What does reconnaissance include? Trends in the development of operational and tactical intelligence
The basis for successful actions of a raid group is secrecy of movement. The secrecy of the group's actions is ensured by strict adherence to camouflage and secrecy measures, the choice of optimal routes of movement and options for constructing a combat (march) order, the skillful use of tracking, constant analysis of the situation and timely adoption of the necessary measures when it changes.
Movement routes (advances to the reconnaissance area and movement of the group (patrol) in the reconnaissance area) are selected based on the map, aerial photographs and clarified during reconnaissance. Reconnaissance of movement routes for reconnaissance can be carried out from a helicopter (in advance by a specially designated reconnaissance group or during the withdrawal), as well as directly upon the group’s arrival in the area of the combat mission.
Advancement to the reconnaissance area and all movements in the reconnaissance area (conducting search reconnaissance, changing observation sites, and in other cases) should be carried out at night or in conditions of limited visibility. Movement of a raid group during the day is not recommended and is allowed only if there are forces and means of direct fire support for its actions. Direct fire support of a reconnaissance group can be provided by artillery, an armored group and support units at firing positions, combat helicopters and VPShG operations, as well as a specially allocated support subgroup (group) from the raid group (detachment). When a support subgroup is separated from a raid group, machine gunners, snipers, and, if available, heavy weapons crews are assigned to it.
Raid operations involve the active movement of a group in a reconnaissance area for the group to sequentially inspect areas of the terrain in order to detect the enemy. During the raid, pay special attention to the secrecy and safety of your movements.
In the course of carrying out the assigned task, the raid group can act under the guise of carrying out economic activities with its troops (units of other types and branches of the military), the local (civilian) population or enemy units. At the same time, technical and other means of transportation (armored vehicles, cars, motorcycles, snowmobiles, various watercraft, horse-drawn vehicles, pack and riding animals, etc.) can be used to lead the group to the reconnaissance area and during the raid.
The choice of battle formation for a group when advancing to a reconnaissance area and moving within it depends on:
combat mission and size of the group;
the ability to effectively manage the unit;
relief, protective properties of the area, time of year and day;
expected directions of enemy detection or attack;
mine situation.
who (your troops or the enemy) controls the airspace.
A reconnaissance detachment can move in a general battle formation or in separate groups. A reconnaissance group of up to 12-14 people, as a rule, moves in a general battle formation (interacting patrols, subgroups, teams of threes or pairs). For any battle formation, assign head and rear patrols, and in some cases, side patrols. Instead of a rear patrol, 1-2 observers may be assigned to the rear.
The battle formation in a column of one at a time (two at a time - “snake”) is the main option for moving a group on almost any terrain. The distance between elements of the battle formation and individual reconnaissance officers is determined by the group commander in each specific case.
The most acceptable battle formation is “trefoil” and “ring” if it is necessary for a group to conduct all-round fire. When retreating after a clash with the enemy, when a group is being pursued by the enemy, or in an area of special attention, build your battle formation in a “ring” or “trefoil.” In forest (mountain-forest) areas, the distance between scouts should be 4-8 meters during the day and 3-6 meters at night, and in open areas up to 10-12 meters.
The line of battle formation is used for a detailed systematic inspection of the area, the advancement of a group (sub-group) to the firing line, in the event of a frontal threat from the enemy, etc. Movement in line can be carried out by the entire group at the same time, by part of the group with its direct fire support from specially designated reconnaissance officers (see figure) or by the sequential movement of individual reconnaissance officers, pairs and trios. When moving sequentially, the principle of short dashes with constant alignment of the line is used, but the personnel of the group moves at a pace at the usual speed for reconnaissance.
With any option for constructing a group’s battle formation, the distance between the scouts in a patrol (subgroup, four-three or pair) should ensure their visual control of each other, but not exceed 10-12 meters, and when moving through open areas of the terrain and inspecting local objects, the distance between them can reach up to 20 meters or more. The distance between patrols and subgroups must also ensure their reliable mutual fire support, which in moderately rough terrain is no more than 100-200 meters, and in the forest - up to 30-50 meters.
The patrols allocated from the group (reconnaissance, head, rear or side) move at a distance of visual communication and fire support from small arms. The patrol order of battle must ensure the possibility of all-round observation and firing. The main task of the patrol is the timely detection of the enemy
one at a time in a column,
"hare trail"
The lead patrol has the task of conducting reconnaissance of the area along the group’s route and preventing a surprise enemy attack on the group.
The “intermediate” head patrol is intended to provide fire support for the actions of the head patrol or to strengthen it in certain areas of the terrain. He moves behind the lead patrol in front of the core (control subgroup) of the reconnaissance group. It includes machine gunners, grenade launchers (anti-tank and under-barrel grenade launchers) and snipers.
A professional's view
Part one, introductory
U Surprisingly, professionalism in our army today is becoming less and less in demand. This is especially visible in military reconnaissance units, i.e. precisely where it is a matter of life and death not only for the reconnaissance officers themselves, but primarily for the units and subunits for which this reconnaissance is conducted. There are many reasons for this state of affairs. This includes low pay for officers, the lack of a normal intelligence training school, a break in the continuity of combat experience, the absolutization of technical types of military intelligence, and much more. Quite a lot of manuals on military intelligence have been published recently, but they all suffer from the same shortcomings: lack of depth and training system. Tolerantly describing the individual training of a reconnaissance officer, they do not pay any attention to the coordination of troikas, groups and larger units; there are also no options for using reconnaissance equipment when performing various types of tasks to obtain information, although now the technology has reached such a level that it can greatly facilitate the work of intelligence officers . Almost all army reconnaissance units have a communication problem, since the means they have do not provide efficiency, secrecy and mobility, although many special formations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Internal Affairs, and the Ministry of Emergency Situations have the most modern communication equipment. Accordingly, the question arises: do they really need it more than the army intelligence units? After all, as the experience of combat operations in Afghanistan, Transnistria, and Chechnya shows, army units bear the main burden of collecting the necessary information.
Reconnaissance is the most important type of combat support. In modern conditions, it is a set of activities carried out by commanders at all levels, headquarters and troops to obtain and study information about the current or potential enemy and the terrain necessary for the preparation and successful conduct of further actions.
It includes the activities of commanders and headquarters in organizing reconnaissance, the direct actions of reconnaissance forces and means to obtain the necessary information about the enemy and the area, as well as the work of headquarters officers in collecting and processing this information, and reporting it to those interested in it. In particular, this article is devoted to military intelligence and its place in the military intelligence system.
Military intelligence, depending on the goals, scale of activity and the nature of the tasks performed, is divided into:
1 strategic;
2 operational-tactical;
3 tactical.
Depending on the scope of action, the forces and means involved, military intelligence is divided into five types:
1 ground;
2 air;
3 sea;
4 space;
5 special.
In turn, tactical reconnaissance of ground forces is divided into ground and air. But ground reconnaissance includes: military, radio and radio engineering, radar, chemical and bacteriological.
So we finally got to “our” military intelligence.
Military reconnaissance is carried out by reconnaissance, motorized rifle, regimental, parachute and air assault units.
The methods of conducting military reconnaissance are: observation, eavesdropping, search, raid, ambush, reconnaissance in force.
In combined arms formations, units and their subdivisions the following are appointed to conduct military reconnaissance:
1 - from the division - reconnaissance detachments, reconnaissance patrols, reconnaissance groups, officer reconnaissance patrols, search units, ambush units, units for reconnaissance in force, observation posts;
2 - from the regiment - reconnaissance detachments, reconnaissance patrols, officer reconnaissance patrols, search units, ambushes, observation posts;
3 - from the battalion - combat reconnaissance patrols, ambush units, patrol squads, observation posts;
4 - from the company - patrol squads, observers, and sometimes combat reconnaissance patrols;
5 - from the platoon, squad - observers, sentinels.
The direct conduct of military reconnaissance falls on regular and non-regular reconnaissance units and units. If we evaluate their capabilities, it turns out that they will not be able to provide commanders and staffs with the appropriate amount of information in a timely manner.
Let's give a simple example.
In an airborne division, there are regular reconnaissance units and subunits to conduct military reconnaissance: these are a separate reconnaissance company of the division, regimental reconnaissance companies, non-standard reconnaissance platoons of parachute battalions.
As a rule, airborne forces conduct combat operations behind enemy lines, which means the role of reconnaissance units is enormous. But if we consider the capabilities of (regular) intelligence units, they will not be able to fulfill the volume of tasks assigned to them. The experience of exercises and research results show that regular reconnaissance forces and assets, especially when the division is performing its immediate mission, are not enough. The division's landing area, according to the most minimal option (with 3-4 landing sites) can occupy an area of 25-30 km2 with a perimeter of 75-90 km. With the removal of reconnaissance units from landing sites to 10 km, the perimeter of the reconnaissance area of operation increases to 120-150 km. A division can allocate a maximum of 12 reconnaissance units from the regular reconnaissance units, and taking into account the non-standard reconnaissance platoons of battalions (9), this will total 21 reconnaissance units (RD-12, RD-9). It is known that a RD or BRD as part of a platoon can view a strip up to 2 km wide across moderately rough, semi-open terrain. Thus, military agencies, even fully involved, will be able to view no more than 40-50 km, that is, one third. This circumstance makes it necessary to attract additional forces from the parachute units. Let's consider non-standard reconnaissance platoons of battalions. Can they even be considered as scouts?
In the RDP training program, seven hours are allocated for reconnaissance training during the run-in of young recruits (topics such as “Organization, weapons and tactics of action of a unit of a potential enemy”, “Intelligence signs of the enemy’s location on the ground and preparing him for combat operations”) and eight hours are allocated in tactical training course to practice the topics “Platoon in reconnaissance”, “Platoon in combat mobile security”. Plus, two-week field training sessions are held with non-staff reconnaissance platoons of battalions under the leadership of the unit’s reconnaissance chief.
Is this really enough to train ordinary soldiers into scouts? Especially in modern conditions, when officers are not distinguished by deep knowledge and methodological skill. It is worth adding that not all reconnaissance units are fully staffed, contrary to the order of the Airborne Forces commander.
Sergeants
O officer in the reconnaissance unit is a king and a god, at least that’s how it should be. And the sergeant is his deputy. It is the sergeants who should conduct all the basic training of reconnaissance soldiers. However, such a situation in units today exists only in words. There is practically not a single educational institution left in the country where intelligence specialists - junior commanders - are trained. As a rule, they are trained directly in the units, choosing from the most prepared soldiers. The effectiveness of such training is extremely low, since there is almost no time for it, and the professional level of modern intelligence officers is low.
The prerequisites for a return to the normal state of affairs were destroyed - sergeants were equalized with ordinary soldiers both in terms of rights and pay, but this is fundamentally wrong. Any officer who served in intelligence at least 10-15 years ago can say with confidence that in his time the sergeants independently conducted training with personnel and were head and shoulders above the real ones in their training.
Selection and acquisition
“Rost above 190, fist like a beer mug - reconnaissance!” - This is approximately how scouts are selected from among the young recruits these days. Of course, the physical condition of a soldier is not the last question during selection, but not the first. First of all, you need to determine the level of his thinking, observation, memory, and strong-willed qualities. A scout is a versatile warrior, but above all an observer.
Nowadays the army is recruited by a conscript contingent that is very weak in all respects; careful selection into intelligence is all the more necessary, because the level of tasks is only increasing.
An important issue is the staffing of squads and platoons, which must be taken very seriously. In ancient times, units could be staffed by height, hair color, nose shape, nationality, etc. Now the main principle is the psychological compatibility of military personnel. What can you expect from, for example, a combat duo consisting of soldiers who are completely unsuitable for each other either in temperament or intellect?
It is necessary to make even greater demands on the staffing of reconnaissance units with officers and warrant officers than on soldiers. First of all, it is unacceptable for an officer or warrant officer to join an intelligence unit without having at least a year of service as an officer. He must get into intelligence, having already revealed himself to a certain extent as a commander. If, on the contrary, an officer enters a unit immediately after college, he begins to retrain and this greatly affects his subordinates during combat training.
Properly carried out measures to recruit a reconnaissance unit will greatly help at the coordination stage in the combat training system.
Preparation
As noted above, there is a sufficient amount of literature on individual and special intelligence training. At the stage of separate training, it is advisable to assign a specific officer to each specialty, who would be responsible for it during this period, that is, to create training groups for specialties, where the above-mentioned officers would be leaders (the requirement for officers to master all specialties is not removed).
At the end of the separate training stage, training is needed on the interchangeability of personnel. The joint training period must be based on issues of combat coordination of combat "twos" and "troikas"; groups, departments; platoons and companies. Be guided by the principles of “from simple to complex” and “minimum conventions, maximum combat situation.”
At this stage, the commander of the reconnaissance unit plays the main role. Here he, as an artist, must realize his “vision” of combat training. First of all, it is necessary to achieve such a relationship between students that they feel each other not only with their fingertips, but also subconsciously, understand at a glance, speak in sign language, facial expressions, and certain signals. This is where the intra-collective climate and psychological compatibility play a role.
The necessary feelings of camaraderie, teamwork, and personal responsibility cannot be achieved without the most serious tests for intelligence officers, and the more difficult the tests, the closer the relationships within the team will be. Although this is prohibited, in some cases even punishments should be collective. There is a huge field for deputy activity here. commander for educational work, unit psychologist, if there is one. This period is characterized by constant testing sessions in the form of competitions for the best “two”, “three”, etc.
And the culmination of this, of course, is tactical exercises, which should be a real indicator of the level of combat training of any unit.
Application
An extremely important role in organizing the process of combat training and reconnaissance as a whole is played by the combined arms commander, who must deeply understand the essence of modern combat and, accordingly, the place of military reconnaissance in it. It is this commander who will have to assign tasks to the scouts in a real battle, and if he is a limited, uncreative person, then trouble. The experience of the wars in Afghanistan, Transnistria, and Chechnya shows that the creativity of a combined arms commander is only enough to invent a “fresh task” for reconnaissance units, such as guarding the headquarters, escorting a convoy with a mat. means or using them as simple combined arms units. Such commanders who use intelligence officers for other purposes must be punished in the strictest possible manner. This is the “fifth column” within the army; with their ignorance they cause more harm than the enemy. On the contrary, the competent use of reconnaissance units often allows one to reduce one’s own losses many times over and achieve success with fewer resources.
For a good intelligence officer, his specialty becomes both a hobby and a lifestyle. I repeatedly observe how intelligence officers, no matter what - salary delays, housing problems, working seven days a week, do their job as expected. It’s just that they, as professionals, don’t know how to work poorly. With these officers I am ready to serve anywhere in the world. The essence of our service depends on ourselves; how we set it up and plan it for ourselves is how it will take place.
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MILITARY THOUGHT No. 7/1993, pp. 55-62
ColonelV.E. SHULGIN ,
candidate of military sciences
ColonelYu.L. FESENKO ,
Doctor of Technical Sciences
MILITARY conflicts of recent decades, despite their local nature, have made it possible to discover something that is usually carefully hidden by all armies of the world - new military equipment. At the same time, they marked a new stage in the development of means of armed warfare, since the creative understanding of the experience of combat operations was a powerful impetus to continue research and improve weapons. In this regard, the war in the Persian Gulf is no exception. A number of publications in the domestic and foreign press are devoted to the analysis of its results. In this case, special attention, as a rule, is paid to the actual side of military operations, as well as to the forecast of changes in the forms and methods of their conduct. Without denying the importance of such an approach to the study of foreign combat experience, we consider it necessary to dwell on the main trends in the development of operational and tactical intelligence, which were most clearly manifested during this military conflict.
The choice of this issue is not accidental, since the success of Operation Desert Storm and the subsequent offensive actions of the MNF was predetermined by the presence of modern reconnaissance means, its skillful organization and conduct in difficult conditions. The Iraqi side paid a lot of attention to measures for operational and tactical camouflage, using, along with traditional means, new ones - inflatable models of aircraft, tanks, launchers, covered with metallized paint and equipped with thermal emitters. The Iraqis' use of the camouflage properties of the terrain, various structures (tunnels, bridges, overpasses, etc.), standard camouflage coverings, the creation of a system of false positions and trenches, and the simulation of combat activity significantly complicated the collection of intelligence data by the MNF. For example, Iraq managed to hide the location of air defense systems not only from US reconnaissance satellites, but also from reconnaissance aircraft of the Ministry of Defense, whose command was subsequently forced to admit that “up to 50% of attacks on air defense facilities were on false targets.” Nevertheless, the military leadership of the MNF managed to obtain fairly complete data on the plan of action, the composition of troop groups, the construction of the defense and the nature of its engineering equipment, as well as establish the location of fire weapons, command posts and enemy rear facilities. This became possible thanks to the integrated use of space, air, ground, sea, and special reconnaissance and ensured the effectiveness of fire strikes and troop actions. It is no coincidence that a high level of operational and tactical intelligence is considered by US military experts to be the main components of victory in a war. And vice versa, the lack of long-range (space and air) reconnaissance on the Iraqi side, as well as its weak organization, did not allow timely discovery of the directions of the main attacks of the MNF and doomed the artillery group, which was superior in number and equipped with long-range systems, to inaction, which was one of the most important reasons for the defeat .
The role of fire destruction, especially in modern operations, can hardly be overestimated. Constituting the main content of combat operations, it has long acquired a complex character. Its main task was the defeat of enemy groups, the destruction of nuclear attack weapons, gaining fire superiority and providing continuous fire support for the actions of troops in solving operational and tactical tasks.
The results of the combat use of the latest high-precision weapons and electronic warfare equipment during the war in the Persian Gulf were so impressive that they allowed us to draw the conclusion Othe ability to achieve operational-strategic goals without invading ground forces into enemy territory. That is why in the domestic and foreign press the period of the war in the Persian Gulf zone before the start of offensive actions by ground forces was called the electronic fire phase, or electronic fire operation.
The steady increase in the role of fire destruction, the expansion of the range of tasks it solves, and a significant increase in the firepower of weapons of destruction (range and accuracy of fire, rate of fire, power of ammunition) have led to an increase in the importance of intelligence data mined for the purpose of planning and carrying out fire strikes, their shares in the total volume of tasks performed by operational and tactical reconnaissance.
However, the development of operational and tactical reconnaissance means within the framework of the so-called vertical integration determined primarily by the needs of one or another type of armed forces (army branch). Only for reconnaissance means directly integrated with weapons of destruction, the task of obtaining intelligence data, the reliability, timeliness and accuracy of which would ensure the possibility of their use to destroy detected objects, was considered as the main one. This facilitated the management of reconnaissance assets and limited the flow of information to the volumes necessary for fire planning and control. When developing other reconnaissance means, the requirement to obtain data that could directly be used in the interests of fire destruction of the enemy was not always made. Thus, the main purpose of radio reconnaissance equipment was usually to intercept enemy radio communications, and the task of establishing the location of his radio stations, if set, was usually limited to determining the areas of their location, which excluded the possibility of using the received data in interests of fire destruction control points. Relapses of this approach have not been eliminated even now, when, for example, when developing electronic reconnaissance equipment, they are limited to information that, at best, makes it possible to clarify the type and organizational affiliation of the detected radars, which practically excludes the possibility of their destruction by fire.
This approach does not correspond to the general trend of increasing the role of fire destruction in armed struggle. When preparing an electronic fire operation, the main thing is not so much obtaining information for a general operational-tactical assessment of the situation, but obtaining data, the timeliness, reliability, accuracy and completeness of which would ensure the delivery of effective fire strikes using conventional and high-precision weapons, as well as electronic suppression of enemy command and control systems.
Calculations show that in modern operations over 85% of intelligence information is obtained by technical means of radio-electronic systems located on ground, air and space carriers, therefore they must ensure the receipt of data in the interests of fire destruction. This requirement in the armies of a number of states has become the main one when creating technical reconnaissance equipment, regardless of their organizational affiliation.
A good example is the Gistars radio-electronic system for aerial reconnaissance of ground targets and control of strikes. The capabilities of this system are not limited to determining the coordinates of detected targets. Its most important task is to direct weapons and determine meeting points for field artillery fire at moving objects. Consequently, Jistars, along with the reconnaissance function itself, includes elements of the impact system, which significantly expands its capabilities.
Thus, obtaining data in the interests of fire destruction (electronic suppression) and bringing it to headquarters and fire assets (electronic warfare equipment) in a time scale close to real is put forward in the category of the basic requirements for reconnaissance technical means (systems), regardless of their organizational affiliation. Along with this, recently they have increasingly been tasked with aiming weapons at detected targets.
The experience of the war in the Persian Gulf indicates that not all MNF reconnaissance assets made it possible to effectively solve the listed tasks. It was necessary to make adjustments during the course of combat operations. In this regard, the experience of using the Imeyus ballistic missile launch detection system (USA) is indicative. Initially, it was intended to provide preliminary notification to the control centers of the Patriot air defense system and target designation to the MNF strike aviation groups about missile launch sites, but this turned out to be insufficient for delivering timely strikes on Iraqi mobile missile systems that managed to leave their launch positions before the strike groups appeared. Prompt introduction of changes to the procedure for receiving and processing the information received by the system significantly increased the timeliness and, consequently, the effectiveness of target designation for strike aircraft. Similar tasks were set for reconnaissance assets before, and were often considered the main ones, for example, for reconnaissance assets of the ground forces. Moreover, it was they who determined the need for vertical integration of reconnaissance and destruction means, when each military formation was equipped with its own reconnaissance means, which, along with giving them a certain tactical independence, made it possible to significantly reduce the time of transfer of information to means of destruction.
Vertical integration of reconnaissance and destruction means also had negative sides. The fact is that during their development, as a rule, only the needs of the type of armed forces (army branch or formation) in whose interests these weapons were created were taken into account. This led to an unjustified dissipation of finances and an increase in the cost of development and production of weapons. There were also shortcomings in the use of intelligence information, when, out of the total volume, only that which was determined by the needs of the corresponding branch of the armed forces (service branch or formation) was taken into account, while some of the intelligence information could be lost or arrive at headquarters too late. In the event of overlap of reconnaissance stripes (zones, sectors), some of the data obtained by reconnaissance assets of various formations duplicated each other, while important objects located outside the reconnaissance stripes could turn out to be unexplored. All this is confirmed by the experience of using various weapons in the Persian Gulf area. As noted in the Pentagon report to the US Congress, “due to the imperfection of the technical means of reconnaissance of the ground forces, air force and navy, as well as the unsatisfactory coordination of their efforts during Operation Desert Storm, there were numerous cases when, for example, naval aviation struck previously hit targets, bypassing those that, according to intelligence data, were considered destroyed. Similar facts occurred in the actions of the weapons of the ground forces and the Air Force, which also repeatedly struck at previously hit (destroyed) targets.”
The above facts confirm an important pattern that is manifested in the development of weapons at the present stage: the more the destructive power and independence in solving fire missions increases, the more the effectiveness of their use depends on the timeliness, reliability, accuracy and completeness of intelligence data. Nevertheless, the development of reconnaissance assets, even when creating reconnaissance-strike complexes, abroad was initially supposed to be carried out on the basis of vertical integration. For example, the first sample of the Assolt Breaker missile launcher was focused on its own reconnaissance and target designation means - the Pave Mower radar station, located on an airborne carrier. In the promising RUK "Jisak", developed in two versions (for the ground forces and the air force), it is also planned to have independent reconnaissance means: in the ground forces, it was planned to use the OV-1D "Mohawk" aircraft as a carrier of the side-view radar, and in the air force - TR aircraft -1 and S-18. Subsequently, it was decided to use the Jistars radar system for air reconnaissance of ground targets and control of strikes in both versions of the RUK. This meant, if not a rejection of the traditional form of vertical integration of reconnaissance and destruction means, then at least a transition to the creation of reconnaissance systems in the interests of several types of armed forces. The combination of reconnaissance and strike capabilities in the Jistars system contributed to improved control of various weapons.
The new concept of using the Jistars radar system provides for its use not only in the interests of the RUK, but also when planning fire damage in army corps and divisions. Its use during the war in the Persian Gulf (to monitor Iraqi reserves and detect batteries at ranges exceeding the capabilities of radar reconnaissance systems of counter-battery systems of American divisions) confirmed that the horizontal integration of reconnaissance and destruction means, along with the vertical one, significantly increases the efficiency of the use of reconnaissance information and capabilities of weapons. This allows us to take a significant step in solving one of the pressing problems of intelligence - increasing the reliability of intelligence information in the interests of fire destruction. Since most of the most important targets (launchers, batteries of self-propelled guns, MLRS, etc.) are mobile, their effective destruction is possible only if it is carried out immediately after detection, when confirmation of the reliability of data about them is difficult or practically absent. According to foreign military experts, the solution to this problem lies in the horizontal integration of intelligence assets of associations (formations) based on the creation of intelligence management systems. An example is the automated system for processing and analyzing intelligence data of the air army (army corps, division) ASAS. The deepest integration of various types of intelligence has been achieved at the divisional level (see table).
Automated system for processing and analyzing intelligence data of the ASAS division
Radio (interception and direction finding points of the "Trailerblazer" radio reconnaissance complex, the "Quick-Fix" helicopter complex) and radio-technical ("Timpex" ground-based radio reconnaissance complex, "Maltuz" helicopter complex) reconnaissance equipment transmit information to interface posts with reconnaissance equipment ASAS system, from where, after initial processing, it goes to the technical center for reconnaissance and electronic warfare of the division, where one of the centers of this system is located. Here, intelligence data is processed, analyzed and transmitted to a similar center located at the divisional combat control center (CDC). It also receives decrypted radar reconnaissance data from the moving target reconnaissance radar (AN/TPQ-58), the Firefinder counter-battery radar system (AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ -37 radars), sound reconnaissance, advanced optical-electronic means artillery observers (PAN), as well as from the Jistars air reconnaissance system, air surveillance equipment, etc. In the DBMS, the received data is processed and combined into a single overall picture of the object situation with the recognition of units, units and formations. The final information is issued in the form of an electronic map of the current object situation, which facilitates its operational and tactical assessment, revealing the enemy’s plan of action, and developing recommendations for fire damage. However, the main thing is that comparison of intelligence information received from various sources can significantly increase its reliability, and, consequently, the effectiveness of the use of destructive weapons. In addition, the automatic duplication of intelligence databases available at each of the reconnaissance control points in the division, army corps and air force (the interconnection of these points with each other) makes it possible to use all available intelligence means to fill in the missing information in the interests of any fire control authority. The ability to include reconnaissance assets into the system at the request of command authorities (including the central database) represents a significant step in improving the management of operational and tactical intelligence, as it allows you to manage all intelligence assets of the association (compound) from a single center, which significantly increases its capabilities when solving problems of electronic fire operations.
Note that, while forming large-scale horizontal structures, automated intelligence management systems do not exclude their already established vertical integration. Being structured into such formations as RUK, ROK, units and subunits of field artillery, reconnaissance assets, as before, will support their combat activities. At the same time, their integration into the intelligence system of an association (formation) increases the reliability of intelligence information received by command and control levels, where direct fire planning is carried out, ensuring clear coordination of the actions of various weapons.
Consequently, the creation of intelligence management systems based on both horizontal and vertical integration of the intelligence assets of an association (formation) makes it possible to more effectively use their combat capabilities and increase the reliability of intelligence information. In addition, their inclusion in the overall combat control system and interface with subsystems of weapons provides operational and tactical intelligence with the required activity and determination when obtaining data in the interests of planning and carrying out an electronic fire operation, it facilitates the achievement of clear and coordinated actions in it of diverse means of destruction and electronic suppression.
Analysis of the capabilities of the ASAS system allows us to reveal another important trend in improving operational and tactical reconnaissance - providing various command levels with intelligence information about objects located at distances significantly exceeding the reach of the fire weapons at their disposal. When implementing the concept of an air-ground operation, this will make it possible to conduct effective reconnaissance in a zone of potential threat of a union (formation), provide the ability to timely reveal the intentions of the opposite side, plan preemptive fire strikes in advance, seize the initiative and achieve the defeat of the enemy in parts. The availability of intelligence data becomes even more important in the context of a reduction in the number of armed forces, when a decrease in the number of troops on the battlefield will lead to the absence of a clearly defined line of contact. Besides, increasing the reconnaissance range will make it possible to track objects (targets) long before they appear within the reach of weapons. The ability to retrospectively view the site environment provides a more complete assessment of the reliability of intelligence data. Search, detection, recognition, determination of coordinates and other characteristics of objects, as well as the transfer of this data to the appropriate command authorities are accompanied by certain time costs, which characterize the “inertia” of reconnaissance. The creation of intelligence management systems will practically solve this problem. According to the calculations of US military experts, the reconnaissance equipment that divisions and army corps should be equipped with by the mid-90s, during the most intense periods of hostilities, will be capable of creating streams of intelligence information (each for tens of thousands of targets) with an intensity of about 80-110 messages per minute. Therefore, they rightly believe that Ensuring timely processing of intelligence information is possible only in automatic or semi-automatic mode. This is how it will be possible to ensure “inertia-free” reconnaissance, to bring all intelligence information into a single picture of the object situation on a time scale close to real. It is quite obvious that reducing the time for planning an operation (by automating the processes of command and control of troops and weapons) loses its meaning if the collection and processing of intelligence information about the enemy continues to be carried out within a few hours.
The resolution of this contradiction consists in introducing cybernetic methods and elements of “artificial intelligence” into technologies for searching, detecting, recognizing targets and determining their coordinates, collecting and processing intelligence information. The use of standard sets of objective features of various targets, electronic “templates” for recognizing the type and determining the organizational affiliation of detected electronic means, self- and cross-correlation methods for identifying individual and group targets, as well as assessing their reliability, machine synthesis of the general picture of the object situation based on a set of individual and group targets - this is not a complete list of methods for automating the processes of detection, recognition, and location of objects developed in the interests of creating the ASAS system, as well as other intelligence systems.
There is no doubt that the widespread introduction of methods for automating intelligence management processes was determined by the needs of practice, but the technological base of modern technical means played a significant role in this. Exactly radio-electronic complexes, which are currently the basis of technical reconnaissance means, turned out to be the most suitable for the perception of cybernetic methods of automating the processes of processing signals that carry intelligence information. This accelerated the technical implementation of the tasks of accurately determining the coordinates of stationary and moving targets, as well as the automation of calculations related to predicting their location for targeting weapons and delivering fire strikes.
It should be noted that these methods of deciphering signals that carry intelligence information, recognizing targets and determining their coordinates are universal and can be used in systems and devices regardless of their affiliation with a particular branch of the armed forces (army branch) and the purpose of reconnaissance assets. This will allow, in order to create them, to combine the efforts of research and scientific-production institutions of various departments, which will undoubtedly contribute to a significant reduction in financial costs and time for the creation of new equipment.
Consequently, the transition from individual means and reconnaissance complexes to automated reconnaissance systems and reconnaissance management systems, which represent the highest degree of integration of reconnaissance assets in the interests of operational and combat support for the actions of troops in electronic fire operations, is the essence of the most important trend in improving operational and tactical reconnaissance.
In connection with the widespread introduction of various automated reconnaissance systems, it is appropriate to note that they are only elements of the general reconnaissance and fire system of formations and formations, which ensures their comprehensive use.
Reforming the Russian Armed Forces requires clear guidelines. Therefore, today it is especially important to deeply study the basic patterns and trends in the development and combat use of weapons and military equipment. The experience of the war in the Persian Gulf zone once again confirmed that victory in armed struggle in modern conditions is possible only with a high degree of awareness of the enemy’s intentions and actions, which can only be achieved by equipping troops with highly effective reconnaissance means and their skillful and comprehensive use. Very promising in this regard, especially in the context of a sharp reduction in allocations for the creation of weapons and military equipment, seems to be the trend of horizontal integration of reconnaissance assets through the development and implementation of reconnaissance systems in the interests of several branches (arms) of the Armed Forces. Along with a significant increase in the efficiency of reconnaissance, the reliability of the data it produces and the accuracy of determining the coordinates of the objects (targets) to be hit, this promises a significant reduction in financial and time costs for the creation of new equipment. In addition, the development and implementation of automated reconnaissance systems and reconnaissance management systems facilitates the creation of unified intelligence, electronic warfare and fire control centers, which fully corresponds to their role in electronic fire operations. The results of the use of heterogeneous forces and weapons in MNF operations showed that it is necessary to integrate reconnaissance systems and weapons based on modern control systems into a unified technological reconnaissance and fire control system for fire destruction, electronic suppression and reconnaissance, and this requires clear coordination of the work of various institutions and departments when creating promising weapons.
This path does not contradict Russia’s scientific and technical policy, aimed at increasing the firepower of formations and formations by increasing the quality parameters of weapons and military equipment.
Military thought. - 1991. - No. 5. - P.65.
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