Medium-range ballistic missiles. Medium-range missiles: from a controversial decision to a reasonable one
WordsVladimirPutinOvolume, WhatsolutionmanualsUSSRrefusefrommissilesaveragerangelookscontroversial, caused acutediscussionamongmilitaryexpertsAndpoliticians. AgreementOliquidationmissilesaverageAndsmallrange / RIAC/ enteredVforce 25 yearsback - 1 June 1988 of the year. BehindThistimeworldchangedso, WhatOnecessityrevisionparametersthisdocumentThey sayNotonlyVRussia, ButAndonWest.
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The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was signed by Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan on December 8, 1987 (came into force six months later). According to the document, two classes of missiles were completely eliminated: medium-range (capable of reaching targets at a distance from 1000 km to 5.5 thousand km) and short-range (from 500 to 1000 km). The Soviet Union eliminated 1,846 such missiles, the Americans - 846.
If this treaty undermines the country's defense capability, then why was it signed?
There are several versions on this matter. According to one of them, the Soviet leadership was afraid of the American Pershing-2s stationed in Europe (Gorbachev even called the Pershings “a pistol to our temple”). According to another, the then leaders of the USSR and the USA did not want to lose the “pace of Reykjavik” and “advanced” the INF Treaty towards strategic nuclear disarmament. There are also conspiracy theories, for example, that the decisions of that time were based more on the ideas that existed at that time about “détente of international tension” and were not based on proper consultations with the military.
There is also a version that explains the appearance of this document by historical chance. In the memoirs and memoirs of some participants in the events of that time one can find such an episode. On April 14, 1987, Gorbachev received US Secretary of State George Shultz in the Kremlin. The conversation turned to the latest Soviet promising development - the OTR-23 Oka missile (it could fly 400 km and was not formally subject to the provisions of the future treaty). Gorbachev impromptu proposed abandoning the development of the Oka and reaching “global zero” under the INF Treaty - no medium- and short-range missiles on both sides. By the time Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev appeared at the negotiations, it was already too late to win back. Akhromeyev later recalled that this “miscalculation” of the General Secretary infuriated the generals.
First the Soviet Union, and then Russia, ultimately lost not only the Oka. Experts, for example, consider the RSD-10 Pioneer missile system (with a range of up to 5,000 km) unique, which has no analogues in the world. Suffice it to say that all Pioneer launches were successful, and the probability of hitting the target was 98%.
Work on the creation of new INF systems was curtailed, and all infrastructure in one way or another connected with them was liquidated. Moscow has fulfilled all its obligations. There is no reason to believe that Washington, having gotten rid of the Pershings, does not follow the letter and spirit of the treaty.
“For the Soviet Union and for today’s Russia, especially taking into account the fact that our other neighboring countries are developing these strike systems, such a decision was, to say the least, controversial, but the decision was made, and we simply must proceed from the realities of today,” - Vladimir Putin said at a meeting on the implementation of the state armament program on Wednesday, June 19.
AverageAndsmallrangewithoutall sorts ofrestrictions
Over the past twenty-five years, many countries have developed and are improving medium- and short-range missiles. We remember the recent tension on the Korean Peninsula, when the DPRK pulled its INF to its borders. North Korean Musudan missiles have a flight range of 3,000 kilometers and can reach not only South Korea, but also Japan, and even the American island of Guam.
Iran is implementing a program to create Shehab-3 medium-range ballistic missiles. There are several modifications of this rocket. The most “popular option” has a flight range of 1.1 thousand km. In 2007, Tehran demonstrated a new Ghadr-1 missile with a firing range of 1.6 thousand km. The history of the development of the Shehab-5 and Shehab-6 ballistic missiles with a firing range of 3 thousand and 5 thousand km, respectively, is very vague. According to some sources, such developments continue. According to others, they are collapsed.
India and Pakistan compete with each other in their INF programs. In 2012, Turkey announced the start of construction of medium-range missiles (they will be able to hit targets at a distance of 2.5 thousand km). China, Israel... - the list of countries where missiles of this class have been tested over the past five years goes on and on.
What should Russia do under these conditions?
Of course, Moscow has such an indisputable argument as strategic nuclear forces. But how reasonable is it to contrast strategic nuclear forces and INF Treaty? Military experts say it's like shooting sparrows with a cannon. The comparison, of course, is not entirely correct, but essentially correct.
In February 2007, the then Chief of the General Staff, Army General Yuri Baluevsky, said: “The agreement ... is of an open-ended nature, but the possibility of exiting it exists if one of the parties provides convincing evidence of the need for withdrawal. Today they exist: many countries are developing and improving medium-range missiles, and Russia, having fulfilled the INF Treaty, has lost many of these weapon systems.”
This statement caused a flurry of comments. In the West, Moscow was even accused of trying to start a new Cold War. However, politicians and experts both in Russia and the West, before and after, spoke many times about the possibility of revising the entire existing legal system in the field of security and nuclear deterrence. For example, the current system does not include American missile defense in Europe.
Go outoneorforbideveryone
If Moscow were to withdraw from the treaty now, this does not mean that Russia would immediately have medium- and short-range missiles. The existing research institutes and design bureaus do not conduct developments in this direction. It no longer makes sense to “raise” previous projects from the late 1980s - they are outdated. To start churning out the Oka and Pioneer missiles again - there is no longer a production base for this; it will need to be restored. This will take several years.
In addition, Russia’s unilateral, “hard” withdrawal from the INF Treaty is not the best option for Moscow. Slamming the door sharply can incur serious image costs. Such a step will primarily puzzle the Europeans, but is unlikely to push countries such as the DPRK and Iran into negotiations on banning the INF Treaty.
Now experts are arguing about how realistic is the initiative of Barack Obama, who proposed that Russia and the United States reduce strategic and tactical offensive weapons by a third. Why not link negotiations on this topic with the revision of the INF Treaty agreements and with missile defense issues in Europe?
Another way to solve the problem is to begin broad international negotiations on limiting or banning the INF Treaty. In other words, “connect” other countries to the USA and Russia, giving the agreement a universal character. There is an international Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which sets strict limits on the behavior of participating countries. It is curious that at the end of his presidential term, at the beginning of 2012, Nicolas Sarkozy took the initiative to completely ban medium- and short-range missiles. This initiative was not heard then. Perhaps it's worth repeating again.
Launch of the Iskander OTRK missile / Photo:
Intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads are a terrible danger to life on Earth. If they are used, most likely human civilization will not survive. But ICBMs still have one advantage: tens of minutes will pass from the moment of launch to hitting the target, and during this time you can still try to prevent the irreparable.
Short- and medium-range missiles are a completely different matter. There will be no time to think if they are used. Almost won't happen. And recent history has already known two serious crises associated with this type of weapon. The most acute was the Caribbean crisis, which almost led to a nuclear missile clash between the USSR and the USA in 1962, when, in response to America’s deployment of ground-based ballistic systems in Turkey, the USSR decided to bring its missiles to Cuba. The Americans installed PGM-19 Jupiter missiles in Turkey, fearing a Soviet breakthrough to the Black Sea straits. This single-stage oxygen-kerosene rocket was designed under the leadership of Wernher von Braun, flew at a distance of up to 2400 km and had a circular deviation of 1.4 km. The power of the nuclear warhead was just under one and a half megatons.
Image: www.popmech.ru
Comparative sizes of Soviet operational-tactical missiles of different years and generations. On the far right is the modern R-500 cruise missile used as part of the Iskander OTRK. The 9M714 missile of various modifications, part of the OTR-23 Oka complex, was subject to destruction under the INF Treaty.
We parted ways
The Soviet Union managed to deliver only R-12 missiles to Cuba (it was also planned to deploy longer-range R-14s). The rocket using high-boiling fuel components was designed by Mikhail Yangel, its range was 2080 km, the warhead had a power of 2.3 Mt, and the maximum deviation was 5 km.
As you know, the events of 1961 ended with a peaceful zero solution: the R-12 was taken away from Cuba, and the Jupiters were removed from positions in Turkey. Less than two decades passed, and at the end of the 1970s there was a new serious crisis around the so-called Euromissiles. Since 1977, the USSR began deploying RSD-10 Pioneer - SS-20 missile systems in the European part of the USSR, according to the NATO index. This solid-fuel missile had a range of up to 5,000 km and carried three thermonuclear warheads with a capacity of 15 Mt each. With such parameters, it was capable of hitting the entire European NATO infrastructure all the way to the Atlantic.
Photo: www.popmech.ru
Ground launch of the American long-range cruise missile BGM-109G Gryphon, a land modification of the Tomahawk missile. Its deployment in Europe became one of the cornerstones of the “Euromissile” crisis that erupted in Soviet-American relations in the 1970s and 1980s.
The Americans responded by deploying ballistic Pershing-2s with a range of 1,770 km in 1983. They were supplemented by the land version of the winged Tomahawks BGM-109 Gryphon. The Griffon, of course, did not have the deadly agility of ballistic missiles, but it flew at a distance of 2,500 km and posed a serious problem for Soviet air defense, moving in the air at low altitude and avoiding obstacles. And most importantly, the accuracy of these weapons has increased significantly. The danger of an instant nuclear conflict with a difficult to predict outcome hangs over Europe. It took years of difficult negotiations and a search for compromises before the USSR and the USA agreed to conclude the Treaty on the Elimination of Shorter and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF Treaty). Exactly 30 years ago, in 1988, it came into force. According to the agreement, the USSR and the USA refused to produce and possess medium- and shorter-range missiles (range 500-5500 km). It is worth emphasizing separately that we were talking specifically about ground-based missiles. Similar weapons for sea and aviation deployment were not prohibited.
Under the INF Treaty, the USSR destroyed 1,846 missile systems, including mobile Pioneer launchers with missiles equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads, stationary R-12 and R-14 missiles, cruise missiles of the RK-55 type, operational-tactical complexes " Temp-S" and "Oka". The United States destroyed 846 missile systems with Pershing-2 missiles, Tomahawk cruise missiles and Pershing-1A operational-tactical missiles.
Medium-range ballistic missiles, MGM-31 Pershing-2, destroyed by the Americans as part of the implementation of the INF Treaty. Currently, the United States is considering the issue of reviving this missile in a sea-based version, which is not prohibited by the treaty.
Digging "Pershing"
It would seem that the open-ended agreement concluded by Gorbachev and Reagan is a thing of the past, but in recent years discussions around this topic have actively resumed. The point of view has been expressed more than once that the agreement with the Americans was not very beneficial for the USSR and its successor, the Russian Federation. One of the arguments is that according to the INF Treaty, our country has lost many more warheads and missiles. Another is that there are several nuclear states near the Russian borders that have INF Treaty and are not bound by any restrictions. Chief Researcher at the Center for International Security at IMEMO RAS, professor, retired Major General Vladimir Dvorkin is deeply convinced that the INF Treaty was timely and should not be revised.
“The assets that the Americans began to deploy in Europe in the first half of the 1980s threatened us with a lightning strike on command posts, bunkers where the country’s military and political leadership could be located, ICBM launchers,” says Vladimir Dvorkin, “Pershing-2 missiles with Their flight time of 6-8 minutes was an innovative weapon. They were equipped with high-precision warheads capable of burying themselves into the earth's surface. "Tomahawks" with their high accuracy and stealth were also dangerous for our air defense. At the same time, the RSD-10 “Pioneer” made it possible to strike the territory of European NATO states, but for the United States they were absolutely safe. It was the right trade."
The problem today is not even that the INF Treaty is being criticized. For several years now, Russia and the United States have been making mutual accusations against each other for violating the treaty. Russian representatives stated that the United States was looking for a reason to withdraw from the INF Treaty. What are we talking about?
"Tomahawk" under "Aegis"?
Russia's claims relate to the creation by the Americans of missile defense position areas in Romania and Poland to combat ballistic missiles. The Aegis (Aegis) missile defense system, which includes AN/SPY-1 three-dimensional phased array radars and Standard Missile-3 missiles with Mk 41 launchers, has existed for quite a long time, but until 2016 it was based only on Navy ships USA. Two years ago, the Americans announced the commissioning of the Aegis Ashore (Land Aegis) land position in the Deveselu region (Romania). Next in line, according to the plan adopted by the Obama administration, is the deployment of a similar facility in Poland. Russian representatives have repeatedly pointed out that the Mk 41 launcher can be used not only to launch anti-missile missiles, but also to launch Tomahawk-type cruise missiles. And if such installations are already located on land, then we can talk about a violation of the INF Treaty. “Theoretically, these fears are justified,” says Vladimir Dvorkin, “however, from a military point of view, this does not make much sense, since the Americans currently have about 6,000 high-precision sea-based Tomahawks and ships armed with them often cruise near our borders. If we add another 20 or 40 ground-based missiles to these thousands, this will not be a significant change in the available capabilities.”
An SM-3 missile is launched from a US Navy ship equipped with a ballistic missile defense system. Currently, similar systems are being deployed on land (Romania, Poland). Russia believes that Mk 41 launchers for the SM-3 missile could also be used to launch Tomahawk cruise missiles.
Captured by suspicion
The Americans are looking with alarm at our new cruise missiles, which are equipped with the Iskander family of operational-tactical missile systems. The Iskander-K variant uses the R-500 (9M728) cruise missile, which, according to Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov, is capable of penetrating any promising missile defense systems. At the same time, Russia’s official position is that the missile’s range is established within the framework of the INF Treaty and does not exceed 500 km. However, American representatives express doubts about the veracity of this parameter, although they do not present any concrete evidence. But more often from overseas they point to another cruise missile developed by the Novator design bureau, which was tested in Russia and has the index 9M729, and NATO calls it SSC-8. According to the Americans, it is an analogue of the sea-based Kalibr missile, which the Russian Navy effectively fired from the Caspian and Mediterranean seas at ISIS targets (an organization banned in Russia) in Syria, and has a range of up to 5,500 km. The Pentagon believes that the missile not only passed the tests, but also, having been put into service, was deployed as part of two divisions of the Iskander complexes. Russia denies these data.
The Iskander operational-tactical missile system with two 9M723 single-stage solid-fuel missiles flying along a quasi-ballistic trajectory. However, American claims against Russia are related to cruise missiles used as part of the complex.
We need to negotiate
“Probably, the Americans base their point of view on the fact that the long-range cruise missile was actually tested in 2014, but the fact of testing itself is not a violation of the INF Treaty,” says Vladimir Dvorkin. - True, there is a clause in the agreement according to which longer-range missiles can be tested on land, but the launcher must be different from those produced in series. Perhaps the US believes that the installation was not sufficiently converted for testing and is close to the equipment of the Iskander complex. What can we offer here? Within the framework of the contract, there is a control commission, at a meeting of which it is necessary to discuss and clearly define the criteria for distinguishing the test installation from the serial one. Unfortunately, this has not been done yet. But the main thing is that mutual claims are mainly of a technical nature and do not affect the potentials that exist today.”
The 1987 INF Treaty was the result of serious compromises and applied only to the USSR and the USA. Missiles of this class remained with NATO members France and Great Britain; they were and are being developed by Israel, India, Pakistan, China, and North Korea. However, according to Vladimir Dvorkin, it is almost impossible to include all these countries in a single treaty banning the INF Treaty. It is much more important to maintain the status quo.
Vladimir Dvorkin believes that the alternative to coordinating positions and removing mutual claims is the collapse of the INF Treaty and this will become a big problem for all interested parties. This year, the United States has allocated funds for the development of a new ground-based medium-range cruise missile. R&D in this area is not prohibited by the treaty, but if the arms race resumes there, it will seriously complicate the military-political situation in Europe and will require the Russian budget to spend large amounts of new money on the production of medium- and short-range missiles.
MOSCOW, Popular Mechanics magazine, Oleg Makarov
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USSR stamp, Treaty between the USSR and the USA on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, December 1987
(INF Treaty, INF Treaty) (eng. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (IRNFT)) - an agreement between the USSR and the USA, signed by M. S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan on December 8, 1987 during the Soviet-American summit in Washington .
The agreement entered into force on June 1, 1988. For the first time in history, the treaty made it possible to eliminate an entire class of weapons: the parties pledged to destroy all systems of ground-based ballistic and cruise missiles of medium (1000-5500 km) and shorter (from 500 to 1000 km) range, and also not to produce, test or deploy such rockets in the future. In accordance with the Treaty, the parties were required to destroy, within three years, all launchers and ground-based missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers, including missiles on both European and Asian territory of the USSR. The treaty provided for verification procedures by inspectors who were to monitor the destruction of the opposing side's missiles.
Before the Treaty was signed in the United States, ballistic missiles were divided into [ ] for intercontinental (over 5000 km), medium (from 500 to 5000 km) and short (from 150 to 500 km) ranges. In the USSR until the mid-1980s [ ] operational-tactical missiles (from 1 to 500 kilometers) also stood out. In the USA, tactical (operational-tactical) missiles had [ ] flight range from 1 to 150 kilometers. In 1987, with the signing of the Treaty, a new classification was finally established. In relation to the period until the mid-1980s, it is legitimate to use both classifications in historical works.
According to Art. 3 Agreements subject to destruction:
- medium range missiles
- USSR - RSD-10 "Pioneer", "R-12", "R-14" (according to NATO classification, "SS-20", "SS-4" and "SS-5" respectively) and ground-launched cruise missiles of the Republic of Kazakhstan -55 (NATO classification - SSC-X-4 “Slingshot”);
- USA - "Pershing 2" and "BGM-109G" (land-based Tomahawk cruise missile);
- short range missiles
- USSR - “OTR-22 Temp-S” and OTR-23 “Oka” (“SS-12” and “SS-23”);
- USA - "Pershing-1A".
By June 1991, the Treaty was implemented: the USSR destroyed 1,846 missile systems (about half of them were manufactured missiles that were not on combat duty); USA - 846 complexes.
After several mutual accusations of violating the INF Treaty, the parties in February 2019 announced the suspension of compliance with their obligations under the Treaty.
Background
In the mid-1970s, first in the USA and then in the USSR, laser, infrared and television missile guidance systems were created. This made it possible to achieve great accuracy in hitting targets (according to various estimates - up to 30 meters). Experts have started talking about the possibility of delivering a new type of nuclear strike - a decapitating or blinding strike, which would make it possible to destroy the leadership of the opposite side before a decision is made to activate the retaliatory strike mechanism. This revived ideas about the possibility of victory in a “limited nuclear war” due to the gain in flight time. On August 17, 1973, US Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger unveiled the concept of the decapitation strike as a new basis for US nuclear policy. To implement it, it was assumed that a gain in flight time would be achieved. The priority in the development of nuclear deterrents shifted from the strategic triad to medium- and shorter-range weapons. In 1974, this approach was enshrined in the fundamental documents on US nuclear strategy.
In order to implement the doctrine, the United States began to modify the Forward Based System located in Western Europe. The project increased US-British cooperation on the modification of submarine-launched ballistic missiles and intermediate-range missiles. In 1974, Great Britain and France signed the Ottawa Declaration, according to which they pledged to develop a common defense system, including the nuclear sphere. In the USSR, these actions were perceived as France's abandonment of the concept of "independent defense" and a partial revision of the Gaullism policy.
These actions caused alarm in the USSR. In 1976, D. F. Ustinov became the Minister of Defense of the USSR, who was inclined towards a tough response to US actions. The basis of the modified nuclear strategy of the USSR was the expansion of the fleet of heavy ICBMs with MIRVs and, at the same time, covering the European strategic direction. In 1977, the USSR began deploying RSD-10 Pioneer (SS-20) medium-range missiles on its western borders. In total, about 300 missiles of this class were deployed, each of which was equipped with three warheads for individual targeting. This allowed the USSR to destroy NATO's military infrastructure in Western Europe in a matter of minutes - control centers, command posts and, especially, ports (the latter, in the event of war, made it impossible for American troops to land in Western Europe). Against the background of the total superiority of the USSR in conventional weapons, this gave the Warsaw Pact Organization complete military superiority in the European theater of operations.
On December 12, 1979, the NATO Council adopted a “double decision” that provided for the deployment of 572 Pershing-2 missiles in Europe by 1983. The short flight time of the Pershing-2 missiles (6-8 minutes) gave the United States the opportunity to strike the first strike at command posts and launchers of Soviet ICBMs (at the same time, the deployed nuclear missiles were not taken into account in the Soviet-American strategic arms limitation agreements that existed at that time). At the same time, NATO countries agreed to begin negotiations with the USSR in order to solve the problem of Soviet Euro-missiles by 1983.
Negotiation
But the United States refused to conduct “package negotiations.” In September 1983, the Americans began deploying their missiles in Great Britain, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands. On November 22, 1983, the Bundestag voted for the deployment of Pershing 2 missiles on German territory. These actions caused a sharply negative reaction in the USSR. On November 24, 1983, Yu. V. Andropov made a special statement, which spoke about the growing danger of nuclear war in Europe, the USSR's withdrawal from the Geneva negotiations on Euromissiles and the adoption of retaliatory measures - the deployment of OTR-23 "Oka" ("SS-23" ) on the territory of the GDR and Czechoslovakia. Having a range of up to 450 km, they could theoretically sweep through the entire territory of Germany, that is, deliver a preventive disarming strike on the Pershing locations. At the same time, the USSR moved its nuclear submarines closer to the US coast.
An attempt to resume contacts between the parties began immediately after the death of Yu. V. Andropov, which occurred on February 9, 1984. His funeral on 14 February was attended by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and US Vice President George H. W. Bush. They proposed resuming negotiations on Euromissiles on the condition that the USSR “unblocks the package.” However, there was no unity in the Soviet leadership. The new General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, K. U. Chernenko, advocated negotiations with NATO countries, but Defense Minister D. F. Ustinov (who became in fact the second person in the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee) categorically refused to unblock the package. On June 29, 1984, the USSR proposed resuming negotiations on “Euromissiles” on package terms. However, the United States (as expected) did not agree with this position. Since the USSR continued the deployment of the OTR-23 Oka in Czechoslovakia and the GDR, which began under Yu. V. Andropov, the United States announced in the summer of 1984 that it intended to deploy Lance operational-tactical missiles with neutron warheads in Europe.
In December 1984, a Soviet delegation led by M. S. Gorbachev visited the UK. But, despite the warm welcome, M. Thatcher categorically refused to conduct “package” negotiations. The situation changed after the death of D.F. Ustinov on December 20, 1984 - a compromise line prevailed in the Soviet leadership. On February 7, 1985, at a meeting with US Secretary of State J. Shultz in Geneva, USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko agreed to conduct negotiations on Euro-missiles separately from negotiations on space weapons. After Gorbachev was elected General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee on March 10, 1985, negotiations resumed.
The USSR's position in the negotiations became softer. In the summer of 1985, Gorbachev introduced a moratorium on the deployment of the OTR-23 Oka in Czechoslovakia and the GDR. Gorbachev and Reagan made an attempt to reach an agreement on negotiations in Geneva in November 1985. It ended in failure: the United States refused to withdraw medium-range missiles from Europe, and the USSR was close to blocking the package again. But in January 1986, Gorbachev announced a program for the phased elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world and made a number of serious concessions. At the meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan in Reykjavik, the USSR agreed to “unblock the package” - to negotiate on the INF separately from SDI.
In the fall of 1986, the USSR proposed an option for the removal of medium-range missiles: the USSR would withdraw the RSD-10 beyond the Urals, and the United States would export the Pershing-2 and ground-based cruise missiles to North America. Reagan agreed to accept this option. However, on December 24, 1986, Japan categorically opposed it: Tokyo feared that the USSR would redirect the RSD-10 at them. On January 1, 1987, China also opposed this option, where they also feared that they could become a target for the RSD-10. As a result, when the USSR proposed the “double zero” project in February 1987, the United States, taking into account the interests of Japan, refused to accept it.
Result of negotiations
A compromise was reached during negotiations between USSR Foreign Minister E. A. Shevardnadze in Washington in September 1987.
The USSR agreed to develop a unified classification for the INF Treaty and include the OTR-23 Oka (SS-23) in the future treaty, although they did not fall under the INF Treaty definition. The United States, in turn, promised to destroy the Tomahawk ground-based cruise missiles and abandon the deployment of the Lance-2 OTR with neutron warheads in Central Europe.
On December 8, 1987, the Washington Treaty was signed, under the terms of which the parties agreed to destroy all INF missiles as a class.
Execution of the Agreement
By June 1991, the Treaty was implemented: the USSR destroyed 1,846 missile systems (about half of them were manufactured missiles that were not on combat duty); USA - 846 complexes.
Execution of the Agreement
Termination of the Agreement
Russian claims against the United States for violations of the Treaty
On February 15, 2007, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Army General Yuri Baluevsky, said that Russia could begin to review the entire treaty-legal system of nuclear deterrence in response to the deployment of elements of the American missile defense system in Eastern Europe. In particular, he said, Russia can unilaterally withdraw from the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces: “The Treaty... is of an open-ended nature, but the possibility of withdrawing from it exists if one of the parties provides convincing evidence of the need for withdrawal. Today they exist: many countries are developing and improving medium-range missiles, and Russia, having fulfilled the INF Treaty, has lost many of these weapon systems.”
A similar statement about Russia’s possible withdrawal from the INF Treaty was made earlier (in June 2000) by Russian President Vladimir Putin in response to the US announcement of its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.
In February 2007, the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces of the Russian Armed Forces, Colonel General Nikolai Solovtsov, said at a press conference that Russia was ready to restore the production of medium-range ballistic missiles: “As a class of MRBMs, they were destroyed, but all the documentation remained, all the technology remained. In the shortest possible time, if necessary, the production of these complexes will be restored. But with new technologies, on a new element base, with a new control system, with new capabilities.” This statement was made in response to reports that Poland and the Czech Republic intend to accept the US proposal to deploy missile defense elements (surveillance radars and interceptor missiles) on their territory.
This approach was reflected in official documents - for example, in the Review of Russian Foreign Policy (2007) it was noted: “The situation emerging around the Treaty between the USSR and the USA on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF) is of concern. Missiles of these two classes were destroyed in accordance with the Treaty back in 1991, but since then this international legal act has not been given a universal character. Moreover, an increasing number of states, including those located near our borders, are developing and putting such missiles into service. In these conditions, it is necessary to think about ensuring our own security.”
From Russia's perspective, the United States has violated the INF Treaty by deploying interceptor missile launchers in Europe that could hypothetically be used to deploy cruise missiles, using target missiles similar in characteristics to ground-launched intermediate-range missiles, and increasing production and use attack unmanned aerial vehicles.
Vertical launcher modules mk.41, already located in the missile defense system in Poland and Romania, make it possible to launch not only Standard 2 and Standard 3 anti-missile missiles, but also Tomahawk missiles (Tomahawk is a medium-range cruise missile (1000-2200 km), capable of carrying nuclear warheads).
In 2013, the United States began test launches from the ground of the AGM-158B aircraft cruise missile with a range of a thousand kilometers. And in December 2017, President Trump signed a defense bill, which, among other things, provided for the allocation of $25 million for the development of a new cruise missile of this type. From the Russian point of view, this is a violation of the INF Treaty.
In June 2013, Vladimir Putin, at a meeting with representatives of the Russian military-industrial complex, called the USSR’s decision to abandon medium-range missiles “at least controversial,” and the head of the presidential administration, Sergei Ivanov, announced the possibility of the Russian Federation withdrawing from the Treaty.
Withdrawal from the Treaty
In July 2014, US President Barack Obama, in a letter to Vladimir Putin, for the first time at the level of heads of state, accused Russia of testing medium-range cruise missiles that violate the Treaty. The USA claims that in 2008-2011. Russia, in violation of the Treaty, tested a ground-based cruise missile with a range of more than 500 km (we are talking about the 9M729 missile, developed by the Yekaterinburg Novator Design Bureau named after Lyulev); According to Russian officials, the range of this missile is obviously less than 500 km).
In November 2016, in Geneva for the first time since 2003, at the initiative of the United States, a meeting of a special control commission within the framework of the INF Treaty was convened, but the concerns of the parties could not be addressed.
On October 31, in an article in Foreign Policy, John Wolfsthal (director of the Nuclear Crisis Group, former special assistant to President Barack Obama and senior director for arms control and nonproliferation at the National Security Council) criticized Trump's decision. In particular, John Wolfsthal argues the following: “Abolition of this treaty will make the United States and its allies (about whom Trump clearly does not care) less secure and undermine the global foundation of nuclear non-proliferation.”
On November 26, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Sergei Ryabkov said that Moscow considers “a direct and blatant violation of the INF Treaty” the US deployment of launchers for MK41 guided missiles as part of the Aegis Ashore complexes in Europe, which, contrary to the Treaty, “allow for the combat use of cruise missiles from the ground medium-range Tomahawk missiles and other strike weapons."
On December 5, Vladimir Putin commented on Pompeo’s statement, recalling that the United States first announced its intention to withdraw from the Treaty and only after that began to provide reasons for its decision, shifting responsibility to Russia: “No evidence of violations on our part is provided,” the Russian President noted.
On December 17, in an interview with the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper, the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Colonel General Sergei Karakaev, stated that “the impact of the consequences of the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty, the subsequent deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe and the associated new threats to our security are undoubtedly taken into account " Karakaev said that by the end of the year it is planned to supply about 100 new types of weapons to the troops, including stationary and mobile-based Yars missile systems. This will be one of the Russian responses to the deployment of the US missile defense system in Eastern European countries. According to Karakaev, a number of military-technical measures will sufficiently reduce the effectiveness of the promising US missile defense system in Europe.
Russian-American negotiations on the treaty that took place on January 15, 2019 in Geneva ended in failure, primarily due to disagreements between the parties regarding claims to the Russian 9M729 missile.
On January 23, the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation invited foreign military attaches and journalists to a briefing, where for the first time some tactical and technical characteristics of the 9M729 ground-based cruise missile were revealed, the launcher and transport-launch container were demonstrated. Representatives of the United States and the military of a number of other NATO member countries, as well as the EU, including Great Britain, Germany and France, ignored the invitation. The demonstration of the Russian 9M729 missile, however, did not dissuade the United States that Russia is violating the INF Treaty. The official representative of the US Embassy in the Russian Federation, Andrea Kalan, told Interfax: “The United States and most of our NATO allies refused to attend this briefing, in which we all saw only another attempt to hide a violation and create the appearance of transparency.”
On February 1, 2019, US President Donald Trump announced the start of the withdrawal procedure from the Treaty. “For too long, Russia has violated the INF Treaty with impunity by covertly developing and deploying a prohibited missile system that poses a direct threat to our allies and troops abroad. Tomorrow, the United States will terminate its obligations under the INF Treaty and begin the process of withdrawing from the INF Treaty, which will be completed in 6 months unless Russia returns to compliance by destroying all of its missiles, installations and associated equipment that violate the treaty,” Trump said.
On February 2, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia, in response to US actions, was also suspending participation in the Treaty: “American partners ... announced that they are engaged in research, development and development work, and we will do the same.” At the same time, Putin demanded that we no longer initiate negotiations with the United States on disarmament: “We will wait until our partners are mature enough to conduct an equal, meaningful dialogue with us on this most important topic - both for us, and for our partners, and for the whole world.” ".
On February 2, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that the United States began preparing for the production of missiles prohibited by the Treaty two years before it announced its withdrawal from the INF Treaty: “According to irrefutable data available to the Russian Ministry of Defense, since June 2017 at the military-industrial enterprise Raytheon Corporation in Tucson, Arizona, has launched a program to expand and modernize production facilities in order to create medium- and shorter-range missiles prohibited by the INF Treaty. Over the past two years, the area of this largest missile weapons production plant in the United States has increased by 44%, and the number of personnel has increased by 2 thousand people.
On February 5, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said at a conference call at the ministry that in 2019-2020, in response to the US decision to suspend implementation of the INF Treaty, a ground-based version of the Kalibr sea-based complex with a long-range cruise missile will be developed. In the same time frame, a ground-based missile system with a long-range hypersonic missile will have to be created.
On February 7, the Russian Ministry of Defense, having familiarized itself with the contents of the US State Department’s note on the suspension of the American side’s participation in the INF Treaty and the beginning of the procedure for withdrawing from it, rejected “unfounded allegations about Russia’s violation of its obligations under this treaty” and, in turn, accused the United States of that they did not take the necessary actions to eliminate their violation of their own obligations under the Treaty. In this regard, the Russian Ministry of Defense proposed that the American side, in the period before the termination of the Treaty, return to its implementation and “take the necessary measures to return to strict compliance with the Treaty by destroying” several types of missiles and military equipment:
The corresponding note was presented to the military attaché at the US Embassy in Moscow.
On February 8, the US mission to NATO stated that the Aegis Ashore missile defense system is “fully compliant with US obligations under the INF Treaty” and is capable of launching “only defensive interceptor missiles”, which in turn are not subject to the Treaty. According to the American side, American attack UAVs do not violate the Treaty either: “The INF Treaty does not place any restrictions on the development, testing and use of reusable armed drones. According to the United States, the term “missile”, which is used in the Treaty, is applicable only to disposable items.”
On February 20, Russian President Vladimir Putin, in his message to the Federal Assembly, stated that in the event of the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe, Russia will be forced to deploy means within the reach of which will be both the territories where these missiles will be deployed and the territories where the centers are located. making decisions about their use (i.e. the United States). At the same time, the flight time of Russian missiles will be adequate to the flight time of American missiles, which Putin estimated at 10-12 minutes. The Russian president emphasized that Russia does not intend to be the first to deploy medium- and shorter-range missiles in Europe.
On March 4, 2019, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree suspending Russia’s implementation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), while at the same time, in a commentary to this decree, Vladimir Putin noted that Russia does not plan to deploy missiles covered by the INF Treaty on border areas.
see also
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty on Wikimedia Commons | |
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in Wikinews |
Notes
- History of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles // Kommersant, 12/07/2017
- The US has targeted sanctions against the Russian missile. Negotiations in Geneva on the INF Treaty are under threat of failure // Kommersant, 12/11/2017
- Putin announced the suspension of Russia's participation in the missile treaty (undefined) . Lenta.ru (February 2, 2019). Retrieved February 2, 2019.
- Russia “may withdraw” from the US missile treaty (undefined) . BBC(February 15, 2007). Archived from the original on February 20, 2012.
- Vladimir Solovyov. Intelligence in words // The United States asked Russia to hold back its missiles (undefined) . Kommersant(February 17, 2007). Archived from the original on February 20, 2012.
- Denis Zhukov; Olga Sokolik. Russia gave an “asymmetrical” response (undefined) . RBC daily(February 20, 2007). Archived from the original on February 20, 2012.
- Russian Foreign Ministry | 03/27/2007 | Review of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation
- Obituary on the arms control regime. The price of the issue // "Kommersant", 08.12.17
- “Saving the treaty requires a more responsible approach on the part of the United States.” Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Sergei Ryabkov on threats to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty // Kommersant, 12/8/2017
- INF Treaty: On Russian claims against the United States (undefined) . Journalistic Truth (December 7, 2018). Retrieved December 10, 2018.
- The United States violated the INF Treaty on four counts (Russian). Russian newspaper. Retrieved December 6, 2018.
- Obama failed to convince Putin to agree to new nuclear cuts (Russian). RIA Novosti (June 19, 2013). Retrieved February 4, 2019.
- The INF Treaty cannot operate indefinitely, Ivanov said (Russian). RIA Novosti (June 21, 2013). Retrieved February 4, 2019.
In the mid-fifties of the last century, France began to create its own strategic nuclear forces. In 1962, it was decided to create a ground-based component of the “nuclear triad” and corresponding weapons. Soon the basic requirements for what was needed were determined and design work began. The first result of the new program was the appearance of the S-2 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). The appearance of these weapons made it possible to significantly increase the potential of nuclear forces in deterring a potential enemy.
The decision to create land-based missile systems appeared in February 1962. Its appearance was associated with the desire of official Paris to create all the necessary components of nuclear forces and get rid of the existing dependence on third countries. In addition, an additional incentive was the delay in work on submarine-launched ballistic missiles. According to the 1962 plan, in the early seventies, the first military bases with silo launchers for medium-range missiles were to appear on French territory. The number of deployed missiles on duty should have exceeded fifty. The strategic ground missile forces were to be subordinate to the command of the air force.
One of the surviving museum samples of the S-2 MRBM. Photo Rbase.new-factoria.ru
By the beginning of the sixties, French scientists and designers managed to accumulate some experience in the creation and operation of missiles of various classes. In particular, there were already some developments on the topic of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. It was planned to use the existing ideas and solutions when developing a new project. At the same time, it was necessary to create and develop some new concepts, technologies, etc. Due to the high complexity, leading industrial enterprises were involved in the work. Société nationale industrielle aérospatiale (later Aérospatiale) was appointed as the lead developer. Nord Aviation, Sud Aviation and other organizations also participated in the project.
The French industry already had some experience in creating missiles, but the development of a project for a full-fledged combat complex was associated with noticeable difficulties. Because of this, it was decided to formulate the general appearance of the rocket and the systems required for it, and then test these ideas using prototype technology demonstrators. The first version of the experimental missile, intended for certain tests, received the symbol S-112.
Work on the S-112 project continued until 1966. After development was completed, the industry produced a prototype of such a rocket. The Biscarrosse training ground, equipped with a silo launcher, was built especially for testing new weapons. It is noteworthy that this test site subsequently underwent several upgrades, thanks to which it is still in use today. In 1966, the first test launch of the S-112 product was carried out at the test site. This was the first launch of a French rocket from a silo installation.
The S-112 represented the implementation of the ideas that underlay the entire program for creating a new MRBM. It was a two-stage ballistic missile with solid fuel engines. The length of the product was 12.5 m, the diameter was 1.5 m. The launch weight reached 25 tons. An autonomous control system was used to ensure that the required course was maintained. The experimental rocket was launched from a special silo with a launch pad. The so-called gas-dynamic launch with leaving the launcher due to the thrust of the main engine.
Tail section of the first stage. Photo Rbase.new-factoria.ru
Based on the results of tests of the S-112 missile, the French industry presented an updated project for a promising weapon. In 1967, the S-01 rocket entered testing. In size and weight, it was almost no different from its predecessor, but its design used more advanced equipment. In addition, there were noticeable design improvements aimed at improving technical and operational characteristics.
The S-01 missile compared favorably with the S-112, but still could not satisfy the customer. For this reason, design work was continued. By the end of 1968, the authors of the project presented a new version of the missile system with the symbol S-02. In December, the first launch of the experimental S-02 rocket took place. Over the next few years, 12 more prototype rockets were used. As the tests were carried out, the design was refined, the identified deficiencies were corrected and the main characteristics were improved. In the later stages of testing, the S-02 project was renamed S-2. It was under this name that the missile was put into service and put into mass production.
To fulfill the requirements, it was proposed to build the rocket according to a two-stage design and equip it with solid fuel engines. All this had a corresponding impact on the design of the main units of the product. The S-02 / S-2 rocket was a product with a total length of 14.8 m with a cylindrical body of large elongation. The rocket's head fairing, which served as the body of the warhead, received a complex shape formed by two conical and one cylindrical surface. The tail section of the first stage had aerodynamic stabilizers.
Diagram of a silo launcher. Figure Capcomespace.net
The housings of both stages, which also served as engine housings, were made of a light and heat-resistant steel alloy. The wall thickness varied from 8 to 18 mm. The outside of the body had an additional coating that protected it from the effects of hot gases during launch. Also, this coating was supposed to improve protection from the damaging factors of enemy nuclear weapons used against a silo installation with an S-2 missile.
The first stage of the rocket, which had its own designation SEP 902, was a cylindrical block with a diameter of 1.5 m and a length of 6.9 m. There were fixed aerodynamic stabilizers at the rear of the body. The tail bottom had holes for installing four nozzles. The dead weight of the first stage structure was 2.7 tons. Most of the internal space was filled with a solid fuel charge of the Izolan 29/9 type weighing 16 tons. The charge was made by casting and fastened to the engine body. The P16 solid propellant engine, which was part of the first stage design, had four conical nozzles made of a heat-resistant alloy. To control roll, pitch and yaw, the nozzles could deviate from their initial position according to commands from the guidance system. A 16-ton charge of solid fuel allowed the engine to operate for 77 seconds.
The second stage or SP 903 was similar to the SP 902 product, but differed in its smaller size and different equipment, as well as the presence of an instrument compartment. With a diameter of 1.5 m, the second stage had a length of only 5.2 m. The stage design weighed 1 ton, the fuel charge accounted for 10 tons. The nozzle apparatus and control systems of the second stage were similar to those used on the first. There were also counterthrust nozzles used when releasing the warhead. 10 tons of fuel provided 53 seconds of operation of the P10 engine. A cylindrical housing of the instrument compartment was attached to the head of the second stage, containing all the necessary equipment for control in flight.
The two stages were connected to each other using a special adapter, which included power elements and a cylindrical casing. The stages were separated using pre-pressurization of the interstage compartment and an extended pyrocharge. The latter was supposed to destroy the adapter, and the increased pressure facilitated this process, also simplifying the divergence of the separated stages.
General view of the launch complex. Photo Network54.com
The S-2 MRBM received an autonomous inertial guidance system, standard for such weapons of its time. A set of gyroscopes and special sensors located in the instrument compartment of the second stage were supposed to monitor changes in the position of the rocket, determining its trajectory. When moving away from the required trajectory, the computing device had to generate commands for the steering gears that control the rotation of the nozzles. The aerodynamic stabilizers of the first stage were installed rigidly and were not used in the control system. The automation was also responsible for separating the stages at a given point in time and resetting the warhead. The control system worked only on the active part of the trajectory.
A special warhead of the MR 31 type was developed for the S-2 missile. It had a nuclear charge with a power of 120 kt and a mass of 700 kg. A detonation system was used to ensure that the warhead was triggered upon contact with the ground or at a given height. The warhead was housed in its own complex-shaped housing and was equipped with ablative protection against temperature loads. The project did not provide for an additional fairing covering the warhead.
The S-2 rocket had a length of 14.8 m and a body diameter of 1.5 m. The span of the tail stabilizers reached 2.62 m. The launch weight was 31.9 tons. Solid fuel engines of two stages made it possible to send a detachable warhead to a range of up to 3000 km. The circular probable deviation was 1 km. During the flight, the rocket rose to a height of up to 600 km.
A silo launcher was developed specifically for the new medium-range missile. This complex was a structure made of reinforced concrete with a height of about 24 m. On the surface there were only a concrete platform at the head of the shaft and a movable cover 1.4 m thick and weighing 140 tons. To service the rocket or launch complex, the cover could be opened hydraulically. In combat use, a powder pressure accumulator was used for this purpose. The main unit of the silo installation was a cylindrical channel for mounting the rocket. The complex also included an elevator shaft and some other blocks. The design of the launcher provided a fairly high level of protection against an enemy nuclear attack.
The head part of a rocket located in the launcher. Photo Network54.com
In the combat-ready position, the rocket's tail section rested on a ring-shaped launch pad. The table was held in place using a system of cables, blocks and hydraulic jacks, which were responsible for moving and leveling it. The central part of the rocket was additionally supported by several annular units, which also served as platforms for placing technicians during maintenance. To access the sites, there were several passages connecting the central volume of the launcher with the elevator shaft.
When deploying serial missile systems, silo launchers were built at a distance of about 400 m from each other and connected to command posts. Each command post, using multiple redundant communications, could control nine launchers. To protect against enemy attacks, the command post was located at great depth and had shock absorption means. A duty crew of two officers had to monitor the status of the missiles and control their launch.
It was proposed to store the S-2 missiles disassembled, with each unit located in a separate sealed container. To store containers with steps and warheads, special underground warehouses had to be built. Before placing the rocket on duty, containers with two stages had to be sent for assembly. Next, the rocket without a warhead was sent to the silo and loaded into it. Only after this could it be equipped with a warhead, transported separately. Then the shaft lid was closed, and control passed to the officers on duty.
In accordance with the plans of 1962, up to 54 new type MRBMs were to be present on combat duty at the same time. Even before the completion of work on creating the required weapons, it was decided to reduce the number of deployed missiles by half. The reasons for the reduction of missiles to 27 units were difficulties with the simultaneous production of land- and sea-based weapons. In addition, some economic difficulties began to appear, forcing plans for the production of military equipment and weapons to be reduced.
Rocket transporter. Photo Capcomespace.net
In 1967, even before testing of the S-02 missile began, construction of infrastructure and launchers began for a new unit that was to operate the promising weapon. It was proposed to deploy the missile formation on the Albion plateau. It was assumed that over the next few years, 27 silo launchers would be built, grouped into three groups of nine units each. The installations of each group had to be controlled from their own command post. In addition, it was necessary to build warehouses for storing weapons, an assembly shop and other necessary facilities. The new formation was deployed on the basis of the air base in the village of Saint-Christol. 2,000 soldiers and officers were supposed to work at the base. The unit was designated as brigade 05.200.
At the end of 1968, the program underwent another cut. It was decided to abandon the third group, leaving only two with 18 launchers. In addition, at the same time, an indication appeared to begin the development of a new medium-range missile, which in the foreseeable future was supposed to replace the S-02 / S-2. In parallel with the construction of new facilities, the industry continued testing and fine-tuning the rocket.
All necessary tests of the S-02 product were completed in 1971, after which it was put into service under the name S-2. There was also an order for the supply of serial missiles. In August of the same year, the first production S-2 MRBMs were handed over to the troops. Soon they were put on duty. The first missiles of the second group were loaded into launchers about a year later. In September 1973, the first tests of the production rocket took place. It is noteworthy that the first combat training launch of the serial S-2 was carried out not at the missile base of the armed forces, but at the Biscarrosse training ground.
Over the next few years, the missile formation, subordinate to the Air Force command, conducted five more training launches, during which they practiced working when receiving an order, and also studied the features of the missiles. In addition, the crews on duty at the missile systems waited every day, without weekends or holidays, for orders to use their weapons, ensuring the security of the country.
Warhead transporter. Photo Capcomespace.net
Until the spring of 1978, S-2 medium-range ballistic missiles remained the only weapon of their class in service with the ground component of France's strategic nuclear forces. In April 1978, one of the groups of the 05.200 brigade, located on the Albion plateau, began receiving the latest S-3 missiles. The complete replacement of old missiles continued until the summer of 1980. After that, only new types of missiles were located in the old silo complexes. Operation of the S-2 was discontinued due to obsolescence.
The total production of S-02/S-2 missiles did not exceed several dozen. 13 missiles were assembled for testing. Another 18 products could be on duty at a time. In addition, there was a certain supply of missiles and warheads, stored separately from each other. The MR 31 warheads went into serial production in 1970 and were produced until 1980. Almost two dozen missiles were used during tests and training launches. Most of the remaining products were later disposed of as unnecessary. Only a few missiles lost their nuclear warheads and solid fuel, after which they became museum exhibits.
The S-2 MRBM was the first weapon of its class created in France. For several years, missiles of this type were on duty and could be used at any moment to strike a potential enemy. However, the S-2 project had some problems, which soon led to the development of a new missile with improved performance. As a result, since the beginning of the eighties, the ground component of the French strategic nuclear forces has completely switched to S-3 medium-range ballistic missiles.
Based on materials from sites:
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/
http://capcomespace.net/
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/
http://astronautix.com/
The Senate and House of Representatives are preparing draft laws that could lead to a violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. At the same time, both houses of the American parliament have almost nothing to do with the process of the country’s withdrawal from international agreements. The US Congress is about to pass laws that violate the INF Treaty, which was signed in 1987 by Gorbachev and Reagan. This was reported by Politico, citing an unnamed source.
The US House of Representatives, in particular, plans to demand that the military begin developing medium-range missiles, which is prohibited by the INF Treaty. The Senate, in turn, will discuss the same proposal, which could include $65 million. The House of Representatives specifically mentions that this refers to work on conventional missiles without nuclear warheads. However, the INF Treaty prohibits their creation, regardless of the warhead. Those who support the adoption of these initiatives believe that they are necessary due to the fact that Russia has already violated the treaty.
Opponents of the laws, on the contrary, are confident that this will only increase the chances of a nuclear confrontation in the context of difficult relations between Russia and the United States. The White House Office of Management and Budget criticized the initiative, saying it would tie the administration into a specific system, reducing the range of military response options. Legal experts also criticized the draft, noting that the Senate can only ratify international agreements, but only the president can withdraw from them.
A little earlier, the media reported that it was possible for the country to withdraw from the INF Treaty unilaterally. It is also worth noting that the United States has repeatedly accused the Russian side of violating the provisions of this treaty. So, in early July it was reported that the United States could introduce. If these initiatives are adopted, another round of confrontation between Russia and the United States is obvious. We should not forget that Washington had previously withdrawn from the ABM Treaty and also violated its promise to abandon NATO’s advance towards Russian borders.
It remains to be seen how Moscow can and will actually respond to such steps by American legislators. Will the still cold confrontation move into a hotter phase? Pravda.Ru talked about this with the editor-in-chief of the Arsenal of the Fatherland magazine, a member of the expert council of the board of the Military-Industrial Commission of the Russian Federation, reserve colonel Viktor Murakhovsky.
— As you know, none of the countries can unilaterally withdraw from the treaty. It turns out that if Washington withdraws from the agreement, then Russia will also have to cease its participation in it? Could this lead to an imbalance of power? Toward a new arms race?
“My personal, deep conviction is that we need to warmly support them and be the first to withdraw from this agreement. In my opinion, there won’t be any special race there. The INF Treaty was concluded in completely different geopolitical conditions when the Warsaw Pact existed. And the leadership of the Soviet Union agreed to conclude this agreement in order to push back the threat of attacks by medium-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles on the European part of the USSR.
Now this buffer does not exist in principle. Currently, ships with US cruise missiles can be located in Estonian territorial waters. And this, let me remind you, is only 150 kilometers to St. Petersburg. There are also territorial waters of Romania and Bulgaria, and territorial waters of Turkey. And from there it’s about 300 kilometers to Crimea. Our southern cities are about 300-400 kilometers away. That is, the military meaning of this agreement has completely disappeared for us.
— What did the INF Treaty establish for Russia?
— Russia has restrictions under this agreement. We cannot create missile systems that will allow us from our European territory - from the Urals or the Volga region - to threaten airfields and ports in Europe where American troops are landing from the continental United States. The Americans are already planning this. This was demonstrated during the exercises: the forces deployed by the United States are deployed through ports and airfields, for example, in the Baltic states.
— Recently, the American administration has been increasingly insistent that Russia is violating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. That is, the topic is no longer new. She has been around for several years now. So in connection with what events did Washington raise this question this time?
— As practice shows, this has practically nothing to do with geopolitical events. This is connected with domestic political events in the United States, that is, with the already well-worn story about Russia’s alleged interference in the American elections. Recently, the director of the CIA reported at congressional hearings that it turns out that the presidential elections in the United States are not the first in which Moscow interfered. This is another Russophobic element. But this time I am deeply convinced that this agreement is absolutely harmful for us at the moment. Precisely in terms of ensuring the military security of the Russian Federation.
— Can we say that Washington’s desire to denounce the INF Treaty is connected with the deployment of the American missile defense system in Europe? After all, missile defense systems can launch not only missiles aimed at repelling a threat from the air, but also weapons for a first ground strike?
“The NK-41 universal launchers are located there, which can be equipped with both cruise missiles and anti-missiles. What's surprising here? They don't report anything, they say there's nothing to worry about. But this is not the fact. The treaty limits the deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles. Well, what difference does it make now if they have one nuclear boat carrying 164 of these missiles? It will sail to Estonia, land in territorial waters, and 164 missiles will strike St. Petersburg, which will arrive there in 20 minutes. And what? What does this have to do with the agreement?
— How can Russia respond?
“The fact of the matter is that, due to the restrictions under this agreement, we cannot respond with what we could. If we leave the treaty and return to the Soviet development of a medium-range missile, we will just get the weapons with which we can attack ports not only in Estonia, but in Western Europe from the Urals or the Volga region (given that the Americans will there to transfer their missile launchers to Europe). Already, a US Air Force duty unit of 4 aircraft is based at the Amari airfield in Estonia. Their flight to St. Petersburg is 20 minutes.
At the same time, 5-6 brigades of medium-range missiles in the European part of the Russian Federation will be able, even without the use of nuclear weapons, to cover all the key points of the military infrastructure that NATO has prepared for a war with Russia. They continue to do this in countries that have recently joined NATO. What do you think, they are only conducting exercises there? No, they store weapons and ammunition there. Why do they store it? Yes, because it’s easier for them to then transfer US soldiers by plane, and in two hours they have ready formations, an offensive group.
The same thing happens in other countries. The Americans are already deploying missile defense systems in Romania and Poland. That is, the Americans have everything ready. Their carriers of sea-based cruise missiles float 150 kilometers from St. Petersburg, 200 kilometers from Crimea. What should they start with? They have everything. They have over three thousand cruise missiles on these naval carriers. So I repeat once again: it will be more profitable for Russia to withdraw from this INF treaty.
Interviewed by Lada KOROTUN