Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. War on Nuclear Weapons
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was approved by resolution 2373 (XXII) of the UN General Assembly on June 12, 1968 and concluded on July 1, 1968 simultaneously in London, Washington and Moscow.
The initiator of the conclusion of this Treaty is Ireland, which put forward the corresponding initiative at the 13th UN General Assembly in 1958. Ireland's initiative was not supported by France and the USSR. In 1965, after the test atomic weapons in France and China, the United States presented a draft non-proliferation agreement to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, and a little later the Soviet Union presented its draft of a similar treaty to the UN General Assembly. In August 1967, Soviet and American proposals were agreed upon. The treaty was opened for signature on July 1, 1968 and came into force on March 5, 1970.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is part of a single group of international agreements regulating the production, testing and use of nuclear weapons:
- Antarctic Treaty (1959);
- Treaty Banning Atmospheric Tests of Nuclear Weapons, in outer space and underwater (1963);
- Treaty on Principles for the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (1967);
- Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (1967, the USSR signed the Protocol to the Treaty in 1978);
- Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968);
- Treaty on the Prohibition of the Placement of Nuclear Weapons on the Bottom of the Seas and Oceans (1971);
- Prevention Agreement nuclear war(1973);
- Treaty to Limit Underground Nuclear Tests (1974);
- Treaty on a Nuclear-Free Zone in the South Pacific (1986);
- Treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa (1996, did not enter into force);
- Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1996, did not enter into force).
The treaty introduced the concept of a “nuclear weapon state,” and a country that produced and detonated a nuclear weapon or other nuclear weapon was recognized as such a state. explosive device before January 1, 1967. There were five such powers: the United States of America, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France and China. The first three of the above states were designated depositories of the treaty.
Thus, the Treaty introduced three state statuses with respect to the possession of nuclear weapons:
- NPT Depositary States (USA, USSR, UK);
- Other states possessing nuclear weapons (France, China);
- States that do not possess nuclear weapons.
The treaty prohibited nuclear-weapon states from transferring to anyone nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, control over such weapons or devices, and not assisting, encouraging or inducing any non-nuclear-weapon state to produce or acquire such weapons or control over them, not to provide source or special fissile material, as well as equipment or material for the production of fissile material. Likewise, the treaty required states that do not possess nuclear weapons not to accept, produce, acquire nuclear weapons, not to seek and not accept any assistance in its production.
The treaty stipulated appropriate forms of control over the use of nuclear technologies and materials. The IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) is used as the international regulatory body, with which each state that does not possess nuclear weapons is obliged to conclude an agreement. It is clear that this state of affairs creates the possibility of abuse by the IAEA. It is significant that the Treaty does not provide for a mechanism for resolving disputes between the IAEA and non-nuclear weapon states.
The Treaty specifically emphasized the inalienable right of the parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination (Article 3.3., Article 4.1., Article 5).
The right of a member state to withdraw from the Treaty in the event of a threat to national security was separately stipulated (Article 10.1).
The agreement was concluded for a period of 25 years with the possibility of extension.
An important addition to the treaty is the UN Security Council resolution of June 19, 1968 and identical statements three nuclear powers - the USSR, the USA and Great Britain on the issue of security guarantees for non-nuclear states - parties to the treaty. The resolution stipulates that in the event of a nuclear attack on a non-nuclear state or the threat of such an attack, the Security Council and, above all, its permanent members possessing nuclear weapons will have to act immediately in accordance with the UN Charter to repel the aggression; it also reaffirms the right of states to individual and collective self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter until the Security Council takes the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security. The statements made by each of the three powers at the adoption of this resolution indicate that any state that has committed aggression using nuclear weapons or threatens such aggression must know that its actions will be effectively countered by measures taken in accordance with UN Charter; they also proclaim the intention of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain to provide assistance to a non-nuclear party to the treaty that is subject to a nuclear attack.
In its content, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was typical document during the Cold War and recorded the agreement reached after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 between the USSR and the USA. It was about the fundamental exclusion of a situation where the question of the use of nuclear weapons in a regional conflict could be made dependent on goodwill, for example, the governments of Cuba or Turkey. For the United States, the benefit of the NPT lay in the appearance of certain guarantees against a repetition in one form or another of the events of 1962 in Cuba. The Soviet Union received certain guarantees that it would not be drawn into a local nuclear war on one of its borders, given the continuing risk of a global nuclear war with the United States. Great Britain was forced to join the United States, which automatically deprived it of the opportunity to conduct an independent policy in nuclear area- a result that suits both the USSR and the USA. France and China received great (nuclear) power status under the Treaty. This also suited everyone, since it was already a fait accompli.
It is significant that in the context of 1968, numerous reservations about the possibility of developing nuclear technology for peaceful purposes played an extremely insignificant role. As of 1968, the total installed capacity of nuclear power plants in the world did not exceed 10 GW (electric), and almost all of the plants were located on the territory of states that have nuclear weapons or their closest allies. Therefore, the guarantees offered by the NPT in the field of peaceful nuclear technologies in 1968 were to a certain extent demagogic in nature. It is characteristic that the conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty had no effect on world prices for uranium, which were very low at that time (about 7 - 8 dollars per pound of oxide). The situation changed dramatically after the 1973 oil crisis. In five years, uranium prices rise almost sixfold, and active construction of nuclear power plants begins in a number of countries. To date, it is the articles of the NPT that establish non-discriminatory access of developing countries to nuclear energy technologies that play a decisive role in assessing the prospects of this Treaty.
In 1965, 10 countries participated in the development of nuclear energy (USSR, USA, Great Britain, France, Germany, East Germany, Japan, Canada, Sweden(?), Belgium). ( http://www.laes.ru/ciso/work/world/razdel/statistik/bigkium.htm)
In 1985, the number of participating countries was 30, in 2002 - 33: Argentina, Armenia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Iran - under construction, Japan, North Korea - under construction , South Korea, Lithuania, Mexico, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Romania, Russia, South Africa, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Great Britain, Ukraine, USA, Taiwan. (V.G. Asmolov et al. “Nuclear Energy”. M., 2004.)
2. Status of the Agreement at the end of 2006
As of the end of 2006, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is considered to be in force and has an open-ended status. Its participants are 187 states, that is, almost all independent states of the world, with the exception of India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea.
However, the legal, factual and ethical status of the contract is not obvious:
1. From the point of view of international law, the Treaty did not provide for such an event as the collapse of one of the depositary powers, and did not stipulate the procedure in this case. Recognition of Russia as the sole legal successor of the USSR has dubious legitimacy and, in essence, is an act of goodwill on the part of any of the states of the post-Soviet space.
Nuclear tests were carried out on the territory of Kazakhstan before January 1, 1967, therefore, for this reason, Kazakhstan should be classified as a “nuclear weapon state.” The sign fixed in the text of the Treaty is the conduct of nuclear tests on the territory of of this state until 1.1.67 - is objective, observable and formal in nature, therefore the statement by the government of Kazakhstan about the renunciation of the country’s nuclear status legal force within the framework of the Agreement does not have.
Today Kazakhstan is a member of the NPT. But what status does it have in this Treaty - a depositary country, a country possessing nuclear weapons or a country not possessing such weapons?
Algeria also has certain grounds to demand nuclear status - the French tested their bomb on the territory of this country.
In a less acute form, the same question can be raised in relation to all former Soviet republics - according to at least, in relation to Ukraine and Belarus, on whose territories a significant number of nuclear charges were stored.
2. Further, there is no doubt that the states possessing nuclear weapons, and, first of all, the depositary states grossly violated obligations assumed in the preamble and article 6 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons:
"...to achieve a cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures towards nuclear disarmament (...), to contribute to the easing of international tensions and the strengthening of confidence between States, in order to contribute to the achievement of the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons, the destruction of all existing stockpiles and the exclusion of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery from national arsenals in accordance with the treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control".
In fact, in the period 1968 - 2006. There was a large-scale increase in nuclear arsenals. For example, for the USSR and the USA:
(Comparative analysis of the creation and development of naval strategic nuclear forces of the USSR and the USA. Vladivostok, 2005)
Currently (2006) the Russian Federation has 5,518 nuclear warheads in service, the United States has more than 7,800 on combat duty, and a total of over 10,800.
3. Even more significant is the formal violation by the Depositary Powers of the following provision of the preamble to the Treaty:
"States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force, either against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations". This provision was grossly violated by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the United States of America in Iraq and Yugoslavia ( US aggression against Afghanistan had its formal legal justification by a UN decision). It is very significant that in all three cases there was aggression on the part of a state possessing nuclear weapons against a state party to the NPT that does not possess such weapons.
The five states that possess nuclear weapons have committed themselves not to use them against states that do not possess such weapons, except in response to nuclear attack or assault with conventional means committed in alliance with a nuclear state. These obligations, however, were not included in the text of the Treaty itself, and the specific form of such obligations may have changed over time. The United States, for example, indicated that it could use nuclear weapons in response to an attack using non-nuclear "weapons" mass destruction", such as biological or chemical weapons, since the United States cannot use either in response. British Defense Secretary Geoff Hoon indirectly referred to the possibility of using nuclear weapons in response to an attack with conventional weapons carried out by any of the “rogue states”.
In article 1 nuclear states undertake not to “induce any non-nuclear-weapon State ... to acquire nuclear weapons” - however, the adoption by a nuclear-armed State of a military doctrine based on the possibility of a pre-emptive strike, as well as other threats to use armed force, can in principle be considered as this kind of motivation.
4. The United States is currently threatening to use force against Iran and the DPRK, interfering with their right to freely withdraw from the Treaty in accordance with Article Ten.
The US aggression against Iraq provided Iran and the DPRK with a formal reason to withdraw from the NPT in accordance with the wording of Article 10: “Each Party to this Treaty, in the exercise of state sovereignty, has the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that exceptional circumstances related to the content of this Treaty have put the threat to the supreme interests of his country. He shall give three months' notice of such withdrawal to all Parties to the Treaty and to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such notice shall contain a statement of the exceptional circumstances which he considers to jeopardize his supreme interests." It is clear that an attack on an independent state party to the NPT by a nuclear power can be considered an “exceptional circumstance that jeopardizes the highest interests.”
5. In violation of Articles 4 and 5 of the NPT, mechanisms for non-discriminatory access of non-nuclear weapon states to peaceful nuclear technologies have not been created. On the contrary, measures have been taken to ensure maximum discrimination against a number of so-called “rogue countries” whose right to develop nuclear energy is disputed.
6. Section 2 of the tenth article of the Treaty speaks of the extension of the Agreement “for an additional specified period or periods of time.” Consequently, the indefinite extension of the NPT adopted at the May 2005 conference has no legal force.
7. De facto, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons lost force from the moment of the creation and testing of nuclear weapons in countries that did not possess such weapons on January 1, 1967.
Today we can confidently talk about the “second nuclear five”.
India and Pakistan officially recognize the existence of nuclear weapons. Until recently, Israel did not officially recognize the country's nuclear weapons, but a reservation by the country's Prime Minister Ehud Olmert finally turned Israel's nuclear program into an open secret.
“Speaking on German television on Monday, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert indirectly admitted for the first time that Israel has nuclear weapons, AFP reports.
The agency made this conclusion from the following words of Olmert: “We have never threatened other countries with destruction. Iran openly and publicly threatens to erase Israel from the world map. Is it possible after this to put Iran, which is seeking to possess nuclear weapons, on a par with France, America, Russia and Israel?" (http://www.canada.ru/forum/viewtopic.php?p=42061).
Israel is believed to have between 100 and 200 warheads today.
South Africa fired several nuclear weapons and possibly detonated them over the Atlantic. Although the country's nuclear arsenal has now been cancelled, South Africa should be considered a "small nuclear power".
The DPRK announced the explosion of a nuclear device. In addition, a number of experts confidently diagnose the presence of an experimental nuclear weapon in Iran. Japan, although it declares the absence of nuclear weapons, does not hide the existence in the country of technologies for their production, as well as the presence on the territory of the country of primary fissile materials and equipment for their enrichment.
In almost all of the listed cases (with the exception of the DPRK and Iran), countries that have the status of possessors of nuclear weapons under the 1968 Treaty not only did not interfere, but even directly contributed to the creation of nuclear weapons technologies among the “second five” states.
“The US House of Representatives on the evening of December 8 approved a law allowing the sale of nuclear fuel and reactors to India, reports Reuters. 330 congressmen were in favor of the document, 59 were against.
The Senate is expected to approve the bill in the coming days, after which it will go to the president for signature. George W. Bush has already announced his support for this initiative, as it will "strengthen US ties with the world's most populous democracy and provide an opportunity for American companies to earn billions of dollars."
At the same time, critics of the law believe that George W. Bush and his administration are making a “historic mistake” that will undermine US efforts aimed at preserving the nuclear non-proliferation regime." (http://lenta.ru/news/2006/12/09 /fuel/)
8. Ethical challenges to the NPT are officially voiced by India, Pakistan and Israel. These states rightly point out that the Treaty has created a privileged club of “nuclear states” to which other countries do not have access, while the Treaty does not contain any moral justification for the legality of such a division.
9. The separation of “peaceful” and “military” nuclear technologies was, to some extent, justified at the technological level of the 1960s. At present, it is not possible to draw a line between these technologies. Control over the export of nuclear materials by the London Club is becoming more and more elusive as globalization processes develop and the mechanisms of the shadow “market” for these materials improve. At present, it is not possible to prove that Japan, Germany, Canada, Australia, Switzerland, and Sweden do not have their own nuclear weapons.
Mohammed ElBaradei, head of the IAEA, believes that in our time nuclear bomb could create at least 40 states - if there was a desire. At the 2005 conference, ElBaradei presented proposals to strengthen the non-proliferation regime:
- refusal to build new uranium enrichment and plutonium separation facilities for the next five years;
- conversion of all research reactors operating on highly enriched uranium to the use of low enriched uranium;
- tightening requirements for IAEA inspections;
- tougher actions by the UN Security Council against any country that withdraws from the NPT;
- strengthening investigations and prosecutions of any illegal trade in nuclear materials and technologies;
- accelerating the nuclear disarmament of nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT;
- taking measures to address existing security deficits in regions like the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula.
3. Prospects for extending the Treaty
Currently, we can say that the legal, factual, ethical and logical grounds for extending the non-proliferation regime have been lost, and this regime exists solely due to inertia.
The uncertainty about the prospects for the continued existence of the NPT was fully manifested at a conference in May 2005 in New York: “The three key committees of the conference, where the issue of revising the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was discussed, ceased their work on Thursday. They failed to unite to in order to draw up written recommendations for strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. American Thomas Graham, who previously participated in the negotiations, said that he had never seen such pessimism at the negotiations on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Graham warned Washington that it would be better. refrain from reaffirming and fulfilling the promises made by the United States government during the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty conferences held in 1995 and 2000.
One more controversial point The question remains of language guaranteeing non-nuclear-weapon states the right to develop nuclear energy and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. This wording should be recorded in the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. There was another contested proposal, which was to legalize nuclear technology that could be used to produce nuclear weapons only in a limited number of countries, excluding, for example, Iran. Critics rejected this proposal as limiting their rights under the treaty" (http://www.kommentator.ru/accent/2005/a0530-2.html).
Already now non-proliferation regime is interpreted by a number of states (in particular, India) as economically discriminatory. It is indicated that in the conditions today The NPT does not so much prevent the expansion of the list of nuclear military powers as allow “nuclear weapon states” to effectively control the market for radioactive materials and nuclear technologies. In other words, The NPT today is a form of government protectionism.
Management of this market is concentrated in the hands of depository countries (in practice, in the hands of the United States), and non-economic benefits from market regulation are also received by member countries of the London Club.
It can be argued that the only global “player” interested in extending the NPT in its current form is the United States, or more precisely, the US Republican administration. Therefore, there is every reason to predict the collapse of the existing form of the nonproliferation regime after the 2008 elections in the United States.
4. Possible modifications of the nonproliferation regime
Let us analyze possible modifications of the nuclear non-proliferation regime for the period 2006 - 2020.
First of all, let us highlight the main factors that may affect the status of the nonproliferation regime:
1. Economic feasibility. In the form in which the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons exists today, it restrains the natural development of the market for nuclear materials and technologies. This, on the one hand, limits the access of a number of countries to vital energy resources, and on the other, limits the profits of the member countries of the London Club. Consequently, considerations of economic feasibility will push world community towards liberalization of nuclear markets. In general, this corresponds to the logic of development of the WTO, the World Bank, etc.
2. "Principle human development and the fight against poverty", recorded in a number of fundamental international documents (Rio de Janeiro, 1992, UN Millennium Summit, 2000, Monter, 2001, etc.), will also contribute to the liberalization of the nuclear energy market.
3. From the most general systemic considerations it is clear that no agreement restraining natural development of society, cannot be successful in the medium and long term. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons records the state of the world in the mid-1960s, when only a few countries had entered the stage of advanced industrial society. Currently, several dozen states are at this stage (according to AlBaradei’s estimates, at least forty). Their desire to possess technologies, including military ones, corresponding to developed industrialism is natural and undeniable.
4. On the other side, United States of America will make every effort to prolong the existence of the non-proliferation regime in one form or another. For the Republican administration, this is due to ideas about world leadership and the responsibilities that follow; for Democrats, it is due to domestic political reasons. At the same time, Democrats will be more free to choose ways to modify the nonproliferation regime.
One can confidently predict an extremely nervous reaction of the American population to the growing list of powers possessing nuclear weapons and to the inclusion of Islamic states in this list.
5. A significant factor “working” to maintain and even tighten the nonproliferation regime is the growing fear of the threat of nuclear terrorism. It is foreseeable that for some time this fear will overwhelm any economic imperatives.
Modern security measures at airports do not stand up to criticism from an economic point of view, and in terms of security logic they are poorly justified.
6. Will make their contribution to limiting the movement of fissile materials and nuclear technologies environmental organizations, journalists and the “public”.
7. A stabilizing role in relation to the NPT will be played by international organizations- first of all, the UN, then - the IAEA. It is necessary to understand that for the IAEA, maintaining the NPT is literally a matter of existence.
8. Finally, important factor ambivalent action will become growing threat local or limited wars with the use of tactical nuclear weapons by the “great powers”.
Thus, a situation of unstable equilibrium is emerging: three factors contribute to the softening of the nonproliferation regime or even its abolition, three, on the contrary, stimulate its tightening, the action of another factor - the threat of war - is unpredictable, and another factor will tend to maintain the regime in an unchanged form.
It is clear that economic (1) and systemic (3) patterns are long-term in nature, and over time their impact on political process will increase. The humanitarian component (2) will lose its importance as the international political crisis grows and the threat of war intensifies (8). At the same time, the role of international organizations (7), environmental movements, the press and the public (6) will begin to rapidly decline. The United States (4) will gradually move from a policy of tightening the NPT to a policy of phasing out this regime. Fear of terrorism will remain, but the economic consequences of such fear will decline over time (social fear, being a strong emotion, is gradually consumed and passes from an “acute” to a “chronic” form).
Factors influencing the nonproliferation regime
Factor | Period | Dynamics | Trend |
---|---|---|---|
Economic feasibility | long-term | growing | Liberalization |
Human development and poverty alleviation | short | falls | Liberalization |
System development | constant | growing | Liberalization |
USA | short | changes | Control |
Terrorist threat | medium term | falls | Control |
Public, press, Greenpeace | short | falls | Control |
UN, IAEA | short-term | falls | Control |
Threat of war | constant | growing | ??? |
In this regard, a whole range of possible modifications of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons emerges:
1. Toughening of the NPT in the scheme of Al Baradei or a scheme similar in content, owned by A. Arbatov
Arbatov A.G. born in 1951 in Moscow. In 1973 he graduated from MGIMO University of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a degree in international relations. Since 1973, he worked at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences (RAN). Worked as an adviser to the USSR delegations during negotiations on limiting strategic weapons in Switzerland and at the UN General Assembly (USA). Member of various public organizations.
In 1992 he created his own independent science center- Center for Geopolitical and Military Forecasts, carrying out orders from the Ministry of Defense and other departments. Member of the Bureau of the Central Council of the Yabloko party. He was elected to the State Duma of the third convocation.
1) Ratification by the United States and China of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty as a key link connecting the “vertical” and “horizontal” nuclear disarmament, which would facilitate the accession of India, Pakistan, and Israel to this treaty and would put a limit on the improvement of nuclear weapons of those states that have already created it. This would also pose a serious obstacle to the creation of nuclear weapons by other overt and covert “threshold” countries.
2) Agreement between the United States and Russia on additional procedures and rules for counting warheads in the process of implementing the 2002 START Treaty, the arms reduction schedule and an adapted system of control and confidence-building measures. Extension of the control systems and confidence-building measures of the START I Treaty at least until 2012. Preparation and commencement of negotiations on the START II Treaty, with a view to reducing strategic nuclear weapons in the period until 2017 to a level of approximately 1000 warheads.
3) Transition to a gradual end to the state of mutual nuclear deterrence between Russia and the United States. At the first stage, a controlled abandonment of the concept of retaliatory strikes, that is, missile launches based on information from missile attack warning systems.
4) A consistent increase in organizational and technical measures in the time it takes to prepare missiles for launches, reliably controlled by inspection teams of the parties, with coverage at the first stage of at least 50% of the strategic forces, including, but not exclusively, by undocking and separate storage of warheads from strategic nuclear forces carriers.
5) Conceptual reduction in the priority of reliance on nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence in the national security strategy of the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France and China, recorded in the main doctrinal documents and programs. The acceptance by all nuclear states, without exception, of the obligation to not be the first to use nuclear weapons against any NPT member state.
6) Expansion of tasks and technologies for joint response to missile threats. For this purpose, “unfreezing” the Moscow Center for Data Exchange on Rocket and Launch Vehicle Launches and expanding its functions.
7) Conclusion of a full-scale agreement between Russia and the United States on cooperation in the development, deployment and use of missile defense information and fire systems, distinguishing between joint and unilateral work in this area and providing guarantees that missile defense systems will not be directed against each other.
8) Ratification by all NPT members of the 1997 Additional Protocol as a prerequisite for any international cooperation in the field of nuclear energy.
The protocol envisages a sharp increase in control by the IAEA over national nuclear programs, including sudden inspections by inspectors of the organization of any nuclear facilities. To date, the Protocol has been signed by thirty countries (out of 187 states party to the NPT). (see: http://www.iranatom.ru/databas.htm, document rep051.pdf)
9) The conclusion of the Treaty on the Ban of Fissile Materials for Military Purposes (FMCT) and the gradual expansion of its coverage with appropriate control mechanisms for nuclear and non-nuclear members of the NPT, the inclusion of the “non-aligned” troika (Israel, India, Pakistan).
10) Integration of existing nuclear export control groups (Zangger Committee, NSG), placing their activities on a legal basis with a new decision-making mechanism (possibly a qualified majority), a system of control and sanctions for violations through the IAEA and the UN Security Council.
11) Prohibition of any new supplies of nuclear technologies and materials to states that are not parties to the NPT and have not accepted comprehensive IAEA safeguards. A ban on the supply of full nuclear cycle technologies to non-nuclear-weapon member countries of the Treaty unless they have acceded to comprehensive safeguards and Additional Protocol IAEA 1997 New supplies to NPT states are carried out only if they accept the conditions for the return or liquidation of received materials and technologies in the event of withdrawal from the NPT (otherwise, a procedure for reporting to the IAEA and adopting sanctions based on the a priori mandate of the UN Security Council must be provided).
12) Ensuring supplies of finished nuclear fuel to countries that have abandoned full cycle, at the lowest market price and subsequent removal of spent nuclear fuel by international consortia specially created for this purpose under the auspices of the IAEA.
13) Tightening the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), especially in terms of the supply of dual-use technologies, exerting joint pressure on the great powers to join the regime of countries that are not its participants. Transformation of the MTCR into an international treaty with clear definitions of its objects and subjects, verification and transparency measures, obligations of member states to adjust their domestic legislation accordingly and create export control mechanisms that meet the general standard.
14) Expanding the staff and funding of the IAEA, as well as its rights to conduct investigations of violations of the NPT with the transfer of the case to the UN Security Council for the application of punitive and coercive measures. (http://www.nationalsecurity.ru/library/00005/00005report4.htm)
The first seven points of this doctrine have no real content, and under no circumstances will they be implemented in practice. Completing the remaining points is quite possible. It, however, will mean the creation of a strategic alliance of countries that possess nuclear weapons, directed against the rest of the world. It is unlikely that such an alliance can be any strong or durable.
As a consequence, this version of the modification of the NPT can only be implemented in the short term (1-2 years), but this is complicated by conflicting relations in the “triangle” of the USA - Russia - Europe.
The IAEA and Russian liberal politicians will actively advocate for the implementation of this version.
2. Preservation of the main provisions of the NPT with a formal “modernization” of this treaty.
By “modernization” is meant a change in the list of depositories, a formal solution in the text of the treaty to the problem of post-Soviet territories, and an expansion of the list of “nuclear powers” by adding at least India.
This is at least logical and brings the legal and factual state of affairs into some correspondence. However, there are absolutely no actors interested in this particular solution to the NPT problem, so the implementation of this option is unlikely.
3. Creation of a system of multi-level nuclear protectionism.
The NPT regime of the “1968 model” provided for only two statuses: states possessing nuclear weapons and states not possessing them. From among the former, a subgroup of depositories was unofficially distinguished, and from them - two superpowers. The transition between statuses was impossible in principle.
In modern conditions, the number of statuses should be increased. It may include the following additional categories: states that have voluntarily renounced the possession of nuclear weapons (South Africa); states that have tested nuclear weapons but do not produce them; states seeking to master the full nuclear cycle. The mechanism for transition from one status to another must be spelled out and, first of all, the expansion of the list of nuclear powers to include the states of the “second nuclear five”.
It must be borne in mind that formal recognition of Israel as a “nuclear weapon state” will lead to the immediate withdrawal of Muslim states from the NPT.
This option is quite possible and even probable. Actually, it has been implemented in recent years - however, de facto, and not de jure - that is, without a formal revision of the NPT. There is no doubt, however, that the United States gives India a different nuclear status than Pakistan, and Pakistan a different nuclear status than Iran.
4. "National nuclear energy and international fuel cycle"
Actually, this is - Russian initiative at the G8 summit in the summer of 2006 in St. Petersburg. Allows you to solve the “main problem of the NPT,” that is, to separate peaceful and military nuclear technologies. Legally, we are talking about replacing trade in fissile materials with leasing of these materials. At the same time, the market for fissile materials is liberalized and at the same time a strictly regulated spent fuel market is created.
This project preserves the spirit of the NPT (and the nonproliferation regime), but requires a complete reworking of the text of the treaty. With the consistent implementation of the concept of “national nuclear energy and the international fuel cycle,” the importance of the UN is growing, but the prerogatives of the IAEA are sharply reduced.
The actor in this version is Russia, which, at the moment, is not supported by anyone. Nevertheless, " nuclear initiative Putin" may well come true, since there is political will and corresponding economic opportunities.
5. Liberalization of the market for fissile materials while formally maintaining the NPT.
The actor in this concept, as far as one can judge, is France. The implementation of this concept is not very likely, since in the short term the terrorist threat will prevent this, and the concept simply does not contain a long-term perspective.
6. Change in the level of the NPT.
The status is introduced: “a state with strategic thermonuclear potential.” This means:
- The country has a wide range of nuclear weapons;
- Availability of thermonuclear weapons, related technologies and production;
- Availability of modern intercontinental means of delivering thermonuclear weapons, relevant technologies and production (meaning the ability of nuclear weapons carriers to overcome the enemy’s air and missile defense systems);
- Accumulated nuclear potential, allowing the adoption of the “doctrine of massive retaliation.”
Today only members of the “first atomic five” can be classified as such states.
The status is introduced: “state possessing nuclear weapons.” This means testing a nuclear device on the territory of a given state before January 1, 2007. States of this status include India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, and South Africa.
The remaining countries receive the previous status of “non-nuclear states”.
The treaty is being rewritten in the “logic of proportion”: thermonuclear countries are treated as nuclear, just as nuclear countries are treated as non-nuclear. That is, the proliferation of thermonuclear weapons beyond the “first five” and nuclear weapons beyond the “second five” is not allowed, and appropriate guarantees of non-aggression are given.
Such a decision will most likely be made - but in the long term (20 years).
7. "Atom for missiles"
Simplified version previous version: A country that does not have nuclear weapons is allowed to develop either nuclear technology - whether peaceful or military - or missile technology, but not both.
If this option is implemented, the powers, members of the “nuclear club” will denounce the Treaty on the Demilitarization of Outer Space, deploy a missile defense system in space and hinder any attempts by “new nuclear countries” to create and test missile technologies.
It must be borne in mind that control over missile technology has always been an unofficial annex to the nonproliferation regime. Moreover, unlike atomic energy, rocket technology has no obvious civil application(except space research, which are quite internationalized). Finally, a cosmodrome is a more vulnerable target than a nuclear center.
This option is consistent with the interests of the United States of America and its decision-making logic. Its implementation (of course, after November 2008) is very likely.
5. Economic consequences of the abolition or deep modification of the nonproliferation regime
In all versions of liberalization of the nuclear market, prices for natural and enriched uranium will rise, approaching the current “black market” prices.
40 years ago, on July 1, 1968, a fundamental international agreement was signed - on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (came into force on March 5, 1970). This is the most powerful and universal international treaty limiting the proliferation of any weapons: 189 states of the world have joined it.
The initiative to adopt the Treaty came from Ireland. Unlike many other international agreements, the name of the person who proposed this idea is well known - it was Frank Aiken, Minister of External Relations of Ireland. He first called for such a treaty in 1958, ten years before it was actually signed. The first country in the world to join the Treaty was Finland. In 1968, the Treaty was adopted at a conference in London. Representatives from about 60 countries took part in the ceremony. Initially, the duration of this Treaty was determined to be 25 years, but in 1995 the participating countries agreed to extend its validity indefinitely.
In fact, the Treaty divided the countries of the world into two categories: countries with nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapons states. The states possessing atomic weapons at that time included the United States (received nuclear weapons in 1945), the USSR (1949), Great Britain (1952), France (1960) and China (1964).
The treaty is based on three fundamental principles: firstly, non-proliferation, secondly, disarmament and, thirdly, the peaceful use of nuclear materials and technologies. The treaty obliges non-nuclear powers to refrain from producing or acquiring nuclear weapons, and to recognize the control of the International Atomic Nuclear Agency over all their nuclear facilities. The nuclear powers, in turn, pledged to refrain from transferring to non-nuclear states technologies and materials that could be used to create atomic weapons, with the exception of transactions taking place under the supervision of the IAEA. An exception is made only for peaceful nuclear technologies.
The Treaty was not joined by Pakistan and India, which officially declared that they had nuclear weapons (1998), and Israel, which neither recognizes nor denies the presence of nuclear weapons. Another exception is North Korea, which became the only country in the world to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty twice. The DPRK joined the Treaty in 1985, withdrew in 1993, rejoined in 1994, and withdrew again in January 2003. . A country participating in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons may withdraw from it by giving 90 days' notice (with the approximate wording that extraordinary circumstances related to the subject matter of the agreement jeopardize the supreme interests of that state).
In 1995, the Treaty expired, so members of the “nuclear club” made significant efforts to ensure that the life of this agreement was continued. This was achieved, but the nuclear powers assumed a number of additional obligations - this step was taken at the request of non-nuclear countries. Among these commitments were work on agreements for a total cessation of nuclear testing and the control of nuclear materials, as well as a commitment to undertake “systematic and progressive efforts to reduce the number of nuclear weapons on a global scale with the strategic goal of the total elimination of these weapons.”
The results of the Treaty are quite contradictory. Three countries remained outside the framework of this agreement and created their own nuclear weapons (India, Pakistan and, possibly, Israel). One country went nuclear but subsequently abandoned its atomic bomb, however, mostly for internal reasons (South Africa). Another one made real attempts to become a member of the nuclear club, but was forced to stop as a result of the war (Iraq). One withdrew from the Treaty and created nuclear weapons (North Korea), which it views rather as an item of trade and a guarantee of the continued existence of the existing regime. Another state, apparently, is trying to create an atomic bomb, which it considers a guarantee of its security and a means of increasing its international status (Iran). June 27, 2008 Washington ProFile
Non-Proliferation Treaty. Brief history
According to estimates by the research organization Natural Resources Defense Council, in 1968 (the year the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed) there were 38,974 nuclear weapons in the world. In 1980 there were 55,246, in 1986 an absolute record was set - 70,481. After that, nuclear arsenals began to decline: to 40,344 in 1995, 28,245 in 2005 and 20,100 in 2008.
However, only data on five members of the “nuclear club” are taken into account here - the USA, USSR (Russia), Great Britain, China and France. Four other countries have (or are believed to have) nuclear weapons - India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel, which together have 300-500 nuclear weapons.
1957 At the initiative of US President Dwight Eisenhower, the International Atomic Nuclear Agency (IAEA) was formed - a division of the UN designed to monitor the use of nuclear materials and technologies.
1958 Ireland has proposed a draft resolution to the UN that should stop the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.
1960 France carried out the first nuclear explosion, thus becoming the fourth nuclear power (after the USA, USSR and Great Britain).
1961 The UN General Assembly unanimously approved Resolution 1665, based on the Irish draft. The Assembly called on the governments of the world to begin negotiations in order to stop the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The resolution stated that countries around the world that already possess nuclear weapons must make every effort to ensure adequate control over them and must refrain from transferring relevant technology and materials to states that do not have nuclear weapons. In turn, non-nuclear powers called on them not to produce or accept nuclear weapons from nuclear powers. These principles formed the basis of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
1963 US President John KennedyJohn Kennedy made one of the statements that made him famous. He predicted that in the near future another 15 or 20 states will join the “nuclear club”. Kennedy said: “I ask you to stop and think about what it means to have a terrible weapon in so many different hands: in countries small and large, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible... If this happens, then it will be impossible to talk about world stability, neither about world security, nor about real disarmament."
Kennedy's statement came a month after the publication of a secret memorandum from the US Department of Defense. The memorandum indicated that 8 countries of the world - Canada, China, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Sweden and Germany - would have the opportunity to produce nuclear weapons over the next decade. Moreover, the memorandum contained the following forecast: in 10 years, the cost of producing an atomic bomb will decrease so much that dozens of other states will have the opportunity to possess the most powerful type of weapon invented by man. As a result, the likelihood of a nuclear war will increase incredibly. This memorandum and similar reports prepared in many countries around the world became one of the reasons for the adoption of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
1964 China successfully tested its nuclear weapons (the relevant technologies and materials were mostly provided by the USSR) and became the fifth member of the “nuclear club.” After China's success, India began feverishly creating its own atomic bomb.
1967 The precedent-setting Treaty of Tlatelolco was signed. As a result, the world's first nuclear-free zone was created in Latin America. The Treaty of Tlatelolco (entered into force in 1968) applies to the states of Central and South America, as well as to the states of the Caribbean. On the territory of states that have formed a nuclear-free zone, the storage, testing, use and creation of nuclear weapons on their territory is prohibited.
Over the past decades, five nuclear-free zones have emerged in the world. In 1985, a treaty was concluded (Treaty of Rarotonga), declaring a nuclear-free zone southern part Pacific (came into force in 1986). In addition to traditional prohibitions, in this part of the planet it is prohibited to conduct nuclear tests, including for peaceful purposes, and, in addition, to bury radioactive waste.
In 1995, a nuclear-free zone was created in Southeast Asia (the Bangkok Treaty entered into force in 1996). Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar (Burma), Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam have joined the treaty. In addition to the territories of the signatory states themselves, the ban on nuclear weapons also applies to their areas of economic interest, which include large parts of the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
In 1996, a nuclear-free zone appeared in Africa (Pelindaba Treaty). This agreement applies to the entire African continent and a number of adjacent islands (54 states in total), but this convention has not yet entered into force. Participating states are, among other things, prohibited from threatening to use nuclear weapons. In addition, a ban has been introduced on any type of attack on peaceful nuclear facilities located in the territory of this zone.
In 1992, South and North Korea signed a declaration establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone on the Korean Peninsula. Both countries agreed not to test, produce, possess, receive, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons, not to permit (or close existing) uranium enrichment facilities, and to use nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes. However, the declaration never came into force because North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and subsequently tested an atomic bomb.
In 2006, an agreement was signed in Semipalatinsk (Kazakhstan) on the creation of a Central Asian nuclear-free zone. Five post-Soviet states of this region - Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan - joined the agreement. This is the first zone of its kind located entirely in the northern hemisphere.
1967 Presumably this year Israel received the materials and technology necessary to produce nuclear weapons.
1968 On June 12, the UN General Assembly approved Resolution 2373, which contained the main provisions of the future Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Representatives of 95 states spoke in support of this resolution, and four were against it (Albania, Cuba, Tanzania and Zambia).
On July 1, the Treaty was opened for signature. It was immediately joined by three of the four nuclear powers - the USA, the USSR and Great Britain. China and France refused to sign the Treaty: China called it discriminatory, France expressed doubt that the signatories would comply with the terms of the agreement. Beijing and Paris only acceded to the Treaty in 1992.
1970 46 states joined the treaty.
1974 India became the first non-nuclear weapon state to conduct nuclear tests. An underground “peaceful nuclear explosion” (as defined by the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) was carried out at the Pokhran test site. In 1997, the former head of the Indian nuclear program admitted that this explosion was not only peaceful. The treaty did not prohibit non-nuclear states from conducting such tests at that time (the corresponding addition appeared only in 2000).
However, the result of this action was scandals in the United States and Canada, which supplied India with nuclear materials and equipment, believing that they were helping the Indian peaceful atom. As a result, in 1975, a new unofficial international structure was formed - the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which began to monitor the relevant direction international trade.
1974 For the first time, the IAEA published a list of nuclear materials that required special permits for export to non-nuclear states. In 1978, the Nuclear Materials Suppliers Group proposed its own version of the list, which was approved by the IAEA.
1980s. The beginning of the 1980s was marked by another deterioration in relations between the USSR and the USA: the danger of a nuclear war was more serious than ever. Detente began in the second half of the decade: in 1987, both sides agreed to completely destroy an entire class of medium-range missiles, and then began negotiations on a radical reduction in nuclear arsenals (the corresponding agreement was signed in 1991). Against this background, their military nuclear programs Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, Taiwan and South Africa were actively developing.
Argentina and Brazil jointly abandoned attempts to create their own atomic bombs; later, under US pressure, Taiwan took a similar step. About 30 more states, including North Korea, have acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
1991 The UN Security Council adopted the famous Resolution 687. It states that Iraq must agree to the unconditional and internationally supervised “destruction, removal or rendering unusable” of its weapons mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range of over 150 km. The resolution came after it was proven that Iraq had secretly acquired nuclear materials and technology in violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which it was a party. This Resolution, or more precisely Iraq's chronic failure to comply with a number of its conditions, ultimately became the reason for the outbreak of war in 2003. It subsequently became apparent that Iraq did not possess weapons of mass destruction.
1991. South Africa acceded to the Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state. Two years later, representatives of South Africa admitted that their state had independently produced 6 nuclear warheads.
1992. Independent Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine signed the Lisbon Protocol, declaring their intention to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states. By 1994 this process was completed. Soviet nuclear arsenals located on the territory of these republics were removed to Russia. In the same year, China and France joined the Treaty.
1993 North Korea suspended its membership in the Treaty, and the IAEA accused Pyongyang of non-compliance with the Treaty's articles.
1995 Five members of the “nuclear club” promised not to threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states that have joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
1998 India and Pakistan conducted military nuclear tests and officially declared possession of nuclear weapons.
2003 North Korea announced its withdrawal from the Treaty. The IAEA published a report for the first time expressing concern about the direction of Iran's secret nuclear program. Libya agreed to stop all secret programs for the development and production of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons.
2005 North Korea has promised to abandon its military nuclear programs. The IAEA has transferred the Iranian dossier to the UN Security Council.
2006 North Korea has conducted its first successful nuclear test.
2007 North Korea has once again agreed to begin negotiations to eliminate its military nuclear programs. June 27, 2008 Washington ProFile
War with nuclear weapons. Evidence base
Almost immediately after nuclear weapons appeared on the world stage, attempts were made to prove that their very existence was meaningless and illegal.
The logic of supporters of a total renunciation of nuclear weapons is as follows. In their opinion, the presence of such weapons in small group states in itself is dishonest in relation to other countries. Many non-nuclear states that have or had nuclear ambitions motivated their attempts by arguing that the treaty legitimized the hegemony of the great powers, making it impossible for poorer or less fortunate countries to resist their pressure. They consider nuclear weapons one of the mechanisms to curb the excessive appetites of the great powers, as well as a serious argument in negotiations.
The very existence of nuclear arsenals periodically prompts non-nuclear states to take actions aimed at obtaining “their” atomic bomb. The regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and technologies is not able to protect against this: firstly, because nuclear technology is more than 60 years old, and many specialists know very well how to create a bomb, and secondly, the presence of such bans did not stop four countries, who received nuclear weapons.
Nuclear powers have traditionally viewed their nuclear arsenals more as a means of political deterrence than as a real military weapon. Nuclear weapons are not weapons in the conventional sense of the word. Its use poses a danger to all parties to the conflict. Its presence is not capable of preventing war or the use of other types of weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear weapons are extremely expensive pleasure, which, however, does not increase the level of security of the country that possesses it. No international agreement can guarantee 100% that nuclear weapons will not be used: a nuclear explosion could be the result of a technical accident, personnel error or the result of terrorist actions.
The consequences of this will be terrifying: in just one second of a nuclear explosion, more energy is released than during the entire period of use of conventional weapons. The peculiarity of nuclear weapons is their indiscriminate nature: they will harm not only the country involved in the armed conflict, but also many other countries, as well as countless future generations.
At the very first meeting of the UN General Assembly, held in London on January 24, 1946, a special commission was created, which was given the following task: proposing measures that could lead “to the removal from national arsenals of atomic weapons and all other types of weapons suitable for mass destruction." Subsequently, the General Assembly repeatedly adopted similar resolutions calling for the renunciation of nuclear weapons.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which came into force in 1970, also stated that its strategic goal was the destruction of the atomic bomb. Article 6 of the Treaty states that “each Party to this Treaty undertakes to negotiate in good faith effective measures for ending the nuclear arms race in the near future and for nuclear disarmament, as well as a treaty for general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” At the height of the Cold War, when the size of nuclear arsenals was amazing and could destroy the planet many times over, this situation did not look serious. The situation changed after the collapse of the USSR (1991) and the end of the nuclear confrontation between East and West.
In 1994, the UN General Assembly asked the International Court of Justice (the legal branch of the UN that has supreme jurisdiction over general questions of international law) to answer the question: “Does international law allow the threat of the use of nuclear weapons?” It is curious that not all states of the world voted for the relevant resolution: 79 states were in favor, 43 were against (including the USA, Russia, Great Britain and France), 38 abstained (including the fifth member of the “nuclear club” - China ). Representatives of another 18 states did not take part in the voting.
The essence of this step was as follows: non-nuclear states similarly hoped to deprive nuclear weapons of their political significance - it was and is believed to this day that in a dispute between a nuclear and non-nuclear country, the best trump cards are in the hands of the nuclear state. This reasoning was partly inspired by the ideologists of the nuclear programs of North Korea and Iran.
The International Court of Justice included 15 lawyers specializing in international law; they were selected not as representatives of their states and peoples, but as specialists in the field of jurisprudence. Each of them was approved by a vote of the UN General Assembly. The court that considered this issue included lawyers from five “nuclear states” (USA, Russia, UK, France, China), there were also three judges from Europe and Africa, two from Asia, one from Latin America.
The court considered this claim for more than a year and a half; the verdict was rendered in 1996. This time was spent studying the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, as well as analyzing international legislation(including laws and customs of war contained in religious traditions). The International Court of Justice formulated its verdict in 105 paragraphs. He ruled that there was no law that would allow threats to use nuclear weapons, and such threats should be considered illegal. This conclusion was made on the basis of a number of conclusions about the essence of the war and the uniqueness of nuclear weapons. For example, nuclear weapon capable of bringing unjustified suffering to soldiers of the warring parties; it kills and wounds not only combatants, but also civilians; it is capable of killing citizens of neutral states (for example, as a result of radioactive contamination of the area); it is not a "proportional" response to an attack; it can cause serious and long-term damage to the environment; as a result of its use, many generations may suffer, etc.
The court unanimously ruled that "all states of the world must enter into the necessary negotiations with a view to achieving complete nuclear disarmament under strict and effective international control." The verdict of the International Court was recognized as a great victory for the fighters against nuclear weapons, but it did not have any immediate effect. However, this verdict became a legal precedent that became part of international law. June 27, 2008 Washington ProFile
Attempts to destroy the bomb. Set of initiatives
Attempts to completely destroy nuclear weapons began literally immediately after their appearance. Some such initiatives have led to serious progress in the world. However, their strategic goal - the total and final abandonment of the atomic bomb - was not achieved.
Baruch's Plan
The first nuclear weapon was tested in the United States on July 16, 1945. This date was the beginning nuclear age. Three weeks later, an atomic bomb was dropped on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. From 1945 to 1949 (successful tests of the Soviet atomic bomb), the United States was the only power in the world with the most powerful weapon in the history of mankind. Then US President Harry TrumanHarry Truman considered the atomic bomb more a means of intimidation than a type of weapon. In subsequent decades the situation changed.
One of the reasons for this was the failure of the first project for a total ban on nuclear weapons, which went down in history under the name "Baruch Plan"Baruch Plan, named after Bernard BaruchBernard Baruch, who was appointed by Truman as the US representative in the newly created UN Nuclear Energy Commission. At the first meeting of the Commission, in June 1946, this plan was announced. It stipulated that all states conducting nuclear research should exchange relevant information; all nuclear programs must be exclusively peaceful in nature; nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction must be destroyed - to carry out these tasks it is necessary to create competent international structures who are obliged to control the actions of individual states.
At the same time, the United States went all-in: they offered to give up their nuclear weapons on the condition that the remaining states would commit themselves not to produce them and agree to create an adequate control system. The plan was rejected by the USSR. Soviet representatives explained this by saying that the UN was dominated by the United States and its allies and therefore could not be trusted. Therefore, the USSR proposed that the United States destroy its nuclear weapons BEFORE other countries created a control system - this proposal was rejected by Washington. In 1949, at a diplomatic conference in Geneva, the USSR made a counterproposal: it proposed to outlaw nuclear weapons. By that time, the Cold War was gaining momentum, and the Soviet initiative also did not find understanding. After the collapse of the Baruch Plan and the Soviet initiative, a nuclear race began in the world, which continues to this day.
Russell-Einstein Manifesto
In 1955, the world's leading media received a message that a message of extreme importance would be announced in London. On July 9 he appeared before reporters famous philosopher, mathematician and pacifist Bertrand Russell, who reported that 11 of the world's most famous scientists signed an appeal to humanity. It contained a call for peace and the renunciation of nuclear weapons, since a nuclear war could lead to the death of all life on the planet: “We appeal as people to people. Remember your humanism and forget about everything else.” This appeal went down in history under the name “Russell-Einstein Manifesto”.
The manifesto was signed by luminaries - of the 11 signatories, only one was not a Nobel Prize winner. Among them were scientists whose names are known even to complete laymen in science, for example, Albert Einstein and Frederic Julio-Curie.
The initiator of the adoption of this appeal was Joseph Rotblat, a physicist born in Poland, who fled the Nazi occupation first to Great Britain and later to the USA. He turned out to be the only scientist involved in the Manhattan Project (a top-secret project to create nuclear weapons) who stopped working on the atomic bomb for ideological reasons. Rotblat, with the support of Russell, assembled this “team” of scientific luminaries.
It is curious that the authors of the Manifesto offered to sign it to the famous German scientist Otto Hahn, who refused to do this because he himself was working on a similar appeal. A staunch anti-communist, Khan also feared that the Manifesto would be used by the USSR, since Curie and Russell had long had a reputation as “friends” Soviet Union"Six days after the appearance of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto, at the annual meeting Nobel laureates in the city of Lindau (Germany), Khan announced the “Mainau Declaration”, the provisions of which differed little from those set out in the Manifesto.
The Manifesto and the Declaration led to the emergence of a powerful and very active movement of scientists against nuclear war in the world. In 1957, in the town of Pugwash (Canada), it was formed new organization- Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, which became the first public structure to begin the fight to reduce nuclear threat. Hundreds of other public organizations followed in the footsteps of the Pugwash Conference (better known in the USSR as the “Pugwash Movement”). The Pugwash Conference played an important role in the development and adoption of many international agreements in the field of disarmament and security:
In 1995, Joseph Rotblat and the Pugwash Conference received the Nobel Peace Prize for "the reduction of the role played by nuclear weapons in international relations and, in the long term, the elimination of such weapons."
1990s
In the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, quite a lot of initiatives appeared at various levels and degrees of influence aimed at eliminating nuclear weapons.
Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons was established by the Australian government in 1995. Australia’s activity (the country does not possess nuclear weapons, does not have a nuclear power plant on its territory, although it has enormous reserves of uranium ores) was explained as follows: “nuclear weapons do not recognize state borders, therefore, absolutely all countries interested in their security must be active." The Commission was tasked with developing specific steps that could lead to the destruction of nuclear arsenals. The Commission attracted many well-known specialists to cooperate, it continues its work to this day, carries out scientific conferences and publishes interesting research, but has not achieved concrete results.
In 1996, the initiative of retired American generals Lee Butler and Andrew Goodpaster attracted great attention. These people could hardly be called convinced pacifists who understood nothing about nuclear affairs. Before resigning, Butler headed the United States Strategic Command, that is, he commanded all strategic and tactical sea- and air-based nuclear charges. Goodpaster was the Commander-in-Chief of the NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization, after which he headed the renowned US Army Academy at West Point, the United States Military Academy.
Butler and Goodpaster developed a plan according to which all nuclear states would have to make drastic reductions in their nuclear arsenals, and eventually completely abandon them. The leaders of this process were to be the United States and Russia, which were to leave 100-200 nuclear warheads at their disposal. As part of this process, it was necessary to develop a mutual control scheme. Butler and Goodpaster warned of the dangers of nuclear terrorism (then a threat not considered as serious as it is today) and accidental explosion (for example, as a result of computer error). The generals also argued that, from a military point of view, nuclear weapons had ceased to be of value.
The generals emphasized that their idea was by no means new to the US establishment. Thus, they often recalled the words of President Dwight Eisenhower (who led the United States from 1953 to 1961): “Nuclear weapons are the only thing capable of destroying the United States.” Subsequently, US leaders repeatedly called for total nuclear disarmament. President John KennedyJohn Kennedy authored the following phrase: “The world should not be a prison in which humanity awaits its execution.” Ronald ReaganRonald Reagan also dreamed of “the disappearance of nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth.” As you know, in 1985, Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev made a joint statement declaring that a nuclear war could not be won.
In 1998, the New Agenda Coalition group was formed, which was founded by Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden. Previously, South Africa and, presumably, Brazil created their own atomic bombs, but abandoned them; Sweden and Egypt had their own military nuclear programs. These countries have issued several declarations calling for the abandonment of nuclear weapons and have been successful on the diplomatic front, convincing many nuclear-weapon states of the need for change.
The "Coalition" insisted that nuclear-weapon states unequivocally recognize that their strategic goal should be complete destruction their nuclear arsenals. As part of this, the Coalition proposed that previously carried out reductions in nuclear arsenals be recognized as permanent (that is, a state that previously agreed to certain limits on its nuclear power would not have the opportunity to take back its words and begin to increase it again), so that nuclear forces would not permanently were in a state of heightened alert (this should reduce the risk of an “accidental” nuclear war) so that more effective methods international control over nuclear arsenals, etc.
Letter of Four
In 2007, an influential newspaper Wall Street The Journal published an open letter signed by two former US secretaries of state - George Shultz and Henry KissingerHenry Kissinger and former minister US Defense William PerryWilliam Perry and former Senator Sam NunnSam Nunn (co-author of the famous Nunn-Lugar program). The authors of the "letter of four" called for reducing dependence on nuclear weapons and potentially abandoning them completely. The four claimed to support this idea large number prominent members of the US establishment, including people involved in political and military planning. Many of the supporters of the ideas expressed in the letter were themselves involved in the buildup of nuclear arsenals during the Cold War.
The "Letter of Four" appeared at a time when anti-nuclear sentiment had increased significantly. In July 2007, a Simons Foundation poll showed that more than 82% of Americans support the total elimination of nuclear weapons, while only 3% support the development of new types of nuclear weapons. At the end of 2007, a study of the Program on International Policy Attitudes (operates as part of the University of Maryland) was conducted in the USA and Russia. As it turned out, the majority of Americans and Russians believe that the nuclear forces of their states should not be on high alert, that the size of nuclear arsenals should be seriously reduced, and the production of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium should be seriously limited. In the long term, residents of both countries would prefer to completely eliminate nuclear weapons: 73% of US residents and 63% of Russians would support the total destruction and ban of nuclear weapons. June 27, 2008 Washington ProFile
Nuclear world. Collection of facts
The exact number of nuclear weapons and munitions in the world's arsenals is unknown. Perhaps only one figure is generally accepted. The total capacity of nuclear weapons now amounts to 5 thousand megatons - approximately 1 ton for every inhabitant of the planet.
Nuclear weapons began to be produced in 1945. Since then, more than 128 thousand charges have been manufactured, of which about 55% came from the United States, 43% from the USSR (Russia).
According to the Federation of American Scientists, in 2007 there were 26,854 nuclear weapons in the world, but about half of them are operational. The rest are in storage. Russia has the largest nuclear arsenal (16 thousand), the USA has 10,104 charges, France has 350, the UK and China have 200 each.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, at the end of 2007, Russia possessed 8,232 nuclear weapons, the United States - 7,068, China - 402, France - 348, Great Britain - 185.
According to CRUSIA, the nuclear arsenal of the United States is 12,070 warheads, Russia - 18 thousand, Great Britain - about 400, France - about 510, China - about 425.
Research organization Natural Resources Defense CouncilNatural Resource Defense Council operates with other figures: Russia - 16 thousand units, USA - 10.1 thousand, China - 200, France -350, UK - 200.
The Center for Defense Information provides different statistics: USA - 10,656 warheads, Russia - about 10 thousand, China - 400, France - 350, UK - 185.
There is even less reliable data on the nuclear arsenals of countries that do not officially belong to the “nuclear club”: India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea. Data about their arsenals is based solely on assumptions. For example, the Defense Information Center believes that India may have more than 60 charges, Pakistan - 15-25, North Korea - 2-5, Israel - 200.
The US Military Intelligence Defense Intelligence Agency operates with other figures: India - about 70, Pakistan - about 40, North Korea - about 10, Israel - 60-85.
According to the Arms Control Association, the nuclear balance could look like this: India - 60-250, Pakistan - 10-150, North Korea - 4-10, Israel - about 100.
In any case, Russia and the United States now account for approximately 97% of all nuclear warheads in the world. However, the main threat of a nuclear war comes from the owners of small and ultra-small nuclear arsenals, which account for no more than 3% of the world's nuclear arsenal. The concern is not so much the likelihood of these states themselves using an atomic bomb, which is also possible, but the chance of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorist organizations.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) believes that 43 countries in the world (including 28 developing ones) have reserves of highly enriched uranium, 12 countries have plutonium reserves (there are also serious suspicions about the presence of plutonium reserves in three more countries) .In 71 countries of the world there are more than 900 laboratories and enterprises that use radioactive and nuclear materials that can be used as the basis for military nuclear programs. These facilities are monitored by 250 international inspectors.
To create an atomic bomb with a yield equal to that dropped on Nagasaki in 1945, you need 8 kg of plutonium (plutonium-239) or 25 kg of highly enriched uranium (uranium-235). However, modern nuclear charges use much less plutonium and uranium (the US Department of Energy Department of Energy claims that 4 kg of plutonium or uranium-233, or 12 kg of uranium-235 is enough for this).
Modern nuclear weapons typically use uranium and plutonium together. For comparison, the bomb dropped on Hiroshima carried 64 kg of uranium, and the bomb dropped on Nagasaki carried 6.3 kg of plutonium. Uranium and plutonium are not the only radioactive materials that can be used to create nuclear weapons. For example, according to preliminary estimates (similar experiments were carried out, for example, by France), it is possible to use 73 kg of neptunium-237 or 60 kg of americium-241 to create a nuclear charge.
The world's reserves of weapons-grade plutonium are approximately 500 tons. For the most part it is at the disposal of the states included in the " nuclear club"However, Japan, Belgium and Switzerland also have similar materials. The USA, Russia, Great Britain and China have reported stopping the production of weapons-grade plutonium in recent years.
The explosion of an atomic charge made from 40 kg of highly enriched uranium is equivalent to the explosion of 15 thousand tons of TNT. Its explosion in the center large city capable of causing the instant death of 20 thousand people and the death of another 120 thousand people over the next few days. The cost of rescue work, decontamination, garbage removal, etc. will be approximately $50 billion.
According to the forecast of the California Institute of Technology, the use of one gram of uranium isotope in an explosive device can cause radioactive contamination of 1 square. miles (2.6 sq. km.) of territory. At the same time, the risk of acquiring cancer for 100 thousand people seriously increases. June 27, 2008 Washington ProFile
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The states concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as “Parties to the Treaty”,
Considering the devastating consequences that a nuclear war would have for all mankind, and the consequent need to make every effort to prevent the danger of such a war and to take measures to ensure the security of peoples,
Considering that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously increase the danger of nuclear war,
In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolutions calling for an agreement to prevent more widespread nuclear weapons,
Committing to cooperate in promoting the application of guarantees for peaceful nuclear activities,
Expressing its support for research, development and other efforts aimed at promoting the application, within the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of effective safeguards regarding the movement of source and special fissionable materials through the use of instruments and other technical methods in certain key places,
Reaffirming the principle that the benefits of the peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products that may be obtained by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all States Parties to the Treaty, both possessing and not possessing nuclear weapons,
Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to this Treaty have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for the further development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy and to contribute to this development, individually or in cooperation with other States,
Declaring our intention to achieve an end to the nuclear arms race as soon as possible and to take effective measures towards nuclear disarmament,
Urging the cooperation of all States in achieving this goal,
Recalling the determination expressed by the parties to the 1963 Atmospheric, Outer Space and Subsea Test Ban Treaty in its preamble to strive to achieve a permanent cessation of all nuclear weapons test explosions and to continue negotiations to this end,
Seeking to contribute to the easing of international tensions and the strengthening of confidence among States in order to contribute to the achievement of the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons, the destruction of all existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the elimination of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery from national arsenals in accordance with the treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,
Recalling that States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force, either against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least possible diversion of the world's manpower and economic resources for armaments,
Agreed as follows:
Article I
Each of the nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any person nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices, either directly or indirectly; and not in any way assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to produce or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or to control such weapons or explosive devices .
Article II
Each of the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Treaty undertakes not to accept transfers from any person of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or of control over such weapons or explosive devices, either directly or indirectly; not to produce or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, nor to seek or accept any assistance in the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Article III
1. Each of the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty undertakes to accept the safeguards as set out in the agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the system Agency safeguards, solely for the purpose of verifying compliance with its obligations undertaken in accordance with this Treaty in order to prevent the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The safeguards procedures required by this article shall be implemented with respect to source or special fissionable material, whether produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or located outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall apply to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere.
2. Each state party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: A) source or special fissionable material or b) equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissile material to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless that source material or special fissile material is subject to the safeguards required by this article.
3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner consistent with Article IV of this Treaty and to avoid creating obstacles to the economic or technological development of a Party to the Treaty or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including international exchange nuclear material and equipment for processing, use or production nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of application of guarantees set out in the preamble to the Treaty.
4. States Parties to the Treaty that do not possess nuclear weapons shall enter into agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the purpose of complying with the requirements of this article, either individually, or jointly with other states in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiations on such agreements shall begin within 180 days of the initial entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the expiration of the 180-day period, negotiations on such agreements shall begin no later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements come into force no later than eighteen months from the date of commencement of negotiations.
Article IV
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed as affecting the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop the research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in accordance with Articles I and II of this Treaty.
2. All Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, scientific and technical information on the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and have the right to participate in such exchange. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in promoting, individually or jointly with other States or international organizations, the further development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty, with due taking into account the needs of developing areas of the world.
Article V
Each Party to this Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international supervision and through appropriate international procedures, the potential benefits of any peaceful use nuclear explosions be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis, and that the cost of explosive devices used to such Parties to the Treaty be as low as practicable and do not include the costs of their research and development. The non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Treaty will be able to obtain such benefits in accordance with a special international agreement or arrangement through an appropriate international body in which the non-nuclear-weapon States are duly represented. Negotiations on this issue will begin as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Treaty. Non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Treaty that so desire may also receive such benefits in accordance with bilateral agreements.
Article VI
Each Party to this Treaty undertakes to negotiate in good faith effective measures to end the nuclear arms race in the near future and nuclear disarmament, as well as a treaty for general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
Article VII
Nothing in this Treaty shall affect the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties for the purpose of ensuring the complete absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.
Article VIII
1. Any Party to this Agreement may propose amendments to this Agreement. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments, which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Then, if one third or more of the Parties to the Treaty so request, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference to which they invite all Parties to the Treaty to consider such amendment.
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority vote of all Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Treaty and all other Parties to the Treaty that are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the date of circulation of such amendment. An amendment shall enter into force for each Party to the Treaty depositing its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all Parties to the Treaty, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Treaty and all other Parties to the Treaty that are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the date of circulation of this amendment. Subsequently, it enters into force for any other Party to the Treaty after it deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment.
3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of the Parties to the Treaty shall be convened in Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of this Treaty in order to ensure that the purposes set out in the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being implemented. Every subsequent five years, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, cause further conferences to be convened for the same purpose of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.
Article IX
1. This Treaty is open for signature by all states. Any state that does not sign the Treaty before it enters into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.
2. This Treaty is subject to ratification by the states that have signed it. Instruments of ratification and accession are deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated as depositary Governments.
3. This Treaty shall enter into force upon its ratification by the states whose governments are designated as depositaries of the Treaty and by 40 other signatories to this Treaty and upon the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is a State that produced and detonated a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device before January 1, 1967.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession will be deposited after the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the day of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly notify all signatory and acceding States of this Treaty of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession, the date of entry into force of this Treaty, the date of receipt of any requests for a conference, and other notifications.
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the depositary Governments in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Article X
1. Each Party to this Treaty, in the exercise of state sovereignty, has the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that exceptional circumstances related to the content of this Treaty have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. He notifies all Parties to the Treaty and the United Nations Security Council of such withdrawal three months in advance. Such notice must contain a statement of exceptional circumstances which he considers to jeopardize his overriding interests.
2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty should continue to be in force indefinitely or whether the Treaty should be extended for a further specified period or periods of time. This decision is made by the majority of the Parties to the Agreement.
Article XI
This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the depositary governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the depositary governments to the governments of the states that have signed and acceded to the Treaty.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto, have signed this Agreement.
DONE in triplicate, in the cities of London, Washington and Moscow, the month of July, the first day, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight.
TASS-DOSSIER /Tatyana Chukova/. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT; Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons - NNPT, or Non-Proliferation Treaty - NPT) is a multilateral international document developed by the UN Disarmament Committee to prevent the expansion of the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons , and limit the possibility of an armed conflict using such weapons.
The document was approved on June 12, 1968 at the XXII session of the UN General Assembly and opened for signature on July 1, 1968 in London, Moscow and Washington (depositaries - Great Britain, the USSR and the USA). Entered into force on March 5, 1970, following the deposit of instruments of ratification by 40 countries, including the depositary countries. In 1992, France and China joined it. Thus, all five permanent members of the UN Security Council bear obligations under this document. Currently, 190 states are parties to the treaty. Israel, India and Pakistan remain outside the document; in 2003, the DPRK (a party to the NPT since 1985) withdrew from it.
According to the NPT, “a nuclear-weapon State is a State that produced and detonated a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device before January 1, 1967.” Thus, the status of official nuclear powers was assigned to the USA, Great Britain, France, China and the USSR, after the collapse of which Russia retained this status (Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine joined the treaty as non-nuclear states in 1993-1994). The remaining countries party to the NPT voluntarily renounced the right to possess nuclear weapons.
The NPT contains reciprocal obligations of nuclear and non-nuclear states. The former pledged not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices to anyone, and states that do not possess such weapons - not to produce or acquire them. However, the NPT does not prohibit the placement of nuclear weapons on the territory of states that do not possess them.
The Treaty supports the inalienable right of the parties to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. And at the same time, a system of guarantees has been created within its framework, according to which International agency Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) has the right to verify compliance by non-nuclear weapons countries with their obligations on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.
An important addition to the treaty is the UN Security Council resolution of June 19, 1968 and statements by three nuclear powers (USSR, USA and Great Britain) on the issue of security guarantees for non-nuclear states parties to the treaty (made on June 19, 1968). In accordance with the resolution, in the event of a nuclear attack on a non-nuclear state or the threat of such an attack, the UN Security Council and, above all, its permanent members possessing nuclear weapons must immediately act in accordance with the UN Charter to repel the aggression. The resolution reaffirms the right of states to individual and collective self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter until the Security Council takes measures to maintain international peace and security. The statements indicate that any state that has committed aggression using nuclear weapons or threatens such aggression must know that its actions will be effectively countered by measures taken in accordance with the UN Charter; they also proclaim the intention of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain to provide assistance to a non-nuclear party to the treaty that is subject to a nuclear attack.
Every five years, parties to the NPT hold conferences to review the treaty's operation (review conferences).
At the 5th conference in 1995, a decision was made on the indefinite validity of the treaty (initial term - 25 years).
At the 2000 conference, the five nuclear powers announced a moratorium on any type of nuclear testing, without waiting for the Comprehensive Ban Treaty (CTBT) to enter into force, as well as their intention to continue reducing strategic and tactical weapons and increasing transparency. The final document of the conference included a “list” of multilateral measures in the field of strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime - “13 steps towards nuclear disarmament”.
In 2005, the participants failed to accept the agreed final document; it was stated that the “13-step program” remained unfulfilled.
In 2010, an Action Plan was agreed, containing 64 practical “steps” aimed at strengthening the treaty.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was opened for signature on July 1, 1968 and entered into force on March 5, 1970. It has 191 members. The treaty was not signed by India, Pakistan, Israel and South Sudan. The DPRK announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, but many states proceed from the fact that the withdrawal was formalized incorrectly from a legal point of view. In this regard, the UN Secretariat continues to consider the DPRK as a party to the NPT.
July 1, 2018 marked the 50th anniversary of the NPT opening for signature. On the occasion of this date, conferences in support of it were held in Moscow and Washington. A joint statement was made by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the three depositories of the Treaty (Great Britain, Russia and the USA) on major contribution NPT to ensure international security and stability and the continued relevance of this Treaty today.
Every five years, a Review Conference is convened to review the functioning of all provisions of the NPT, as well as agree on a list of recommendations to strengthen the Treaty.
At the 2015 Review Conference, the adoption of the final document was blocked by the delegations of the USA, Great Britain and Canada. For them, it was unacceptable that in the section on the Middle East, which was prepared on the basis of Russian proposals, the three co-authors of the 1995 resolution had the right to veto the holding of a Conference on the creation of a zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMDF) in the Middle East. (this provision would allow, if necessary, to block the holding of the Conference, which was important for Israel).
From April 23 to May 4, 2018, the second session of the Preparatory Committee (PC-2) for the 2020 NPT Review Conference was held in Geneva.
As the session showed, contradictions on such issues as nuclear disarmament and the creation in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMDF) remained and in some places even intensified. New trends have also emerged, including attempts to use the NPT review process as a platform to exert political pressure on individual states, as well as the introduction of topics not related to the Treaty to the NPT platform.
During PC-2 Russian delegation relied on a balanced approach to the consideration of the three main components of the NPT - nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of atomic energy. Together with China, they issued a statement in support of the JCPOA.
The third PC session will take place April 29–May 10, 2019 in New York. The candidacy of Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the UN in New York, M. Jacob, was approved for the post of chairman of the session.