Grenades of the former German army and its allies. Wehrmacht small arms
The cumulative effect of a directed explosion became known in the 19th century, shortly after the start of mass production of high explosives. The first scientific work devoted to this issue was published in 1915 in Great Britain.
This effect is achieved by giving explosive charges a special shape. Typically, for this purpose, charges are made with a recess in the part opposite to its detonator. When an explosion is initiated, a converging stream of detonation products is formed into a high-speed cumulative jet, and the cumulative effect increases when the recess is lined with a layer of metal (1-2 mm thick). The speed of the metal jet reaches 10 km/s. Compared to the expanding detonation products of conventional charges, in the converging flow of shaped charge products, the pressure and density of matter and energy are much higher, which ensures the directional effect of the explosion and the high penetrating force of the shaped charge jet.
When the conical shell collapses, the velocities of individual parts of the jet turn out to be somewhat different, as a result of which the jet stretches in flight. Therefore, a slight increase in the gap between the charge and the target increases the penetration depth due to the elongation of the jet. The thickness of the armor penetrated by cumulative shells does not depend on the firing range and is approximately equal to their caliber. At significant distances between the charge and the target, the jet breaks into pieces, and the penetration effect is reduced.
In the 30s of the 20th century, there was a massive saturation of troops with armored vehicles. In addition to traditional means of combating them, in the pre-war period, the development of cumulative projectiles was carried out in some countries.
What was especially tempting was that the armor penetration of such ammunition did not depend on the speed of contact with the armor. This made it possible to successfully use them to destroy tanks in artillery systems that were not originally intended for this purpose, as well as to create highly effective anti-tank mines and grenades. Germany had advanced the most in the creation of cumulative anti-tank ammunition; by the time of the attack on the USSR, cumulative artillery shells of 75-105 mm caliber had been created and adopted there.
Unfortunately, in the Soviet Union before the war, due attention was not paid to this area. In our country, the improvement of anti-tank weapons proceeded by increasing the caliber of anti-tank guns and increasing the initial velocities of armor-piercing shells. To be fair, it should be said that in the USSR in the late 30s, an experimental batch of 76-mm cumulative shells was fired and tested. During the tests, it turned out that cumulative shells equipped with standard fuses from fragmentation shells, as a rule, do not penetrate armor and ricochet. Obviously, the problem was in the fuses, but the military, which already did not show much interest in such shells, finally abandoned them after unsuccessful firing.
At the same time, a significant number of recoilless (dynamo-reactive) Kurchevsky guns were manufactured in the USSR.
76-mm Kurchevsky recoilless rifle on a truck chassis
The advantage of such systems is their light weight and lower cost compared to “classic” guns. Recoilless rifles in combination with cumulative projectiles could quite successfully prove themselves as an anti-tank weapon.
With the outbreak of hostilities, reports began to arrive from the fronts that German artillery was using previously unknown so-called “armor-burning” shells that effectively hit tanks. When inspecting the damaged tanks, we noticed the characteristic appearance of holes with melted edges. At first, it was suggested that the unknown shells used “fast-burning thermite,” accelerated by powder gases. However, this assumption was soon refuted experimentally. It was found that the processes of combustion of thermite incendiary compositions and the interaction of the slag jet with the metal of the tank armor proceed too slowly and cannot be realized in a very short time for the shell to penetrate the armor. At this time, samples of “armor-burning” shells captured from the Germans were delivered from the front. It turned out that their design is based on the use of the cumulative effect of an explosion.
At the beginning of 1942, designers M.Ya. Vasiliev, Z.V. Vladimirov and N.S. Zhitkikh designed a 76-mm cumulative projectile with a conical cumulative recess lined with a steel shell. An artillery shell body with bottom equipment was used, the chamber of which was additionally bored into a cone in its head part. The projectile used a powerful explosive - an alloy of TNT and hexogen. The bottom hole and plug served to install an additional detonator and a beam detonator capsule. A big problem was the lack of a suitable fuse in production. After a series of experiments, the AM-6 aviation instantaneous fuse was chosen.
HEAT shells, which had armor penetration of about 70-75 mm, appeared in the ammunition load of regimental guns in 1943, and were mass-produced throughout the war.
Regimental 76-mm gun mod. 1927
The industry supplied the front with about 1.1 million 76-mm cumulative anti-tank shells. Unfortunately, their use in tank and divisional 76-mm guns was prohibited due to the unreliable operation of the fuse and the danger of an explosion in the barrel. Fuzes for cumulative artillery shells, meeting safety requirements when firing from long-barreled guns, were created only at the end of 1944.
In 1942, a group of designers including I.P. Dzyuba, N.P. Kazeikina, I.P. Kucherenko, V.Ya. Matyushkina and A.A. Greenberg developed cumulative anti-tank shells for 122-mm howitzers.
The 122-mm cumulative projectile for the howitzer of the 1938 model had a body made of steel cast iron, was equipped with an effective explosive composition based on hexogen and a powerful PETN detonator. The 122-mm cumulative projectile was equipped with the B-229 instantaneous fuse, which was developed in a very short time at TsKB-22, headed by A.Ya. Karpov.
122-mm howitzer M-30 mod. 1938
The projectile was put into service and put into mass production at the beginning of 1943, and managed to take part in the Battle of Kursk. Until the end of the war, more than 100 thousand 122-mm cumulative shells were produced. The projectile penetrated armor up to 150 mm thick along the normal line, ensuring the defeat of heavy German Tiger and Panther tanks. However, the effective firing range of howitzers at maneuvering tanks was suicidal - 400 meters.
The creation of cumulative shells opened up great opportunities for the use of artillery guns with relatively low initial velocities - 76-mm regimental guns of the 1927 and 1943 models. and 122-mm howitzers of the 1938 model, which were available in large quantities in the army. The presence of cumulative shells in the ammunition loads of these guns significantly increased the effectiveness of their anti-tank fire. This significantly strengthened the anti-tank defense of Soviet rifle divisions.
One of the main tasks of the Il-2 armored attack aircraft, which entered service at the beginning of 1941, was to fight armored vehicles.
However, the cannon armament available to the attack aircraft could only effectively hit lightly armored vehicles.
82-132 mm rocket projectiles did not have the required firing accuracy. However, in 1942, cumulative RBSK-82 were developed to arm the Il-2.
The head of the RBSK-82 missile consisted of a steel cylinder with a wall thickness of 8 mm. A cone made of sheet iron was rolled into the front part of the cylinder, creating a recess in the explosive substance poured into the cylinder of the projectile head. A tube ran through the center of the cylinder, which served “to transmit a beam of fire from the pin cap to the TAT-1 detonator cap.” The shells were tested in two versions of explosive equipment: TNT and alloy 70/30 (TNT with hexogen). The shells with TNT were fitted with an AM-A fuse, and the shells with the 70/30 alloy were fitted with an M-50 fuse. The fuses had a pin-type capsule of the APUV type. The RBSK-82 missile unit is standard, from M-8 missile shells filled with pyroxylin gunpowder.
A total of 40 RBSK-82s were used up during the tests, 18 of them by firing in the air, the rest by firing on the ground. Captured German Pz tanks were fired upon. III, StuG III and the Czech tank Pz.38(t) with reinforced armor. Firing in the air was carried out at the StuG III tank from a dive at an angle of 30° with salvoes of 2-4 shells in one pass. The firing distance was 200 m. The shells showed good stability along the flight path, but it was not possible to get a single drop into the tank.
The RBSK-82 cumulative action armor-piercing rocket-propelled projectile, filled with 70/30 alloy, penetrated 30 mm thick armor at any impact angle, and pierced 50 mm thick armor at a right angle, but did not penetrate it at a 30° impact angle. Apparently, the low armor penetration is a consequence of the delay in the firing of the fuse “from the ricochet and the cumulative jet is formed with a deformed cone.”
RBSK-82 shells loaded with TNT penetrated 30 mm thick armor only at impact angles of at least 30°, and did not penetrate 50 mm armor under any impact conditions. The holes produced by penetrating armor had a diameter of up to 35 mm. In most cases, penetration of the armor was accompanied by spalling of the metal around the exit hole.
HEAT missiles were not accepted for service due to the lack of a clear advantage over standard rockets. A new, much more powerful weapon was already on the way - PTABs.
Priority in the development of small cumulative aviation bombs belongs to domestic scientists and designers. In mid-1942, the famous fuze developer I.A. Larionov, proposed the design of a light anti-tank bomb with cumulative action. The Air Force command showed interest in implementing the proposal. TsKB-22 quickly carried out design work and testing of the new bomb began at the end of 1942. The final version was PTAB-2.5-1.5, i.e. an anti-tank aviation bomb with a cumulative effect weighing 1.5 kg in the dimensions of a 2.5 kg aviation fragmentation bomb. The State Defense Committee urgently decided to adopt the PTAB-2.5-1.5 and organize its mass production.
The first PTAB-2.5-1.5 housings and riveted pinnate-cylindrical stabilizers were made from sheet steel 0.6 mm thick. To increase the fragmentation effect, a 1.5-mm steel jacket was additionally put on the cylindrical part of the bomb. The PTAB combat charge consisted of a mixed BB of the TGA type, equipped through the bottom point. To protect the AD-A fuse impeller from spontaneous collapse, a special fuse made of a square-shaped tin plate with a fork of two wire mustaches attached to it, passing between the blades, was put on the bomb stabilizer. After the PTAB was dropped from the aircraft, it was torn off the bomb by the oncoming air flow.
Upon impact with the tank's armor, a fuse was triggered, which, through a tetryl detonator block, caused the detonation of the explosive charge. When the charge detonated, due to the presence of a cumulative funnel and a metal cone in it, a cumulative jet was created, which, as field tests showed, pierced armor up to 60 mm thick at an impact angle of 30° with a subsequent destructive effect behind the armor: defeating the tank crew, initiating detonation of ammunition , as well as ignition of fuel or its vapors.
The bomb load of the Il-2 aircraft included up to 192 PTAB-2.5-1.5 bombs in 4 cassettes of small bombs (48 pieces each) or up to 220 pieces when they were rationally placed in bulk in 4 bomb bays.
The adoption of PTABs was kept secret for some time; their use without the permission of the high command was prohibited. This made it possible to use the effect of surprise and effectively use new weapons in the battle of Kursk.
The massive use of PTAB had a stunning effect of tactical surprise and had a strong moral impact on the enemy. German tank crews, however, like Soviet ones, by the third year of the war had already become accustomed to the relatively low effectiveness of bomb assault strikes. At the initial stage of the battle, the Germans did not use dispersed marching and pre-battle formations at all, that is, on the routes of movement in columns, in places of concentration and in starting positions, for which they were severely punished - the PTAB flight line was blocked by 2-3 tanks, one distant from the other at 60-75 m, as a result of which the latter suffered significant losses, even in the absence of massive use of IL-2. One IL-2 from a height of 75-100 meters could cover an area of 15x75 meters, destroying all enemy equipment there.
On average, during the war, irretrievable tank losses from aviation did not exceed 5%; after the use of PTAB in certain sectors of the front, this figure exceeded 20%.
Having recovered from the shock, the German tank crews soon moved exclusively to dispersed marching and pre-battle formations. Naturally, this greatly complicated the management of tank units and subunits, increased the time for their deployment, concentration and redeployment, and complicated the interaction between them. In parking lots, German tank crews began to place their vehicles under trees, light mesh canopies, and install light metal meshes over the roof of the turret and hull. The effectiveness of IL-2 strikes using PTAB decreased by approximately 4-4.5 times, remaining, however, on average 2-3 times higher than when using high-explosive and high-explosive fragmentation bombs.
In 1944, a more powerful anti-tank bomb PTAB-10-2.5, with the dimensions of a 10-kg aircraft bomb, was adopted. It provided penetration of armor up to 160 mm thick. According to the principle of operation and purpose of the main components and elements, PTAB-10-2.5 was similar to PTAB-2.5-1.5 and differed from it only in shape and dimensions.
In the 1920s-1930s, the Red Army was armed with the muzzle-loading “Dyakonov grenade launcher,” created at the end of the First World War and subsequently modernized.
It was a 41-mm caliber mortar, which was put on the barrel of a rifle, fixed on the front sight with a cutout. On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, every rifle and cavalry squad had a grenade launcher. Then the question arose about giving the rifle grenade launcher “anti-tank” properties.
During the Second World War, in 1944, the VKG-40 cumulative grenade entered service with the Red Army. The grenade was fired with a special blank cartridge containing 2.75 g of VP or P-45 gunpowder. The reduced charge of the blank cartridge made it possible to fire a grenade at direct fire with the butt resting on the shoulder, at a range of up to 150 meters.
The cumulative rifle grenade is designed to combat lightly armored vehicles and enemy mobile vehicles not protected by armor, as well as firing points. The VKG-40 was used very limitedly, which is explained by the low accuracy of fire and poor armor penetration.
During the war, the USSR produced a significant number of hand-held anti-tank grenades. Initially these were high-explosive grenades; as the thickness of the armor increased, the weight of anti-tank grenades also increased. However, this still did not ensure penetration of the armor of medium tanks, so the RPG-41 grenade, with an explosive weight of 1400 g, could penetrate 25 mm armor.
Needless to say, what a danger this anti-tank weapon posed to those who used it.
In mid-1943, the Red Army adopted a fundamentally new cumulative action grenade, RPG-43, developed by N.P. Belyakov. This was the first cumulative hand grenade developed in the USSR.
Sectional view of the RPG-43 hand-held cumulative grenade
The RPG-43 had a body with a flat bottom and a conical lid, a wooden handle with a safety mechanism, a belt stabilizer and an impact-ignition mechanism with a fuse. Inside the case is placed a bursting charge with a cumulative conical recess lined with a thin layer of metal, and a cup with a safety spring and a sting fixed in its bottom.
At its front end of the handle there is a metal sleeve, inside of which there is a fuse holder and a pin holding it in the rearmost position. On the outside, a spring is put on the bushing and fabric tapes are laid, attached to the stabilizer cap. The safety mechanism consists of a folding bar and a pin. The hinged bar serves to hold the stabilizer cap on the grenade handle before it is thrown, preventing it from sliding or turning in place.
When throwing a grenade, the hinged bar separates and releases the stabilizer cap, which, under the action of a spring, slides off the handle and pulls the tapes behind it. The safety pin falls out under its own weight, releasing the fuse holder. Thanks to the presence of a stabilizer, the grenade flew head-first, which is necessary for optimal use of the energy of the grenade's cumulative charge. When a grenade hits an obstacle with the bottom of the body, the fuse, overcoming the resistance of the safety spring, is impaled on the sting by a detonator cap, which causes the explosive charge to detonate. The RPG-43's shaped charge penetrated armor up to 75 mm thick.
With the advent of German heavy tanks on the battlefield, an anti-tank hand grenade with greater armor penetration was required. A group of designers consisting of M.Z. Polevanova, L.B. Ioffe and N.S. Zhitkikh developed the RPG-6 cumulative grenade. In October 1943, the grenade was adopted by the Red Army. The RPG-6 grenade is in many ways similar to the German PWM-1.
German PWM-1 anti-tank hand grenade
The RPG-6 had a teardrop-shaped body with a charge and an additional detonator and a handle with an inertial fuse, a detonator capsule and a tape stabilizer.
The fuse firing pin was blocked by a pin. The stabilizer bands were placed in the handle and held in place by a safety bar. The safety pin was removed before throwing. After the throw, the safety bar flew off, the stabilizer was pulled out, the firing pin was pulled out - the fuse was cocked.
Thus, the RPG-6’s safety system was three-stage (the RPG-43’s was two-stage). In terms of technology, a significant feature of the RLG-6 was the absence of turned and threaded parts, the widespread use of stamping and knurling. Compared to the RPG-43, the RPG-6 was more technologically advanced in production and somewhat safer to use. RPG-43 and RPG-6 were thrown at 15-20 m, after the throw the fighter had to take cover.
During the war years, hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers were never created in the USSR, although work was carried out in this direction. The main anti-tank weapons of the infantry were still anti-tank rifles and hand anti-tank grenades. This was partly offset by a significant increase in the number of anti-tank artillery in the second half of the war. But during the offensive, anti-tank guns could not always accompany the infantry, and in the event of the sudden appearance of enemy tanks, this often led to large and unjustified losses.
By the end of the 30s, almost all participants in the coming world war had formed common directions in the development of small arms. The range and accuracy of the attack was reduced, which was compensated by the greater density of fire. As a consequence of this, the beginning of mass rearmament of units with automatic small arms - submachine guns, machine guns, assault rifles.
Accuracy of fire began to fade into the background, while the soldiers advancing in a chain began to be taught shooting on the move. With the advent of airborne troops, the need arose to create special lightweight weapons.
Maneuver warfare also affected machine guns: they became much lighter and more mobile. New types of small arms appeared (which was dictated, first of all, by the need to fight tanks) - rifle grenades, anti-tank rifles and RPGs with cumulative grenades.
Small arms of the USSR World War II
On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, the rifle division of the Red Army was a very formidable force - about 14.5 thousand people. The main type of small arms were rifles and carbines - 10,420 pieces. The share of submachine guns was insignificant - 1204. There were 166, 392 and 33 units of heavy, light and anti-aircraft machine guns, respectively.
The division had its own artillery of 144 guns and 66 mortars. The firepower was supplemented by 16 tanks, 13 armored vehicles and a solid fleet of auxiliary vehicles.
Rifles and carbines
The main small arms of the USSR infantry units of the first period of the war was certainly the famous three-line rifle - the 7.62 mm S.I. Mosin rifle of the 1891 model, modernized in 1930. Its advantages are well known - strength, reliability, ease of maintenance, combined with good ballistics qualities, in particular, with an aiming range of 2 km.
The three-line rifle is an ideal weapon for newly recruited soldiers, and the simplicity of the design created enormous opportunities for its mass production. But like any weapon, the three-line gun had its drawbacks. The permanently attached bayonet in combination with a long barrel (1670 mm) created inconvenience when moving, especially in wooded areas. The bolt handle caused serious complaints when reloading.
On its basis, a sniper rifle and a series of carbines of the 1938 and 1944 models were created. Fate gave the three-line a long life (the last three-line was released in 1965), participation in many wars and an astronomical “circulation” of 37 million copies.
Sniper with a Mosin rifle (with a PE optical sight, model 1931)
The target range of the SVT-40 is up to 1 km. The SVT-40 served with honor on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. It was also appreciated by our opponents. Historical fact: having captured rich trophies at the beginning of the war, among which there were many SVT-40s, the German army... adopted it for service, and the Finns created their own rifle on the basis of the SVT-40 - TaRaKo.
The creative development of the ideas implemented in the SVT-40 became the AVT-40 automatic rifle. It differed from its predecessor in its ability to fire automatically at a rate of up to 25 rounds per minute. The disadvantage of the AVT-40 is its low accuracy of fire, strong unmasking flame and loud sound at the moment of firing. Subsequently, as automatic weapons entered the military en masse, they were removed from service.
Submachine guns
The Great Patriotic War was the time of the final transition from rifles to automatic weapons. The Red Army began to fight, armed with a small number of PPD-40 - a submachine gun designed by the outstanding Soviet designer Vasily Alekseevich Degtyarev. At that time, PPD-40 was in no way inferior to its domestic and foreign counterparts.
Designed for a pistol cartridge cal. 7.62 x 25 mm, the PPD-40 had an impressive ammunition load of 71 rounds, housed in a drum-type magazine. Weighing about 4 kg, it fired at a rate of 800 rounds per minute with an effective range of up to 200 meters. However, just a few months after the start of the war it was replaced by the legendary PPSh-40 cal. 7.62 x 25 mm.
The creator of the PPSh-40, designer Georgy Semenovich Shpagin, was faced with the task of developing an extremely easy-to-use, reliable, technologically advanced, cheap to produce mass weapon.
From its predecessor, the PPD-40, the PPSh inherited a drum magazine with 71 rounds. A little later, a simpler and more reliable sector horn magazine with 35 rounds was developed for it. The weight of the equipped machine guns (both versions) was 5.3 and 4.15 kg, respectively. The rate of fire of the PPSh-40 reached 900 rounds per minute with an aiming range of up to 300 meters and the ability to fire single shots.
To master the PPSh-40, a few lessons were enough. It could easily be disassembled into 5 parts made using stamping and welding technology, thanks to which during the war years the Soviet defense industry produced about 5.5 million machine guns.
In the summer of 1942, the young designer Alexey Sudaev presented his brainchild - a 7.62 mm submachine gun. It was strikingly different from its “bigger brothers” PPD and PPSh-40 in its rational layout, higher manufacturability and ease of manufacturing parts using arc welding.
PPS-42 was 3.5 kg lighter and required three times less manufacturing time. However, despite its quite obvious advantages, it never became a mass weapon, leaving the PPSh-40 to take the lead.
By the beginning of the war, the DP-27 light machine gun (Degtyarev infantry, 7.62mm caliber) had been in service with the Red Army for almost 15 years, having the status of the main light machine gun of infantry units. Its automation was powered by the energy of powder gases. The gas regulator reliably protected the mechanism from contamination and high temperatures.
The DP-27 could only fire automatically, but even a beginner needed a few days to master shooting in short bursts of 3-5 shots. Ammunition of 47 rounds was placed in a disk magazine with a bullet towards the center in one row. The magazine itself was mounted on top of the receiver. The weight of the unloaded machine gun was 8.5 kg. An equipped magazine increased it by almost another 3 kg.
It was a powerful weapon with an effective range of 1.5 km and a combat rate of fire of up to 150 rounds per minute. In the firing position, the machine gun rested on a bipod. A flame arrester was screwed onto the end of the barrel, significantly reducing its unmasking effect. The DP-27 was serviced by a gunner and his assistant. In total, about 800 thousand machine guns were produced.
Small arms of the Wehrmacht of World War II
The main strategy of the German army is offensive or blitzkrieg (blitzkrieg - lightning war). The decisive role in it was assigned to large tank formations, carrying out deep breakthroughs of the enemy’s defenses in cooperation with artillery and aviation.
Tank units bypassed powerful fortified areas, destroying control centers and rear communications, without which the enemy quickly lost their combat effectiveness. The defeat was completed by motorized units of the ground forces.
Small arms of the Wehrmacht infantry division
The staff of the German infantry division of the 1940 model assumed the presence of 12,609 rifles and carbines, 312 submachine guns (machine guns), light and heavy machine guns - 425 and 110 pieces, respectively, 90 anti-tank rifles and 3,600 pistols.The Wehrmacht's small arms generally met the high wartime requirements. It was reliable, trouble-free, simple, easy to manufacture and maintain, which contributed to its serial production.
Rifles, carbines, machine guns
Mauser 98K
The Mauser 98K is an improved version of the Mauser 98 rifle, developed at the end of the 19th century by the brothers Paul and Wilhelm Mauser, founders of the world famous arms company. Equipping the German army with it began in 1935. Mauser 98K
The weapon was loaded with a clip of five 7.92 mm cartridges. A trained soldier could shoot 15 times within a minute at a range of up to 1.5 km. The Mauser 98K was very compact. Its main characteristics: weight, length, barrel length - 4.1 kg x 1250 x 740 mm. The indisputable advantages of the rifle are evidenced by numerous conflicts involving it, longevity and a truly sky-high “circulation” - more than 15 million units.
MP-40 "Schmeisser" assault rifle
Perhaps the most famous Wehrmacht small arms of the Second World War was the famous MP-40 submachine gun, a modification of its predecessor, the MP-36, created by Heinrich Vollmer. However, as fate would have it, he is better known under the name “Schmeisser”, obtained thanks to the stamp on the store - “PATENT SCHMEISSER”. The mark simply meant that, in addition to G. Vollmer, Hugo Schmeisser also participated in the creation of the MP-40, but only as the creator of the store. MP-40 "Schmeisser" assault rifle
Initially, the MP-40 was intended to arm the command staff of infantry units, but later it was transferred to the disposal of tank crews, armored vehicle drivers, paratroopers and special forces soldiers.
However, the MP-40 was absolutely unsuitable for infantry units, since it was exclusively a melee weapon. In a fierce battle in open terrain, having a weapon with a firing range of 70 to 150 meters meant for a German soldier to be practically unarmed in front of his enemy, armed with Mosin and Tokarev rifles with a firing range of 400 to 800 meters.
StG-44 assault rifle
Assault rifle StG-44 (sturmgewehr) cal. 7.92mm is another legend of the Third Reich. This is certainly an outstanding creation by Hugo Schmeisser - the prototype of many post-war assault rifles and machine guns, including the famous AK-47.
The StG-44 could conduct single and automatic fire. Its weight with a full magazine was 5.22 kg. At a target range of 800 meters, the Sturmgewehr was in no way inferior to its main competitors. There were three versions of the magazine - for 15, 20 and 30 shots with a rate of up to 500 rounds per minute. The option of using a rifle with an under-barrel grenade launcher and an infrared sight was considered.
Not without its shortcomings. The assault rifle was heavier than the Mauser-98K by a whole kilogram. Its wooden butt sometimes could not withstand hand-to-hand combat and simply broke. The flame escaping from the barrel revealed the location of the shooter, and the long magazine and sighting devices forced him to raise his head high in a prone position.
The 7.92 mm MG-42 is rightly called one of the best machine guns of World War II. It was developed at Grossfus by engineers Werner Gruner and Kurt Horn. Those who experienced its firepower were very outspoken. Our soldiers called it a “lawn mower,” and the allies called it “Hitler’s circular saw.”
Depending on the type of bolt, the machine gun fired accurately at a speed of up to 1500 rpm at a range of up to 1 km. Ammunition was supplied using a machine gun belt with 50 - 250 rounds of ammunition. The uniqueness of the MG-42 was complemented by a relatively small number of parts - 200 - and the high technology of their production using stamping and spot welding.
The barrel, hot from shooting, was replaced with a spare one in a few seconds using a special clamp. In total, about 450 thousand machine guns were produced. The unique technical developments embodied in the MG-42 were borrowed by gunsmiths from many countries around the world when creating their machine guns.
There are three modifications of grenade launcher rounds. The original and now obsolete type VOG-17 with an instant fuze. The subsequent modification, VOG-17M, differs from the previous one in that the fuse is equipped with a self-destruct device. The self-destruct mechanism is activated by overloads when fired.
For firing from automatic grenade launchers, 40x53 mm shots are used with an initial grenade speed of more than 240 m/s. The effective firing range of these grenades is 2000-2200 m. An important feature of foreign ammunition for anti-personnel grenade launchers is their diversity.
Experience of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. showed the need for mass production of cartridges. In one of his speeches, J.V. Stalin said that in 1944 alone, the Soviet Union produced 7 billion 400 million rounds of ammunition.
The effectiveness of gas cartridges is assessed experimentally in order to determine the concentration of the tear substance at different distances. For this purpose, specially designed sampling tubes are used, in which a package of filtering and sorbing material is placed.
The effectiveness of traumatic cartridges is assessed using the following methods:
- by specific kinetic energy, which should not exceed 0.5 J/mm2;
- by imprint in ballistic plasticine;
- by hydrostatic pressure, which should not exceed 50 MPa.
The enemy can use various means of protection against damage: building structures, car bodies, personal armor protection (PIB). When hitting an obstacle, the bullets are deformed.
Armor-piercing bullets provide the greatest penetration depth.
The objectives of the experimental assessment of the effectiveness of the lethal (damaging) effect of cartridges are to assess the behavior of the bullet, regardless of the location of impact and the trajectory of the bullet in the body, correlated with the actual results of using cartridges.
In the 80s XX century, the US National Law Institute developed a mathematical model that allows using a computer to obtain the relative stopping effect coefficient RII (Relative Incapacitation Index) for various ammunition.
The effectiveness of a cartridge is determined by the probability of incapacitating manpower or other targets when fired from a weapon and depends on the probability of hitting the target, the lethal, stopping and penetrating effect of the bullet. The determination of the probability of hitting a target is described in sufficient detail in the specialized literature.
It is well known that a shot from a firearm is accompanied by a loud sound, which, along with the muzzle flame, is the main unmasking factor for the sniper, indicating the direction of the shot and warning the enemy of the threat.
The small arms system that Russia inherited from the USSR was focused on the concept of a global-scale conflict involving large human and material resources. However, the experience of local wars in the second half of the 20th century showed the need to increase the firing range of sniper weapons with the probability of hitting a “running figure” target at a distance of 1500 m. In this regard, sniper rifles were developed chambered for .50 Browning and the domestic 12.7x108 mm cartridge .
The main domestic rifle cartridge is the 7.62x54 mm cartridge of the 1908/30 model, which was the basis for the creation of the SVD family of sniper rifles and other weapon designs (Fig. 1). Two types of cartridges were developed specifically for sniper rifles: “sniper” 7N1 and the so-called “with silver nose bullets” 57-N-323S.
The main cartridges used for sniping by foreign armies and intelligence services are: 5.56x45mm NATO cartridge (.223 Remington), .243 Winchester, 7mm Remington Magnum, 7.5x54mm, .300 Winchester Magnum, 7.62x51mm NATO, .338 Lapua Magnum, .50 Browning.
The .243 Winchester cartridge (Fig. 1, a) is a typical hunting ammunition that has insignificant recoil compared to larger caliber ammunition and, accordingly, provides better accuracy.
Shooting further and more accurately is one of the priorities for the development of small arms and ammunition. As soon as one of the warring sides achieved an increase in the capabilities of one or another type of small arms, the other side immediately suffered additional losses and was forced to change the tactics of its troops.
Gas cartridges are used mainly in civilian weapons due to their sufficient effectiveness in riot control. They are equipped with irritants - substances that cause a person to temporarily lose the ability to carry out active actions due to irritation of the mucous surfaces of the eyes, upper respiratory tract, and moist skin.
A separate group includes small-caliber pistol cartridges designed for use in PDW (Personal Defense Weapon) weapons. They are characterized by a caliber of 4.4...5.8 mm, a low bullet mass, an initial bullet speed of more than 700 m/s, a bottle sleeve, and a relatively high penetration effect for pistol cartridges.
In the early 1980s. Relatively lightweight body armor of varying degrees of protection appeared. So, for example, a 1st class body armor provides protection from bullets of cartridges 57-N-181 C (for the PM pistol) and 57-N-111 (for the Nagan revolver), and a 2nd class of protection provides protection from bullets of the 7N7 cartridge (for the PSM pistol) and 57-11-134 S (for the TT pistol). And although the body armor covers 25-30% of the human body, it has significantly increased survivability in combat conditions.
The 9-mm Parabellum cartridge, adopted by Germany on August 22, 1908, is still in service with the armies of most countries of the world. To a large extent, such a long life of the cartridge is due to the fact that it was constantly improved.
In 1936, the German company Gustav Genschow & Co created the 9-mm Ultra cartridge for the Walter PP pistol. The 9-mm “Kurz” cartridge was used as the basis, with the sleeve lengthened from 17 to 18.5 mm. The cartridge was produced until the end of World War II.
The “father” of modern pistol cartridges is considered to be Hugo Borchardt, chief engineer of the German arms company Ludwig Lewe & Co., who in 1893 developed a 7.65×25 cartridge (caliber × case length) with a bottle sleeve for his self-loading pistol , a groove instead of a flange and a shell bullet.
The pistol was not accepted for service, and Borchard did not continue to refine his pistol and cartridge.
Pistol cartridge bullets are divided into shellless (solid), shelled, semi-jacketed (with an open nose), expansive (with a cavity in the head), and armor-piercing. In the United States and Western countries, abbreviations are used to indicate design features. The most common abbreviations are shown in the table
According to the forensic requirements of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, the minimum energy criterion for human susceptibility is a specific kinetic energy of 0.5 J/mm².
The mass of the bullet is of great importance. The lighter the bullet, the faster it loses kinetic energy, the more difficult it is to keep it within the limits of the permissible traumatic effect at an acceptable firing range. As a result, it is necessary to significantly increase the initial energy, introducing restrictions on the minimum permissible distance for using weapons, which is not always possible to withstand.
The predecessor of this ammunition is the 7.62 mm reduced velocity (SV) cartridge, created in the early 60s. for use in an AKM assault rifle equipped with a silent and flameless firing device (SBS).
The SP-5 and SP-6 9 mm cartridges were created according to the same principle in the mid-80s. N. Zabelin, L. Dvoryaninova and Yu.Z. Frolov at TsNIITOCHMASH based on the 7.62 mm cartridge case mod. 1943. Leaving its shape, length and capsule the same, the designers changed the barrel of the cartridge case - to attach a 9-mm bullet, and the powder charge - to impart to a bullet weighing about 16 g an initial speed of 280-295 m/s. Used for shooting from the 9-mm VSK-94 sniper rifle, AK-9 Kalashnikov assault rifle, and special “Val” assault rifle.
The first thing you need to understand is that a traumatic weapon is far from being a combat weapon or even a service weapon, although it can be used on its basis. In other words, you shouldn’t expect miracles from a traumatic pistol, because when it was created, I’m more than sure, the main requirement for any model was to minimize the likelihood of causing severe injuries that could lead to death. However, one should not underestimate trauma, considering it a child’s toy with which a bit of pampering is acceptable. This is the same weapon, it can also kill under certain conditions, not guaranteed, of course, but it can.
Often, in modern conditions, the outcome of a fire contact will depend not only on the skill of the shooter, his weapon, but also on the ammunition used.
The purpose of the cartridge depends on the type of bullet with which it is equipped. Today, there are many different types of bullets with a wide variety of destructive effects - from non-lethal to armor-piercing. The main meaning of these differences is the interfering (defeat of manpower protected by armor) or stopping action (braking the bullet at the target and complete transfer of impulse). The stopping effect implies an increased traumatic effect.
It was developed by B.V. Semin. When designing the cartridge, the cartridge case from the 7.62x25 mm TT cartridge, “cut” at 18 mm from the bottom, was taken as a basis. This decision made it possible, on the one hand, to use machine tools and measuring equipment for TT cartridges, and on the other hand, it excluded the possibility of using new cartridges for Soviet weapons that remained in the hands of the population after the war.
Many letters
The female name Katyusha entered the history of Russia and world history as the name of one of the most terrible types of weapons of the Second World War.
At the same time, not a single type of weapon was surrounded by such a veil of secrecy and misinformation...
PAGES OF HISTORY
No matter how much our father-commanders kept the Katyusha materiel secret, just a few weeks after its first combat use it fell into the hands of the Germans and ceased to be a secret. But the history of the creation of “Katyusha” was kept “closed sealed” for many years, both because of ideological principles and because of the ambitions of the designers.
Question one: why was rocket artillery used only in 1941? After all, gunpowder rockets were used by the Chinese a thousand years ago. In the first half of the 19th century, missiles were used quite widely in European armies (missiles by V. Kongrev, A. Zasyadko, K. Konstantinov and others).
Rocket launchers of the early 19th century. V. Kongrev (a) and I. Kosinsky (b)
Alas, the combat use of missiles was limited by their enormous dispersion. At first, long poles made of wood or iron – “tails” – were used to stabilize them. But such missiles were effective only for hitting area targets. So, for example, in 1854, the Anglo-French fired missiles at Odessa from rowing barges, and the Russians fired missiles at Central Asian cities in the 50s–70s of the 19th century.
But with the introduction of rifled guns, gunpowder rockets became an anachronism, and between 1860–1880 they were removed from service in all European armies (in Austria in 1866, in England in 1885, in Russia in 1879). In 1914, only signal flares remained in the armies and navies of all countries. Nevertheless, Russian inventors constantly turned to the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) with projects for military missiles. So, in September 1905, the Artillery Committee rejected the high-explosive rocket project. The warhead of this rocket was stuffed with pyroxylin, and smokeless gunpowder rather than black gunpowder was used as fuel. Moreover, the fellows from the State Agrarian University did not even try to work out an interesting project, but dismissed it out of the blue. It is curious that the designer was... Hieromonk Kirik.
It was only during the First World War that interest in rockets was revived. There are three main reasons for this. Firstly, slow-burning gunpowder was created, which made it possible to dramatically increase flight speed and firing range. Accordingly, with an increase in flight speed, it became possible to effectively use wing stabilizers and improve the accuracy of fire.
The second reason: the need to create powerful weapons for airplanes of the First World War - “flying whatnots”.
And finally, the most important reason is that the rocket was best suited as a means of delivering chemical weapons.
CHEMICAL PROJECTILE
Back on June 15, 1936, the head of the chemical department of the Red Army, corps engineer Y. Fishman, was presented with a report from the director of the RNII, military engineer 1st rank I. Kleimenov, and the head of the 1st department, military engineer 2nd rank K. Glukharev, on preliminary tests of 132/82-mm short-range chemical rocket mines . This ammunition complemented the 250/132 mm short-range chemical mine, testing of which was completed by May 1936.
M-13 rocket.
The M-13 projectile consists of a head and a body. The head has a shell and a combat charge. A fuse is attached to the front of the head. The body ensures the flight of a rocket projectile and consists of a casing, a combustion chamber, a nozzle and stabilizers. In front of the combustion chamber there are two electric powder igniters. On the outer surface of the combustion chamber shell there are two threaded guide pins, which serve to hold the missile projectile in the guide mounts. 1 - fuse retaining ring, 2 - GVMZ fuse, 3 - detonator block, 4 - explosive charge, 5 - warhead, 6 - igniter, 7 - chamber bottom, 8 - guide pin, 9 - powder rocket charge, 10 - rocket part, 11 - grate, 12 - critical section of the nozzle, 13 - nozzle, 14 - stabilizer, 15 - remote fuse pin, 16 - AGDT remote fuse, 17 - igniter.
Thus, “RNII has completed all preliminary development of the issue of creating a powerful means of short-range chemical attack, and expects from you a general conclusion on the tests and instructions on the need for further work in this direction. For its part, RNII considers it necessary to now issue a pilot order for the production of RKhM-250 (300 pieces) and RKhM-132 (300 pieces) for the purpose of conducting field and military tests. The five pieces of RKhM-250 remaining from the preliminary tests, three of which are at the Central Chemical Test Site (Prichernavskaya station) and three RKhM-132 can be used for additional tests according to your instructions.”
Experimental installation of M-8 on a tank
According to the RNII report on the main activities for 1936 on topic No. 1, samples of 132-mm and 250-mm chemical rockets with a warhead capacity of 6 and 30 liters of chemical agent were manufactured and tested. The tests, carried out in the presence of the head of the VOKHIMU RKKA, gave satisfactory results and received a positive assessment. But VOKHIMU did nothing to introduce these shells into the Red Army and gave RNII new assignments for shells with a longer range.
The Katyusha prototype (BM-13) was first mentioned on January 3, 1939 in a letter from the People's Commissar of Defense Industry Mikhail Kaganovich to his brother, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Lazar Kaganovich: “In October 1938, an automobile mechanized rocket launcher for organizing a surprise chemical attack on the enemy in "Basically, it passed factory firing tests at the Sofrinsky control and testing artillery range and is currently undergoing field tests at the Central Military Chemical Test Site in Prichernavskaya."
Experimental installation of M-13 on a trailer
Please note that the customers of the future Katyusha are military chemists. The work was also financed through the Chemical Administration and, finally, the missile warheads were exclusively chemical.
132-mm chemical shells RHS-132 were tested by firing at the Pavlograd artillery range on August 1, 1938. The fire was carried out with single shells and series of 6 and 12 shells. The duration of firing in a series with full ammunition did not exceed 4 seconds. During this time, the target area reached 156 liters of explosive agent, which, in terms of an artillery caliber of 152 mm, was equivalent to 63 artillery shells when firing in a salvo from 21 three-gun batteries or 1.3 artillery regiments, provided that the fire was carried out with unstable explosive agents. The tests focused on the fact that the metal consumption per 156 liters of explosive agent when firing rocket projectiles was 550 kg, while when firing 152-mm chemical projectiles, the weight of the metal was 2370 kg, that is, 4.3 times more.
The test report stated: “The vehicle-mounted mechanized chemical attack missile launcher was tested to show significant advantages over artillery systems. The three-ton vehicle is equipped with a system capable of firing both a single fire and a series of 24 shots within 3 seconds. Travel speed is normal for a truck. Transferring from traveling to combat position takes 3–4 minutes. Firing - from the driver's cabin or from cover.
The first experimental installation of M-13 on a car chassis
The warhead of one RCS (reactive chemical projectile - “NVO”) holds 8 liters of agent, and in artillery shells of a similar caliber - only 2 liters. To create a dead zone on an area of 12 hectares, one salvo from three trucks is enough, which replaces 150 howitzers or 3 artillery regiments. At a distance of 6 km, the area of contamination with chemical agents in one salvo is 6–8 hectares.”
I note that the Germans also prepared their multiple rocket launchers exclusively for chemical warfare. Thus, in the late 1930s, the German engineer Nebel designed a 15-cm rocket and a six-barrel tubular installation, which the Germans called a six-barrel mortar. Testing of the mortar began in 1937. The system was named “15-cm smoke mortar type “D”. In 1941, it was renamed 15 cm Nb.W 41 (Nebelwerfer), that is, a 15-cm smoke mortar mod. 41. Naturally, their main purpose was not to set up smoke screens, but to fire rockets filled with toxic substances. Interestingly, Soviet soldiers called the 15 cm Nb.W 41 “Vanyusha”, by analogy with the M-13, called “Katyusha”.
Nb.W 41
The first launch of the Katyusha prototype (designed by Tikhomirov and Artemyev) took place in the USSR on March 3, 1928. The flight range of the 22.7 kg rocket was 1300 m, and a Van Deren system mortar was used as a launcher.
The caliber of our missiles during the Great Patriotic War - 82 mm and 132 mm - was determined by nothing more than the diameter of the engine's powder bombs. Seven 24-mm powder bombs, tightly packed into the combustion chamber, give a diameter of 72 mm, the thickness of the chamber walls is 5 mm, hence the diameter (caliber) of the rocket is 82 mm. Seven thicker (40 mm) pieces in the same way give a caliber of 132 mm.
The most important issue in the design of rockets was the method of stabilization. Soviet designers preferred finned rockets and adhered to this principle until the end of the war.
In the 1930s, rockets with a ring stabilizer that did not exceed the dimensions of the projectile were tested. Such projectiles could be fired from tubular guides. But tests have shown that it is impossible to achieve stable flight using a ring stabilizer.
Then they fired 82-mm rockets with a four-blade tail span of 200, 180, 160, 140 and 120 mm. The results were quite definite - with a decrease in the span of the tail, flight stability and accuracy decreased. The tail, with a span of more than 200 mm, shifted the center of gravity of the projectile back, which also worsened flight stability. Lightening the tail by reducing the thickness of the stabilizer blades caused strong vibrations of the blades until they were destroyed.
Grooved guides were adopted as launchers for finned missiles. Experiments have shown that the longer they are, the higher the accuracy of the projectiles. The length of 5 m for the RS-132 became the maximum due to restrictions on railway dimensions.
I note that the Germans stabilized their rockets until 1942 exclusively by rotation. The USSR also tested turbojet missiles, but they did not go into mass production. As often happens with us, the reason for failures during testing was explained not by poor execution, but by the irrationality of the concept.
FIRST SALLOS
Whether we like it or not, the Germans used multiple launch rocket systems for the first time in the Great Patriotic War on June 22, 1941 near Brest. “And then the arrows showed 03.15, the command “Fire!” was sounded, and the devil’s dance began. The earth began to shake. Nine batteries of the 4th Special Purpose Mortar Regiment also contributed to the infernal symphony. In half an hour, 2880 shells whistled over the Bug and fell on the city and fortress on the eastern bank of the river. Heavy 600-mm mortars and 210-mm guns of the 98th artillery regiment rained down their volleys on the fortifications of the citadel and hit point targets - Soviet artillery positions. It seemed that the fortress would not leave one stone unturned.”
This is how historian Paul Karel described the first use of 15-cm rocket launchers. In addition, the Germans in 1941 used heavy 28 cm high-explosive and 32 cm incendiary turbojet shells. The projectiles were over-caliber and had one powder engine (the diameter of the engine part was 140 mm).
A 28-cm high-explosive mine, with a direct hit on a stone house, completely destroyed it. The mine successfully destroyed field-type shelters. Living targets within a radius of several tens of meters were hit by the blast wave. Mine fragments flew at a distance of up to 800 m. The warhead contained 50 kg of liquid TNT or ammatol grade 40/60. It is curious that both 28 cm and 32 cm German mines (missiles) were transported and launched from a simple wooden closure such as a box.
The first use of Katyushas took place on July 14, 1941. The battery of captain Ivan Andreevich Flerov fired two salvos from seven launchers at the Orsha railway station. The appearance of the Katyusha came as a complete surprise to the leadership of the Abwehr and the Wehrmacht. On August 14, the High Command of the German Ground Forces notified its troops: “The Russians have an automatic multi-barrel flamethrower cannon... The shot is fired by electricity. When fired, smoke is generated... If such guns are captured, report immediately.” Two weeks later, a directive appeared entitled “Russian gun throwing rocket-like projectiles.” It said: “...The troops are reporting that the Russians are using a new type of weapon that fires rockets. A large number of shots can be fired from one installation within 3-5 seconds... Each appearance of these guns must be reported to the general commander of the chemical forces at the high command on the same day.”
Where the name “Katyusha” came from is not known for certain. Pyotr Guk’s version is interesting: “Both at the front and then, after the war, when I got acquainted with the archives, talked with veterans, read their speeches in the press, I came across a variety of explanations for how the formidable weapon received a maiden name. Some believed that the beginning was made by the letter “K”, which the Voronezh Comintern members put on their products. There was a legend among the troops that the Guards mortars were named after the dashing partisan girl who destroyed many Nazis.”
When, at a firing range, soldiers and commanders asked a GAU representative to name the “true” name of the combat installation, he advised: “Call the installation as an ordinary artillery piece. This is important for maintaining secrecy."
Soon, Katyusha had a younger brother named Luka. In May 1942, a group of officers from the Main Directorate of Armaments developed the M-30 projectile, in which a powerful over-caliber warhead, made in the shape of an ellipsoid, with a maximum diameter of 300 mm, was attached to the rocket engine from the M-13.
Installation of M-30 "Luka"
After successful field tests, on June 8, 1942, the State Defense Committee (GKO) issued a decree on the adoption of the M-30 and the start of its mass production. In Stalin's times, all important problems were resolved quickly, and by July 10, 1942, the first 20 M-30 guards mortar divisions were created. Each of them had a three-battery composition, the battery consisted of 32 four-charge single-tier launchers. The divisional salvo accordingly amounted to 384 shells.
The first combat use of the M-30 took place in the 61st Army of the Western Front near the city of Beleva. On the afternoon of June 5, two regimental salvoes fell on German positions in Annino and Upper Doltsy with a thunderous roar. Both villages were razed to the ground, after which the infantry occupied them without loss.
The power of the Luka shells (M-30 and its modification M-31) made a great impression on both the enemy and our soldiers. There were many different assumptions and fabrications about “Luka” at the front. One of the legends was that the warhead of the rocket was filled with some kind of special, especially powerful explosive, capable of burning everything in the area of the explosion. In fact, the warheads used conventional explosives. The exceptional effect of the Luka shells was achieved through salvo firing. With the simultaneous or almost simultaneous explosion of an entire group of shells, the law of addition of impulses from shock waves came into force.
Installation of the M-30 Luka on the Studebaker chassis
M-30 shells had high-explosive, chemical and incendiary warheads. However, the high-explosive warhead was mainly used. For the characteristic shape of the M-30's head section, front-line soldiers called it “Luka Mudishchev” (the hero of Barkov’s poem of the same name). Naturally, the official press preferred not to mention this nickname, unlike the widely circulated “Katyusha”. The Luka, like the German 28 cm and 30 cm shells, was launched from the wooden sealed box in which it was delivered from the factory. Four, and later eight, of these boxes were placed on a special frame, resulting in a simple launcher.
Needless to say, after the war the journalistic and literary fraternity appropriately and inappropriately remembered “Katyusha”, but chose to forget her much more formidable brother “Luka”. In the 1970s–1980s, at the first mention of “Luka,” veterans asked me in surprise: “How do you know? You didn’t fight.”
ANTI-TANK MYTH
"Katyusha" was a first-class weapon. As often happens, the father-commanders wanted it to become a universal weapon, including an anti-tank weapon.
An order is an order, and reports of victory rushed to headquarters. If you believe the secret publication “Field Rocket Artillery in the Great Patriotic War” (Moscow, 1955), then on the Kursk Bulge in two days in three episodes, 95 enemy tanks were destroyed by Katyushas! If this were true, then the anti-tank artillery should be disbanded and replaced with multiple rocket launchers.
In some ways, the huge numbers of destroyed tanks were influenced by the fact that for each damaged tank the crew of the combat vehicle received 2,000 rubles, of which 500 rubles. - commander, 500 rubles. - to the gunner, the rest - to the rest.
Unfortunately, due to the huge dispersion, shooting at tanks is ineffective. Here I am picking up the most boring brochure “Tables for firing M-13 rocket projectiles,” published in 1942. It follows from it that with a firing range of 3000 m, the range deviation was 257 m, and the lateral deviation was 51 m. For shorter distances, the range deviation was not given at all, since the dispersion of projectiles could not be calculated. It is not difficult to imagine the likelihood of a missile hitting a tank at such a distance. If we theoretically imagine that a combat vehicle somehow managed to shoot at a tank at point-blank range, then even here the muzzle velocity of a 132-mm projectile was only 70 m/s, which is clearly not enough to penetrate the armor of a Tiger or Panther.
It is not for nothing that the year of publication of the shooting tables is specified here. According to the TS-13 firing tables of the same M-13 missile, the average deviation in range in 1944 is 105 m, and in 1957 - 135 m, and the lateral deviation is 200 and 300 m, respectively. Obviously, the 1957 table is more correct, in which the dispersion increased by almost 1.5 times, so that in the 1944 tables there are errors in calculations or, most likely, deliberate falsification to increase the morale of personnel.
There is no doubt that if an M-13 shell hits a medium or light tank, it will be disabled. The M-13 shell is not able to penetrate the frontal armor of the Tiger. But in order to be guaranteed to hit a single tank from a distance of the same 3 thousand m, it is necessary to fire from 300 to 900 M-13 shells due to their enormous dispersion; at shorter distances an even larger number of missiles will be required.
Here is another example told by veteran Dmitry Loza. During the Uman-Botoshan offensive operation on March 15, 1944, two Shermans from the 45th mechanized brigade of the 5th mechanized corps got stuck in the mud. The landing party from the tanks jumped off and retreated. German soldiers surrounded the stuck tanks, “covered the viewing slots with mud, covered the sighting holes in the turret with black soil, completely blinding the crew. They knocked on the hatches and tried to open them with rifle bayonets. And everyone shouted: “Rus, kaput! Give up!” But then two BM-13 combat vehicles arrived. The Katyushas quickly descended into the ditch with their front wheels and fired a direct fire salvo. Bright fiery arrows, hissing and whistling, rushed into the ravine. A moment later, blinding flames danced around. When the smoke from the rocket explosions cleared, the tanks stood seemingly unharmed, only the hulls and turrets were covered with thick soot...
Having repaired the damage to the tracks and throwing out the burnt tarpaulins, the Emcha left for Mogilev-Podolsky.” So, thirty-two 132-mm M-13 shells were fired at two Shermans at point-blank range, and they... only had their tarpaulin burnt.
WAR STATISTICS
The first installations for firing the M-13 had the index BM-13-16 and were mounted on the chassis of a ZIS-6 vehicle. The 82-mm BM-8-36 launcher was also mounted on the same chassis. There were only a few hundred ZIS-6 cars, and at the beginning of 1942 their production was stopped.
Launchers for M-8 and M-13 missiles in 1941–1942 were mounted on anything. Thus, six M-8 guide shells were installed on machines from the Maxim machine gun, 12 M-8 guide shells were installed on a motorcycle, sled and snowmobile (M-8 and M-13), T-40 and T-60 tanks, armored railway vehicles platforms (BM-8-48, BM-8-72, BM-13-16), river and sea boats, etc. But basically, launchers in 1942–1944 were mounted on cars received under Lend-Lease: Austin, Dodge, Ford Marmont, Bedford, etc.
Over the 5 years of the war, out of 3374 chassis used for combat vehicles, the ZIS-6 accounted for 372 (11%), Studebaker - 1845 (54.7%), the remaining 17 types of chassis (except for the Willys with mountain launchers) – 1157 (34.3%). Finally, it was decided to standardize combat vehicles based on the Studebaker car. In April 1943, such a system was put into service under the designation BM-13N (normalized). In March 1944, a self-propelled launcher for the M-13 was adopted on the Studebaker BM-31-12 chassis.
But in the post-war years, Studebakers were ordered to be forgotten, although combat vehicles on its chassis were in service until the early 1960s. In secret instructions, the Studebaker was called an “all-terrain vehicle.” Mutant Katyushas on the ZIS-5 chassis or post-war types of vehicles, which are stubbornly passed off as genuine military relics, were erected on numerous pedestals, but the genuine BM-13-16 on the ZIS-6 chassis was preserved only in the Artillery Museum in St. Petersburg.
As already mentioned, the Germans captured several launchers and hundreds of 132 mm M-13 and 82 mm M-8 shells back in 1941. The Wehrmacht command believed that their turbojet shells and tubular launchers with revolver-type guides were better than Soviet wing-stabilized shells. But the SS took up the M-8 and M-13 and ordered the Skoda company to copy them.
In 1942, based on the 82-mm Soviet M-8 projectile, 8 cm R.Sprgr rockets were created in Zbroevka. In fact, it was a new projectile, and not a copy of the M-8, although externally the German projectile was very similar to the M-8.
Unlike the Soviet projectile, the stabilizer feathers were set obliquely at an angle of 1.5 degrees to the longitudinal axis. Due to this, the projectile rotated in flight. The rotation speed was many times less than that of a turbojet projectile, and did not play any role in stabilizing the projectile, but it eliminated the eccentricity of the thrust of a single-nozzle rocket engine. But eccentricity, that is, a displacement of the engine thrust vector due to uneven burning of gunpowder in the bombs, was the main reason for the low accuracy of Soviet missiles of the M-8 and M-13 types.
German installation for firing prototypes of Soviet missiles
Based on the Soviet M-13, the Skoda company created a whole series of 15-cm missiles with oblique wings for the SS and Luftwaffe, but they were produced in small series. Our troops captured several samples of German 8-cm shells, and our designers made their own samples based on them. The M-13 and M-31 missiles with oblique tails were adopted by the Red Army in 1944, they were assigned special ballistic indices - TS-46 and TS-47.
R.Sprgr projectile
The apotheosis of the combat use of “Katyusha” and “Luka” was the storming of Berlin. In total, more than 44 thousand guns and mortars, as well as 1,785 M-30 and M-31 launchers, 1,620 rocket artillery combat vehicles (219 divisions) were involved in the Berlin operation. In the battles for Berlin, rocket artillery units used the wealth of experience they acquired in the battles for Poznan, which consisted of direct fire with single M-31, M-20 and even M-13 projectiles.
At first glance, this method of firing may seem primitive, but its results turned out to be very significant. Firing single rockets during battles in such a huge city as Berlin has found the widest application.
To conduct such fire, assault groups of approximately the following composition were created in the guards mortar units: an officer - group commander, an electrical engineer, 25 sergeants and soldiers for the M-31 assault group and 8-10 for the M-13 assault group.
The intensity of the battles and the fire missions performed by rocket artillery in the battles for Berlin can be judged by the number of rockets expended in these battles. In the offensive zone of the 3rd Shock Army the following were expended: M-13 shells - 6270; M-31 shells – 3674; M-20 shells – 600; M-8 shells - 1878.
Of this amount, the rocket artillery assault groups expended: M-8 shells - 1638; M-13 shells – 3353; M-20 shells – 191; M-31 shells – 479.
These groups in Berlin destroyed 120 buildings that were strong centers of enemy resistance, destroyed three 75-mm guns, suppressed dozens of firing points, and killed over 1,000 enemy soldiers and officers.
So, our glorious “Katyusha” and her unjustly offended brother “Luka” became a weapon of victory in the full sense of the word!
The information used in writing this material is, in principle, generally known. But maybe at least someone will learn something new for themselves
Here's a small illustration:
Let’s say I read in a 12-volume book (which usually exaggerates the strength of the Germans and satellites opposing us) that by the beginning of 1944 on the Soviet-German front the ratio of forces in artillery guns and mortars was 1.7: 1 (95,604 Soviet versus 54,570 enemy). More than one and a half overall superiority. That is, in active sectors it could be up to three times (for example, in the Belarusian operation, 29,000 Soviets against 10,000 enemy). Does this mean that the enemy could not raise his head under the hurricane fire of Soviet artillery? No, an artillery gun is just a tool for discharging shells. There are no shells - and the gun is a useless toy. And providing shells is precisely a logistics task.
In 2009, on VIF, Isaev posted a comparison of ammunition consumption of Soviet and German artillery (1942: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/0/archive/1718/1718985.htm, 1943: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/ forum/0/archive/1706/1706490.htm, 1944: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/0/archive/1733/1733134.htm, 1945: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/ 0/archive/1733/1733171.htm). I collected everything in a table, supplemented it with rocket artillery, for the Germans I added from Hanna the consumption of captured calibers (often it gives a non-negligible addition) and the consumption of tank calibers for comparability - in Soviet figures, tank calibers (20-mm ShVAK and 85-mm non-aircraft) are present. Posted it. Well, I grouped it a little differently. It turns out to be quite interesting. Despite the superiority of Soviet artillery in the number of barrels, the Germans fired more shells in pieces, if we take artillery calibers (i.e. guns 75 mm and above, without anti-aircraft):
USSR Germany 1942 37,983,800 45,261,822 1943 82,125,480 69,928,496 1944 98,564,568 113,663,900
If we convert into tons, the superiority is even more noticeable:
USSR Germany 1942 446,113 709,957 1943 828,193 1,121,545 1944 1,000,962 1,540,933
Tons here are taken by the weight of the projectile, not the shot. That is, the weight of metal and explosives falling directly on the head of the opposing party. I note that I did not count armor-piercing shells from tank and anti-tank guns as Germans (I hope it’s clear why). It is not possible to exclude them on the Soviet side, but judging by the Germans, the amendment will be insignificant. In Germany, consumption is given on all fronts, which begins to play a role in 1944.
In the Soviet army, on average, 3.6-3.8 shells were fired per day on a gun barrel from 76.2 mm and above in the active army (without RGK). The figure is quite stable both by year and by caliber: in 1944 the average daily round for all calibers was 3.6 per barrel, for a 122 mm howitzer - 3.0, for 76.2 mm barrels (regimental, divisional, tank) - 3.7. On the contrary, the average daily fire per mortar barrel increases year by year: from 2.0 in 1942 to 4.1 in 1944.
Regarding the Germans, I do not have any guns in the active army. But if we take the general availability of guns, then the average daily round of fire per barrel of 75 mm caliber and higher in 1944 will be about 8.5. At the same time, the main workhorse of divisional artillery (105-mm howitzers - almost a third of the total tonnage of shells) fired an average of 14.5 shells per barrel per day, and the second main caliber (150-mm divisional howitzers - 20% of the total tonnage) fired approximately 10. 7. Mortars were used much less intensively - 81 mm mortars fired 4.4 rounds per barrel per day, and 120 mm only 2.3. The regimental artillery guns gave a consumption closer to average (75 mm infantry gun 7 shells per barrel, 150 mm infantry gun - 8.3).
Another instructive metric is the consumption of shells per division.
The division was the main organizational building block, but typically divisions achieved reinforcement in units. It would be interesting to see how the middle division was supported in terms of firepower. In 1942-44, the USSR had approximately 500 estimated divisions in the active army (without RGK) (weighted average number: 1942 - 425 divisions, 1943 - 494 divisions, 1944 - 510 divisions). The active army ground forces numbered approximately 5.5 million, that is, there were approximately 11 thousand people per division. This “had to” naturally, taking into account both the composition of the division itself and all the reinforcement and support units that worked for it both directly and in the rear.
For the Germans, the average number of troops per division of the Eastern Front, calculated in the same way, decreased from 16,000 in 1943 to 13,800 in 1944, approximately 1.45-1.25 times “thicker” than the Soviet one. Moreover, the average daily fire for a Soviet division in 1944 was about 5.4 tons (1942 - 2.9; 1943 - 4.6), and for a German division it was three times more (16.2 tons). If we count 10,000 people in the active army, then on the Soviet side, 5 tons of ammunition were spent per day to support their actions in 1944, and 13.8 tons on the German side.
The American division in the European theater of operations stands out even more in this sense. It had three times more people than the Soviet one: 34,000 (this does not include Supply Command troops), and the daily ammunition consumption was almost ten times more (52.3 tons). Or 15.4 tons per day for 10,000 people, that is, more than three times more than in the Red Army.
In this sense, it was the Americans who implemented Joseph Vissarionovich’s recommendation to “fight with little blood but with a lot of shells.” You can compare - in June 1944, the distance to the Elbe was approximately the same from Omaha Beach and from Vitebsk. The Russians and Americans also reached the Elbe at about the same time. That is, they provided themselves with the same speed of advancement. However, the Americans along this route spent 15 tons per day per 10,000 personnel and lost an average of 3.8% of troops per month killed, wounded, captured and missing. Soviet troops, advancing at the same speed, spent (specifically) three times less shells, but they also lost 8.5% per month. Those. speed was ensured by the expenditure of manpower.
It is also interesting to look at the distribution of weight consumption of ammunition by type of gun:
Let me remind you that all the figures here are for artillery 75 mm and above, that is, without anti-aircraft guns, without 50 mm mortars, without battalion/anti-tank guns with a caliber from 28 to 57 mm. Infantry guns include German guns with this name, Soviet 76 mm regiments and an American 75 mm howitzer. Other guns weighing less than 8 tons in firing position are counted as field guns. At the upper limit this includes systems such as the Soviet 152 mm howitzer-cannon ML-20 and the German s.FH 18. Heavier guns such as the Soviet 203 mm howitzer B-4, the American 203 mm howitzer M1 or the German 210- mm mortar, as well as the 152-155-170 mm long-range guns on their carriages fall into the next class - heavy and long-range artillery.
It can be seen that in the Red Army the lion's share of fire falls on mortars and regimental guns, i.e. to fire in the near tactical zone. Heavy artillery plays a very minor role (more in 1945, but not much). In field artillery, the effort (based on the weight of the shells fired) is approximately evenly distributed between the 76 mm gun, 122 mm howitzer and 152 mm howitzer/howitzer-gun. Which leads to the fact that the average weight of a Soviet projectile is one and a half times less than a German one.
In addition, it should be noted that the further away the target, the less covered (on average) it is. In the near tactical zone, most targets are dug in/covered in one way or another, while in the depths such unsheltered targets appear as moving reserves, enemy troops in gathering places, headquarters locations, etc. In other words, a projectile hitting a target in depth on average causes more damage than a projectile fired along the front edge (on the other hand, the dispersion of projectiles at long distances is higher).
Then, if the enemy has parity in the weight of shells fired, but at the same time has half as many people at the front, he thereby gives half as many targets to our artillery.
All this works for the observed loss ratio.
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