Katyusha Guards rocket mortar. Katyusha rocket launchers
Seven Boyars
Reign: from 1610 to 1613.
Seven Boyars- the name adopted by historians for the transitional government in Russia of 7 boyars in July-September 1610, which formally existed until the election of Tsar Mikhail Romanov to the throne.
The Seven Boyars included members of the Boyar Duma:
Prince Fyodor Ivanovich Mstislavsky (? - 1622).
Prince Ivan Mikhailovich Vorotynsky (? - 1627).
Prince Andrei Vasilyevich Trubetskoy (? - 1612).
Boyar Fyodor Ivanovich Sheremetev (? - 1650).
Head Seven Boyars They elected a prince, boyar, governor, and influential member of the Boyar Duma since 1586, Fyodor Ivanovich Mstislavsky. Previously, he three times refused nomination to the Russian throne (1598, 1606, 1610), and agreed to become the head of the united boyar government only in 1610, during the period of the so-called Time of Troubles.
After Tsar Vasily Shuisky was overthrown on July 17, 1610, as a result of a conspiracy, higher authority took over the Boyar Duma - a group of 7 boyars. The power of the Seven Boyars did not actually extend beyond Moscow: in Khoroshevo, to the west of Moscow, the Poles, led by Zolkiewski, stood up, and in the southeast, in Kolomenskoye, False Dmitry II, who had returned from Kaluga, stood together with the Polish detachment of Sapieha. The boyars were especially afraid of False Dmitry, since he had in Moscow a large number of supporters and was more popular than them.
Afraid to seek help and support within the country due to the blazing peasant war under the leadership of I.I. Bolotnikov, the boyars decided to make a proposal to the Poles. In the negotiations that began, members Seven Boyars made a promise, despite the protests of the Russian Patriarch Hermogenes, not to elect a representative of Russian clans to the royal throne.
As a result, it was decided to invite the Polish prince Vladislav to the throne on the condition of his conversion to Orthodoxy. On August 17 (27), 1610, an agreement was signed between 7 boyars and Hetman Zholkiewski, after which Moscow kissed the cross of Vladislav.
However Sigismund III demanded that not his son Vladislav, but himself Semiboryaschina recognized as the Tsar of all Russia. By his order, S. Zholkiewski brought the captured Tsar Vasily Shuisky to Poland, and government of Semiboriashchyna at that time, on the night of September 21, 1610, secretly admitted Polish troops to Moscow. IN Russian history this fact is considered by many researchers as an act of national treason.
After these events, from October 1610, real power actually passed to the commander of the Polish garrison, Alexander Gonsevsky, Vladislav's governor. Disregarding the Russian government of 7 boyars, he generously distributed lands to supporters of Poland, confiscating them from those who remained loyal to the country.
This changed the attitude of the representatives themselves Seven Boyars to the Poles they called. Patriarch Hermogenes, taking advantage of the growing discontent in the country, began sending letters to Russian cities, calling for resistance new government. By the beginning of 1611, the main Moscow ambassadors were arrested and imprisoned. And in March 1611, Patriarch Hermogenes was imprisoned in the Chudov Monastery.
The movement against the Poles was growing in the country. Detachments were organized in almost twenty cities of Russia, which began to move towards the capital from the end of winter. On March 19, 1611, an uprising of residents broke out in Moscow. After heavy fighting, setting fire to houses and buildings in Kitai-Gorod, the Polish garrison managed to suppress the uprising of the townspeople. It was this event that was noted in historiography as “the final ruin of the Muscovite kingdom.”
Seven Boyars nominally functioned until the liberation of Moscow in August 1612 by the people's militia under the leadership of the townsman K. Minin and Prince D. Pozharsky. On October 22, 1612, exhausted by siege and starvation, the Polish garrison surrendered to the victors. Moscow was completely liberated from foreign invaders. The Boyar Duma, which had stained itself by collaboration with the Poles, was overthrown.
In Polish history the assessment Seven Boyars different from Russian. It is considered the elected government, which is legally legal basis invited foreigners to rule Muscovy (agreement of August 17, 1610).
The Seven Boyars (1610-1613).
The historical period (from the overthrow of Vasily Shuisky to the election of the founder of the new dynasty, Mikhail Romanov, to the Russian throne), during which the supreme power in the country was exercised by the government from the Boyar Duma, is usually called the term “Seven Boyars” - according to the number of members included in it: princes F. AND. Mstislavsky, I.M. Vorotynsky, A.V. Trubetskoy, A.V. Golitsyn, B.M. Lykov and boyars I.N. Romanov, V.I. Sheremetev: “...after the overthrow of Shuisky, there was no one to become or at least be considered the head of the government, except for the Boyar Duma, and everyone had to swear an oath - until the election of a new tsar, obey the boyars. But this is a rather formal definition. In fact, the power of the Boyar Duma did not extend beyond the borders of Moscow: in the west, in Khoroshevo, there were Poles led by Stanislav Zholkiewski, and in the southeast, in Kolomenskoye, False Dmitry II, who had returned from Kaluga, was with whom was the Polish detachment of Sapieha. The boyars were especially afraid of False Dmitry II, since he had a large number of supporters in Moscow and was more popular than them.
Afraid to seek help and support within the country due to the blazing peasant war, the boyars decided to turn to the Poles with a proposal. In the negotiations that began, the members of the Seven Boyars promised, despite the protests of the Russian Patriarch Hermogenes, not to elect a representative of Russian clans to the royal throne.
As a result, it was decided to invite the Polish prince Vladislav to the throne on the condition of his conversion to Orthodoxy. On August 17 (27), 1610, an agreement was signed between 7 boyars and Hetman Zholkiewski, after which Moscow kissed the cross of Vladislav.
However, Sigismund III demanded that not his son Vladislav, but himself, be recognized by the Semiborya region as the king of all Russia. By his order, S. Zholkiewski brought the captive Tsar Vasily Shuisky to Poland, and the government of Semiboriashchyna at that time, on the night of September 21, 1610, secretly allowed Polish troops into Moscow. In Russian history, this fact is considered by many researchers as an act of national treason.
After these events, from October 1610, real power actually passed to the commander of the Polish garrison, Alexander Gonsevsky, Vladislav's governor (he was 14 years old).
The events that took place caused deep discontent among all classes Russian state and served as fertile ground for the rise of the national liberation movement against the interventionists.
The Duma nobleman Prokopiy Lyapunov became the head of the first militia. The core of the militia were the Ryazan nobles, who were joined by service people from the country's districts, as well as detachments of the Cossacks of Ataman Ivan Zarutsky and Prince Dmitry Trubetskoy.
In the spring of 1611, the militia approached Moscow. A popular uprising against the interventionists broke out in the city. All the posads ended up in the hands of the rebels. The Polish garrison took refuge behind the walls of Kitay-Gorod and the Kremlin. The siege began.
However, soon disagreements and a struggle for primacy began between the leaders of the militia. The first militia actually disintegrated. Meanwhile, the situation became even more complicated. After the fall of Smolensk (June 3, 1611), the Polish-Lithuanian army was freed for a large campaign against Russia.
King Sigismund III now hoped to seize the Russian throne by force. However, a new upsurge in the national liberation struggle of the Russian people prevented him from doing this: the formation of a second militia began in Nizhny Novgorod.
The organizer of the militia was the “zemstvo elder” Kuzma Minin, who addressed the Nizhny Novgorod people with an appeal: “Oh, brothers and friends, all the peoples of Nizhny Novgorod! What will we do now, seeing the Moscow state in great devastation?.. Let us call upon ourselves in Nizhny Novgorod the brave and courageous warriors of the Moscow state, reliable nobles of the city of Smolensk, now because they are near our city, in Arzamastekh place" (Encyclopedia Nizhny Novgorod). At the same time, with the approval of the Nizhny Novgorod residents, a verdict was drawn up to collect money “for the formation of military people,” and Kuzma Minin was instructed to establish “from whom how much to take, depending on their belongings and trades.” Funds for equipment and salaries for the “military men” were quickly collected.
Kuzma Minin also played a decisive role in the selection of the military leader of the militia: it was he who formulated strict requirements for the future governor. The residents of Nizhny Novgorod ordered to call “an honest husband, who is usually involved in military affairs and who would be skilled in such matters, and who would not appear in treason.” Prince Dmitry Pozharsky satisfied all these requirements.
Service people from neighboring districts began to gather in Nizhny Novgorod. By the fall of 1611, there were already 2-3 thousand well-armed and trained militia in the city; they formed the core of the army.
The leaders of the militia established connections with other cities of the Volga region and sent a secret ambassador to Patriarch Hermogenes, who was imprisoned in the Kremlin. During this “sovereignless time,” Patriarch Hermogenes blessed the militia for the war with the “Latins.”
In the spring of 1612, the “Zemstvo army”, led by Minin and Pozharsky, went from Nizhny Novgorod up the Volga. Along the way they were joined by " military men» Volga cities. In Yaroslavl, where the militia stood for four months, a provisional government was created - the “Council of the Whole Land”, new bodies central control- orders. The total number of the “zemstvo army” exceeded 10 thousand people. The liberation of neighboring cities and counties from the invaders began.
In July 1612, when news arrived of Hetman Khodkevich’s campaign against Moscow, the “Zemstvo army” marched to the capital to prevent him from joining the Polish garrison.
In August 1612, the militia approached Moscow. Ataman Zarutsky with a few supporters fled from near Moscow to Astrakhan, and most of his Cossacks joined the “zemstvo army.” The militia did not allow Hetman Khodkevich to enter Moscow. In a stubborn battle near the Novodevichy Convent, the hetman was defeated and retreated. The Polish garrison, which did not receive reinforcements, food and ammunition, was doomed.
On October 22, the “Zemstvo army” stormed Kitay-Gorod, and on October 26, the Polish garrison of the Kremlin capitulated. Moscow was liberated from the interventionists.
The Polish king Sigismund III tried to organize a campaign against Moscow, but was stopped under the walls of Volokolamsk. The city's defenders repulsed three attacks by the Poles and forced them to retreat.
However, the priority was still the question of restoring central power, which in specific historical conditions early XVII century meant the election of a new king. There was already a precedent: the election of Boris Godunov to the kingdom. The Zemsky Sobor, very broad in its composition, met in Moscow. In addition to the boyar duma, the highest clergy and the capital's nobility, numerous provincial nobility, townspeople, Cossacks and even black-sown (state) peasants were represented at the cathedral. 50 Russian cities sent their representatives.
After much debate, the members of the cathedral agreed on the candidacy of 16-year-old Mikhail Romanov, the cousin of the last tsar from the Moscow Rurik dynasty - Fyodor Ivanovich, which gave grounds to associate him with the “legitimate” dynasty and suited everyone - the boyars, the Cossack nobility, the clergy.
On February 21, 1613, the Zemsky Sobor announced the election of Mikhail Romanov as Tsar. Thus the Time of Troubles entered its final phase.
“Although the first years of Mikhail’s reign were also troubled years, the fact is that the reasons that fueled, so to speak, the troubles and consisted of moral instability and bewilderment of the healthy sections of Moscow society and their political weakening, these reasons had already been eliminated. When these layers managed to unite, take possession of Moscow and elect a tsar for themselves, all other elements operating in turmoil lost strength and little by little calmed down. Figuratively speaking, the moment of Michael’s election is the moment the wind stops in the storm; the sea is still agitated, still dangerous, but it moves by inertia and must calm down” (S. F. Platonov. Full course lectures on Russian history).
They created a transitional government, the purpose of which was to prepare for the election of a new tsar to replace the overthrown Vasily Shuisky. However, the peculiarities of the Time of Troubles, against the backdrop of which events developed, required immediate decisions from them.
The country is in a state of severe crisis
The political and economic situation in Russia at the beginning of 1610 was very difficult. The war with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth proceeded extremely unfavorably for it; in addition, the army of another impostor, claiming to be the heir to the throne, False Dmitry II, approached Moscow. He went down in history under the nickname Tushino Thief - after the location of his camp in the village of Tushino near Moscow.
The situation was aggravated by the consequences of the uprising led by Ivan Bolotnikov that had recently swept across Russia, as well as by the attack of the Nagai and Crimean Tatars. All this led to extreme impoverishment of the people and inevitable social tension in such cases. Another defeat of the tsarist troops in the battle with the Poles served as an impetus for popular unrest and the overthrow of Tsar Vasily Shuisky.
Education of the Seven Boyars
The election of a new autocrat was ahead, and to prepare this most important act in the life of the state, as well as to govern the country during the transition period, a provisional government was formed, which included the seven most noble and influential members of the Boyar Duma. Among them were princes F. I. Mstislavsky, I. M. Vorotynsky, A. V. Trubetskoy, A. V. Golitsyn, as well as boyars B. M. Lykov-Obolensky, I. N. Romanov and F. I. Sheremetev .
Thus, in the wake of Polish intervention and internal problems, the Seven Boyars were formed. The years of rule of this authority, headed by Prince Fyodor Mikhailovich Mstislavsky, ended with the accession to the throne of the first tsar from the House of Romanov, Mikhail Fedorovich, and the end of the Time of Troubles. But this was preceded by a difficult and long period.
Limitations of the power of the boyars
To understand what the Seven Boyars were and how broad its powers were, one should take into account the situation that had developed around Moscow at that time. From documentary sources it is known that to the west of it, in the immediate vicinity of the city outposts, there were Poles led by Hetman Zhelkovsky, and in the southeast, in Kolomenskoye, the army of False Dmitry was stationed, reinforced by the Lithuanian detachment of Sapieha who joined him. Thus, during the entire period of the Seven Boyars, its power did not extend beyond the capital.
Forced agreement with the Poles
The question of what the Seven Boyars in the history of Russia is, as a rule, has never given rise to debate. Typically, members of this government body were relegated to the role of national traitors, and this is the point. For them personally, the main threat was not the Poles, with whom they could, if desired, come to an agreement, but the troops of the impostor, who had many supporters among the Moscow common people. If the Tushinsky thief had won, the boyars would definitely not have cut off their heads.
This prompted them to negotiate with Hetman Zhelkovsky and sign an agreement according to which Russian Tsar Vladislav Vaza, the son of the Polish king, was supposed to become. The Lithuanians who supported the impostor, led by Sapieha, also agreed to swear allegiance to the Polish prince, thus depriving himself of a real opportunity to seize power in Moscow.
Hostages of your own decisions
However, in order to have greater guarantees of personal safety, the boyars secretly opened the Kremlin gates on the night of September 21, 1610 and allowed the interventionists into the capital. From that moment on, the whole essence of the Seven Boyars came down to playing the role of puppets in the hands of the Polish king, who pursued a political line that suited him through his protege, the commandant of Moscow Alexander Gonsevsky. The boyars were deprived of real power and became, essentially, hostages. It is in this pitiful role of theirs that it is customary to see the answer to the question: “What is the Seven Boyars?”
Although the agreement infringed national interests Russian people and was offensive to him, it did not talk about the annexation of Russia to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, but stipulated the preservation of Orthodoxy throughout its territory. He himself was, according to the agreement, obliged to convert from the Catholic faith to Orthodoxy.
Arbitrariness that caused nationwide outrage
After all real power passed from the hands of the transitional government to the Polish governor, he, having received the rank of boyar, began to rule the country uncontrollably. At his will, Vladislav took away lands and estates from those Russians who remained faithful to their patriotic duty, and gave them away to the Poles who made up his inner circle. This caused a wave of indignation in the country. It is believed that during this period the Seven Boyars also changed their attitude towards the Poles.
During the Time of Troubles, the head of the Russian Federation enjoyed special authority among the people. Orthodox Church A true patriot of his Fatherland, he, with the support of the boyars, sent letters throughout Russia in which he called for the creation of a militia and armed struggle with the occupiers. Despite the fact that, by order of the Polish governor, he was imprisoned in the dungeon of the Chudov Monastery, where he soon died of hunger, his messages became the impetus that resulted in the appearance of the regiments of Minin and Pozharsky under the walls of Moscow.
The end of the Seven Boyars period
The subsequent election of the Tsar to the throne in 1613 marked the end of a period that went down in Russian history as the Seven Boyars. The years of reign of seven representatives of the highest Moscow nobility are rightly considered one of the most difficult during the entire period of the Time of Troubles. Upon their completion, the country entered a new historical era.
Speaking about the origin of the term itself, it is worth mentioning the relatively late appearance of the word Semiboyarshchina. During the Time of Troubles and over the next two centuries, members of this government structure were called “seven-numbered boyars.” The expression used today was first found only in 1813 in the story by A. A. Bestuzhev-Marlinsky.
There were earlier periods in Russian history when, in the absence of the tsar, power was concentrated in the hands of boyar commissions. This happened mainly when the sovereign went to war or a long pilgrimage. It was then that it became a tradition to create these temporary government bodies of seven people. The Russian historian of the 17th century, official G.K. Kotoshikhin writes about this in detail in his writings.
Attempts to rethink past events
It should be noted that in last years the question of what the Seven Boyars were and what their role was in Russian history received a slightly different treatment. If in Soviet period the actions of this temporary authority were clearly viewed as betrayal, then in the post-perestroika period publications appeared in which collusion with the Poles was considered as the only reasonable diplomatic move aimed at saving the country from the bloody chaos inevitable in the event of the victory of False Dmitry II.
Today, being outside ideological stereotypes, researchers have the opportunity to give a more objective assessment historical realities past centuries, among which the Seven Boyars occupies an important place. The years separating us from that era have not erased from people's memory negative aspects its activities, but they also allowed them to be given a deeper understanding.
It all started with development rockets based on black powder in 1921. N.I. took part in the work on the project. Tikhomirov, V.A. Artemyev from the gas dynamic laboratory.
By 1933, the work was almost completed and official testing began. To launch them, multi-charge aviation and single-charge ground launchers were used. These shells were prototypes of those later used on Katyushas. The development was carried out by a group of developers from the Jet Institute.
In 1937-38 rockets of this type were adopted air force Soviet Union. They were used on the I-15, I-16, I-153 fighters, and later on the Il-2 attack aircraft.
From 1938 to 1941, work was underway at the Jet Institute to create a multi-charge launcher mounted on a truck. In March 1941, field tests of the installations, called BM-13, were carried out - Fighting machine 132 mm shells.
On combat vehicles stood high-explosive fragmentation shells caliber 132 mm called M-13, literally a few days before the start of the war, launched into mass production. On June 26, 1941, the assembly of the first two production BM-13s based on the ZIS-6 was completed in Voronezh. On June 28, the installations were tested at a training ground near Moscow and became available to the army.
An experimental battery of seven vehicles under the command of Captain I. Flerov first took part in the battles on July 14, 1941 for the city of Rudnya, occupied by the Germans the day before. Two days later, the same formation fired railway station Orsha and crossing the Orshitsa River.
Production of BM-13 was established at the plant named after. Comintern in Voronezh, as well as at the Moscow Compressor. The production of shells was organized at the Moscow plant named after. Vladimir Ilyich. During the war, several modifications were developed rocket launcher and shells for it.
A year later, in 1942, 310 mm shells were developed. In April 1944, they created self-propelled gun with 12 guides, which was mounted on a truck chassis.
origin of name
In order to maintain secrecy, management strongly recommended calling the installation BM-13 whatever you like, as long as not to reveal the details of its characteristics and purpose. For this reason, soldiers at first called the BM-13 a “guards mortar.”
As for the affectionate “Katyusha”, there are many versions regarding the appearance of such a name for a mortar launcher.
One version says that the mortar launcher was called “Katyusha” after the name of Matvey Blanter’s song “Katyusha”, a popular song before the war, based on the words of Mikhail Isakovsky. The version is very convincing because when Rudnya was shelled, the installations were located on one of the local hills.
The other version is partly more prosaic, but no less heartfelt. There was an unspoken tradition in the army of giving affectionate nicknames to weapons. For example, the M-30 howitzer was nicknamed “Mother”, the ML-20 howitzer gun was called “Emelka”. Initially, the BM-13 was called “Raisa Sergeevna” for some time, thus deciphering the abbreviation RS - rocket.
The installations were such a guarded military secret that during combat operations it was strictly forbidden to use traditional commands like “fire”, “volley” or “fire”. They were replaced by the commands “play” and “sing”: to start it, you had to turn the handle of the electric generator very quickly.
Well, another version is quite simple: an unknown soldier wrote on the installation the name of his beloved girl - Katyusha. The nickname stuck.
Performance characteristics
Chief designer A.V. Kostikov
- Number of guides - 16
- Guide length - 5 meters
- Weight in camping equipment without shells - 5 tons
- Transition from stowed position in combat - 2 - 3 minutes
- Time to charge the installation - 5 - 8 minutes
- Volley duration - 4 - 6 seconds
- Type of projectile - rocket, high-explosive fragmentation
- Caliber - 132 mm
- Maximum projectile speed - 355 m/s
- Range - 8470 meters
At the end of 1941, one of those miracles that never ceases to amaze the world happened. The defeated, bloodless, almost completely destroyed Red Army seemed to rise from the dead, first throwing the Wehrmacht back from Moscow, then defeating Paulus’s army at Stalingrad and finally seizing the strategic initiative in Battle of Kursk, which predetermined the outcome of the war.
A new book by an authoritative military historian dedicated to these events is not an ordinary chronicle of military operations, more than an ordinary description of the battles of 1941 - 1943. In his outstanding study, a leading American specialist did something that none of his colleagues had dared to do before - he conducted a comprehensive analysis of the Soviet war machine and her work in the first years of the war, revealing the mechanics of the “Russian military miracle.”
Encyclopedic in its coverage of material, unprecedented in its accuracy and depth of analysis, this work has already been recognized as a classic.
Having studied the huge volume archival documents, evaluating combat capabilities and the tactics of both sides, the balance of forces on the Soviet-German front and the style of warfare, David Glantz examines in detail the process of accumulation of combat experience by the Red Army, which allowed it to first catch up with the enemy and then surpass the Wehrmacht, which was considered invincible.
This fundamental work debunks many myths existing in both German and American historiography. Glanz irrefutably proves that the decisive victory over Germany was won precisely at Eastern Front and it was by no means accidental that the outcome of the war was decided not by “generals Mud and Frost”, not by the stupidity and incompetence of Hitler (who was in fact an outstanding strategist), but by the increased skill of the Soviet command and the courage, dedication and steadfastness of the Russian soldier.
Note 1: Due to the low quality of the original scan, the tables are left with pictures.
Rocket artillery (Guards mortars)
The formation of the Soviet rocket and artillery forces began soon after the start of the war. The first batteries of BM-13 installations were created in July, five more at the beginning of August, and two more at the end of this month. In August and September, the first eight regiments were formed on BM-8 or BM-13 installations, all of them immediately went into battle. At the end of August, the NKO began to consolidate individual missile batteries into separate divisions, designating the first two as numbers 42 and 43.
The first experimental rocket and artillery batteries consisted of three fire platoons with seven truck-mounted launch systems BM-13 and one 122-mm howitzer for installation fire. In addition to them, the battery had a headquarters platoon, a small supply and logistics service, as well as 44 trucks capable of transporting 600 missiles, three fuel stations and a seven-day supply of rations. Each battery could fire 112 M-13 missiles filled with high explosives in one salvo. However, the experience of battles showed that individual rocket batteries, numbering from 6 to 9 BM-13 installations, were difficult to control in battle, the density of their fire did not cause significant damage to the enemy, and the 122-mm howitzer turned out to be essentially useless. Therefore, on August 8, the Headquarters ordered the NPO to begin the formation of eight new regiments rocket artillery, equipped with both BM-13 and lighter BM-8 launchers.
These new state regiments, which the NGO called regiments guards mortars, consisted of three divisions of M-13 or M-8 installations, each of which had three firing batteries of four installations, as well as anti-aircraft division and a small rear service. The total strength of the regiment was 36 Katyushas. In a full salvo, the BM-8 regiment fired 576 82 mm caliber rockets at the enemy, each carrying 1.4 pounds of explosives, and the BM-13 regiment fired 1,296 132 mm caliber rockets, each carrying 10.8 pounds of explosives. These rocket launchers, although not very accurate, were ideal for covering wide areas massive, intense, albeit not very accurate fire. When they were fired at night, the terrible howl, the impressive flashes and the indiscriminate fire raining down on the enemy's heads struck fear into the heart of the enemy.
The NKO formed these new units very quickly, sending a total of nine regiments to the fronts by the end of September. These regiments were organized by the 1st Moscow Red Banner Artillery School, and later by the Moscow and Kazan centers for the formation of guards mortar units. On September 8, the State Defense Committee created the position of commander of the guards mortar forces with the rank of deputy People's Commissar Defense, as well as the Main Directorate of Guards Mortar Units subordinate to it within the structure of the NPO. Later, in October and November, 14 guards mortar regiments and 19 separate divisions were created.
During the chaotic and often desperate fighting between the Battle of Smolensk and the Battle of Moscow from September to November, front and army commanders used their rocket launchers, scattering them along the entire front and thereby negating their potential combat impact. As a result, the Headquarters ordered the active fronts to create operational groups from them to increase the combat effectiveness of guards mortar units and demanded that all active armies by January 11, 1942, do the same. However, these measures failed to solve the problem. Worse yet, in November-December, the NKO disbanded 9 of the 14 guards mortar regiments and created instead 28 separate divisions with two batteries each, thereby further reducing combat effectiveness these troops. As a result, by the end of the year, the structure of the Red Army included eight regiments of guards mortars and 73 separate divisions of guards mortars.
Some measures for more effective concentration missile forces were finally undertaken on January 14, 1942, four days after the Headquarters issued its famous directive of January 10, which sharply criticized the combat performance of the Red Army artillery during the counteroffensive near Moscow and demanded that all active fronts and armies use artillery in all future offensive operations, concentrating it in “artillery offensives”. After this, the NKO formed 20 new regiments of BM-8 and BM-13 guard mortars, capable of firing 384 M-13 or M-8 missiles in one salvo. These regiments consisted of three divisions of two batteries each with total number 20 launchers. In addition, on February 25, the State Defense Committee ordered the NKO to organize the production of another 1,215 launchers, including 405 BM-8 and 810 BM-13, equipping 50 more regiments with them from March to May. Soon after this, weapons designers were tasked with starting the development of two more types of missiles - the 132 mm M-20 and the 300 mm M-30.
These measures led to an increase in the number of guards mortar regiments in the Red Army from 8 on January 1, 1942 to 70 on July 1, of which 57 regiments were part of the active fronts on June 26. However, the number of guards mortar divisions during the same period decreased from 74 to 42, as many of them were transferred to the newly created tank, mechanized and cavalry corps.
On June 4, the Guards Mortar Troops were again reorganized to provide more effective support to the Red Army forces during the summer-autumn campaign. Anti-aircraft platoons These regiments were replaced by full batteries with four 37 mm guns each. At the same time, the NKO formed 20 new separate heavy guard mortar divisions, equipped with more powerful launchers with 300-mm M-30 missiles. These heavy divisions consisted of a headquarters and three firing batteries, with a total of 32 launchers of four missiles each. The new 300mm rocket shells carried 64 pounds of explosives, and one new battalion could fire 384 rockets in one salvo over a distance of 1.74 miles. By July 1, 1942, the Red Army's guards mortar forces included 70 regiments and 52 separate guards mortar divisions, including several M-30 divisions.
In July, after the start of the summer campaign, the NKO formed another 44 separate divisions of M-30 guard mortars with two firing batteries of 24 launchers each - a total of 48 launchers, which could fire volleys of 288 missiles. He also began to consolidate new heavy Guards mortar divisions into heavy Guards mortar regiments, each consisting of four heavy Guards mortar battalions, and by September 1942 had formed two such regiments. On October 1, the Red Army had 79 regiments of guards mortars with M-8 and M-13 installations, 77 separate M-30 divisions and 36 separate M-8 and M-13 divisions, with a total strength of 350 divisions.
Guards mortars played only a limited role in defensive battles during the German Operation Blau, but Headquarters assigned them a much more significant role in the November 1942 offensives in the areas of Rzhev and Stalingrad. For example, it allocated 103 to the Western and Kalinin fronts for use in Operation Mars missile divisions, including 47 M-30 divisions, and the Southwestern, Don, Stalingrad and Transcaucasian fronts for use in Operations Uranus and Saturn - 130 divisions, including 20 M-30 divisions.
On the eve of these new offensives, increased production rocket launchers allowed the formation of brigades and divisions of guards mortars, First, before the start offensive operations, the headquarters of guards mortar units and operational groups of guards mortars as part of the operating fronts formed ten heavy brigades of guards mortars, each of which consisted of five heavy M-30 regiments, but had a reduced logistics service.
After the start of the November operations, the NKO, in accordance with the Headquarters directive of November 26, ordered its Directorate of Guards Mortar Units to form three new heavy guards mortar divisions by January 10, 1943, and a little later - a fourth. They received numbers from 1 to 4. Such a division consisted of a headquarters, two heavy brigades of M-30 guard mortars, which in turn were subdivided into six M-30 divisions, four M-13 regiments and fire control units. In total, the division had 576 M-30 launchers and 96 BM-13 vehicles, capable of unleashing 3,840 missiles (2,304 M-30 and 1,536 M-13) or 230 tons of explosives on the enemy in one salvo. At the same time, the NKO reorganized the heavy brigades of the M-30 Guards mortars into divisions according to a similar model.
In December 1942, the NKO formed 11 new brigades of guards mortars M-30 and 47 new regiments of guards mortars M-13, increasing by January 1, 1943 the total number of guards mortar troops to four divisions, 11 brigades, 91 separate regiment and 51 divisions. By this time, a new M-31 missile launcher had also been developed, which had more power than the M-30. The firing range increased to 4325 meters, and the burst diameter to 7-8 meters. Since the beginning of 1943, this installation was produced in huge quantities.
The NPO's efforts to increase the power and quantity of its rocket artillery did not weaken in 1943. Already in January-February, three more guards mortar divisions were formed - the 5th, 6th and 7th. More powerful and better controlled than their predecessors, these divisions consisted of three M-30 or M-31 heavy brigades, in turn subdivided into four divisions with three batteries each, for a total strength of 864 launchers. While the brigade was capable of firing 1,152 missiles in one salvo, the division could unleash 3,456 missiles from 864 missile launchers on the enemy in one devastating salvo - 474 missiles less than the former division, but with a total combat weight of 320 tons, that is, 90 tons more than before. At the same time, the NKO approved a new uniform organization of the M-13 and M-8 guards mortar regiments attached tank armies, tank, mechanized and cavalry corps.
Based on combat experience winter campaign, the State Defense Committee, by order of April 29, 1943, ordered the centralization artillery fire within the framework of its concept of “artillery offensive”. At the same time, the commander of the guards mortar units and his management were transferred under the operational leadership of the commander of the artillery of the Red Army, and the commander of the rocket artillery became the latter’s first deputy, and the chiefs of the guards mortar troops of the operating fronts also became deputy chiefs of the front artillery.
During the second half of 1943, many guards mortar divisions were transferred to the breakthrough artillery corps, but several of them remained outside the operational structures. For example, in July 1943, four of the seven divisions of the RVGK guards mortars were subordinated to the breakthrough artillery corps (2nd - 7th Corps, 3rd - 2nd Corps, 5th - 4th Corps and 7th - 5th Corps), while three (1st, 4th and 6th) remained under front-line subordination or under the direct control of the RVGK.
During this period, regiments and divisions of guards mortars were still the main “cubes” that made up rocket artillery RVGK. The regiment consisted of three divisions with two batteries of four installations each, as well as an anti-aircraft battalion. In turn, the divisions could be light or heavy, the first had eight older and lighter M-8 and M-13 vehicles and minimal air defense, the second had three batteries with 32 four-missile launchers.
By December 31, 1943 in military structure The Red Army included 7 divisions, 13 brigades, 108 regiments and 6 separate divisions of guards mortars. By this time, when plans for “artillery offensives” were drawn up in support of major operations, representatives of the Headquarters in the troops and commanders of the fronts of the Red Army traditionally included a massive raid of guards mortars directly in the plans for the artillery offensive, and first of all - in the plan for the artillery preparation that preceded general attack. Upon completion of the breakthrough, units of the Guards mortars, subordinate to the tank armies, tank, mechanized and cavalry corps, ensured the development of success and supported the mobile troops throughout the entire offensive.