan

As already noted, from time to time the Chinese leadership lets the world know about its claims to Taiwan, which causes a certain nervousness in China's relations with Japan, as well as with Australia and, naturally, with the United States. China is watching with concern the strengthening political relations Japan with Taiwan, which was a Japanese colony called Formosa from 1895 to 1945 and today serves as an important strategic and economic partner.

While developing relations with multilateral entities in Asia (ASEAN, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Six-Party Forum on North Korea) in recent years in the interests of strengthening its foreign policy positions, China insists that Taiwan should not be admitted to any international organization in which membership is based on state level. At the same time, the Chinese government is opposed to discussing security issues related to Taiwan, in regional organizations organizations dealing with security issues, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum.

On the issue of Taiwan in the 1998 White Paper contains a rather decisive statement: “The Chinese government is committed to achieving the reunification of the country through peaceful means, but will not commit itself not to resort to force. Every sovereign state has the right to use all means it deems necessary, including military means, to ensure its sovereignty and territorial integrity. […] The Chinese government is opposed to any country selling arms to Taiwan, which not only violates basic international law, but also threatens China's security and the peace and stability of the region.”

As the American press reported, Japan and Australia have recently become somewhat concerned about China's "muscle flexing" and Japan has "recently expressed a desire to expand the scope of security ties with the United States and for the first time explicitly raised the issue of joint US-Japan cooperation in in the event of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait." As for Australia, “Chinese officials recently demanded that the Australian government “renegotiate” its fifty-year-old treaty with the United States.”

Noteworthy is the fact that in March 2005, the National People's Congress of China adopted a law against separatism, which is clearly aimed at putting pressure on Taiwan. According to this law, in the event of Taiwan's independence and secession, "non-peaceful means and other necessary measures will be used to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China." Referring to the adoption of this law, the United States is putting pressure on countries European Union so that the EU does not lift the arms embargo on China, which has been in force for 15 years.

The United States is expressing concern that China has deployed more than 700 missiles on its southeastern coast adjacent to the Taiwan Strait, with their number increasing by 70–75 units every year. As noted, the PRC’s interest in Taiwan is explained not only by the goals of unification, but also strategic objectives and the need to ensure the safety of the sea straits, through which 80% of oil and huge volumes of other raw materials enter the country.

Chinese policy and practice in the field nuclear non-proliferation

American publications on nonproliferation issues pay great attention to the issues of security and accounting of nuclear weapons and materials in the PRC, and especially to the fact that China was one of the main suppliers of nuclear technology and equipment to a number of developing countries. Thus, the Carnegie Endowment noted in its publications that the Chinese practical approach to the export of nuclear and military items did not comply with the norms of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

In 1980–1990 Chinese nuclear exports, especially to Pakistan, has become a matter of serious international concern in terms of nuclear non-proliferation standards. According to an August 1997 report by the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, “Prior to China's accession to the NPT in 1992, the United States concluded that China was assisting Pakistan in the development of nuclear explosive devices.” It was assumed that the PRC provided assistance to Pakistan in the construction of a 50–70 MW plutonium production reactor, which was not under IAEA safeguards. According to media reports, in 1995 the Clinton administration determined that China had sold 5,000 ring magnets to the A.K. Khan in Kahuta for centrifugal uranium enrichment, where weapons-grade nuclear material is produced. CIA Director John Tenet stated at a Senate hearing in 2001 that “Chinese organizations have provided large-scale support in the past for Pakistan’s nuclear programs, both safeguarded and unsafeguarded.” China continues to cooperate with Pakistan in the construction of the Chashma nuclear power plant.

China has also provided and continues to provide assistance in the nuclear field Algeria, which only in 1996 concluded an agreement with the IAEA on safeguards. China supplied nuclear technology to Iran, in particular, sold three zero-power research reactors and a small-power reactor, as well as two or three small cyclotrons for electromagnetic isotope separation. Until 1997, China assisted Iran in the construction of a plant for the production of uranium hexafluoride near the city of Isfahan. The Iranian nuclear problem, according to China, should be resolved within the framework of the IAEA. China expressed support for the efforts of Iran and the three countries of the European Union to achieve a long-term settlement of this problem through negotiations.

Regarding nuclear problem on Korean Peninsula Chinese official representatives emphasize that this problem must be resolved through negotiations, and objected to the Security Council taking any measures against the DPRK in 1993 and 2003, when it informed the UN Security Council of its intention to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. As is known, in 2003 North Korea withdrew from the Treaty. Speaking in favor of the negotiation process, the PRC took on the role of host at the six-party negotiations (DPRK, Republic of Korea, USA, Russia, Japan, China) held in Beijing. Regarding the Korean issue, the head of the PRC delegation at the NPT Review Conference in May 2005 said: “We hope that the parties concerned will refrain from provocative actions and demonstrate a greater degree of flexibility in order to create favorable conditions for the resumption of negotiations.”

According to observers (in particular, the famous American political scientist French Fukuyama), “only China had sufficient economic leverage to bring North Korea to the negotiating table. And indeed, Beijing, by briefly reducing electricity supplies to this country, forced Pyongyang to agree to the six-party format.” To a large extent, it was thanks to the efforts of China that in September 2005, at the six-party talks in Beijing, it was possible to adopt a joint statement on ways to reach an agreement on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but there is no doubt that the implementation of this agreement in practical matters will largely depend on mediation and Beijing's efforts.

The 2002 Carnegie Endowment Handbook noted that efforts have been made over the past 25 years to persuade Beijing to at least formally change its practical approach to nuclear cooperation to bring it closer to the policies of other nuclear suppliers, and these efforts have produced noticeable results. “With continued encouragement from the United States,” the guide states, “a national export control system has been created, but it is a work in progress and the system is not yet very effective.” In December 2003, China published the government White Paper “China's Nonproliferation Policies and Measures,” which sets out in detail the country's policy line and specific steps in the field of WMD nonproliferation. In September 2005, another White Paper entitled “China's Efforts in the Field of Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation” was published. The need to abandon unilateralism and double standards in this area is declared as one of the most important principles, it is emphasized “ great importance» the role of the United Nations. It also emphasizes the need to “guarantee the rights of all countries, especially developing countries, to use scientific and technological advances and dual-use results for peaceful purposes, subject to full compliance with non-proliferation objectives, as well as the need to prevent any country from engaging in proliferation under the pretext of peaceful use.” " It is easy to see that these provisions definitely refer to the United States and its policies in the international arena.

In 1984, the People's Republic of China became a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in 1992 it joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in 1995 it supported its indefinite extension, and in 1997 it became a member of the Zangger Committee. Also in 1997, the State Council of the People's Republic of China adopted the Regulation on Control over Nuclear Exports, and in 1998 – the Regulation on Control over the Export of Dual-Use Nuclear Items and Related Technologies. In 2001, amendments to the Criminal Code were approved, which establish that the illegal production, sale and transportation of radioactive substances are crimes subject to criminal prosecution. In 2002, the Chinese government adopted the Regulations on Safeguards and Control of Nuclear Imports and Exports and on Nuclear Cooperation with Foreign Countries.

Although in those years, and sometimes even now, a number of countries had and continue to have complaints regarding the practical policy of the PRC in the field of nuclear and missile non-proliferation, it cannot be denied that the Chinese government is systematically taking steps aimed at strengthening export controls. In 2004, with the active assistance of Russia, China became a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). As stated in the Chinese White Paper 2003, China adheres to the principle of comprehensive control in its export policy ( catch-all).

China has not joined the international Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), but in 1992 it stated that it would comply with the principles and norms of the MTCR, and in 1994 it reaffirmed its pledge not to export surface-to-surface missiles capable of having a range greater than 300. km and deliver a payload of over 500 kg. In 2000, China stated that it did not intend to assist any country in developing ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and in August 2002, the Regulation on the Control of the Export of Missiles and Related Equipment and Technology was adopted and related controls were approved. list.

In 1989, China entered into a voluntary agreement with the IAEA to subject some of its civilian nuclear activities to Agency safeguards, and in 2002 it acceded to the Additional Safeguards Protocol.

The PRC actively supported the creation of nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZ) in various regions of the world - in Latin America, Southern Pacific Ocean, Africa, Southeast Asia, by signing protocols ensuring the nuclear-free status of such zones. China recognizes Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status and has expressed support for efforts to create nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and Central Asia.

As mentioned above, in 1996 China signed the CTBT and declared a moratorium on nuclear testing, but has not yet ratified the Treaty. At the 2005 NPT Review Conference, the Chinese delegation expressed support for the “soon” entry into force of the CTBT and assured that the PRC was “now actively working on internal legal procedures for the purpose of ratifying the Treaty.” Observers, however, not without irony, drew attention to the fact that a roughly similar explanation for the lack of ratification was made by the Chinese five years ago - at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. The White Paper (September 2005) states that China is "vigorously" preparing for ratification of the CTBT, and Chinese officials say that work is underway to ensure "Chinese public support" for the Treaty.

China's position on the issue nuclear disarmament

There is no doubt that China is interested in the maximum reduction of nuclear weapons of the main nuclear powers. Based on this fundamental position, the PRC advocates at the United Nations and other international organizations, including at the multilateral negotiating forum - the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, for the complete prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. In a working paper presented by the Chinese delegation on April 28, 2004 to the Preparatory Committee of the 2005 NPT Review Conference as a recommendation to that conference, this position was formulated very clearly: “States with the largest nuclear arsenals bear a special responsibility for nuclear disarmament and must take a leadership role in radically reducing their nuclear arsenals, enshrining their reduction promises in legal form, and eliminating all nuclear weapons being reduced from their arsenals."

Having stopped the production of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium and, obviously, believing that its reserves of these fissile materials are sufficient at this time, China supports, especially recently, the conclusion of the Convention on the Ban of the Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons (CPFM). This certainly shows China's desire to stop the growth of nuclear capabilities of its Asian neighbors. It cannot be ruled out that China itself is not very interested in developing a legally binding agreement on the FMCT. However, due to the negative attitude of the United States towards the possibility of achieving a verifiable agreement on the FMCG, announced in July 2004, the prospects for agreement on this issue seem even gloomier than before. The Geneva Conference on Disarmament has been stalling in one place for a number of years, both on this issue and on other aspects of disarmament.

At the 59th session of the UN General Assembly in 2004, when considering a draft resolution introduced by Malaysia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement on the agenda item “Promotion of multilateralism in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation”, the Chinese delegation stated that no country could act alone and that “it is our duty to advance the cause of multilateral arms control and disarmament.”

China is especially active – for obvious reasons – in the international arena against the militarization of space and in support of steps to abandon the creation of missile defense systems or, in any case, to limit such systems to the maximum. According to well-known American sinologists J. Louis and S. Litay, “no country has shown such attention to the US strategic defense initiative (SDI), put forward in the 1980s, as China,” and the Chinese military “repeatedly demanded that the designers missiles to concentrate efforts in the coming years on the survivability of missiles and their ability to overcome missile defenses."

The PRC strongly supported the preservation of the 1972 US-USSR ABM Treaty until the US unilaterally denounced it. Chinese representatives emphasized that this Treaty is “the cornerstone of the global strategic balance” and the basis not only of the bilateral one between the United States and Russia, but also “ multilateral nuclear disarmament process. […] The Treaty must be strictly observed until we achieve the goal of the universal elimination of nuclear weapons.” As American arms control experts M. Levi and M. O’Hanlon noted, “Russia’s willingness to tolerate the Bush administration’s withdrawal from the ABM Treaty with tolerance, without decisive protests, has put China in a difficult situation. The latter apparently expected Moscow to take the initiative to force the US administration to pay a diplomatic price for lifting restrictions on the creation of missile defense and, possibly, to try to persuade the United States to agree to some restrictions on future deployment of missile defense. American experts conclude from this that “China has more reason to be concerned about the strategic balance with the United States than Russia. Given the nature of the dispute between Beijing and Washington over Taiwan, China, rather than Russia, may end up at war with the United States."

The September 2005 White Paper on missile defense states the following: “The research, development and deployment of missile defense systems does not in any way provide effective solution problems. China wouldn't want anti-missile system had a negative impact on the global strategic stability, would create a factor of instability for international peace and security, undermine trust between major powers, and harm the legitimate security interests of other states. China is even more opposed to some countries' cooperation in the field of missile defense to further the spread of ballistic missile technology. China believes that relevant states should increase the transparency of their missile defense program in order to deepen trust and dispel suspicion. Since the issue of Taiwan affects its core interests, China opposes attempts by any country to provide assistance or protection by any means to the Taiwan region of China in the field of missile defense."

In June 2002, the delegations of China and Russia jointly submitted to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva a working document “Possible Elements for a Future International Legal Agreement on Preventing the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and the Use or Threat of Force against Space Objects.” Under this proposal, the primary obligations of States would be not to place into orbit around the Earth any objects carrying any weapons, not to install such weapons on celestial bodies, or to otherwise place such weapons in outer space; not resort to the use of force or threat of force against space objects; not to assist or induce other states, groups of states, international organizations to participate in prohibited activities.

As follows from China’s working document dated April 28, 2004, cited above, China advocates that negotiations be held at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament on nuclear disarmament, on an FMCT, and on a ban on the transfer of weapons into space, which, however, does not seem realistic due to the current position of the United States and some other states.

Observers drew attention to the statement by the Director General of the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Liu Jieyi, made in April 2004, in which he called on nuclear powers “not to conduct research or develop new types of nuclear weapons.” This is regarded as China's reaction to the work being carried out in this direction in the United States.

It seems clear that the deployment of a US missile defense system not only pushes China to reconsider its approach to nuclear weapons and to reduce nuclear weapons, but potentially contributes to a decrease in interest in arms control agreements and may initiate an increase in arms.

At the 59th session of the UN General Assembly in 2004, the Chinese delegation, when adopting the traditional resolution on the item “Preventing an arms race in outer space,” expressed objections to research and development of space weapons, saying that “if you sit back, then space will become the fourth medium of warfare in addition to land, sea and air.” An arms race in space would disrupt strategic stability, and testing weapons in low orbit would “exacerbate the already pressing space debris problem.”

At the NPT Review Conference in May 2005, the Chinese delegation, unlike the delegations of all other nuclear powers party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, provided virtually no information about the steps it was taking to limit or reduce its nuclear arsenal, or about its intentions in this direction, as follows from the letter and spirit of China's obligations under Art. VI Treaty. Your application for plenary session The delegation boiled down to a general declaration in favor of nuclear disarmament, again drawing attention to the “disturbing fact” of the abrogation of the ABM Treaty and (once again!) emphasizing that “the two states with the largest nuclear arsenals must faithfully implement the Treaty that they concluded to reduce of its nuclear weapons, and to make further reductions in its nuclear arsenals on a controlled and irreversible basis, thereby creating favorable conditions for final, complete and comprehensive nuclear disarmament.” in the intimate store www.uslada-shop.ru

In the section on nuclear disarmament of its national report on the implementation of the NPT (by the way, presented for the first time, obviously taking into account the position of the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement), China limited itself to only the most general statement that it “consistently and strictly fulfills its disarmament obligations in accordance with the NPT and makes serious efforts to advance the international process of nuclear disarmament, the final and complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all nuclear weapons and the creation of a world free of nuclear weapons."

The Chinese delegation at the last Review Conference this time showed activity unusual for the country. As a follow-up to its plenary statement and report on the implementation of the NPT, the delegation submitted to the conference six (!) working documents with its proposals for inclusion in the final document of the conference